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“Social Welfare” offers, for the first time, a wide-ranging, internationally-focused 
selection of cutting-edge work from leading academics. Its interdisciplinary approach 
and comparative perspective promote examination of the most pressing social welfare 
issues of the day. The book is divided in three sections. The first part aims to clarify 
some of the ambiguity around the term and discusses the pros and cons of 
privatization; the second part presents a range of social welfare paradoxes and 
innovations; and the third section establishes a clear set of economic frameworks with 
which to understand the conditions under which the change in social welfare can be 
obtained.  
Section One: Idealization and Privatization 
Drawing on the work of Hegel, Alexander and others, Laratta’s opening chapter takes 
us into the extreme difficulties posed by the concept of civil society which exists in an 
uneasy relationship with the concept of Social Welfare. Indeed, the history of civil 
society in many countries is not one of self-organization and/or anti-statism as it is 
often described by contemporary civil society scholars, but it is largely a history of 
how social welfare provision was organized in a traditionally class-based society. 
Laratta argues that many contemporary civil society scholars, in idealizing the sphere 
of civil society over the spheres of market and state, tend to see their theories as 
inheriting and understanding the “classical political theory” on civil society. However, 
when we look more closely we find that the use of the concept of civil society in 
Enlightenment thought is sometimes significantly different from its use in 
contemporary civil society theorizing- even though the latter speaks in the name of the 
former. For Hegel civil society was first characterized as a “System of Needs” in which 
labour represents the moving principle through which people create those things that 
others need while satisfying their own needs through exchange. However, with the 
production of commodities and knowledge –with the latter being a consequence of the 
former - persons in civil society (market) become related to each other exclusively 
because they are dependent on them (PR 183). This articulates a virtuous circle which 
leads to inequalities in civil society in terms of rich and poor. This was the vision of 
civil society at the beginning of the 19th century, prior to the rise of modern capitalism. 
As has been pointed out by Whelan (2000), “both revolutionary and evolutionary 
forms of socialism were a response to this emerging political economy in the mid-19th 
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century. Fear of revolution ultimately led to the rise of the welfare state from the late 
19th century in order to ameliorate the harsh conditions brought on by modern 
capitalism” (13). The state was thought to provide a variety of solutions to the problem 
of inequalities which could not be resolved through the market (ibid.). Thus, the 
central idea in Classical Political Theory was that the state has the important function 
“to protect the individual from the markets and other powerful group interests in civil 
society” (ibid, 12). In contemporary civil society theorizing, the central idea becomes 
that of civil society protecting individuals against the unmitigated power of the state 
(Gellner, 1994). This contributed a lot to the introduction by many governments of a 
‘neo-liberal’ policy which reduced the role of the state as main provider of social 
services and promoted the application of the new public management mechanisms 
evidently inspired by the models adopted in the private sector (Minogue, 1998). In this 
new environment, private organisations, which had previously been seen as fulfilling 
the demand for social services which the state did not provide, now clearly abandoned 
this role in favour of a more dominant one in which they were left to cope with the 
whole burden of social services provision (Young, 2000; Pavolini, 2003).  
In the second chapter, Kallianiotis shows how in the last 30 years privatization has 
become the only trend, even though that has become economically and politically 
disruptive. He argues forcibly that privatization has contributed further to the 
weakening of the public sector, since public assets have been sold at very low prices 
that did not even compensate for the loss of future revenue from these companies. 
This failure of privatisation had already been anticipated by some scholars, for 
example Walzer (1988). In a discussion about the relationship between the 
‘nationalized distribution of welfare services and socialized distribution of welfare 
services’, he noted that the crucial matter was to hold them both in balance, but he also 
pointed out that this requires neither the removal nor replacement of the state (Walzer, 
1988: 17). He claimed that the replacement of the state would be a utopian project only 
and one unlikely in fact to strengthen the private organizations because these need the 
state ‘to defend them against their own divisiveness, to protect them when they are 
alone and helpless, to enforce universal standards of care and safety’ (Walzer, 1988: 
18). On the following page of the same paper, Walzer (1988: 18) reached an important 
conclusion when he said that: …when welfare is delivered socially rather than 
nationally, citizens receive a different and unequal kind of welfare… The claims of 
particularity are represented by social authority, that is, by men and women closely 
connected to a particular place or regularly attentive to the interests and aspirations of 
a particular group. For this reason, socialised distribution is bound to be different in 
different places, reflecting the decisions of many different committees. And ‘different’ 
here necessarily means unequal. Some committees function better than others because 
they tax their members more heavily, spend their money more wisely, choose to 
provide these services rather than those. Years later, Fine (1997) made a similar point 
when he claimed, using Hegelian language, that the end of civil society’s mediating 
institutions (private organisations) remains restricted and finite, and they will never 
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secure the individual’s freedom because they do not abolish the differences and
inequalities in civil society but reproduce them in a different shape.
Section Two: Paradoxes and Innovations
The third chapter by Villadsen explores paradoxes in modern welfare provision, both 
by drawing upon theoretical concepts of paradoxes in modern forms of governing and
by presenting some specific case studies of paradoxical welfare. In his detailed
chapter, Villadsen examines three types of paradoxes: a) the paradox of universality;
b) the paradox of truth; and c) the paradox of power. The latter one encapsulates the
concomitant value placed on deregulation and regulation in modern welfare states. 
The problem is that welfare state wishes to facilitate the diversity of civil society, yet 
the state often resorts to planning in order to secure this diversity. In many cases,
social policies conceive of civil society as an unfathomable residual, as well as a
concrete collaborator. Paradoxically, for instance, is that when governmental
authorities seek support and revitalize agents in civil society, they at the same time
fear that this very support may infect and undermine the particular rationality of 
voluntary and grass roots organization. More formally, the problem is thus that any 
premeditated attempt to delimit authenticity undermines this very authenticity. The
fundamentally asymmetrical relations of power between state authorities and civil 
society agents are therefore sought equilibrated by means of strategies of 
‘partnerships’, ‘project-organizations’, or quality standards defined by civil society
agents themselves. 
Chapter four by O’Keeffe looks exactly at this growing importance of ‘partnerships’ 
and ‘area-based partnership organizations’ to aspect of social welfare. Those 
organizations tend to provide social welfare services as part of a suite of local 
development actions that include training and up-skilling local populations, 
supporting new enterprise development and animating the community and voluntary 
sector. Drawing on experiences in social welfare service delivery across four European
countries, this chapter examines the outputs and impacts of area-based partnerships’ 
approaches to social welfare, including the degree of innovation, the extent to which 
initiatives have become mainstreamed, and the ways in which regional and national 
policies and practices may have been amended as a result of local pilots and lessons.
The chapter also assess the limitations of area-based partnerships’ approaches, and it 
questions the significance of factors such as the lack of long-term funding streams,
shortcomings in enforcement and limited information dissemination. 
In the fifth chapter, Leonardsen Dag argues that even in countries with high standard 
of living such as Norway there is a mismatch between the type of welfare problems 
that exists and the measures applied to combat them. Today a dangerous mix of
interests has occurred between governments in search of solutions and legitimation,
and social science industry that too easily promises ‘technocratic’ solutions to what 
essentially is a political problem. In Norway, as in many other countries, politicians 
are searching for what they call ‘evidence-based’ documentation that can tell them in a 
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century. Fear of revolution ultimately led to the rise of the welfare state from the late 
19th century in order to ameliorate the harsh conditions brought on by modern
capitalism” (13). The state was thought to provide a variety of solutions to the problem 
of inequalities which could not be resolved through the market (ibid.). Thus, the 
central idea in Classical Political Theory was that the state has the important function 
“to protect the individual from the markets and other powerful group interests in civil 
society” (ibid, 12). In contemporary civil society theorizing, the central idea becomes 
that of civil society protecting individuals against the unmitigated power of the state 
(Gellner, 1994). This contributed a lot to the introduction by many governments of a
‘neo-liberal’ policy which reduced the role of the state as main provider of social
services and promoted the application of the new public management mechanisms
evidently inspired by the models adopted in the private sector (Minogue, 1998). In this 
new environment, private organisations, which had previously been seen as fulfilling
the demand for social services which the state did not provide, now clearly abandoned
this role in favour of a more dominant one in which they were left to cope with the 
whole burden of social services provision (Young, 2000; Pavolini, 2003). 
In the second chapter, Kallianiotis shows how in the last 30 years privatization has
become the only trend, even though that has become economically and politically
disruptive. He argues forcibly that privatization has contributed further to the 
weakening of the public sector, since public assets have been sold at very low prices
that did not even compensate for the loss of future revenue from these companies. 
This failure of privatisation had already been anticipated by some scholars, for
example Walzer (1988). In a discussion about the relationship between the
‘nationalized distribution of welfare services and socialized distribution of welfare
services’, he noted that the crucial matter was to hold them both in balance, but he also
pointed out that this requires neither the removal nor replacement of the state (Walzer, 
1988: 17). He claimed that the replacement of the state would be a utopian project only 
and one unlikely in fact to strengthen the private organizations because these need the
state ‘to defend them against their own divisiveness, to protect them when they are 
alone and helpless, to enforce universal standards of care and safety’ (Walzer, 1988: 
18). On the following page of the same paper, Walzer (1988: 18) reached an important
conclusion when he said that: …when welfare is delivered socially rather than 
nationally, citizens receive a different and unequal kind of welfare… The claims of 
particularity are represented by social authority, that is, by men and women closely 
connected to a particular place or regularly attentive to the interests and aspirations of 
a particular group. For this reason, socialised distribution is bound to be different in 
different places, reflecting the decisions of many different committees. And ‘different’ 
here necessarily means unequal. Some committees function better than others because 
they tax their members more heavily, spend their money more wisely, choose to
provide these services rather than those. Years later, Fine (1997) made a similar point 
when he claimed, using Hegelian language, that the end of civil society’s mediating 
institutions (private organisations) remains restricted and finite, and they will never
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secure the individual’s freedom because they do not abolish the differences and 
inequalities in civil society but reproduce them in a different shape.  
Section Two: Paradoxes and Innovations 
The third chapter by Villadsen explores paradoxes in modern welfare provision, both 
by drawing upon theoretical concepts of paradoxes in modern forms of governing and 
by presenting some specific case studies of paradoxical welfare. In his detailed 
chapter, Villadsen examines three types of paradoxes: a) the paradox of universality; 
b) the paradox of truth; and c) the paradox of power. The latter one encapsulates the
concomitant value placed on deregulation and regulation in modern welfare states.
The problem is that welfare state wishes to facilitate the diversity of civil society, yet
the state often resorts to planning in order to secure this diversity. In many cases,
social policies conceive of civil society as an unfathomable residual, as well as a
concrete collaborator. Paradoxically, for instance, is that when governmental
authorities seek support and revitalize agents in civil society, they at the same time
fear that this very support may infect and undermine the particular rationality of
voluntary and grass roots organization. More formally, the problem is thus that any
premeditated attempt to delimit authenticity undermines this very authenticity. The
fundamentally asymmetrical relations of power between state authorities and civil
society agents are therefore sought equilibrated by means of strategies of
‘partnerships’, ‘project-organizations’, or quality standards defined by civil society
agents themselves.
Chapter four by O’Keeffe looks exactly at this growing importance of ‘partnerships’ 
and ‘area-based partnership organizations’ to aspect of social welfare. Those 
organizations tend to provide social welfare services as part of a suite of local 
development actions that include training and up-skilling local populations, 
supporting new enterprise development and animating the community and voluntary 
sector. Drawing on experiences in social welfare service delivery across four European 
countries, this chapter examines the outputs and impacts of area-based partnerships’ 
approaches to social welfare, including the degree of innovation, the extent to which 
initiatives have become mainstreamed, and the ways in which regional and national 
policies and practices may have been amended as a result of local pilots and lessons. 
The chapter also assess the limitations of area-based partnerships’ approaches, and it 
questions the significance of factors such as the lack of long-term funding streams, 
shortcomings in enforcement and limited information dissemination. 
In the fifth chapter, Leonardsen Dag argues that even in countries with high standard 
of living such as Norway there is a mismatch between the type of welfare problems 
that exists and the measures applied to combat them. Today a dangerous mix of 
interests has occurred between governments in search of solutions and legitimation, 
and social science industry that too easily promises ‘technocratic’ solutions to what 
essentially is a political problem. In Norway, as in many other countries, politicians 
are searching for what they call ‘evidence-based’ documentation that can tell them in a 
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scientific way and with scientific certainty, what works in preventing crime, bullying, 
suicide, drug addiction etc. As problems escalate, so do calls for scientific solutions. 
The danger the author see in this is to use Herbert Marcuse’s expression ‘the 
materialization of values’. Marcuse in 1970 wrote that ‘The historical achievement of 
science and technology has rendered possible the translation of values into technical 
tasks….Consequently what is at stake is the redefinition of values in technical terms, 
as elements in technological process”. von Wright(1994) made a corresponding remark 
when warning against the illusion that more scientific techniques can protect us 
against different threats in modern society.   
In the following chapter, Underlid Kjell drawing again on the case of Norway, 
presents us with evidences that poverty is not just uneven distribution of economic-
material resources as it is often understood, but also of immaterial values, like freedom 
which is described as lack of, or inhibited, autonomy. Indeed, as argued in the opening 
chapter of this book, for Hegel “poverty is not only indigence in externals; it is also 
joined to moral degradation. The poor are subject to yet another cleavage, namely a 
cleavage of heart and mind between them and civil society. The poor man feels 
himself excluded and shunned, scorned, by everyone. This exclusion necessarily gives 
rise to an inner indignation. He is conscious of himself as infinite and free, and so there 
arises the demand that his determinate external existence should correspond to this 
consciousness. In civil society it is not a merely natural need and distress against 
which the poor man must struggle. The poor man is opposed not only by nature, by 
mere being, but also by my will. The poor man feels as if he were related to an 
arbitrary will, to human contingency, and in the last analysis, what makes him 
indignant is that he is put into this state of division through sheer arbitrariness” (PR: 
244, editorial notes1 rephrased). 
Section Three: Competition and Negotiation 
Economic theory predicts that concentration of market power leads to higher prices. 
However, higher hospital prices may signal higher quality. In Chapter 7, Schneider 
sheds light on the relationship between hospital competition and health outcomes as 
measured by risk-adjusted mortality rate that are based on the California Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft Mortality Reporting Program. The findings of this study could 
have a real impact on the current situation. Indeed, as argued by the author, during 
the past decade the hospital industry introduced profound organizational changes, 
including the extensive consolidation of hospitals through mergers and the formation 
of hospital systems. In addition, faced with falling profit margins, hospitals industry 
saw an unprecedented wave of hospital closures and loss in operative capacity (Hsia 
et al. 2011). Both trends tend to decrease the existing competitive pressures for 
hospitals in the market. However, if hospitals located in less competitive markets 
exhibit worth health outcomes, then the case for promoting competition through 
antitrust enforcement and support of failing hospitals is strengthened. Here lays the 
importance of this study.  
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The next chapter by Aguirre focuses on the effects of price discrimination under 
imperfect competition. In particular the chapter shows that under third-degree price
discrimination the seller can charge different prices to consumers who are separated
geographically or that are differentiated by age, occupation, time of purchases or by 
endues. Moving from non-discrimination to discrimination raises the firm’s profit,
harm consumers in markets where the prices increase and benefit the consumers who 
face lower prices. Consequently the overall effect on welfare is undermined. In this
chapter the author present a model which allows the welfare effects of third-degree 
price discrimination to be well understood and explained. 
Negotiation in the social welfare system is often proposed to be a solution to some of
the negative effects of competition. However, in most research in multiparty 
automated negotiation has focused on building efficient mechanisms and protocols to 
reach agreements among multiple participants, being an objective to optimize some
type of social welfare measurement without placing social welfare itself as an integral 
part of the negotiation process (Hindrinks et al., 2009). In chapter 9 of this book, 
Marsa-Maestre et al. discuss the application of heuristic nonlinear optimization 
techniques to mediated negotiations involving highly uncorrelated utility spaces, and
the effect of the different notions of social welfare in this kind of negotiations. The
authors define different metrics for social welfare which allow to address one of the
main challenges in negotiation in non-monotonic spaces: the low probability of finding
and agreement. Some of the proposed metrics increase the agreement probability at 
the cost of individual utility, while the other focus in enforcing specific consensus 
policies different from ‘classic’ social welfare.
The final chapter by Candel-Sanchez proposes a game-theoretic approach to
understand the relationship between social welfare and the emergence of a negotiation 
process. The author demonstrates that if the parties are uncertain about the threshold
under which a negotiation does take place (i.e. the cost of the public good), then the 
free rider problem is partially overcome and negotiations might emerge with positive 
probability. This view of the problem allows for a mechanism designed solution to the 
very hot issue of international conflicts over territory. 
Rosario Laratta 
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Idealization and Privatization 
Part 1 
Social Welfare:  
Idealization and Privatization 
 1 
Contemporary Civil Society Theory  
Versus Hegel’s Understanding of Civil Society 
Rosario Laratta 
Graduate School of Governance Studies, Meiji University, 
Japan 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Contemporary civil society theory 
Although contemporary literature on civil society appears as a quite heterogeneous group of 
discourses, following Mcllwaine (1997) we can separate it into two broad perspectives: the 
Neo-Liberal approach and the Neo-Marxist approach. These two approaches have been 
based on what Magatti (2005) identifies as a “New-Triadic Model For Development” in 
which civil society has been posited as a third sector alongside with the first sector, or state, 
and the second sector, or Market. Advocates of this Triadic Model generally define civil 
society in an exclusionary way- it is neither state nor market. The model is neutral, so far as 
it neither really problematizes the relationship of civil society to the market nor does it allow 
for civil society to say what kind of state is needed, but it praises civil society as an 
autonomous space of positive freedom in opposition to the other two sectors. As has been 
pointed out by Gordenker and Weiss (1996), “although recognizing the legitimacy of each 
sector of society, this view tends to glorify civil society at the expense of states and markets. 
Individuals in civil society are portrayed as vanguards of the just society, as ‘princes’ and 
‘merchants’ strive to dominate or to make profits”(19). Maybe one of the scholars who best 
captures the idealized essence of civil society in the contemporary literature is Fisher (1997). 
He says that “the optimism of the proponents of the Triadic Model derives from a general 
sense of goodness attributed to civil society, unencumbered and untainted by the politics of 
government or the greed of the market…civil society is idealized as the place in which 
people help others for reasons other than profit or politics.”(Fisher, 1997: 442). From here, 
the warns of some scholars against the anti-political tendencies which commonly 
accompany the celebration of civil society (see, Walzer, 1995).  
1.1.1 The Neo-Liberal perspective 
We can find the origin of the Neo-Liberal approach in the period that runs from the late 
1970s onwards and through the 1980s when -as further discussed in Section III below- a 
culture of deregulation and privatization was pushed forward. This culture was peppered 
throughout by a notion of failed state, or a decrease in the importance of the state and a 
belief that a liberal economy creates a condition wherein a civil society of associations 
autonomous from the state can flourish (Fisher, 1997). The proponents of this new 
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perspective see an expansive civil society as the unleashing of an entrepreneurial initiative 
that will work towards the stated ideal market order (MacLean, 1996). This neo-liberal 
approach was disseminated throughout the 1990s in a new version, named Social 
Responsible Capitalism, in which civil society was extolled as an emerging way of resolving 
the contradictions and tensions of capitalism and, in particular, its “atomizing, 
unequalizing, and exclusionary effect”(Howell and Pearce, 2001: 47). This new approach 
argued that civil society offers more and better services than the state and, at the same time, 
maintains the stability and reproduction of a market economy by alleviating the 
socioeconomic inequalities created and aggravated by the market. Civil society, in this new 
perspective, became an alternative regulatory means to the state and market. As Fisher 
(1997) eloquently states, the supporters of this perspective see civil society “as everything 
that governments are not: unburdened with large bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open 
to innovation, more effective and faster at implementing development efforts, and able to 
identify and respond to grass-roots needs.”(442). Thus, while the (Neo)-Liberal discourse led 
in practice to the adoption of the New Public Management, in which the contracting-out 
culture was both a consequence and predominant feature, the Social Responsible Capitalism 
discourse has prompted partnerships and alliances based on the notions of trust and social 
capital.  
1.1.2 The Neo-Marxist perspective 
The Neo-Marxist approach, drawing mainly on Gramsci and Marx, shares with Social 
Responsible Capitalism the recognition of the inequalities brought in by the market and, 
though they recognize the state as a separated sphere of society which follows a different 
and autonomous logic- a logic of collective regulation of social life- they still see this as 
inherently subject to a bureaucratic rationality characterized by coercion and domination 
(Thrived et al, 1996). However, as has been pointed out by Hyden (1997), the Neo-Marxist 
approach differs from the previous school of thought in that it suggests that the ability of 
individuals to organize and participate in governance issues is related to socioeconomic 
status, and therefore that policymaking is usually the preserve of a select minority with 
resources. The advocates of this approach support the idea that only the emergence of 
strong social movements, capable of challenging the unmitigated power structures of 
society, can provide hope for a more fundamental change. A lot of literature on new social 
movements in the 1980s, and not least Eastern Europe literature on ‘anti-politics’, has been 
based exactly on this approach. Civil society was at all times defined as dominated by the 
‘Horrible-State’ and consequently as the rag-bag for everything which does not belong to the 
state. In the 1970s writers such as Alvin Gouldener and Agnes Heller expressed a very 
strong anti-Leninist/ anti-statist perspective. Heller (1978) warned: “where there is a state, 
the public and private spheres can be unified only at the cost of tyranny. Whoever wants to 
avoid tyranny has to reconsider what kind of relations have to exist between state and civil 
society.” (882). In this way, the protest of many people interrogating states and asking for an 
end to abuse of power in 1989 in eastern Europe, and later in other countries, was read as 
the battle of civil society against the Leviathan-state and its attempt to redefine a civil 
society’s pole parallel to that of the state. As has been pointed out by Frankel (1983), people 
discussed the Solidarity Movement in terms of ‘Civil Society’ reconstituting itself, of a new 
‘social contract’ which ‘the state’ had not been able to dissolve in previous decades.  
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The Neo-Marxist approach, as the previous one, sees in civil society the potential for making 
“the impossible possible by doing what governments cannot or will not”(Simmons, 1998: 
87). Civil society, in this view, will not only oppose egotistic behaviour, derived from the 
market’s logic, an ethical behavior of solidarity, but it will also prevent society from being 
dominated by the power of the state. The conclusive synthesis of those two approaches is 
best captured in one of the contemporary civil society theory’s major exponents, Ernest 
Gellner. He refers to civil society as a “set of nongovernmental institutions, which is strong 
enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its 
role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can, nevertheless, prevent the 
state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (Gellner, 1994: 5).  
1.2 The ‘New Triadic Model’ from Habermas to Alexander through Civil Society and 
Political Theory (J.Cohen and A. Arato). 
1.2.1 The Habermasian Model. 
Habermas, in his work on the public sphere, attempts to deal with its many meanings by 
analyzing the way in which it has evolved. The public sphere was seen as an institutionally-
organized space where public opinion manifested itself. Standing between the private 
organization of material production and private social life on the one hand, and the 
organizational form of the state institutions on the other hand, the early bourgeois public 
sphere mediated the relationship between the state and civil society without being 
equivalent to either.  
 
Fig. 1. 
The public sphere formed an arena where criticism could be expressed, debate held, and 
through the exchange of views in this context, public opinion formed. This public opinion 
would control how civil society was organized and regulated. It would possibly also curb 
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bourgeois public sphere expanded and lost its cohesion as conflicts, formerly driven back 
into the private realm, began to appear. Thus, new systems of action were put in place, 
conflicts of interest that were previously settled in the private sphere became political. State 
intervention increased more and more. At this point, according to Habermas, the relations 
originally rooted in the private realm between the public and the private spheres began to 
disappear. These spheres became progressively intermeshed and “a depoliticized social 
sphere originated that could not be subsumed under the categories of public and private 
from either a sociological or a legal perspective. In this intermediate sphere the sector of 
society that had been absorbed by the state, and the sectors of the state that had been taken 
over by society, intermeshed without involving any rational-critical political debate on the 
part of private people” (Habermas, 1989: 176). Thus “the process of the politically relevant 
exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between the private 
bureaucracies, special interest associations, parties, and public administration” (ibid.:176). 
These transformations lead Habermas to reconsider his previous analysis of ‘public sphere’. 
This time he linked together two kinds of approaches: the interpretative sociology based on 
internal perspectives of a participant, so that society could be conceptualized as ‘lifeworld’, 
and the systems theory based on the external perspective of an observer, so that society 
could be conceptualized as ‘system’. (See Figure 2.) 
According to Habermas, transformations have given rise to a differentiation between the 
lifeworld’s sphere and the system’s sphere. As has been pointed out in Sales’s interpretation 
of Habermas, “the sphere of lifeworld and the sphere of the system have themselves become 
quasi-autonomous subsystems in spite of their high degree of interconnection” (Sale, 1991: 
305). The private sphere and public sphere became the institutional level of both lifeworld 
and the system. In fact, on the one hand, in the lifeworld, the private remains the family 
with its role of specialization and the public became the communicative network, which 
dominates the production of culture and public opinion. However, on the other hand, in the 
system, the modern state apparatus remains the public sphere with its formally organized, 
bureaucratically structured administration and the point where political power is 
institutionalized, while the private is represented by the capitalist market economy. Despite 
this, Habermas recognized that the dynamics of capitalist growth have brought about an 
increasing complexity of subsystems with a ‘colonization of the lifeworld’ in which the 
public sphere is “undermined and eroded by the administrative system” (Habermas, 1987: 
2:325). Large enterprise economies and authoritarian states are seen by Habermas (1987) as 
systems of influence which led to a “repressive integration” with monetarization and 
bureaucratization (2: 391). From here the search for an escape from ‘the colonization of the 
lifeworld’, from this pessimistic turn which denounces alienation but which did not see 
solution to it. Habermas (1987) sees in what he calls “new frictional surfaces”, which are 
frequently emerging across the terrain of civil society, the desire and potential for opening 
up opportunities for citizens’ participation, and consequently the way out from the 
colonization of the lifeworld (357). In other words, Habermas perceives emerging civil 
society organizations as offering an appropriate basis within which a communicatively 
structured public sphere could be reinvigorated. Habermas’ appraisal of Cohen and Arato’s 
works: in 1987 Habermas saw in the work of Cohen and Arato (1986), Civil Society and Social 
Theory, an excellent piece of writing and in 1997 he described the same authors’ 1992 work, 
Civil Society and Political Theory, as “the most comprehensive study on this topic”  
(Habermas, 1997: 367). Actually, if we look closely at Cohen and Arato’s works we find an  
 





implicit adherence to Habermas’ “reconstruction of historical materialism” through the 
distinction between the system and the lifeworld (Fine, 1997). In these authors, as well as in 
Habermas, both these spheres are conceptualized as limited spheres of social life and the 
only way of avoiding this which they recognized is a Triadic Model in which civil society 
becomes glorified as the only autonomous sphere of freedom ready to balance and 
counterbalance the other two spheres of social alienation. In proposing this Triadic Model, 
Cohen and Arato (1992) saw Hegel as the “precursor” of civil society theory (301) because 
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conformism take place in civil society. They claimed, in their own way, how it was with the 
German theorist that civil society can gain a more realistic and complex understanding of 
the legal, institutional and cultural independence in respect to the other two spheres – state 
and market. By highlighting this, they pointed to the way in which Marx - in reading Hegel’ 
s concept of civil society exclusively as the system of needs- actually misread Hegel. At the 
same time, they also criticized Hegel for having conceptualized a two- sphere model 
(market and state), rather than a three-sphere model (market- civil society- state) on which 
Marx’s misreading of Hegel was funded. This criticism of Hegel also led them to argue 
against Arendt and Foucault and to appraise Parsons as Hegel’s successor. Arendt saw the 
growing centrality of economic life as a danger to modern society because it subordinates 
freedom of morality, which is inspired by political praxis, to the world of necessity and 
consequently marking the death of politics and public life. Cohen and Arato (1992) were 
decisively against this view, which they saw as underestimating the value of social 
movements which Habermas proposed as the solution to the colonization of the lifeworld. 
They also criticized Foucault’s view for exaggerating the “omnipresence of power and its 
monopoly on rational truth”(Alexander, 1993: 797). Foucault’s argument was that the state, 
by generating rules and policies, exercises its important function of surveillance on society; 
such a view was seen by Cohen and Arato (1992) as reductive because it did not take into 
consideration the influence of social movements on the unmitigated power of the state. On 
the other hand, Cohen and Arato (1992) saw in Parson’s societal community the mediation 
which they were looking for, a differentiated and autonomous sphere which is based on 
persuasion rather than money and power and which allows inclusion on the basis of 
institutional values and universal rights. However, they also found in Parsons the weakness 
of having presented the positive relationships which take place between, respectively, the 
societal community and the state, and the societal community and the market, without 
presenting the possible and obvious conflicts and tensions which usual accompany those 
relationships. 
1.2.2 Alexander’s alternative model 
According to Alexander (1993), Cohen and Arato’s model, following Habermas’ substantive 
theoretical ideas, “presents a highly idealized and rationalistic understanding of good (i.e., 
civil) society” which failed in two principal respects (800). First, it misunderstood the 
discourse of civil society by limiting it to the sphere of ‘voluntary action’ where the 
conscious, the rational and the solidaristic characters prevail. This way of understanding the 
sphere of civil society, according to Alexander (1993), led Cohen and Arato (1992) to see the 
bad and irrational as the results of external political and economic manipulations and 
therefore civil society as the sphere of normative integration which provides the alternative 
to the inevitable evils of economical and political life. Second, Cohen and Arato’s model 
misunderstood “the structure and processes which constitute the civil sphere” (Alexander, 
1993: 801). According to Alexander (1993), on Piagetian grounds, Cohen and Arato (1992) 
argued that the individual increasingly becomes able “to engage in rational, impersonal, and 
altruistic moral judgments”, while on general evolutionary grounds, they tried to justify 
how those qualities of “rationality and universal morality” characterize the modern “life 
world”; however, by doing thus, they failed to theorize solidarity realistically (801-802). 
Alexander (1993) claims that “While universalism and inclusion certainly are 
 
Contemporary Civil Society Theory Versus Hegel’s Understanding of Civil Society 
 
9 
institutionalized commitments in democratic (and many non - democratic) societies, 
primordiality and exclusion are fundamental parts of these societies as well” (802) and, later 
in the same paper, he adds that “ national solidarities become democratic to the degree that 
these primordialities, and the groups that represent them, are mediated by universalistic 
culture, differentiated institutions, cosmopolitan interest groups, and civil interactions” 
(ibid). In other words, what Alexander (1993) recognized is that the ‘bad’ and ‘irrational’ -
uncivil solidarity- are internal categories to the discourse of civil society and not necessarily 
the results of outside economic and politic manipulations. Cohen and Arato, according to 
Alexander (1993), failed to recognize the evil within civil society and they viewed the 
dangers to contemporary societies as emerging, exclusively from the colonization of the civil 
by the other two spheres, market and state, defined as domains of social alienation. As 
Alexander points out,  
“In historical terms, it has often been market exchange and political bureaucracy that have 
promoted universal solidarity rather than the other way around…. If economic and political 
pressures were the only dangers to an inclusive and democratic civil society, there would be 
much less dangerous conflict in the world today. The emergence of an independent solitary 
sphere is not only the solution but also the problem, for there are internal contradictions within 
civil society itself.” (802).  
This new way of conceptualizing the civil and the uncivil within the sphere of society, led 
Alexander to propose an alternative model to the one previously proposed by Cohen and 
Arato. The first big difference which Alexander’s model makes, compared to the one 
postulated by Cohen and Arato, refers to the way in which Market and State are 
conceptualized. Whereas, for Cohen and Arato, market exclusively implies a logic of 
egotism and atomistic behavior, and the state is conceptualized as consisting of bureaucratic 
organization and power relations, thus civil society appears to be the only sphere which 
involves direct relations of solidarity; for Alexander, market and state are themselves 
spheres filled with norms and values, structured by extended solidarities and connected to 
norms of justice. Alexander (1997), following Walzer (1983), claims that market and state 
have imminent moral structures of their own - they are spheres of justice in their own right. 
However, these non civil spheres, which he calls ‘other regimes of justification’, “differ in 
fundamental ways from justifications by reference to the ‘common good’, the criteria that 
most approximate the criteria of civil society itself” (128). In other words, the economic and 
political involvements with solidarity, according to Alexander, do not necessarily refer to 
civil concerns, but to orientations that are specifically economic and political. In this way, 
Alexander comes to justify his own triadic model, which although it partially differs from 
that postulated by Cohen and Arato for it recognizes the market and state as moral 
structures filled by norms and values and not just as spheres of social alienations, as the 
previous one. Furthermore, it still cannot find ways to see that what it recognizes as the 
‘civil’ within the civil society sphere is, in actual fact, the ‘moral structures’ in which, as it 
rightly noted, the determinations of the commodity-form of the market realize themselves. 
However, Alexander (2001) admits that it is this lack of connection between the moral 
structures of market and the civil values of civil society, or on the other side of the coin, 
between failure to achieve distinction in the economic realm and failure to sustain 
expectations in civil society, that an independent civil realm is continuously constructed. 
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institutionalized commitments in democratic (and many non - democratic) societies, 
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“if you are poor, you are often thought to be irrational, dependent, and lazy, not only in the 
economy but in society as such. The relative asymmetry of resources that is inherent in economic 
life, in other words, becomes translated into projections about civil competence and 
incompetence. It is often difficult for actors without economic achievement or wealth to 
communicate effectively in the civil sphere, to receive full respect from its regulatory 
institutions, and to interact with others.” (24).  
It is from this argument that Alexander (2001) comes to defend the idea of a civil society’s 
sphere, independent from the market. Unsuccessful or dominated members of the capitalist 
economy, thanks to the existence of the independent force of civil society, become able to 
make claims for respect and power (ibid). Alexander (2001) says that, “On the basis of the 
implied universalism of solidarity in civil society, moreover, they (members of the capitalist 
economy) believe these claims should find response.”(25). Thus, according to Alexander 
(2001), underprivileged actors organize social movements demanding economic justice 
through its networks, create voluntary organizations that demand fairness, winning 
concessions in face-to-face negotiations with economic institutions, forcing the state to 
intervene in economic life on their behalf, and so on. At this point of his argument, we can 
see a sort of rethinking in Alexander. In fact, he says that “while these efforts at repairs often 
fail, they often succeed in institutionalizing ‘workers’ rights’” and he adds, in the same 
paper that,  
“In this situation, civil criteria might be said to have entered directly into the economic capitalist 
sphere. Dangerous working conditions are prohibited, discrimination in labor markets is 
outlawed, unemployment is controlled and humanized, and wealth itself is redistributed 
according to criteria that are antithetical to those of a strictly economic kind. ” (25).  
Alexander (2001) claims that, in order to recognize those extraordinary achievements, the 
sphere of capitalism and that of civil society should be analytically separated. However, he 
notes that this analytical separation comports a “relative autonomy” of the civil society 
sphere which, though it will allow the recognition of the highly effective repairs that this 
sphere makes to the other social spheres. At the same time, it will manifest itself in highly 
destructive interpenetrations. From here, comes Alexander’s claim: “civil society is a 
utopian ideal that has never been fully realized in any actually existing social system, and 
never will be.” (Alexander, 2001: 22). Thus, in Alexander’ model we find a better 
theorization of the economy, compared with Cohen and Arato’s model but there is still a 
lack of a theorization of the state which could have helped him to resolve what he finally 
come to see as the utopian ideal of civil society.  
In the next part of this section, we will see how, for Hegel, civil society’s mediation 
institutions represent forms of ‘relative universality’ which prepare the terrain for the 
transition to the concrete mode of existence of the universal in modern society, which is the 
state. Now, whereas the state as a mediating institution- and similar to the ones placed in 
civil society- is not an absolute overcoming of the contradictions which derive from the 
development of commodity-form (and this can be the reason why Hegel introduced the 
notion of World History), the contemporary civil society theory does not seek a solution to 
‘fix’ the state (actually, there is no explicit theorization of the state at all), but seeks the 
establishment of alternative institutions on which they can place their hopes for a state that 
works. However, as Van Rooy (1998) claims, the danger which Hegel acknowledged was 
that the civil society mediating institution -as an alternative to the state- carries with it no 
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guarantee of moral behavior or service for the common good; these guarantees only found 
their way into the ethical law of the state. 
1.3 Hegelian analysis of civil society 
While scholars of contemporary civil society theory come either to acknowledge civil society 
as the creation of a previous non-existent free space, or to extol the concept of civil society as 
a pure space of positive freedom in opposition to the reified economic and political 
functional systems, the Hegelian system definitely contrasts with those views. Nevertheless, 
before starting to analysis the concept of civil society as found in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 
it is necessary to say a few words about the main reason which led Hegel to analyse this 
concept and his dialectical logic.  
The question which constitutes the foundation of Hegel’s analysis is : What makes the real 
rational? But what is real is, for Hegel, already rational. From a social theory point of view, 
Hegel was not trying to establish a rational social order (or create any alternative to the 
already existing one), but rather to find what makes rational the social order that is already 
rational and therefore real. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right tells us that what makes the rational 
social order rational is ‘freedom’ or self-determination. However, in Hegel this concept of self 
determination is an extended one. In fact, it does not mean that an entity is free when it is 
determined by ‘itself’ rather than determined by an ‘other’, which would automatically 
imply self-sufficiency, independence, and self-realization. On the contrary, Hegel’s 
metaphysical doctrine teaches us that every being can be determined only in relation to 
some other. Thus, self-determination or freedom, in Hegel, means ‘being-with-oneself-in-an-
other’ which, although it seems difficult to accept as rational, is proved to be real (and 
therefore rational) in the case of ‘love’, for instance, where, through an act of conscious 
identification with the needs and good of another, the self ceases to see the demands of the 
other as self-limiting. In the Philosophy of Right, however, this configuration of freedom, 
which seems to have a very intellectual character, assumes a more practical aspect since it is 
a phenomenon of the will, realized through actions of engagement with the existing world. 
The Philosophy of Right is divided into three sections: Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical 
Life; each section is grounded on a particular form of practical freedom so that we have, 
respectively, a personal freedom, a moral freedom, and a social freedom. One of the main 
Hegelian claims is that, in the social institutions of ethical life (family, civil society, and 
state), freedom is. Therefore, those social institutions are examined by Hegel not because 
they provide the social conditions which make freedom possible, but because they actualize 
freedom by making real and secure those conditions that make it possible for their members 
to realize personal and moral freedom. Thus, we can say that, contrary to many scholars of 
contemporary civil society theory, Hegel is not in search of freedom, but he is trying to 
understand ‘freedom’.  
A second point which should be made clear, before we actually start to examine Hegel’s 
concept of civil society, is that, in his Philosophy of Right, civil society is conceptualized in 
double relation towards the family-which is seen as something which civil society 
transcends- and the state-which is seen as a political sphere transcending civil society. Kainz 
(1974), by focusing on Hegel’s dialectical logic, tries to make the Hegelian reader understand 
that in the Philosophy of Right there is a kind of continuity between what is presented as the 
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that, if we call the original presupposition of a person “the thesis”, the opposing viewpoint 
of another person “the antithesis”, and the compromised agreement “the synthesis”, we can 
think of the thesis as a starting point in life, the antithesis as some obstacles which intervene 
during the course of life, and finally the synthesis as a way of surviving the obstacles 
without being destroyed (ibid.: 1974). Keeping this configuration in mind, we can think of 
the Philosophy of Right as having the aim of presenting the three moments mentioned above: 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The thesis is presented in the introduction where Hegel 
analyses the moments of the will, the absolute will as a peculiarly Hegelian conception of 
freedom and the abstract right; the antithesis is presented in the chapter on morality where 
property rights, human rights and law seem to take on the aspect of universal, objective 
norms which are beyond the grasp of men, but to which men must submit; and finally the 
synthesis which is represented as the sphere of “Ethical Life” and subdivided in three 
conceptual moments of family, civil society, and state. Then again, within the sphere of 
Ethical Life, we can think of family as the moment representing the thesis, civil society as the 
moment representing the antithesis, and state as the moment representing the synthesis. 
Thus, on the base of what we have just stated, we can say that, for Hegel, “civil society” is 
the antithetic moment within ethical life and consequently it cannot be understood without 
reference to the conflicts which arises between the sphere of abstract right and that of 
morality. This is the second point which makes the Hegelian concept contrast with the view 
found in many scholars of contemporary civil society theory. 
In the next pages we see that the Hegelian concept of civil society encapsulates a modern, 
complex and differentiated sphere of ethical life, co-existing with other spheres of right, 
moral, family and state. With the development of a system of needs –which respectively 
represents the thesis within civil society- a separation of formal process from content is 
generated and because of this the freedom of civil society converts all human relations into 
commodity relations (Riedel, 1970). In this first configuration of civil society, named ‘system 
of needs’ the efficient satisfaction of needs tends to mask the real conflict which occurs 
between personal and moral freedom or between abstract right and morality. However, this 
deals with inequality and poverty as necessary accompaniments of civil society (Hegel, PR 
193). These problems become evident in the systems of welfare and rights which represent 
the antithesis within civil society. The function of the antithesis –in this case welfare and 
rights systems- is just that of the problem arising by opposing the thesis. It is then the 
synthesis- represented as the system of associations in civil society- which tries to discover 
solutions or compromises between the thesis and the antithesis. This system of associations 
is considered by Hegel as “the second ethical root of the state, the one placed in civil 
society” (Hegel, PR: 255). It is in this system of associations that, for Hegel, freedom starts to 
manifest a more concrete concept of practical freedom (social freedom) which, however, will 
assume the form of the absolute only in the Ethical Idea of the State.  
1.3.1 The ‘Social Institution’ of ethical life: Civil society 
Social freedom, as we anticipated earlier, is, for Hegel, the type of practical freedom which 
characterizes ethical life. This kind of freedom is said to be the most difficult to understand 
because it is not just expressed by ‘laws and social institutions’ which bring about and 
maintain the social conditions necessary for individuals to realize themselves (objective 
freedom); it also refers to a ‘subjective disposition’ (a certain frame of mind) on the part of 
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the individuals toward the principles (social norms) embodied in those laws and institutions 
(subjective freedom). Hegel’s claim is that the mere fact that individuals conform to the 
requirements of rational laws and institutions is not sufficient to ensure that someone’s 
actions can be said to come from his own will (they might remain external- as involuntary 
actions- to their own wills). Hegel says: 
“The objective sphere of ethics, which takes the place of the abstract good, is substance made 
concrete by subjectivity as infinite form.” (PR: 144). 
In other words, for Hegel, participating in social institutions or following the laws does not 
necessarily imply subjective free activity and freedom cannot be fully actualized.  
In Hegel, the ‘subjective disposition’ of an individual is often characterized as an ‘attitude of 
trust’ predicated upon a relation of unity between individuals and their social institutions. 
This relation of unity consists in the individuals’ perception of their social institutions as 
undifferentiated from themselves, and thus that those institutions cease, for them, to be ‘an 
other’. Hegel clearly states that social institutions and laws,  
“are not something alien to the subject. On the contrary, the subject bears spiritual witness to 
them as to its own essence, in which it has its self-awareness and lives as in its element which is 
not distinct from itself … Faith and trust arise with the emergence of reflection, and they 
presuppose representations and distinctions. ” (PR, 147). 
So it seems that, for Hegel, trust (faith, conviction) is possible only if individuals see 
themselves as undifferentiated from their social institutions and that they can achieve social 
freedom only at the expense of their ability to distance themselves reflectively from social 
norms. The example about the distinction between believing in pagan religion and being a 
pagan, which Hegel mentions in paragraph 147 of the same quotation but which I haven’t 
reported here, seems to highlight exactly this point. However, this last claim would have 
applied only if Hegel did not go further to explain how socially free individuals are 
conscious of their undifferentiated unity with their social institutions. According to Hegel, 
individuals are conscious, in regard to what we have just said, insofar as they view their 
social institutions as: their end (or will), their essence (or identity), and the product of their 
own activity.  
The undifferentiated unity of will is particularly evident in Hegel’s understanding of family 
– this is because, in Hegel’s words, family (not discussed here) is “the immediate or natural 
ethical spirit” (PR: 157). As a member of family, in fact, an individual stands in a conscious 
relationship with the social institution in question and develops a conception of what is 
good for the family and an ability to operate effectively by considerations relating to that 
good, even when doing so conflicts with the particular interest he/she has as a separate 
individual. Thus, we recognize the major factor which will lead us to realize one of the most 
significant differences between Hegel’s line of thought and that found in Rousseau: if the 
family member wills a course of action in accord with his/her understanding of what is 
good for his/her family, then in what sense is that will also, at the same time, a particular 
will? For Hegel, as opposed to Rousseau, a particular will is not necessary an egoistic one 
which tends only toward particular advantage, but an interest which a person has as a 
separate individual, unattached to others through obligations or sentiments. For Hegel, a 
particular will is a distinctive one, a will which possesses a determinate content (an end or a 
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particular will is a distinctive one, a will which possesses a determinate content (an end or a 





distinct from other human wills. Defined in this way, the particular will, for Hegel, is not 
necessarily egoistic (as it appears to be in Rousseau) and it also can be a universal will 
insofar as it is consciously directed at the good of a certain social whole. From an ethical 
perspective Hegel claims, “the will is present as the will of spirit and has a substantial 
content which is in conformity with itself.” (PR: 151, addition) This is really the achievement 
of ethical life compared with the two previous moments of abstract right and morality 
where, respectively, “particularity is not yet that of the concept” and “self-consciousness is 
not yet spiritual consciousness” (ibid.).  
More complicated to grasp is the undifferentiated unity of essences. Individuals, according to 
Hegel, regard the universal interest of their social institutions as their final end. In other 
words, social participation in those institutions is said to assume, for individuals, an 
intrinsic value which goes far beyond the merely instrumental value those institutions have 
as means for the achievement of their members’ private ends. Participating in social 
institutions is thus regarded by social members as activities through which they establish 
their own ‘identities’ as determinate individuals. However, what social members regard as 
their own identities is not social institutions themselves but the particular roles or positions 
they occupy within them (Williams, 1997). Those identities, in Hegel’s view, are, first of all, 
self-conscious identities and this implies that individuals develop a conscious 
understanding of who they are either from a subjective point of view or from an objective 
one. Individuals’ conceptions of ‘who they are’ is not just confirmed by their self-conception 
but also by their social world and therefore based on a objective existence. Following 
Hegel’s interpretation, social roles can be said to be constitutive of the identity of a social 
member in two respects. First, social roles furnish social members with the projects and final 
ends which are, for Hegel, ‘absolute’ and ‘unconditioned’ with the idea of an individual’s 
moral duty (for example, to take the ends I have as a parent as absolute is to see myself as 
having an obligation to realize them and this obligatory character of the ends is linked to the 
fact that I regard my social roles as making up the substance of who I am). Second, 
individuals, by performing their social roles, and performing them well, secure the esteem 
of others and their self-esteem as well. To use Hegelian language, we can say that social 
members achieve recognition or honour (respect) from their fellow social members. Thus, it 
seems that identities which individuals develop through their social participation are merely 
subjective (moral duty and self-esteem) and therefore perceived to be more a theoretical 
stance to the world than a practical one. Nevertheless, this claim is false if we think that 
social members give objective existence to their conceptions of themselves by actually 
pursuing and realizing the practical projects implied by their self-conceptions.  
Beyond the subjective disposition- as discussed so far- on the part of social members that their 
social institutions constitute a ‘home’, these must really be homes for their participants. In 
other words, they must enable their members to realize their true essence, namely practical 
freedom or universality. In Hegel’s own view, social institutions must be rational. But as we 
saw earlier, for Hegel, social institutions are real and therefore rational. Thus, how does he 
demonstrate that what he assumes to be true is really true? He does this by answering two 
basic questions: first, why are social institutions in place? And second, what does that 
institution as a whole require in order to realize its essential end? The first question has 
already been answered –either implicitly or explicitly- and it should be clear by now that in 
the social institutions of ethical life freedom is actualized for their social members. As for the 
second question, which becomes more relevant here, Hegel tries to answer this by 
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discussing the concept of ‘mutual dependence’ between the whole and its constitutive parts. In 
order to make clear this concept we can focus on the similarities which exist between a 
biological organism and a social organism in terms of the relationship between the organism 
as a whole and its parts and Hegel picks up exactly not just on these similarities but also on 
their differences. In order to carry out a variety of complex functions aimed at realizing its 
objective, the social organism, like the biological one, normally relies on the cooperation of 
differentiated, highly specialized components. In biological organisms, as in social 
organisms, this specialization typically takes the form of a network of functional sub-
systems, each of which operate with a significant degree of autonomy, even though all are 
ultimately subordinated to the aim of the whole and dependent on its proper functioning. 
Thus the relation between the organism and its parts can be characterized as one of mutual 
dependence. This relation between the whole and its parts can be considered as one feature of 
the ‘interpenetrating unity’ of particularity and universality that Hegel equates with the 
concept of rationality or actuality. This last point is clearly made by Hegel when he defines 
the state by saying that: 
“The state is an organism” (PR: 269). 
 
“The state is actual, and its actuality consists in the fact that the interest of the whole realizes 
itself through the particular ends. Actuality is always the unity of universality and 
particularity, the resolution of universality into particularity; the latter appears to be self-
sufficient, although it is sustained and supported only by the whole. If this unity is not present, 
nothing can be actual, even if it may be assumed to have existence. A bad state is one which 
merely exists; a sick body also exists, but it has not true reality. A hand which has been cut off 
still looks like a hand and exists, but it has not actuality.” (PR: 270) 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is a big difference between a biological organism 
and a social organism and it consists in the fact that in the latter the parts which constitute 
the organism as a whole, are discrete units of subjectivity, as we saw earlier. By taking this 
into consideration we do not think of the whole as a merely material entity but rather as a 
spiritual entity. Indeed, only if the whole is assumed to be a spiritual unity, it is possible to 
think of its social members as individuals capable of willingly overriding their private 
interests for the sake of universal ends and “recognizing actuality as constituents of their 
acting by recognizing it in their acts” (Gillian Rose,1995: 204, emphasis added, quoted in 
Fine,1997). Social institutions can therefore be thought of as working for the achievement of 
both material reproduction and the formation of conscious agents of social reproduction 
who are free as persons and moral subjects. This is the reason behind the Hegelian claims 
that social institutions “constitute the inner necessity of freedom” and that “ true actuality is 
necessary: what is actual is necessary in itself” (PR: 270). 
1.3.2 The complexity of civil society: Reconciling two viewpoints 
Bearing these preliminary considerations in mind, we should now turn to see how, for 
Hegel, these apply to one of the social institutions of Ethical Life -Civil Society. In other 
words, we should try to understand how freedom is actualized in civil society. In the latter 
institution of ethical life, individuals are joined together in what Hegel calls “formal 
universality” and are said to have merely external relations both to one another and to the 
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 “an association of members as self-sufficient individuals in what is therefore a formal 
universality, occasioned by their needs and by the legal constitution as a means of security for 
persons and property, and by an external order for their particular and common interests.” (PR: 
157).  
Civil society, from this perspective, represents the moment of difference or atomism because 
those who participate in this sphere are said to do so as separate independent individuals 
who work and trade in order to satisfy their own particular needs, especially those that 
derive from their status as natural beings. In modern Civil Society, production and exchange 
are market-regulated and this means that, while there are rules (Law of the Market) that in 
fact govern the apparently independent activities of economic agents and unite them into a 
coherent system of production and exchange, the operation of those rules remains external 
to both the wills and consciousness of the individuals involved. This point is made clear in 
Hegel’s critical discussion of the science of political economy (PR: 189). He considers 
political economy as the science of understanding because within it “the simple principles of 
the thing” are discovered but, at the same time, he also points out the limits of this discipline 
(ibid.). According to Hegel, what political economy does not recognize is that the 
articulation between objective freedom and subjective freedom within the system of needs is 
defective and, therefore, must develop into more concrete and ‘higher’ forms of mediations 
which obtain in the estates, corporations, and the state. In the system of needs, the relations 
which members of civil society have to other individuals, and to the economic order in 
general, are external in the sense that, as economic agents, they need be, and actually are, 
motivated only by their own private ends rather than by the ends of other participants in 
civil society or by the collective end that they in fact, but unwillingly, bring about. In this 
market-regulated society individuals’ relations to others and to society itself appear in 
themselves as primarily of instrumental value, since they serve as the means of achieving a 
set of ends they have independent of their association with others in the whole: universality 
here becomes a means for the existence and maintenance of individuals rather than an end 
in itself (PR). However, as Fine & Vazquez (2004) have correctly point out, “this (system of 
needs) is also the dimension of civil society in which the right of subjective freedom becomes 
more than a formality” (7, emphasis added). Thus, from one side, the system of needs is 
presented as a sphere where universality is not an end in itself and, from the other side, it is 
appraised to be the place where subjective freedom is enhanced. This ‘apparently’ divergent 
thoughts led many commentators to support the idea that civil society embodies, in Hegel’s 
view, both the positive and negative aspects of freedom (for a wider discussion see Kainz, 
1977). We believe it is just an ‘apparent’ divergence in thought, otherwise, as has been 
pointed out by Fine & Vazquez (2004), we are going to make what Hegel has recognized as 
the Kantian mistake, so named in consideration of a “moment of ethical life, subjective 
freedom, as its principle” (4). Hegel elegantly teaches us that this difference consists just in 
viewpoints. In fact, he says that 
“there are always only two possible viewpoints in the ethical realm: either one starts from 
substantiality, or one proceeds atomistically and moves upward from the basis of individuality. 
This latter viewpoint excludes spirit, because it leads only to an aggregation, whereas spirit is 
not something individual but the unity of individual and the universal.” (PR: 156, addition).  
And it is exactly at these two viewpoints that now we turn, trying also to demonstrate how 
these are always present in the Hegelian analysis of civil society. 
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1.3.3 The system of needs 
Proceeding atomistically and moving upward from the basis of individuality, what we find 
in the first configuration of civil society, named the system of needs, is a ‘lack of unity’ or 
simply what many Hegelian scholars have defined as the separation of formal process from 
content. Hegel’s discussions of poverty and alienation, crisis of production, and so on within 
civil society are rightly seen as the problems generated by this separation. For instance, 
Riedel (1970) eloquently said that “the freedom of civil society, because of this separation 
from all contents, threatened to trivialize life and convert all human relations into 
commodity relations”(X). In chapter two of “Capital”, Marx shows that the exchange of 
commodities can only take place through the conscious and voluntary action of their 
possessors. He says:  
“In order that these objects may enter into relation with each other as commodities, their 
guardians must place themselves in relation to one another, as persons whose will resides in 
those objects, and must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the 
other, and alienate his own, except through an act to which both parties consent. The guardians 
must, therefore, recognize each other as owners of private property.” (Marx, 1976). 
Fine (1997) claims that civil society becomes the moment of liberation of plurality for the 
particular person but also of conflicting interests among similar persons. Persons in civil 
society become related to each other exclusively because they are dependent on them (PR: 
183). Hegel describes civil society as “ethical life split into its extremes and lost” (PR: 184) 
that in the complexity “affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the 
physical and ethical corruption common to both” (PR: 185). In civil society everyone is given 
the possibility and opportunity of satisfying their needs, but whether individuals find 
satisfaction depends on factors such as talent, ability, effort, fortune. It is thus 
understandable how the system of need -intended as the first Hegelian representation of 
civil society- is a sphere of inequality. It is exactly this problem of inequalities that shows the 
limitations of civil society. In fact, it is because of its ethos of universal self-seeking and 
exploitation that a contrast between wealth and poverty is generated. Inequality produces a 
potentially antagonistic social situation and threatens a return to the Master/Slave 
relationship. This is what Williams (1997) calls the ‘deficient’ relationship of the process of 
recognition. In fact, what happens in the master/slave relationship is that the master is 
recognized by the slave but not vice versa. This process, which at first seems to confirm a 
victory for the master because it has won the recognition of the slave, results later in a 
condition where the winner loses. In fact, the slave accepts the status imposed on him by the 
master and it becomes a commodity or property of the master. This means that the 
recognition that the slave gives to the master is uncertain and unstable, and the master 
understands that his recognition is unreliable. But, the master depends on such recognition. 
Thus in this way, the master goes against himself and misses the opportunity to achieve his 
goal which is ‘achieving recognition’ from the slave. 
Inequalities and poverty represent the danger of civil society. The emergence of poverty is 
an inevitable accompaniment of civil society. For Hegel “The origin of poverty is generally a 
consequence of civil society, and on the whole it arises necessarily out of it” (PR: 244, 
editorial notes). The reasons why this happens can be related to two main factors. First, as 
we have discussed previously, civil society encourages self-sufficient individualism and the 
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‘atomistic principle in which each individual fends merely for himself and does not concern 
himself with a common social good’ (PR). This atomistic principle abandons the individual 
to contingency. Second, as Williams (1997) noted, while the market promotes the production 
of large quantities of goods, it does not guarantee their rational distribution. The latter 
requires not just that enough goods be present to satisfy the material needs of society overall 
but that those goods are distributed so that the material needs of each individual are met.  
Let us leave now, for a moment, the atomistic viewpoint and consider the aspect of 
substantiality. According to Hegel, although members of civil society work in order to achieve 
their own private ends, their work takes place within a system of social cooperation marked by 
a division of labor. From here originates the Hegelian claim that civil society is “ a system of all 
around interdependence” (PR: 183). Labor becomes an activity which serves not only as a 
highly efficient means of satisfying material needs, it also becomes an activity that is informed 
by a kind of recognition of the subjectivity of others. Fine (1995) claims: “Labour in the 
Philosophy of Right is a process of objectification of subjectivity and actualisation of subjective 
freedom as ethical universal freedom. It is a mediating activity which is a formative relation 
not only for the working subject, but also for the objects which acquire value and their 
appropriateness for consumption through the mediating activity of labour” (59). The 
dependence between fellow members, which labor produces, forces individuals to step out of 
their merely particular points of view and to adopt a universal perspective. It is exactly in this 
respect that Hegel regards labor as a source of education in service of moral action. Individuals 
develop through labour the ability to discern, and determine one’s activity in accord with, 
objectives of one’s fellow beings. In other words, they develop within individuals a subjective 
capacity without which moral action would be impossible. Hegel claims: 
“Although particularity and universality have become separated in civil society, they are 
nevertheless bound up with and conditioned by each other. Although each appears to do precisely 
the opposite of the other and imagines that it can exist only by keeping the other at a distance, 
each nevertheless has the other as its condition…” (PR: 184, addition). 
However, Labor does not provide a final resolution either to the atomistic principle of civil 
society –in fact, labor, intended either as a source of education or as source of mediation 
between particularity and universality, relies on the state- or to the irrational distribution of 
goods which it produces. Let us return again to the atomistic viewpoint in order to see how 
it contrasts with the substantial one.  
Hegel notes that with the development of the understanding, which increases with the 
development of the productive powers, it becomes possible to increase the satisfaction of 
needs either from a quantitative or qualitative point of view. This repeating process of 
production of commodities and knowledge over time results in an extension of the division 
of labor and specialization of roles. Hegel says: 
“On the one hand, as the association of human beings through their needs is universalized, and 
with it the ways in which means of satisfying these needs are devised and made available, the 
accumulation of wealth increases; for the greatest profit is derived from this twofold universality. 
But on the other hand, the specialization and limitation of particular work also increase, as do 
likewise the dependence and want of the class which is tied to such work; this in turn leads to an 
inability to feel and enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil 
society.” (PR: 243)  
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Mass production creates a new problem, namely surplus production which represents an 
excess of what can be consumed in a given domestic market. When a surplus of goods is 
produced, workers are laid off, creating unemployment. Now, the surplus is what everyone 
‘wants’, as Hegel makes clear in the above quotation, but what happens is that when wealth 
accumulates in one sector of society, poverty, need, and misery are created in another sector. 
Avineri (1972) claims that civil society becomes an essentially zero sum equation in which 
poverty in one sphere is the price that society pays for wealth in another. Hegel 
acknowledges that if individuals are to be free in the market they must be able to know that 
the true end of civil society’s mass production capacity is not the creation and accumulation 
of wealth per se but the assurance of each individual that his/her needs will be met. 
Individuals, for Hegel, need commonly affirmed social structures such as estates in order to 
achieve this.  
1.3.4 The system of justice: Welfare and rights 
Hegel claims that those “particular spheres of needs” (estates) which are generated from the 
movement of the market are, first of all, “systems of differences”, and here the term 
‘differences’ necessarily implies inequalities in terms of resources and skills of individuals 
(PR: 207). However, he praises those social structures because they provide individuals of 
different social and economic groups with political representation of their interests and 
allow them to express their wills voluntarily. Through this function of political 
representation, those estates reconcile the private ends of individuals with the common 
good and provide individuals with opportunities for making subjective choices. Thus, 
according to Hegel, it is within estates that, for the first time, universality and particularity 
come to coexist in a relatively self-conscious manner. He distinguishes three kinds of estates: 
the substantial or imminent estate, the trade and industry estate, and the universal estate. 
Those three estates, according to Hegel, reproduce once again the three logical moments of 
the concept because they “are determined in accordance with the concept”(PR: 202). Indeed, 
we can think of the substantial estate as the thesis moment, the trade and industry estate as 
the antithesis moment, and finally the universal estate as the synthesis moment. 
Consequently, it is exactly in the universal estate- constituted by the state bureaucracy, civil 
servants and the members of government in general- that the particular interests of its 
participants come to converge with the interests of society as a whole. It is precisely to the 
universal estate that Hegel refers when he says: 
 “The proper conceptual definition of the Estates should therefore be sought in the fact that, in 
them, the subjective moment of universal freedom—the personal insight and personal will of that 
sphere which has been described in this work as civil society—comes into existence in relation to 
the state” (PR: 301). 
This placing of the importance of estates in their ability to strength the political 
representation of individuals reveals, however, the Hegelian understanding of the 
intervention of the state in the market as a necessity (Fine & Vazquez, 2004). Following this 
consideration, it can be said that, for Hegel, freedom can be realized simply by virtue of the 
fact that rational laws and institutions are in place (as long as the state is there forcing 
individuals to respect laws and contracts). But, as we said earlier, laws and institutions, for 
Hegel, do not constitute the necessary preconditions for individuals to realize themselves, or 





‘atomistic principle in which each individual fends merely for himself and does not concern 
himself with a common social good’ (PR). This atomistic principle abandons the individual 
to contingency. Second, as Williams (1997) noted, while the market promotes the production 
of large quantities of goods, it does not guarantee their rational distribution. The latter 
requires not just that enough goods be present to satisfy the material needs of society overall 
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appropriateness for consumption through the mediating activity of labour” (59). The 
dependence between fellow members, which labor produces, forces individuals to step out of 
their merely particular points of view and to adopt a universal perspective. It is exactly in this 
respect that Hegel regards labor as a source of education in service of moral action. Individuals 
develop through labour the ability to discern, and determine one’s activity in accord with, 
objectives of one’s fellow beings. In other words, they develop within individuals a subjective 
capacity without which moral action would be impossible. Hegel claims: 
“Although particularity and universality have become separated in civil society, they are 
nevertheless bound up with and conditioned by each other. Although each appears to do precisely 
the opposite of the other and imagines that it can exist only by keeping the other at a distance, 
each nevertheless has the other as its condition…” (PR: 184, addition). 
However, Labor does not provide a final resolution either to the atomistic principle of civil 
society –in fact, labor, intended either as a source of education or as source of mediation 
between particularity and universality, relies on the state- or to the irrational distribution of 
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social institutions do not acquire what Hegel calls ‘an existence in self consciousness 
befitting of freedom’, they can never secure the full freedom for the individual. It is exactly 
this view that generates the contrast between Hegel and the social contract theory. Indeed, 
as Fine & Vazquez (2004) have eloquently stated, from the perspective of social contract 
theory, “the formation of objective law appears as a product of the rational will. For Hegel, 
by contrast, the transformation of subjective right into objective law is a social process.”(8). 
Nevertheless, Hegel did not fail to recognize that this state’s intervention does not provide a 
final resolution to the problem of irrational distribution of goods, produced through the 
market. In fact, he says: 
“to maintain the increasingly impoverished mass at its normal standard of living, the livelihood 
of the needy would be ensured without the mediation of work; this would be contrary to the 
principle of civil society and the feeling of self- sufficiency and honour among its individual 
members” (PR: 245). 
As has been pointed out by Williams (1997) in his interpretation of Hegel, direct welfare 
could lead to scorn for the ethos of self-sufficiency and when this happens the result is 
rabble. Indeed, although for Hegel it is the absence of welfare that in first place leads to 
rabble, in his 1819 lectures, Hegel expanded the concept of rabble to that of ‘rabble 
mentality’. According to Hegel, in civil society, the poor are deprived of work and property 
and the resources to meet their needs; but, since in civil society recognition is bound up with 
work and property, the poor are in effect denied recognition, and suffer rejection. We assist 
in a kind of spiritual death of same individuals (the poor) who are denied recognition and 
are also excluded from civil society while they live in the midst of it. According to Hegel,  
‘Poverty is not only indigence in externals; it is also joined to moral degradation. The poor are 
subject to yet another cleavage, namely a cleavage of heart and mind between them and civil 
society. The poor man feels himself excluded and shunned, scorned, by everyone. This exclusion 
necessarily gives rise to an inner indignation. He is conscious of himself as infinite and free, and 
so there arises the demand that his determinate external existence should correspond to this 
consciousness. In civil society it is not a merely natural need and distress against which the poor 
man must struggle. The poor man is opposed not only by nature, by mere being, but also by my 
will. The poor man feels as if he were related to an arbitrary will, to human contingency, and in 
the last analysis, what makes him indignant is that he is put into this state of division through 
sheer arbitrariness’ (PR: 244, editorial notes1 rephrased). 
Self-consciousness appears to be driven to the extreme point where it no longer has any 
rights, and where freedom no longer has any determinate existence. In this situation, where 
the existence of freedom becomes something wholly contingent, inner indignation is 
necessary. Because the individual’s freedom has no determinate existence, the recognition of 
universal freedom disappears (Williams, 1997). Williams (1997) states that,  
‘It would not be surprising that the poor do not recognise the legitimacy of the laws and rules of 
civil society. On the one hand, the poor do not have rights in civil society because recognition is a 
condition of having rights, and they are not recognized by that society. On the other hand, since 
the poor are not recognized by civil society, neither do they recognise the society that excludes 
them’ (248). 
It is worth noting here how this view contrasts with what we really find in Hegel. In fact, for 
Hegel, as we saw early, the poor is ‘conscious of himself as infinite and free’ and this means 
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that he has right is civil society, while for Williams the poor does not have rights in civil 
society. Hegel believes that the poor individual has the right to invoke the right of distress. 
In fact, Hegel in this regard says:  
‘Life, as the totality of ends, has a right in opposition to abstract right. If, for example, it can be 
preserved by stealing a loaf, this certainly constitutes an infringement of someone’s property, but 
it would be wrong to regard such an action as a common theft. If someone whose life is in danger 
were not allowed to take measures to save himself, he would be destined to forfeit all his rights, 
and since he would be deprived of life, his entire freedom would be negated… But the only thing 
necessary is to live now, the future is not absolute, and it remains exposed to contingency’ (PR: 
127, addition). 
Though Hegel considers it possible for the poor to invoke the right of distress, he also 
acknowledges the fact that poverty gives rise to a ‘permanent right of distress’ which 
changes the right to property, which he considers as the ‘right to right’. Thus, how to avoid 
this? The ‘administration of justice’(not fully discussed here), in Hegel’s view, seems to 
address precisely this issue. Laws, the court, for instance, are conceptualized by Hegel as 
important moments of the presence of a more concrete universality within civil society. For 
it is within them that the ‘right’ comes into a concrete existence. He explains, in fact, that 
“the objective actuality of right” refers not only to the fact that the right is known as “right 
in itself”, but it also refers to the fact that the right is posited in those moments (laws, court) 
which give to the right an objective existence or “universal validity” (PR: 210- 211, emphasis 
added). In this way, Hegel claims that it is “through the administration of justice that 
infringements of property or personality are annulled.” (PR: 230). There are, however, two 
significant limitations to the administration of justice. First the individual’s universal 
interest is defended as against his merely personal interests. This limitation is acknowledged 
by Hegel as “relative union” (PR. 229). Second, as has been pointed out by Peddle (2000), 
“because the actuality of the union of universal and particular ends occurs only in single 
cases of infringement of the law, justice is not a thoroughgoing unity of universal and 
particular rights” (10). Hegel recognizes that guaranteeing the ‘undisturbed security’ of 
person and property -although necessary in order to prevent the ‘rabble mentality’ from 
degenerating into an infringement of property and personality’s right- does not “secure the 
livelihood and welfare of individuals” (PR: 230). From here, a further and more concrete 
mediation is needed. 
1.3.5 The system of associations 
One conclusion which we can draw at this stage of our study is that civil society intended as 
a ‘system of needs’ or as a ‘system of welfare and rights’ does not always actualize social 
freedom in all its forms. This conclusion is also shared by Fine and Vazquez (2004) when 
they say that “in the tension between concept and existence subjective freedom is sometimes 
enhanced and sometimes denied” (13, emphasis added). However Hegel shows us that civil 
society in its fully rational forms also includes certain groups, named corporations, where 
members partially shed the perspective of independent individuals and acquire bonds of 
solidarity with the fellow members of their trade or estate. Within corporations the 
individual mission is seen as a value per se rather than being instrumental to satisfying other 
interests, for example maximizing profit. Individuals who take part in a corporation are said 
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an awareness of being part of a wider ethical whole and not just an isolated individual. 
Hegel states that in the corporation “the selfish end which pursues its own particular interest 
comprehends and expresses itself at the same time as a universal end” and consequently the 
social member’s interest becomes “no wider in scope than the end inherent in the trade 
which is the corporation’s proper business and interest”(PR: 251). It is in accordance with 
this claim that the corporation is then said to have “the right to assume the role of a second 
family for its members”, although this role must take place “under the supervision of the 
public authority” (PR: 252). But, what exactly does it mean that a corporation assumes the role of a 
second family for its members? One of the answer to this question could be that, as in the 
family, the individual finds the source of moral authority within their own consciences 
rather than in something external to him and this, in turn, determines the individual’s moral 
freedom, so likewise does the individual in a corporation. Put in this way, moral freedom 
appears to be something exclusively internal to the individual and therefore it may not 
initially be clear how the corporation could be implicated in its relation. However, according 
to Hegel, the corporation fosters the freedom of moral subjects in three respects. First, 
corporations educate members ethically by encouraging the formation of shared ethical 
goals that are internalised by individuals. Second, they provide individuals with political 
representation; the particular interests of social members are collectively shaped and 
channeled into the state. By channeling these interests into the state, corporations give them 
their universal character. Related to this second function is the third: corporations secure 
individuals’ welfare. The first function refers to the formation of an individual as a moral 
subject, while the second and third functions contribute to the successful realisation of the 
individual’s moral subjectivity once the individual has been constituted as a moral subject. It 
is exactly by understanding these last two functions of corporations that the demands of 
moral subjectivity can be reconciled with the social cooperation (or social solidarity) of 
individuals within a corporation. For Hegel, in fact, the ability of the individual to act 
successfully within their own understanding of the ‘good’ does not necessarily rely on the 
need to place clearly defined limits on the authority of the institution (such as the state) to be 
in authority over its members (citizens)- the latter claim is very familiar among 
contemporary political philosophers (see Rawls, 1971). On the contrary, the solution for 
Hegel is to make the goodness and rationality which is embodied in laws and ethical norms 
transparent to individuals so that they can be achieved without violating the ideal of moral 
subjects whose actions are determined only by their own understanding of the good. 
However, this difference between Hegel and the contemporary political philosophy does 
not bring to light the greatest intuition of Hegel -grounded in the Enlightenment- which was 
to recognise that moral subjectivity is not just a disposition of mind which allows 
individuals to discern reflectively what is good from what is evil- intuition which was 
originated by Socrates and later advanced by Christianity with the idea that the content of 
ethical norms comes from an extra-human being (God). Instead, for Hegel the moral 
authority, which enables individuals to know “what right and duty are”, is within the 
individual (as Socrates saw it) and, at the same time, proceeding from the individual and 
not from an extra human being entity (as the Enlightenment recognised it, especially Kant’s 
idea of moral authority) (PR: 137, remark). But, if Hegel’s idea was just that of bringing together 
the thoughts of Socrates and Kant, to what extent can we define his idea as an intuitive one? The 
Hegelian intuition was that if an individual is to be able to accept the demands of morality -
which imply doing duties: diminishing one’s private good for the good of others- ethical 
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norms must incorporate consideration of human well-being. In other words, doing a duty 
must be the source of a particular sense of satisfaction for the individual who does it. 
Furthermore, Hegel claims that “well-being is not a good without right. Similarly, right is not 
the good without well-being” (PR: 130). A conclusion which Hegel draws from all this is that 
moral subjects can recognise as good only what unified right and well-being in a way that 
the personal freedom of all is reconciled with the well-being of each individual. 
Accordingly, we can say that corporations -in order to reconcile the well being of each 
individual with the personal freedom of all- need to unify right and well-being. Thus, it is 
within the corporation that the two moments determined in the system of justice, named 
welfare and rights, are concretely united. However, this “ethical union present in corporate 
life is subject to competition among the various corporations comprising civil society, it is 
not therefore sufficient to ethical life” (Paddle, 2000: 12). From here the Hegelian claim that 
the ethical union of civil society within corporate life requires “the supervision of the public 
authority” (PR: 252). Indeed, Hegel was perfectly aware of the fact that corporations are the 
concrete form in which the “particular spheres of needs” develop themselves. Therefore 
“the corporation, of course, must come under the higher supervision of the state, for it 
would otherwise become ossified and set in its ways, and decline into a miserable guild 
system” (PR: 255, addition). In other words, without the supervision of the state, the welfare 
secured through corporations is no longer a right and it would be “grounded only on 
contingency rather than on a foundation which is stable and legitimate in and for itself.” (PR: 
303, remark). In the absence of unity between welfare and right, individuals would no 
longer recognize their corporations as their ‘good’.  
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second family for its members? One of the answer to this question could be that, as in the 
family, the individual finds the source of moral authority within their own consciences 
rather than in something external to him and this, in turn, determines the individual’s moral 
freedom, so likewise does the individual in a corporation. Put in this way, moral freedom 
appears to be something exclusively internal to the individual and therefore it may not 
initially be clear how the corporation could be implicated in its relation. However, according 
to Hegel, the corporation fosters the freedom of moral subjects in three respects. First, 
corporations educate members ethically by encouraging the formation of shared ethical 
goals that are internalised by individuals. Second, they provide individuals with political 
representation; the particular interests of social members are collectively shaped and 
channeled into the state. By channeling these interests into the state, corporations give them 
their universal character. Related to this second function is the third: corporations secure 
individuals’ welfare. The first function refers to the formation of an individual as a moral 
subject, while the second and third functions contribute to the successful realisation of the 
individual’s moral subjectivity once the individual has been constituted as a moral subject. It 
is exactly by understanding these last two functions of corporations that the demands of 
moral subjectivity can be reconciled with the social cooperation (or social solidarity) of 
individuals within a corporation. For Hegel, in fact, the ability of the individual to act 
successfully within their own understanding of the ‘good’ does not necessarily rely on the 
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to recognise that moral subjectivity is not just a disposition of mind which allows 
individuals to discern reflectively what is good from what is evil- intuition which was 
originated by Socrates and later advanced by Christianity with the idea that the content of 
ethical norms comes from an extra-human being (God). Instead, for Hegel the moral 
authority, which enables individuals to know “what right and duty are”, is within the 
individual (as Socrates saw it) and, at the same time, proceeding from the individual and 
not from an extra human being entity (as the Enlightenment recognised it, especially Kant’s 
idea of moral authority) (PR: 137, remark). But, if Hegel’s idea was just that of bringing together 
the thoughts of Socrates and Kant, to what extent can we define his idea as an intuitive one? The 
Hegelian intuition was that if an individual is to be able to accept the demands of morality -
which imply doing duties: diminishing one’s private good for the good of others- ethical 
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norms must incorporate consideration of human well-being. In other words, doing a duty 
must be the source of a particular sense of satisfaction for the individual who does it. 
Furthermore, Hegel claims that “well-being is not a good without right. Similarly, right is not 
the good without well-being” (PR: 130). A conclusion which Hegel draws from all this is that 
moral subjects can recognise as good only what unified right and well-being in a way that 
the personal freedom of all is reconciled with the well-being of each individual. 
Accordingly, we can say that corporations -in order to reconcile the well being of each 
individual with the personal freedom of all- need to unify right and well-being. Thus, it is 
within the corporation that the two moments determined in the system of justice, named 
welfare and rights, are concretely united. However, this “ethical union present in corporate 
life is subject to competition among the various corporations comprising civil society, it is 
not therefore sufficient to ethical life” (Paddle, 2000: 12). From here the Hegelian claim that 
the ethical union of civil society within corporate life requires “the supervision of the public 
authority” (PR: 252). Indeed, Hegel was perfectly aware of the fact that corporations are the 
concrete form in which the “particular spheres of needs” develop themselves. Therefore 
“the corporation, of course, must come under the higher supervision of the state, for it 
would otherwise become ossified and set in its ways, and decline into a miserable guild 
system” (PR: 255, addition). In other words, without the supervision of the state, the welfare 
secured through corporations is no longer a right and it would be “grounded only on 
contingency rather than on a foundation which is stable and legitimate in and for itself.” (PR: 
303, remark). In the absence of unity between welfare and right, individuals would no 
longer recognize their corporations as their ‘good’.  
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1. Introduction 
Since 1980, with pressure from IMF and lately, from the EU and the Troika, privatization has 
become the key dimension of the world capital markets and European Union has been the 
international leader in selling state-owned productive assets (national wealth) to the private 
sector (mostly to foreign firms). This trend started because the states have historically taken 
a major direct role in the economy of all European countries [Kallianiotis (2007)], due to 
security, social policy, control of the enterprises, ownership of the national assets (wealth) 
by the nation, avoidance of private monopolies, and prevention of social inequality. During 
the Great Depression (early 1930s), many productive assets were shifted to state ownership, 
as failing enterprises were taken over by governments in the Western Europe.1 In the 
Eastern Europe, due to the socialist system, all enterprises ended up in the hands of the 
government. The last major expansion of state control in Western Europe was the 
nationalization of the banks in France at the outset of the Mitterrand administration in 1981. 
[Walter and Smith (2000, p. 165).But since that time the trend has changed and privatization is 
considered the only way of business, independently of the social cost to the country. On 
Sunday, September 7, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, announced plans to 
take control of troubled mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, replaced the 
companies’ chief executives and provided up to $200 billion in capital to restore the firms to 
financial health. This nationalization movement had a positive effect, with stock markets 
rallying in the U.S. (DJIA gained 289.78 points or 2.6% to 11,510.74) and abroad, and 
mortgage rates fell. Also, Germany took a 25% stake in Commerzbank after injecting 
another $13.63 billion to shore up its finances. Further, Lloyds Banking could be pushed 
closer to nationalization, if the U.K. economy continues to sour. We see in many cases that 
governments must be in control of industries and firms for the benefits of the citizens. The 
uncontrolled private firms will cause serious problems in the future of our economic and 
social lives and due to globalization the (domino) effect will move to allover the world. 
Nationalization of some most deeply wounded financial institutions, during the 2008 
financial crisis, might be the best policy to save the economies and bring back stability and 
                                                 
1 The Great Panic or “planned” financial crisis (late 2000s) led governments to similar actions, but at a 
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confidence. Merkel’s Cabinet, on February 18, 2009, approved draft legislation allowing the 
state to take over lender Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, paving the way for the first German 
bank nationalization since the 1930s. The bill, which was put to parliament on April 3, let the 
government carrying out compulsory purchases of shares in “systemically relevant” banks. 
The U.K. classified two bailed-out banks (Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC and Lloyds 
Banking Group PLC) as public-sector entities, moving up to $2.136 trillion of liabilities to its 
balance sheet. Lately, President Hugo Chavez said on August 17, 2011 that he planned to 
nationalize Venezuela’s gold-mining industry in an attempt to boost international reserves.2 
Also, Royal Bank of Scotland received billions of pounds from U.K. government, in a rescue 
deal that could be a model for other banks, but left RBS nearly nationalized. On the one 
hand, U.K. Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, decided to nationalize troubled mortgage lender 
Northern Rock Bank, which had racked up more than $48.7 billion in debts to the state. 
Later, U.K. nationalized mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley. Latvia took a 51% stake in its 
largest locally owned bank amid concerns about Parex’s ability to repay two syndicated 
loans. On the other hand, many states in the U.S. were planning to lease major toll roads 
under an arrangement known as public-private partnerships; investors lease or buy roads, 
bridges or other infrastructure, operate them independently and collect tolls. 
The French government was considering injecting as much as €4 billion ($5.1 billion) and 
taking a stake of about 20% in a new mutual bank to be formed by the planned merger of 
Groupe Banque Populaire and Groupe Caisse d’ Epargne. Also, Citigroup was in talks with 
federal officials about the U.S. taking greater ownership of the bank by converting its 7.8% 
stake of preferred shares to as much as 40% of Citigroup’s common stock. Doing so gave the 
wobbling bank a desperately needed boost to its capital, but less control of its destiny. In 
2008, during the past five quarters the bank had $28 billion in losses. Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said, while the U.S. government might take “substantial” stakes 
in Citigroup Inc. and other banks, it did not plan a full-scale nationalization that could wipe 
out stockholders. Nationalization is when the government “seizes” a company, “zeroes out 
the shareholders and begins to manage and run the bank, and we don’t plan anything like 
that,” Bernanke told lawmakers in Washington on February 25, 2009. 
Thus, even the free-market oriented U.S. was thinking about nationalization. Senate Banking 
Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd said, banks may have to be nationalized for “a 
short time” to help lenders including Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp. survived the 
worst economic slump in 75 years. The DJIA fell another 100.28 points (-1.3%) to 7,365.67, 
flirting with a 12-year low because the White House was preparing to nationalize several 
large U.S. banks. Gold topped $1,000/ounce as investors sought a refuge. At the same time, 
a stimulus provision was discouraging banks that received federal bailouts from hiring 
skilled foreign workers, which was a very good labor policy for the country. This was and 
continues to be absolutely necessary to improve employment in the U.S. and control a little 
the Asian “invasion”, which has diluted the traditional values of the country, and to keep 
the salaries at a survival level for American citizens and stimulate American children to 
study for improving their income. The country as well as EU member-nations need 
                                                 
2 Chavez has already nationalized banks, telecommunications, oil fields, the power sector, and 
hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland. Venezuela produces about 1.7 metric tons of gold a year. 
See, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2011, pp. A1 and A10.  
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desperately a domestic policy, which would improve social welfare of their citizens; these 
past liberal policies have destroyed the countries and have made them as third-world 
nations. These fears for possible nationalizations were provisional, due to the financial crisis. 
Lately, Belgium nationalized part of Dexia Bank for $5.4 billion. Also, Greece activated 
rescue fund for Proton Bank. 
 Unfortunately, the last 30 years, privatization has become the only trend, even though that 
has been economically and politically disruptive. “More than 80 countries have launched 
ambitious efforts to privatize their state-owned enterprises. Since 1980, more than 2,000 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized in developing countries, 6,800 
worldwide.” [Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1992)]. The total value of world wide privatizations 
exceeded $185 billion by 1990 and the privatizations only in Europe and Central Asia 
between 1990 and 2006 exceeded $207 billion. [Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Database, The World Bank Group.] Governments, especially those in Euro-zone that are in 
debt crisis, want revenue and they are selling any assets that the country had accumulated; 
but, there is another reason, too, public workers, acting unethically, have reduced their 
productivity close to zero. This sale-off tension is a short-term objective of most 
privatization programs; revenue collection for the current government and the pressure 
from the EMU, ECB, and IMF (Troika) to reduce budget deficits and subsidies. Also, the 
liberalization policies, the deregulation, and the globalization of the financial system, lately, 
try to increase supply and demand of securities in the domestic capital markets and 
integrate them with the EU and the international one; therefore, privatization is considered 
as the main contributor of financial assets.  
In the early 1980s, the states accounted directly and indirectly for half of GDP in the 
European economies. However, as a result of these privatizations, the share of state-owned 
enterprises in the GDP of OECD countries declined from 10% in the mid-1970s to about 7% 
in the late 1980s and 5% at the end of the 1990s. Governments raised almost $670 billion by 
direct sales and public share offerings between 1977 and 1998; they covered some of their 
tremendous budget deficits and contributed to the liquidity of the financial market. In the 
OECD countries, during the 1990s, primary and secondary privatization share offerings 
accounted for more than 55% of all equity offerings in Europe, and in countries such as Italy 
and Spain, they accounted for more than 70% of stock market capitalization by 1998. 
[OECD, Privatization Trends, Paris, 1999]. The purpose, here, is to examine this vague 
“intellectual” debate, which is very common in EU, about the privatization and its effect on 
financial markets and about the kinds of activities that belong in the public sector and the 
private one. The role of an uncorrupted government is important to be emphasized, too. 
Even, Czech President Klaus assailed the EU as undemocratic and said it should halt further 
centralization of powers. Troika is forcing Greece to sell public enterprises and derive €50 
billion from these sales; otherwise, there will be restrictions on the 6th installment of the €110 
billion loan that had been approved in 2010. [Kallianiotis (2011a)]. 
Undoubtedly, the focus, here, is on privatization in the members of the EU and the Euro-
zone countries. During 1990s, the EU accounted for $301 billion in privatization proceeds. 
[Walter and Smith (2000, p. 172).] Walter and Smith (2000, Figure 6.2, p. 174) give a 
breakdown by country of almost every privatization activity. European privatization after 
World War II began in Germany under the Adenauer government, with the 1961 sale of the 
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zone countries. During 1990s, the EU accounted for $301 billion in privatization proceeds. 
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was also emphasized. This was followed in 1965 with the sale of Veba. Later, the first 
massive privatization program in Britain was launched by the government of Margaret 
Thatcher, which redefined the role of the state and the private firm in economic activities. 
The first major transaction was that of British Telecom in 1984, followed by massive 
privatizations of British Airways, British Petroleum, British Airports Authority (BAA), 
British Rail, Cable & Wireless, and British Aerospace. All involved share sales to 
institutional and retail shareholders in the U.K. and abroad; it reduced the proportion of 
state own enterprises in the U.K. economy from over 10% of GDP in 1978 to virtually zero, 
when the Conservatives left office in 1997, and certainly, it increased the number of firms 
listed in the stock exchanges. The Labour party shifted its position from bitter opposition to 
privatization and threats of re-nationalizations in the early days of the Thatcher initiative to 
strong support by the time the Blair administration took office. Amazing homogeneity (sic) 
in all European parties (conservatives, socialists, and communists) in power in EU, today!  
More recent, France embarked on an ambitious program of privatization under the 
government of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1986, which saw the privatization of 22 
companies worth $12 billion in the following two years, a process that was halted (but not 
reversed) by the socialists in 1988. Privatization was resumed by the Balladur government in 
1993 and continued under the Jospin government, often with spectacular successes such as 
the $7.1 billion France Telecom initial public offerings (IPO) in 1997. French privatization 
proceeds averaged over $7 billion annually during 1994-1998, almost twice the amount in 
Germany during this period. Walter and Smith (2000, p. 174) show, in their Figure 6.2, Spain 
and Portugal, which undertook privatizations in 1997 and 1998, and Italy engaging in state-
owned enterprises (SOE) sales of well over $60 billion during 1994-1998. The Nordic 
countries and Greece, on the other hand, lagged a little behind much of the rest of Europe, 
but the last 30 years the socialists (PASOK) and the “centrists” (N.D.) in Greece are selling 
almost everything. In terms of industries, the most intense activity was in the 
telecommunications, financial services, transport, and public utilities sectors. The Maastricht 
treaty provides (imposes) a unique “motivation” for privatization in the entire EU. 
Actually, the EU share of global privatizations has increased steadily as Commission 
directives have mandated market liberalization and reductions in subsidies and as the 
Maastricht fiscal targets have placed tremendous pressure on raising government revenues 
and limiting its spending, even now, during the current financial crisis, deep recession, and 
enormous unemployment, which require exactly the opposite policy. During 1998 alone, 
Italy undertook a public issue of BNL (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) shares for $4.6 billion, 
as well as the fourth tranche of privatization of ENI (Ente Nazionale Industiale, a major 
Italian industrial holding company) begun in 1995. France did a $7 billion secondary 
offering of France Telecom shares, in addition to the sale of 2% to Deutsche Telekom to 
cement a strategic alliance between them. There were also insurance and banking offerings 
such as those by CNP Assurances and GAN. Spain raised over $24 billion in privatization 
revenue in 1997 and 1998 through sales of shares in telecoms, Argentaria Bank, the Endesa 
power group and Tabacalera, the tobacco company. Portugal undertook secondary offerings 
of EDP electricity, BRISA, the motorway toll operator, and Cimpor cement companies. 
Finland sold a 22.2% stake in Sonara telecoms and a 15% stake in Fortum, the electricity 
company. Austria attempted its largest privatization in the form of a 25% share offer in 
Telekom Audtria for $2.33 billion. Walter and Smith (2000, p. 178, Figure 6.4) depict the 1998 
market value, sales, and profits of the 34 largest publicly-traded privatized companies in 
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EU, each having a market capitalization of at least $15 billion. Currently, with the pressure 
from Troika, Greece has to privatize SOEs to collect €50 billion, but the market is at a very 
bad financial distress (undervalued). Then, the Greek SOEs will be sold at a very low price 
(fire sales), which means negligible revenue for the government.3 
Between 1991 and 2006, Greece has implemented 61 transactions worth over $20 billion of 
privatization revenues. Privatization in Greece began in the early 1990s after the first election 
of the New Democracy Party. The government considered privatization as the main policy 
objective, and issued a list of firms to be privatized. The initial stage of the Greek privatization 
program mainly involved the enterprises belonging to the IRO. [OECD Economic Surveys, 
Greece, 1998, Public Enterprise Reform, Table 21, p. 111]. The first transactions date back to 
1991 and 1992 with the full sales of the Olympic Marine shipping company, the Bank of Chios, 
and of Elvim (Heracles Gen Cement). However, the implementation of this first wave of 
privatizations was blocked by strong political and labor union opposition. The context 
changed after 1995, when Greece was admitted to candidacy in the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). This exerted pressure on the governments to implement structural 
reforms in order to foster policy credibility. Indeed, after a break lasting three years, the 
divestment process resumed in 1996 and gathered momentum through the second half of the 
1990s onwards. During this second stage, which continues to the present, privatizations 
mainly involved the public utilities, services, and telecommunications.  
In March 1996 telecommunications started being privatized with the initial public offer of 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), with an offer of 7.6% of its shares. 
Subsequent sales of the telecommunication group occurred in 1997 (12.4% of capital sold), in 
1998 through two tranches of 3.5% and 15% of capital, respectively, in 1999, in 2002 and 2005. 
To date 70.6% of its capital has been sold, raising over $5.6 billion. Other more recent 
transactions include the sale of 16% of the National Bank of Greece, which happened between 
1998 and 1999. Then, the three subsequent issues of the state power producer Public Power 
Corporation (PPC,  ), took place, respectively in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005 and worth 
overall about $1.4 billion. In addition, the four tranches of the Greek Organization of Football 
Prognostics (OPAP) in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005, worth in total $2.75 billion. The most 
proceeds were raised from the privatization of telecommunications (41% of total revenues) 
and services of public utility (21% of total revenues), such as water supply (i.e. the 
privatization of the Water Supply & Sewerage System in 1999); electric, gas, and water 
distribution (i.e. the sale of the Gas supply company of Thessaloniki EPA – Thessaloniki in 
2000); and the already mentioned electricity sector [i.e. Public Power Corporation (PPC)]. 
Also, the financial sector has raised 16% of total revenues. Among the commercial banks, 
investment banks, and holding companies privatized are: the Bank of Chios in 1991, the 
Bank of Athens in 1993, the Athens Bourse in 1997, the General Hellenic Bank in 1998 and 
2004, the National Bank of Greece in 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2004, the Hellenic Industrial 
Development Bank in 1999, the Greek Stock Exchange Holdings in 2000, and finally the 
Agricultural Bank of Greece in 2000. Further, privatization of the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) was one of the goals of the Kostas Karamanlis' Government. In his Platform Speech 
(March 2004), he said that "Government will reduce its business activities, give up its role as 
a contractor and enhance its regulatory powers. At all events, it will maintain control on the 
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natural monopolies of transport networks". The first move was the sell off in 2004 of an 8.2% 
stake in Hellenic Petroleum for around $240 million. DEKA, the Greek state portfolio 
management agency, sold its stake to a unit of the Latsis Group. In November 2004, a 7.46% 
stake in National Bank of Greece was placed with foreign and Greek institutional investors 
via an accelerated book-building process. Revenues were worth around $725 million. 
Furthermore, the goal of reducing budget deficit led the Government to plan an ambitious 
privatization program for 2005; it aimed to raise more than $2 billion in the year. In this 
context, in July 2005, a 16.4% of the gambling company OPAP was sold via a retail and 
institutional public offer, raising more than $1.5 billion. In September 2005, a 10% stake of 
the telecommunications company OTE was sold, via a public offer, generating revenues 
worth over $1 billion. The privatization process continued in 2006 with the IPO of Postal 
Savings Bank, whose 35% was sold on the Athens Stock Exchange for barely $800 million. 
The largest privatization, ever occurred in Greece, took place in the second half of 2006, with 
the complete sale off of Emporiki Bank. The government sold to Crédit Agricole its 35.56% 
stake, raising around $2.2 billion. Another important operation is the public offer of Hellenic 
Telecom Organization (OTE). In June 2007, the government, finally, sold a 10.07% stake for 
almost $1.5 billion, as part of its ambitious privatization programme for the year, aimed at 
repaying the Country’s public debt. After few days, in July 2007, the Greek government has 
completed another long-awaited operation: the sale of a 20% stake in Greek Postal Savings 
Bank for more than €500 million. With this operation, the Greek government once again, 
after the gratifying result of 2006, has reached its privatization revenues target, €1.7 billion, 
well in advance than year end.4 
After these privatizations, Deutsche Telekom AG gained control of Greece’s phone company 
(Hellenic Telecommunications Organization, OTE), which created a goliath in the Balkans. 
The German telecommunications company paid about €2.9 billion ($4.6 billion) for 25% of 
the shares of OTE and in 2011 it took the majority control of the company. At the same time, 
OTE and Cosmote brought Deutsche Telekom access to Greece, Albania, Skopje, Serbia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria. In 2000, Deutsche Telekom acquired a majority stake in Hungary’s 
Magyar Telekom Telecommunications that gave it indirect control of telecom companies in 
Skopje and Montenegro. In 2001, Deutsche Telekom acquired a direct majority state in 
Croatia’s Hrvatski Telekom. We have created a private monopolist in Balkans and the 
workers and customers in these countries will be negatively affected. This is also a very 
serious problem for the security of Greece, which is surrounded by so many enemies.  
Lately, Electricite de France SA submitted a bid for British Energy Group PLC, making it the 
frontrunner to buy the U.K. nuclear-power-plant operator, which was valued at £7.25 billion 
($14.16 billion). This British utility company was 35%-owned by the U.K. government and 
was put up for sale in March 2008. Other companies that were expected to submit some kind 
of offer for this British Energy included Germany’s RWE AG and Spain’s Iberdrola SA. Also, 
France Telecom SA made a $42 billion takeover offer for TeliaSonera AB, the Swedish phone 
company, but TeliaSonera rejected France Telecom’s cash-and-stock offer. Deutsche Bank 
reached a deal to buy a nearly 30% stake in Deutsche Post’s banking unit for $3.89 billion. In 
March 2009, the Greek government succeeded to privatize the Greek airline carrier Olympic 
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http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/atlas.php?id=13&mn=PM&print=1  
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Airways by selling it to Marfin Egnatia (MIG) for €177.2 million. In a few days European 
Commission (EU) gave the approval of this privatization and the ratification took place from 
the Privatization Committee of the Greek government. The new owner, Andreas 
Vgenopoulos, said that he will spend €100 million to buy new airplanes and was thinking to 
collaborate with Iberia, he kept the existing personnel of the carrier and he started accepting 
applications for new hiring of employees. Also, Russian oil firm Surgut bought a 21% stake 
in Hungarian national energy company MOL for $1.9 billion. But, Chicago canceled a deal 
to privatize Midway airport after the winning consortium failed to line up funding. 
Privatization has been imposed by some (neo-liberal entities), who believe that it might 
increase efficiency of the public sector, but it has contributed further to the weakening of the 
public sector, since public assets have been sold at very low prices that did not even 
compensate for the loss of future revenue from these companies. Alexiou (2003, p. 26) says 
that, “the contractionary nature of the policies imposed upon the EU member states, to 
arguably facilitate their transition into the monetary union appear to, at least in the short 
run, have created an economic environment that is far from conducive to employment 
creation. Lack of strategies that target real, rather than nominal variables, permeates current 
economic policy as this is run by the think-tanks of an independent European Central Bank 
and its affiliated institutions.” Studies by Kay and Thompson (1986) and Wortzel and 
Wortzel (1989) suggested that privatizations did not promote economic efficiency, only 
governments have raised significant revenues through the sale of SOEs. Sappington and 
Stiglitz (1987) addressed issues related to state versus private ownership and they favored 
state ownership, together with many other studies. Bhaskar and Khan (1995) in a study of 
the Jute industry in Bangladesh found that privatization had a large and significant negative 
effect on the employment of white-collar workers, while the reduction in output is not 
statistically significant. Parker (1999) reviews privatization in each of the member states of 
the EU, identifies the differences in the levels of privatization activity, and explains that 
privatization may not lead to efficiency, but to redistribution of income and economic 
power. Morgen (2001) says that devolution and privatization have marked the neoliberal 
agenda of downsizing the state and minimizing its role in regulating and ameliorating the 
operation of the market. Becker (2007) deals with privatization of water and waste public 
firms in EU and does not expect full privatization of these monopolistic companies. Editors 
Freixas, Hartmann, and Mayer (2008) provide a variety of articles on developments in 
European financial markets and institutions and some of them are referred to privatization 
[i.e., Degeorge and Maug (2008, pp. 223-224)]. Luechinger, Meier, and Stutzer (2008) say that 
high general unemployment reduces individual welfare even for people who are still 
employed and the public sector attracts more risk-averse individuals than does the private 
sector. Kallianiotis (2009) says that the vast privatizations have caused huge social welfare 
losses. Kallianiotis and Dragone (2009) said that privatization in EU has become the only 
trend the last years, even though that has been economically and political disruptive. Then, 
excess privatization causes serious social welfare problems to our societies. 
2. Privatization, denationalization, individuals’ utility, and social welfare 
2.1 Preamble 
The term “privatization” has been introduced in 1930s and denotes the process of transferring 
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effect on the employment of white-collar workers, while the reduction in output is not 
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2. Privatization, denationalization, individuals’ utility, and social welfare 
2.1 Preamble 
The term “privatization” has been introduced in 1930s and denotes the process of transferring 





private sector (business) making those private-owned enterprises (POEs). This can involve the 
denationalization of this enterprise or industry as well as allowing the private sector to 
provide what had been considered government (public) services. Privatization, then, refers to 
transfer not only the assets, but also any government function to the private sector including 
governmental functions like, revenue collection, law enforcement, and others. Also, 
privatization has been used to describe the buyout of the majority or all shares of a public 
corporation; privatizing a publicly traded stock. Investors, who will invest in these securities, 
will have an increase in their utility, but the effect on social welfare is questionable. 
Privatization can take place through selling of shares on the stock market, share issue 
privatization (SIP) or by selling the entire enterprise or part of it to a strategic investor 
through the auction process, asset sale privatization (ASP) or the shares of ownership are 
distributed to all citizens (free or at a very low price), voucher privatization (VP). The SIP 
type is the most common and can broaden and deepen domestic capital markets, increase 
investment opportunities, and potentially economic growth, but there is risk involved, too. 
It can be difficult to find enough buyers, so prices can be low (or underpriced, due to 
financial crisis), capital gains and government revenue insignificant, and transaction costs 
very high. ASP is more common in developing countries and VP has mainly been used in 
the former socialist economies during their transition (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Russia). Share or asset sale privatizations are more beneficial to the government because 
bidders compete and offer higher price, which create more revenue for the government, if 
the financial assets are overvalued. Voucher privatizations create a sense of participation 
and inclusion of all citizens. There were many privatizations the last years (more than 1,800 
transactions from 2000-2008) in EU,5 as Kallianiotis (2011e, Table 1 in Appendix) shows and 
these phenomena will continue until they will sell every asset, which belong to the public 
(citizens). Greece is forced by Troika to generate €50 billion from selling off every public 
enterprise and public real assets (structures and land, even archaeological monuments). In 
addition, Table 2 (in the same Appendix) gives the investment in projects of four different 
sectors (Energy, Telecom, Transport, and Water and Sewerage) from 1990 to 2006, which 
reached a total of $206.521 billion. Further, data and their analysis are very important to 
make some inferences for the effects of privatization. Table 3 (in Appendix) depicts the 1998 
market value, sales and profits of the largest publicly-traded privatized companies in 
Europe and Table 4 (in Appendix)6 shows the largest share offerings. Privatization slowed 
as the global financial crisis took hold and as political difficulties continued. But, at the same 
time, some nationalizations were expected in the wake of the crisis. Preliminary results for 
2009 show a slight uptick in privatization value, as markets began to stabilize and as 
growing budget deficits led to new pressures for privatizations. [“Privatization Trends”, 
View Point, Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank, May 2010]. 
                                                 
5 Also, Kallianiotis (2011e, Table 8 in the Appendix) reveals the privatizations in EU from 1989 to 1999 
and Table 9 from 2000-2008. See, http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/QueryDetails.aspx. The 
Europe & Central Asia (ECA) region raised over $171 billion from privatizations between 2000 and 
2008, representing 38% of the total for developing countries. With 856 transactions, the region had the 
highest number of transactions during this period. In 2008, the region raised $16.7 billion, down 60% 
from 2007. Turkey, the Russian Federation, and Serbia together were accounting for nearly 82% of 
regional value. 
6 Tables are omitted, here, due to confinable space, but are available from the author, in his manuscript, 
Kallianiotis (2011e). 
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2.2 A Theoretical Social Welfare Criterion: The Optimal Level of Privatization 
The expected objectives and possible effects and social benefits (SB) of privatization are the 
ones depicted in Graph 1 bellow, but there is a tremendous social cost or losses (SC) 
accompanying all these outcomes. The question is, here; are the social benefits of 
privatization exceeding its social costs (SB>SC)? The answer is obvious by observing the 
reaction and opposition of all citizens, except of the international organizations and some 
liberal bureaucrats, who have some highly paid secured jobs and are ignorant of what is the 
ultimate social objective of a sovereign nation and its citizens. Public sector employees and 
private ones differ fundamentally in their acceptance of risk and they are exposure 
dissimilarly to economic shocks. Public sector employees enjoy extended dismissal 
protection and work in enterprises that very rarely go bankrupt. Thus, these workers face a 
reduced risk of losing their jobs, in comparison with employees in the private sector. For this 
reason, their compensation is lower than those who work in private businesses. 
The evaluation of privatization must be from the point of view of the society’s well-being 
and not from the profit maximization one of multinational firms. The total welfare of a 
country (given the factor endowments and the state of the economy) must be improved 
continuously. [Kallianiotis (2011a)]. General concerns about the state of the economy or 
anxiety about crime rate or high risk or job losses are affecting negatively the social welfare. 
Also, the measurement of social welfare (SW or W) requires some ethical and country-
specific standards, which involve internal and eternal value judgments. [Koutsoyiannis 
(1981, pp. 524-549) and Layard and Walters (1978, pp. 3-51)]. As a welfare criterion can be 
the growth of the wealth of the society (nation’s GNP), which increases employment ( u 0 ) 
and production (keeping prices stable, 0  ). This implies that the income distribution will 
be ethical and just (not exactly equal). A high (out of control) growth can lead to reduction 
in social welfare, due to waste, pollution, huge fluctuations of business cycles, creation of 
bubbles, irrational euphoria, and negative mental, physical, and spiritual effects on humans. 
Efficiency (saving of recourses) is very important in social welfare (respect of the creation 
and individuals). Financial markets stability (normal return) and low risk to attract long-
term investments and prevent speculators and opportunists through regulations improves 
the wealth of the investors and their utility. We cannot accept an action, which increases 
some individuals’ utilities, but one individual’s utility is decreasing because all individuals 
are equal (have the same “worthiness”). The criterion must be objectively measured and 
Pareto-Optimal one.7  
The optimal level of privatization of SOEs is where the SW or W is maximized. [max 
SW W SB SC   ].8 This point is where the marginal benefits of privatization ( PMB ), due 
to increase in efficiency, productivity, government revenue, increase in capital market 
liquidity, reduction in national debt, etc. are offset by the marginal cost of socio-economic 
distress ( SEDMC  ), due to increase in unemployment, reduction in public wealth, increase in 
dependency, creation of private monopolies, increase in prices, increase in risk, etc. Figure 1 
                                                 
7 According to Pareto-optimal criterion any change in our socio-economic system that makes at least one 
individual better-off and no one worse-off is an improvement in the social welfare. 
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shows that at zero (0) [ PO PP% ( ) ] ratio,9 the country has only SOEs, which provide high SB, 
but they also have a relatively high SC. At 100% [ PO PP% ( ) ] ratio, the SOEs are zero (0), we 
have only POEs, where the SC is huge and exceeds the SB (SC>SB). The optimal level of 
privatization is at point B (point of bliss), where the SW is maximized; the condition is: 
P SEDMB MC . The objective of a government must be to privatize a proportion of the SOE 
as much as it is needed to reach the optimal ratio PP*( ) , which is below 50%. After this 
point, the SW is falling and it is becoming negative closed to 100% [ PO PP% ( ) ], actually, 
after 75% of privatization of the SOEs. 
The social welfare function can be written as follows, 
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i G S P Ru f X X E P PW S S ND E R&[ , , , , , & , , ( ), ]  (2) 
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(tastes, employment, socio-economic benefits, and investments in private securities)  
 SOE POEK K K  ; SOE POEL L L      (5) 
(endowments) 
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(technology) 










    (7) 
(revenue)10 
Where, SW or W = social welfare, A B C Nu u u u, , ,... , = utility (happiness) of individuals A, B, 
C, …, and N in the nation, SB = social benefits, SC = social cost, iu = utility of persons 
working for a SOE and investing in government securities, ju = utility of persons who lost 
                                                 
9 Where, POE=private-owned enterprise, SOE=state-owned enterprise, %PO=percentage of private 
ownership, PP=proportion of privatization of the SOE.  
10 Where, G PFCIF COF and G PFR R . 
 
Privatization and Financial Markets in European Union: A Social Welfare Perspective 
 
35 
their job, due to privatization and do not have any investment, uu =utility of unconcerned 
individuals, who are working for a private firm and invest in private securities, SOE = state-
owned enterprises, POE = private-owned enterprises, X= commodity or service, E = 
employment, G SP & = prices of goods and services, PW = public wealth, S&S = security and 
safety, ND = national debt, GPE R( ) =expected return of a portfolio in government securities, 
P
G
R =risk of a portfolio in government securities (interest rate risk or maturity risk), 
PF
PE R( ) =expected return of a portfolio in private securities, P
PF
R =risk of a portfolio in 
private securities, K= capital,11 L = labor,12 R = revenue, G = government, PF = private firm, 
BP = before privatization, AP = after privatization. 
The optimality conditions are: 
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11 Assumed that SOE POEK K . Then, tK 1  ti 1   (with the privatization). 
12 Assumed that SOE POEL L . Then, tL u1     (after privatization). 










  ) because he has no 
investment. Historically, for the U.S. financial market, the average reward to variability ratios are: 
iRV 0.217 (investing in L-T government bonds) and the uRV 0.421 (investing in Large-company 
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Note: SW =social welfare, SB =social benefits, SC =social cost, and SW SB SC( )  , PO% or PP = 
percentage of private ownership or proportion of privatization, PP*( )  is the optimal level of 
privatization in the country, where the SW is maximized. The condition of optimization is: The 
marginal benefits of privatization must be equal to the marginal cost of socio-economic distress 
( P SEDMB MC ). To the left of this point the SBs are high because of high employment, job security, low 
prices, big national (public) wealth, independence of government, high income, low risk, security and 
safety, and stability. Also, the SC is high because of inefficiency, low productivity, low production, 
subsidies, budget deficits, strong unions, and large governments. To the right of this optimal ratio 
PP*( ) , the SBs are high, due to efficiency of the private firms, higher productivity, more output, high 
profitability, higher revenue for the governments (T), lower deficits, increase in government spending, 
liquidity in capital markets, and innovations. But the SC is high, too, because unemployment is high, 
reduction in public wealth, dependency on foreign capital and markets, private monopolists, higher 
prices, high risk, high bail out cost, social inequality, and redistribution of income (from domestic 
earners to foreigners).  
Fig. 1. Effects of Privatization on the Social Welfare 
 




Note: T=taxes, G=government spending, u=unemployment rate, BD=budget deficit, ND=national debt, 
S=saving, and I=investment. 
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The above social welfare function [eq. (1)] must rise and this can happen only with 
individuals’ happiness (utility). But, after a point, where the SC is increasing drastically, 
compared to the SB, the SW is falling. Our objective for this privatization is to reach a 
position, where we will make the groups of individuals i, j, and u happier, without making 
anyone less happy. This will be an efficient social state.14 An appropriate factor ownership is 
necessary for any sovereign nation by keeping the SC at a minimum. The distribution of 
factor ownership must be such that each citizen, who is risk-averse, can buy the 
consumption bundle (and has the satisfaction that his country maximizes national wealth) 
with the income that his factor ownership generate to him and have some savings (that will 
be invested) in an environment that social and economic distress are at a very low level, 
which corresponds to the welfare-maximizing configuration of the national economy. 
Undoubtedly, incentives are necessary for the public enterprises; but an uncorrupted, 
efficient, and acting in favor of the country government is imperative. Rewards to people, 
who work (have high productivity) and the opposite for the others are important. A wage 
differential must exist to public firms, too, but not a discrepancy of hundred of million of 
dollars, as it happen to the unfair private firms.[Kallianiotis (2011c)]. This will ensure 
reasonable utilization of labor and increase in productivity and efficiency. Public employees 
                                                 
14 From the continuous demonstrations, we can see that the current privatizations are making many 
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The above social welfare function [eq. (1)] must rise and this can happen only with 
individuals’ happiness (utility). But, after a point, where the SC is increasing drastically, 
compared to the SB, the SW is falling. Our objective for this privatization is to reach a 
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14 From the continuous demonstrations, we can see that the current privatizations are making many 





must be socially responsible and maintain a social discipline with education and continuous 
attempt for moral and ethical uplift. If state-owned enterprises make people feel happier, 
with the same consumption bundle and income, it is, other things being equal, preferable 
and promotes national security, self-sufficiency, independence, sovereignty, and social 
welfare. People working in the public sector are affected less strongly by general economic 
shocks than are people working in the private sector and their well-being is less sensitive to 
fluctuations in unemployment rates. Of course, the public sector attracts more risk-averse 
individuals than does the private sector. With a relatively large and efficient public sector, 
the country’s risk is lower and the social welfare is higher. 
Economic liberals claim that society is better off when allocation is done by the “dirty” 
speculators in the unregulated “free-markets”, rather than by the exercise of a mixed power 
(political, social, economic, ethical, cultural, traditional, and others) to all citizens and 
markets. The negative results of globalization are already obvious from now to the entire 
world. Sovereign nations must undertake actions, which can be justified either on efficiency 
grounds, on equity grounds, and on cultural peculiarities, if the dark powers allow it to 
happen. The utilities of the citizens are interdependent and the social welfare function 
incorporates an ethical valuation of all citizens’ individual utility functions, for this reason 
homogeneity plays a major role in nations’ continuity. Leaders and scientists are responsible 
to determine the welfare-maximizing state (the “point of bliss”, a state of perfection) for the 
entire society. We cannot provoke or scandalize or underrate any person in our society. 
Political leaders must refurbish their old power.  
2.3 Public enterprises and private firms: pros and cons of privatization 
The objective function of a public enterprise is completely different from that of a private 
firm. Thus, the main effect of privatization is the drastic change of the objective function of 
the SOE (public firm), when it is privatized. Public enterprises’ objective is social prosperity: 
 t t t t t t t tSP f E Q S P Rmax ( , , , , , , )   (14) 
Subject to  
 National Constraints 
where, tSP = social prosperity, tE = employment, tQ = output, tS = subsidies, tP = low 
prices, tR = decent revenue of the government, t = equality among citizens, and t = a 
stability of the democratic nation factor. 
On the contrary, private firms (POEs) are concerned mainly about profits: 
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where, t =profit (or V = the market value of liabilities and equity), tR =revenue (price 
times quantity, PF PFt tP xQ ), t =executives’ compensation, tw =real wage, ti =cost of capital, 
t =a firm specific effect, and t
2 =a risk factor. 
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Private businesses are producing, where marginal cost equals to marginal revenue 
( t tMC MR ); actually, the private giant multinational firm is becoming a monopolist, with 
the lowest output and higher prices compared to the public one [eq. (15)]. Their first concern 
is the reduction of the labor cost, the increase in earnings by engaging in risky investment, 
the determination of CEOs’ pay by themselves, and the maximization of the market price of 
their stocks. For this reason privatization has a large negative effect on white-collar 
employment, clerical as well as managerial because they have high wages. Liquidity in 
financial market will increase together with the inequality in salaries between the executives 
(counting in hundred of millions of dollars per annum) and the other employees (a few 
thousands per annum). 
Public enterprises are more concerned about employment, which increases social welfare of 
the country. Then, the objective function of a publicly owned enterprise is more complex 
and broader [eq. (14)]. We assume that public firms are concerned first, about employment 
and second, about revenue for the government. The standard explanation for the public 
sector’s concern for employment can be a “welfarist”[Bhaskar and Khan (1995, p. 270)] one 
(the public sector seeks to maximize social prosperity and consequently, social welfare). 
With widespread prevalence of unemployment in EU, after its integration and the 
uncontrolled inflows of illegal migration, a welfare-maximizing public-sector should push 
employment beyond the point, where the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. For this 
reason, output in public firms would also be greater than in private ones ( G PFt tQ Q ) and 
prices lower than in private firms ( G PFt tP P ). Further, excessive public sector employment 
could arise for another reason. The public sector might be used by politicians in order to 
create jobs in response to political pressure. This phenomenon is well spread in all over 
Europe and is called “clientelism”. Also, public enterprises can be used by politicians to 
employ their voters and their family members; then, the reason is “canvassing”. Finally, 
another explanation can be “sociological” and complementary to the clientelist and canvassing 
explanations, which is also political. This is a motivation of public sector managers in the 
determination of a pattern of excess employment. These managers create jobs for those to 
whom they are tied by kinship or social bonds. [Kallianiotis (2009, pp. 75-76)]. Of course, the 
above practices caused serious inefficiency and budgetary problems to EU nations.   
Aristotle’s social welfare plan had some secondary goals that served the ultimate goal. They 
were the stability of the democratic state (that we do today through enforcement, police, secret 
services, spying, and terrorizing the citizens) and the fulfillment of the state’s ends, liberty and 
equality. Also, Aristotle’s land distribution plan brought about a kind of parity between the 
rich and the poor. Today the chasm between these two groups is widening and the middle-
class is in extinction (wiping out).15 The government should privatize only its most inefficient, 
heavily subsidized, and those that are not part of the national security of the country firms and 
also, the least likely to upset political and social interest groups, ones. The nation must have 
                                                 
15 After twenty five centuries from Aristotle’s moral and ethical philosophical teachings and twenty 
centuries since we have had the revealed truth, today’s “democracies” are acting much worse than 
Hellas in her Golden Age and Roman Empire around the year 33 A.D. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was a 
great Greek philosopher from North Greece (Macedonia), who was a student of Plato (447-347 B.C.) and 
the teacher of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.). Plato was a student of Socrates (469-399 B.C.), the 
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high cohesion, solidarity, and patriotism among all stakeholders and preserve it for the 
benefits of all citizens and for its national defense, especially today with all these external 
pressures. Of course, to maintain SOEs ownership in domestic private hands, it will be 
preferable relative to sell them to foreign bidders (alienation of public wealth).  
Further, the government has to intervene in all sectors and by using effective policies must 
make the market work more efficiently for the entire country. The social and economic 
policies must constrain the aggressive and unfair market behavior and produce socially 
acceptable results for all citizens. Governments must control efficiently all the social interest 
firms and there are many activities that fall into the government domain (“public goods”). 
These activities must be: national defense, public safety, public utilities (electricity, gas, 
water, telephone), public transportation (airlines, railways, etc.), public parks, the survival 
of endangered species, health care, postal services, agricultural banks, defense-related 
manufacturing, and certain strategic industries, economic infrastructure (electric power, 
water supply systems, sewage systems, telecommunications, rail lines, roads, tunnels, 
bridges, canals, seaports, airports and air traffic control system), some hospitals and schools, 
security services, and the criminal justice system. 
It is well known, historically, that public goods cannot be provided by the free market. The 
value of these goods is hard to identify and to allocate among beneficiaries, who will enjoy 
them and will share their cost (through a fair and efficient tax system). The citizens need 
education, incentives, national conscience, social cohesion, resource users’ fees, ownership 
rights, low taxes, no property taxes (on first dwellings),16 social prosperity, and common 
paideia, which would make it clear in their own interests to maintain the resources on a 
sustainable basis and bequeath them, even improved, to their children (the future 
generations). The market is weak to allocate costs and benefits; but, a fair, just, honest, 
impartial, lawful, truthful, uncorrupted, and objective government intervention must 
allocate costs and benefits of shared public goods effectively. As it was mentioned above, in 
the Politics, Aristotle urged democratic states to pay attention to both the wealthy and the 
poor. Then, our nations, today, with their anti-social policies, cannot be democracies! 
Aristotle warned that “poverty is the cause of the defects of democracy”. (1320a 36-37). The 
current signs are proving this warning. 
Privatization of industries with natural monopolies, such as a high-way, water supply, etc., 
could lead to abuse of monopoly power. Of course, improvement of efficiency is necessary 
and the government must be responsible to pursue this objective. Today, due to market-
based solutions; resource allocation, economic growth, efficiency, increase in government 
revenue, technological changes, etc., their ownership has shifted towards the private one 
and unfortunately, at a dramatic speed, without taking into consideration the negative 
impact on the citizens, due to the high risk of the financial market, where the private sector 
has to comply to its orders. There are cases that private-sector activities can exist-alongside 
with the public ones and when there is a need to transfer some to the private sector, the 
government must continue to hold 51% of the equity (as Figure 1 is showing) and be in a 
position to control the firm. The state ought to control a range of core economic activities 
that have strong public-good characteristics, which were mentioned above.  
                                                 
16 Taxes must be on income. A home, in which a family lives, does not generate income; then, zero taxes. 
It has many expenses, mortgage payments, maintenance cost, insurance cost, etc. 
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In summary; why governments are privatizing their public enterprises (SOEs)? Some of the 
reasons can be the followings: 
1. To raise revenue for the inefficient and in debt nation through sale proceeds (usually, 
they are sold at a very low price) or to stop the financial drain from the subsidies. This 
objective is politically controversial because the nations (its citizens) lose for ever a 
potential stream of earnings in favor of some current sale proceeds that will benefit 
temporarily the party in power. The government can make this state-owned enterprise 
efficient and stop gradually the subsidies and the hiring of excessive employees. As the 
time is passing, the EU is going against the subsidies. It gave them at the beginning to 
avoid the reaction from the European citizens, who were and are against the Union. 
Further, the Maastricht Treaty imposes a 3% budget deficit and member-nations have to 
sell all their public firms, even the national defense industry. Also, the EU wants to 
increase competition in the different industries by destroying national enterprises. The 
problem for Europe and Europeans is the European Union. 
2. To promote economic efficiency in the internal operations of these public enterprises. 
But is efficiency the objective of these enterprises or to serve the citizens of the country? 
A healthy government must impose efficiency to the entire public sector; otherwise it 
will be better to resign. We do not need inefficient governments anymore. Their 
corruption is known from the media and they are making headlines everyday. 
3. To reduce government interference and political expediency, which create distortions in 
the economy. But the voters can correct these distortions by voting out these politicians, 
who are against their own country. This situation is common today and it is impossible 
to find an uncorrupted politician; then, citizens try just to vote for the least bad ones.  
4. To encourage competition and market-based discipline in these public enterprises. But, 
the country has to protect its industries, its labor force, its resources, its welfare, and its 
future. We must put the interest of the citizens first in priority and then, to consider the 
free market “values”. Actually, the free market is value-free, too.  
5. To support wide share ownership among the general population through the financial 
market. But, this market is corrupted and very risky, too, so the allocation of capital is 
completely inefficient and very risky. The reach people are paying low interest rate and 
the poor very high (due to high risk premium). [Kallianiotis (2002) and Ball (2009, p. 
327)]. The proportion of population, which holds these securities is very limited, the 
return uncertain and the risk is increasing every day. For insiders and speculators there 
are enormous benefits, they are the only contributors to the profit function of these 
financial markets, today, but in the future they might collapse (already the financial 
distress, due to the current global crisis that they have caused, is very high and people 
are losing their hard working limited savings, which are invested for their retirements).  
6. To respond effectively to globalization of industries and international consolidation. 
But, this trend leads to private monopolies and these ones are going to be worse than 
the public monopolies, without any control by any government. The current mania of 
privatization, forced by Troika, and the mergers and acquisitions will cause serious 
problems in the near future.17 Globalization is the worst economic system that has ever 
been conceived by any mind. This system will bring the globe to its end by reducing 
freedom (a heavenly gift), liberty, and social welfare to zero. 
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Undoubtedly, it is important to increase productivity, efficiency, and welfare, but if this can 
be done with restructuring of state enterprises, there is no need for privatization. Public 
sector employment, especially of white-collar workers, is always excessive. Moving people 
from low-productivity jobs in state enterprises to unemployment does not increase a 
country’s income, and it certainty does not increase the welfare of its citizens. The moral is 
simple in economics and in our lives: “Moderation is the best solution”; and human beings 
are very complex entities (persons) and not only a primitive economic being. Then, 
privatization needs to be part of a more comprehensive program and not because the 
suspicious IMF and the distrustful EU say so, which entails creating jobs in tandem with the 
inevitable job destruction that privatization often entails; but, if there are national security 
issues, privatization must be avoided, independently what the “experts” or the “globalists” 
are saying and the ignorant politicians are carrying it out. As many believe lately, 
globalization and technology have increased income inequality around the world.18 It is 
apparent to everyone that the performance of public enterprises has been far from 
satisfactory and they suffered sustained losses and were a major burden on the government 
budget, which is a serious ethical issue of our self-interest societies, today. 
Likewise, the European financial markets are as inefficient, as the SOEs. New rules to cut 
hassle, expense of trades in EU started from October 30, 2007. They would eliminate many 
of the barriers within the EU. These new rules would open the way for European financial 
firms to compete with one another, force them to get the best prices for their customers and 
outlaw national financial-exchange monopolies. Despite years of efforts to create a common 
market, investing across borders in Europe remains an unachievable goal. The expectations 
are that the cost of trading stocks in Europe could fall by as much as 25% within a year, and 
investors will get more choice in financial services. Of course, services represent almost 60% 
of the value added of the EU economy and cover a vast spread of economic activities, from 
banks and insurance to data processing and management consultancy, to transport and 
tourism, and to legal and educational services. They play an increasingly large part in the 
economy and employment of the EU. [Moussis (2003, p. 94)]. This is a major disadvantage 
for the EU economies because the service sector is very vulnerable to business cycles; 
agriculture and manufacture are much more important and stable sectors. 
3. Regulations, public policies, and implications of privatization 
Stiglitz (2002, pp. 54-58) has stressed, from his work experience in government and 
international organizations, that the IMF and the World Bank [even the EU] have 
approached the privatization issue from a narrow ideological perspective (privatization was 
to be pursued rapidly). Also, scorecards were kept for the countries making the transition 
from public to private ownership (from communism to the market economy, actually, to 
globalization). Those who privatized faster were given the high marks. Through these 
pressures, privatization often did not bring the benefits that were promised. “The problems 
that arose from these failures have created antipathy to the very idea of privatization.” The 
IMF, EU, and other international institutions assume that markets arise quickly to meet 
every need, but in fact, many government activities arise because free markets have failed to 
                                                 
18 This has been said by four Nobel Laureates (Robert Solow, Finn Kydland, George Akerlof, and Robert 
Fogel). See, The Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2008, pp. A1 and A2.  
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provide essential services. This is obvious everywhere outside the United States. Economists 
and political advisors, who have studied in U.S. universities, try to impose the same theories 
on their countries, but, these do not work because the structure of the economies, the 
culture, and the needs of the citizens are different, there. The private financial markets are 
also very risky and they have a negative effect on individuals’ lives; for this reason a healthy 
public system must exist (like, the Social Security, the Unemployment Insurance, a National 
Mortgage Association, a Student Loan Supplier, etc). Eliminating the government 
enterprises may cause security problems (i.e., utilities, telephone, education, etc.), 
unemployment, and other types of suffering to the citizens, especially with the creation of 
private monopolies. Drogalis (2008) criticizes the American social welfare system comparing 
it with Aristotle’s social welfare one. The same can be said for the European Union, which 
follows the U.S.A. (a general servile imperialism). Aristotle recommended that the state 
must gather together all “excess revenue” into a fund and distribute this wealth through 
block grants “sufficient for the purchase of a plot of land” or “enough to start men in 
commerce or agriculture” (1320a 39-46). Today, we take away all the wealth from the state 
(from the tax payers-citizens) with privatizations. Thus, we destroy the public wealth of the 
future generations. 
The authorities believe (have been persuaded by some special-interest groups) that it is 
important to privatize quickly and deal with the issues of competition, regulation, and loss 
of national wealth, later. Of course, privatizing a public monopoly might increase efficiency 
and can yield some revenue to the government; but, the IMF and EU focus only on 
macroeconomic issues, such as the size of the national debt and government’s deficit (60% 
and 3% of the GDP) according to Maastricht criteria, than on structural issues, such as 
efficiency and competitiveness of the industry, selling the public enterprises at a correct 
market price,19 morality and work ethics, incentives, employment, and indigenous value 
system. These new private monopolies will be more efficient in production than the 
government, but they will be more efficient in exploiting their monopoly power, too; 
employees and consumers will suffer. Privatization has a drastic impact on employment and 
this is the major argument against privatization and its social cost. There is truth on this 
issue and from the other side; the low productivity of the public sector (which is very 
unethical from the side of employees).These unproductive employees cannot be promoted, 
their salaries should be low, and they might lose their jobs, too. But, the profit of this new 
private firm is going to come from trimming the payroll and eliminating the permanent jobs 
to its workers. Economists, as social scientists, have to focus on overall efficiency (for the 
entire society) and not on specific firm’s one. There are enormous social costs associated 
with unemployment and security costs associated with the foreign ownership of these new 
private firms, for which they do not care because their objective is different than the 
government’s one. “Privatization often destroys jobs rather than creating new ones.” 
[Stiglitz (2002, p. 57)]. Privatization, outsourcing, the moving of firms in countries with 
lower cost of production, and the illegal migration are some causes of high unemployment 
in Greece and in the entire EU. 
                                                 
19 Today, with this undervalued stock market, the sales of SOEs will be at an unfair low price, which 
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Furthermore, there can be a large social cost of unemployment (especially with the socialist 
and communist parties that exist in EU country-members), manifested by urban violence, 
increased crime, social and political unrest, reduction in wages, and employment of illegal 
immigrants because they are the only ones, who can accept a low pay job (reverse 
discrimination). Also, widespread anxiety exists even among workers, who have managed 
under pressure to keep their jobs, a broader sense of alienation floats in the air; additional 
financial burdens on family members, who manage to remain employed or receiving a low 
pension are appearing, the withdrawal of children from private schools because the parents 
cannot afford the high tuitions is following, and the tremendous financial distress and high 
probability of bankruptcy among households are, now, a fact. The cost of unemployment is 
huge for the unemployed person, his family, the financial market, and the entire society (by 
losing the skills of these people), and definitely, cannot be covered with some 
unemployment insurance. Their children without the appropriate education would be 
future unemployed citizens, too. The social cost is even higher when a public enterprise is 
sold to foreigners. Foreign owners feel only one obligation towards their shareholders (this 
is the only pressure from the market to maximize their market value by reducing costs) and 
less of an obligation towards the social policy of the host country (its social welfare). Their 
decisions are not based on patriotism or on any other social values; their “values” are greed, 
fear, corruption, exploitation, etc.  
Every citizen in a country must care about high rates of unemployment, even when he 
himself is not unemployed. High general unemployment (the worst deficiency of the free 
market) reduces individual welfare by increasing social cost on the rest of the population. A 
high rate of general unemployment has negative effects on the population as a whole 
because of social effects, like higher crime rates, the imposition of higher taxes to finance 
increased welfare spending. Also, it increases the income inequality within the society, it 
affects people’s well-being by reducing their sense of personal economic security, it 
depresses wages increases their actual or perceived risk of job loss and unemployment. 
Then, unemployment creates general negative externalities and externalities arising from 
changes in individuals’ perceived economic risks. All these have a negative effect on the 
social welfare. The number one objective of public policy must be full employment ( u 0 ). 
Unfortunately, the most serious concern with privatization, as it has so often been practiced, 
is corruption, due to the corrupted participants (politicians and public servants). The 
rhetoric of market fundamentalism asserts that privatization would reduce what economists 
call the “rent-seeking” activity of government officials who either skim off the profits of 
government enterprises or award contracts and jobs to their friends or to those who pay 
higher commission. But also, privatization is jokingly referred to as “briberization”. If a 
government is corrupt, there is very little evidence that privatization will solve the problem. 
After all, the same corrupt government that mismanaged the public firm will also handle the 
privatization; this might be a reason that the offshore banking is doing very well and 
Switzerland is prospered. These governments, by selling a government enterprise at below 
market price, they could get a significant chunk of the asset value for themselves rather than 
leaving it for subsequent officeholders. Competition among current and future politicians 
and parties has increased unfair privatization. “Not surprisingly, the rigged privatization 
process was designed to maximize the amount government ministers could appropriate for 
themselves, not the amount that would accrue to the government’s treasury, let alone the 
overall efficiency of the economy. Indeed, sometimes [privatization] was associated with 
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decline [growth] and proved to be a powerful force for undermining confidence in 
democratic and market institutions.” [Stiglitz (2002, pp. 58-59)].     
The major problems of our societies, today, are the “independent” central banks and the 
corrupted and powerless politicians. They use public enterprises to reward political 
supporters through mispricing of products and services, investment in low-value projects, 
cross-subsidization, overstaffing just to win the votes from their families, suboptimum plant 
location, without paying when they use their products or services, without contributing to 
their pension plans, and putting their incapable friends as managers. Due to these 
government corruptions, some academics believe that privatization of every industry will 
bring significant economic gains to the country, but they forget that the country is the 
citizens of it and their welfare, not a market-oriented economic efficiency at the moment and 
the perdition of the nation (its wealth and its sovereignty), later. Now, that the stock prices 
have declined so much, the sales of these SOEs do not generate any serious revenues to the 
governments. One of the reasons of the double digits unemployment rate in EU is the 
irrational privatization (combined with the other absurd behavior, the uncontrolled illegal 
immigration, the outsourcing, the tremendous imports, and the movements of businesses to 
other low cost nations). Free trade, free markets, and privatization, lately, restrained the 
social welfare. European governments are selling public utilities and telecommunication 
companies without having prior implemented any viable regulatory framework to govern 
these critical infrastructure activities newly allocated to the private sector. 
Privatization promised important gains in the efficiency of resource allocation and the rate 
of economic growth through competition, but it does not mention its effect on employment 
and ownership of this new private firm, which is lost for the country forever. In the early 
1990s all eyes were on Eastern Europe, where efforts ranged from successful mass 
privatization in Poland and Eastern Germany (after its reunification with West Germany). It 
is argued that over time (in the long run) privatization will lead to lower prices, improved 
quality, more choices, less corruption, less red tape, and quicker delivery. But, the existence 
of problems such as market failures, natural monopolies, and the planned financial crisis 
should limit this process. Currently, the greediness in the financial markets by the 
speculators, the political inaction, and the misinformation from the media increase the 
volatility in the stock markets, reduce consumers’ and investors’ confidence and economies 
can go back to a second recession (hopefully not a depression), which seems that this will be 
the future game by these unregulated market makers. 
Also, governments have few incentives to ensure that public enterprises are well run and 
there is no comparison of these state firms with other ones, which makes them inefficient. 
The government administration has difficulty evaluating the efficiency of all these various 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but the voters know them because they deal with their 
services daily and they must not elect a party, which is running inefficiently their 
government. The government needs to have a reward and punishment system for the 
management of public enterprises and these firms must balance their books [revenue equals 
cost ( t tR C )]. Of course, privatizing a non-profitable state-owned company, it has to raise 
prices in order to become profitable because there will be no subsidies (tax money) in order 
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It is true that state-run enterprises tend to be bureaucratic, but a democratically elected 
government is accountable to the people through legislature, Parliament, and the other 
institutions must be motivated to safeguarding the assets, the wealth, and the welfare of the 
citizens of the nation. Private firms might run more efficient, but they serve only their own 
interest and the market’s criteria; mostly, they are acting against the social interest. The 
government has to improve all public industries, which have to produce revenue to the 
government and offer services to the public; and also, to preserve the middle class. In Book 
4, Chapter 12 of the Politics, Aristotle attributed the stability of democracies to the presence 
of an economic middle class. Our non-democratic societies, today, are destroying the middle 
class; this will be the end of the current civilization. 
Corruption is common in the public sector, but it starts from the politicians. They are the 
example for the public and certainly, every leader is a prototype for the people. The 
decisions must be made for the public benefits and not for political or personal gains. The 
voters are responsible to elect the highest ethical, moral, patriotic, and efficient politicians 
(the best among the people), too. If politicians are corrupted, during the privatization 
process, they will sell the assets in significant under-pricing terms and they actually care for 
their commission and not so much for the government revenue or the financial markets or 
the social welfare. The managers of the public enterprises must be accountable to the 
minister, who supervises them because all of them are accountable to the broader 
community and to political “stakeholders”. The public does not have any control of private 
firms and lately, governments have lost completely their control or oversight of private 
companies. They invest wherever they want to maximize their profit, usually outside of the 
country; they lay off workers to minimize their costs, and serve poorly the needs of their 
customers and destroy the environment. The government cannot impose any social 
constraints on these giants and the anti-trust laws are not applied anymore. 
A democratically elected government can intervene when civil liberties are threatened by 
the public enterprises and through these controls can satisfy the social goals and benefit the 
nation. With respect to capital, state-owned enterprises can borrow money from the 
government that raises it in the financial markets more cheaply (by issuing government 
bonds) than the private companies.20 Investment decisions are based on market interest rates 
(cost of capital), then, private firms cannot promote efficient investments. Government is 
also sensitive to job losses, but the private industries are exactly the opposite, they show 
high sensitivity of profit losses, on taxes, on restrictions, and to the market value of their 
stocks. Government chooses to keep certain public companies and bail them out because of 
their strategic importance or national security. Poorly managed state companies, instead of 
going bankrupt or sold to a private firm, must have their management removed, especially 
if the management had been appointed by the previous party in power and now is against 
the policy of the current one, which is in government. 
If a government-owned monopoly, which provides an essential service (i.e., water supply or 
electricity) to all citizens, is privatized, its new owners could lead to the abandoning of the 
social obligation to those who are less able to pay or to regions, where this service is 
unaffordable (like, remote islands). These enterprises must be state-owned because the anti-
                                                 
20 Except now that the government bonds have been downgraded and their cost has increased 
drastically. 
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trust laws do not work anywhere today and the private firm will become a monopoly and 
the citizens will be in trouble (exploited). The profit of private enterprises ends up to 
stockholders after executives’ payments; the majority of them are foreigners and the 
workers of the company have to accept low wages because these shareholders need high 
return on their money. Unemployment and low income is possible from these 
“competitive and efficient” private firms. Governments can exert pressure on state-owned 
enterprises to help implementing public policy [maximization of social prosperity: 
t t t t t t t tSP f E Q S P Rmax ( , , , , , , )  and then, social welfare: 
A B C NW f u u u umax ( , , ,... , ) ]. 
Also, they can buy supplies from local producers (creating more income and employment 
domestically) and not from abroad, where quality is questionable. In addition, the public 
enterprise can lower prices to satisfy domestic policy of lower inflation, increases in 
demand, and reduction in unemployment. SOEs act anti-cyclically, but POEs act exactly the 
opposite, pro-cyclically.  
A private firm over-react to short-term events (small recessions) because the financial 
market presses it to show high earnings and profit; otherwise the stock prices will fall, 
because this is, unfortunately, the ultimate objective of the firms that the market is imposing 
on them (market has become the only god, at least they are not atheists) and try with all 
their means to maximize their value [ V D P Smax     or E EBIT TV
i
( )(1 )max  ].21 
Private companies are downsizing even in periods of economic growth, just to increase even 
further their profits. Their advertising cost is also outrageous. The uncontrolled private 
firms opposed to the needs of the majority, to the welfare of the nation, and thus, they are 
anti-democratic and because they are in control of our society, our democracies are in 
collapse (in social dissolution). Our society needs a better social and humane socio-
economico-political system after thousands of years of experience, knowledge, and 
improvements. The voters are responsible for the leaders they elect and the inefficient 
leaders must feel the pressure of future elections, where they will not be elected. Now, with 
this global financial crisis, the best could have been to have some nationalizations and 
improvements in stability and increases in employment and welfare. The shareholders 
(especially, the institutional ones) have the responsibility to control the outrageous CEOs’ 
compensation.22 
Needless to say, many industries must stay public, like, prisons, basic health care, and basic 
education. Utilities that provide benefits to society at large and produce no profit, like 
defense, must stay public, too. All natural monopolies are not subject to competition and 
then, they can be better administrated by the government. Also, regarding corruption; the 
sales (privatizations) themselves give a large opportunity for grand corruption. 
Privatizations in many countries were accompanied by large-scale corruption during the 
sale of the state-owned enterprises. Those with political connections unfairly gained large 
                                                 
21 Where, V=market value of the firm, D=market value of debt (bonds), P=market value of preferred 
stocks, S=market value of common stocks, E(EBIT)=expected earnings before interest and taxes, 
T=corporate tax rate (fiscal policy instrument), and i=market rate of interest (monetary policy 
instrument). 
22 What is the marginal product of labor of a CEO ( CEOLMP  ) that justifies compensation (  ) more 
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20 Except now that the government bonds have been downgraded and their cost has increased 
drastically. 
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trust laws do not work anywhere today and the private firm will become a monopoly and 
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enterprises to help implementing public policy [maximization of social prosperity: 
t t t t t t t tSP f E Q S P Rmax ( , , , , , , )  and then, social welfare: 
A B C NW f u u u umax ( , , ,... , ) ]. 
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i
( )(1 )max  ].21 
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21 Where, V=market value of the firm, D=market value of debt (bonds), P=market value of preferred 
stocks, S=market value of common stocks, E(EBIT)=expected earnings before interest and taxes, 
T=corporate tax rate (fiscal policy instrument), and i=market rate of interest (monetary policy 
instrument). 
22 What is the marginal product of labor of a CEO ( CEOLMP  ) that justifies compensation (  ) more 






wealth, which has discredited privatization in these nations, as the media have reported 
widely. 
Privatization has faced and will face opposition from entrenched members of the existing 
management concerned about losing their positions, from labor groups concerned about job 
losses in subsequent business restructuring or from local interest groups, linked industries 
that might be adversely affected by a change in ownership, and the citizens of the country 
by losing their national wealth. Unfortunately, governments do not listen to such opponents 
because of their power, the pressure from EU and the IMF, and the global trend. Political 
opponents are often eager to use the issues raised in the privatization debate for political 
advantage, but when they will be in government, they act the same way. Many times, there 
is no transparency, fairness, objective selection criteria for possible private-sector buyers, for 
investment bankers or for facilitators of the privatization process and the country and its 
citizens experience tremendous social costs. 
Usually, state own enterprises will command a very low price, which is far below book 
value (politicians are charged of “giving away” these public firms). There are possible long-
term liabilities involving environmental and health issues that the new owners may not 
want to take on and which require some kind of government guarantee. [Walter and Smith 
(2000, p. 179)]. Evaluating the condition of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) is often complex 
and difficult. The government is forced to accept a “realistic market value”, which is not fair 
for the country and its wealth preservation, because always it is below book value. The 
valuation techniques, used for private enterprises, cannot be used, here, because they are 
not suitable to the situation. What will be the appropriate discount rates needed for this 
valuation? The complexity of taxes, regulations, unions, investment bankers, role of foreign 
investors in this privatization, which might cause serious security issues for the country, due 
to corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency of the government officials make the correct 
valuation impossible.  
Finally, a large number of shares of a privatized firm must go to employees of the state-
owned enterprise (SOE) because these employees have contributed, materially and 
intellectually to the value of the firm and therefore, a stake in its ownership must go to them 
or only employees as owners may improve performance of this private firm. Of course, the 
worst thing for the firm’s labor could be extensive layoffs and personnel changes. Even the 
great Greek philosopher, Aristotle, understood self-sufficiency, which build state stability. A 
person must participate in the activities of the state in order to achieve his natural end and 
love it, as his own country. The ideal city (state) supports “mere life, it exists for the sake of a 
good life”. [Aristotle, Politics (1252b27-1253a1)]. 
Alternatives to shifting ownership to new investors (privatization) include leasing and 
operating concessions, but the social benefits are also insignificant (there might be social 
losses). (1) A build-operate-transfer contract may involve the sale to a private company of a 
concession to undertake an infrastructure project, like a bridge or tunnel, and to operate it 
on a commercial basis for perhaps 30 years, after which the project reverts to the 
government at no cost or at a price, but the value of this asset will be relatively low 
(completely obsolete) at that time and the maintenance cost very high. The benefits for the 
government can be insignificant. (2) A facility such as a resort or a seaport or a canal may be 
leased to a private operator for a fixed period against mutually agreeable performance 
requirements and financial terms, but the risk is that workers will be layoff and the state is 
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losing temporarily its wealth. (3) A state-owned enterprise (SOE) may be placed under a 
management contract with a private operator, who has the necessary expertise to maximize 
profit by minimizing cost (labor cost mostly), which will affect negatively employment. 
Thus, the social welfare is not improving and the revenue for the government from the 
leases is negligible.23 
The above approaches are difficult for the state and the labor of the country and the results 
are the same as transferring ownership to private enterprises. Such transfers are common in 
EU by all socialist and centrist governments. Governments might give up operational 
control in privatizations via share offers, but they have to retain veto power through the 
corporate charter with regard to choice of the CEO, maximum allowable foreign 
shareholdings, and by retention of a “golden share” (more than 51%), which enables them to 
block certain corporate action that would go against the social welfare of the country, 
especially during periods of financial crises and recessions, as Figure 1 shows. 
Of course, as it has been mentioned above, the efficiency gains from privatization emanate 
from the monopoly power that the private owners have after privatization of this SOE and 
from the operational efficiency, due to superior management of this new private firm. 
Utilities and other government services fall into this category and the private owners are 
benefited immensely after privatization (exploitation of monopoly rents). The private firms’ 
shareholders (who are mostly foreigners) clearly benefit from the increased profits. This 
increase in cash flows reduces the default risk of the company’s debt-holders and 
consequently the risk premium, and the cost of capital. 
It will be in the country’s advantage and in the government’s political interest to ensure that 
SOE ownership remains in domestic private hands. For doing this, the government has to 
offer domestic bidders tax breaks or other subsidies in order to ensure that they remain 
competitive against foreign bidders for this SOE. Of course, the government may legally 
restrict foreign buyers from bidding for the SOE for security purposes. Privatization has 
been so far “politically successful” in EU; it has been endorsed and overseen by a wide 
spectrum of political opinion (all the “new age” parties) and has become, with the passage 
of time, generally accepted (imposed by force); notwithstanding some epic battles over 
particular privatizations. Unfortunately, the trend is, “the market knows best” and there is 
no need to have public approval through referenda. But, it proved in 2008 that the market 
does not know and its ignorance caused serious problems to the global economies, which 
are not over yet, after four years.  
Unremittingly, institutional investors have mostly participated in EU privatizations. An 
important question is the extent to which foreign investors should be included as eligible 
buyers in privatizations. There are strong national security arguments against limits to 
                                                 
23 Greece has leased the seaport of Piraeus to a state-owned Chinese firm, Cosco, for 35 years and 
people lost their jobs. Also, Chinese are bringing everything that they want to Europe, which 
affect negatively employment, income, and tax revenue in Greece and the entire Europe. See, 
“China’s new Silk Road into Europe”, The Telegraph, August 19, 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/7869999/Chinas-new-Silk-Road-into-
Europe.html.  
See also, Louisa Lim, “In Greek Port, Storm Brews over Chinese-Run Labor”, (npr.org, August 25, 2011). 
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foreign participation. [Markusen (2001)]. Privatization is at its root a very local business with 
strong political links. For investment bankers themselves, few sources of revenue are more 
attractive than the kinds of fees that can be earned in privatization transactions. They put 
their firm’s skills and knowledge to work without necessarily committing its capital, and the 
fees (commensurate with the value-added of the service) are usually considerable. With the 
current trend of globalization, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and privatization have 
become worldwide social problems of wealth deprivation (wealth transferring from citizens 
to multinationals).  
At the end, these advisers (investment bankers) on privatization, initial public offerings 
(IPOs) between 1985 and 1999, made $167.2 billion in proceeds by involving in 488 issues. 
Advisers on privatization, seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) from 1985-1999, had as proceeds 
$462.4 billion in 4,936 different issues. [Walter and Smith (2000, pp. 194-195)]. Then, 
privatization continues to be an active business for investment bankers (and they are the 
initiators of this process in many cases), ultimately they will transfer everything to the 
private sector and countries will end up without any assets and without any national 
wealth. Europe has been the primary scene of complete privatization, due to the pressure 
from the EMU (Maastricht criteria) and the IMF (debt crisis). Historically, before the 
integration of these countries the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was unique and the 
unemployment was in the region of 2% in Europe. Now, they are basically “sold out” and 
the social problems are increasing (there are regions with 40% unemployment rate). Of 
course, their leaders will sell everything and EU will remain for a long time attractive arena 
for investment banks24 to maximize their objective functions against the citizens and the 
nations’ objectives. Our problem is that we do not have good sets of data, which could allow 
us to infer statistically, by running different tests, validating the effects of privatization on 
financial markets (liquidity), on employment, on output, and on social welfare. 
The European integration under the common currency, the euro, has created a complex 
relationship between the structure of the financial systems, the uncontrolled enterprises and 
speculators, and the nation, which has lost its public policies [Kallianiotis (2011a)] and its 
sovereignty and cannot exercise any control. The financial system plays a limited role in 
corporate governance, in determining to whom management reports and the performance 
standards to whom management is held. It tries to allocate capital to the most productive 
uses and denies it to the less competitive small local businesses. The uniform approach to 
corporate control (actually, immunity) will ultimately destroy the small domestic firms, 
which have traditionally existed in the national economies, created jobs, entrepreneurship, 
and established a social environment. It is necessary to save small businesses in every 
country. 
We may see some growing opportunities for external financing of large corporations in 
Euro-zone, with lower cost of capital and competitive performance, but the reduction in 
labor cost has affected negatively workers, with their downsizing and their only focus on 
shareholders value and executives’ compensation. The market capitalism acts in the interest 
                                                 
24 Investment bankers caused the current financial crisis, which led countries to chaos and citizens to 
suicide. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that “Today, investment banks, the pride of Wall 
Street, have virtually ceased to exist.” See, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/russias-putin-
financial-system-has-failed  
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of shareholders to maximize their wealth. The CEOs determine by themselves their 
payments, which are in tens and hundreds of millions of dollars per annum. Agency 
problems exist and growing. A small financial crisis led these oligopolists to financial 
distress and governments have to bail them out. All political parties have become neo-
liberals and governments have lost completely their control towards irresponsible 
multinational firms and towards the guided media, which provide any propaganda that 
they want as news and shape the public opinion the way to satisfy anti-national policies and 
anti-social objectives by receiving very high compensations. [Kallianiotis (2010b)]. 
The CEOs compensation reached $250 million per annum. “Wall Street’s five biggest firms 
paid more than $3.1 billion in the last five years to their top executives, while they presided 
over the packaging and sale of loans that helped bring down the investment-banking 
system. Merrill Lunch & Co., once the largest U.S. brokerage, paid its chief executives the 
most, with Stanley O’Neil taking in $172 million from 2003 to 2007 and John Thain $86 
million after a month’s work last year [2007]. … Bear Stearns Co.’s James ‘Jimmy’ Cayne 
made $161 million before the company collapsed and was sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Goldman Chief Executive Officer, Lloyd Blankfein, made $57.6 million in 2007 in salary and 
bonus. Co-presidents Gary Cohn and Jon Winkelried each got $56 million. Morgan Stanley’s 
current and former chief executives, John Mack and Philip Purcell, were paid about $194 
million over the last five years. The ex-U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, who was the 
former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. CEO, received about $111 million between 2003 and 2006. 
(Democrats and Republicans in Congress were demanding that limits be placed on 
executive pay as part of the $700 billion financial rescue plan proposed by U.S. Treasury 
Secretary, Henry Paulson, who said in testimony to Congress on September 24, 2008, that he 
would accept such limits as part of the plan after initially opposing them). Goldman Sachs 
had the highest total executive pay, of $859 million, followed by Bear Sterns at $609 million. 
CEO pay at the five firms increased each year, doubling to $253 million in 2007. (Executive-
compensation figures include salary, bonuses, stock and stock options, some awarded for 
past performance).”  
Shareholders and boards should have done something about this robbery of the firms and 
society a long time ago. These people cannot make more than $1 million per year! This is a 
crime against humanity! This corrupted system increases inequality, iniquity, social 
injustice, indifference, and destroys our traditional moral and ethical value system. The 
amazing is that employees are making this big money only, if they work in Wall Street, in 
Hollywood or if they are soccer players. Does it tell something for the trend of our falling 
society? The American people, as well as the Europeans are very angry about executive 
compensation and they are absolutely right. Of course, the foreigners, when they hear these 
figures, their anti-capitalism is increasing. The U.S. government and the regulatory 
authorities have a weak record when they come to regulating compensation and it seems 
that nothing will happen and the Western economies will follow their negative trends. It is 
impossible the compensation committee or the general counsel or the head of human 
resources to negotiate a pay package with someone who will be their boss in a week; it is a 
vicious cycle, here, and there are always too many loopholes. Then, the system will collapse.    
Firms’ objective of value maximization, [ V D P Smax    ], without any constraints 
[social, moral, ethical, legal, environmental, etc.], causes serious social (welfare) problems. 
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legal environment to exist). Governments are controlled by businesses and lobbyists. 
Inefficiency has become the trend in the markets, due to excess profit, speculation, inside 
information, corruption, labor exploitation, cartels, price control, price discrimination 
(depending on the price elasticity), formation of public expectations, and other frictions. 
Corporate lobbies are seeking to pursue only their policy. Governments provide the 
regulatory and legal structure and the institutions, within which businesses function and 
enjoy social safety, security, tax shields, a productive labor supply, a huge market for their 
products and services, and everything they need. [Kallianiotis (2003 and 2002, p. 55)]. 
From the stakeholders of corporations (managers, shareholders, customers, and workers), 
workers and customers have the least rights and privileges, are last in priorities, and their 
interests are not satisfy. People (citizens) carry the burden of everything in a nation, not the 
businesses and not the governments. Actually, they are property-holders, but the 
government with the taxes, businesses with the high prices on goods and services, and the 
banks with the high interest on loans and low interest on deposits, take all people’s surplus 
away. 
Laissez faire economy needs some government regulations, but the government has to be 
independent and a true democracy, which is a very rare form of government, today. Politics 
and markets are inseparable; actually, politicians obey to the powerful markets (“money 
talks”). Of course, relations between government, banks, and industry are antagonistic, 
because the interest of the first is the social interest and of the seconds is the self-interest. 
Unfortunately, markets are short-sighted, acting against the social interest, and pro-
cyclically. An example can be the oil companies, which had raised the price of oil to a level, 
which caused a global recession. The deregulation of the financial markets since 1980 caused 
this enormous financial crisis in 2008. On October 23, 2008, the former Fed chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, during a testimony on Capitol Hill, admitted that he made errors been against 
regulations and keeping the interest rate at 1% for a long period. Furthermore, credit-default 
swaps (CDSs), which allow banks and other lenders to buy insurance against borrowers 
going bust, have cause serious problems to the borrowing countries and the financial 
markets. Europeans are asking for more regulations of these “toxic” speculative instruments 
and more transparency, especially lately, with the debt crises of the GIPSI (“PIIGS”) nations 
in Euro-zone. Further, the EU was considering a ban on speculative derivative trades, 
including credit-default swaps, which have been blamed for worsening the crisis in Greece. 
Of course, the central issue in Europe can not be the free-market model, but the economic 
and social well-being of the sovereign nations. The labor force is losing, daily, its previous 
rights and achievements. The illegal immigrants (the substitute of labor force by business) 
are contributing to these employment problems. Lately, the physical capital (wealth) 
belongs to foreigners; the technological changes are so drastic, which is difficult to follow by 
citizens and very costly to businesses, the long-term unemployment is very serious, the 
international trade (imports from China and developing countries) has destroy domestic 
economies. The primary (agriculture) and secondary (manufacturing) sectors are 
disappearing from Europe, as it has happened in the U.S. They have to protect their 
domestic industries and to enforce antitrust laws because oligopolists are thriving and 
monopolists are coming to replace them. There can be no antitrust exemptions, if they want 
to protect a little the fair competition and small businesses. Governments have to be in 
control of the anti-social free-market. 
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The root of any problem in EU lies in the political process itself and in the weak (servile) 
politicians. Each EU country-member was structured by idiosyncratic founding 
circumstances, culture, civilization, and social structure, different points of departure for 
each nation imprinted their own mark on their evolution and for some on their thousands 
years old history (with common nationality, religion, language, etc). Homogeneity is 
absolutely necessary for nations to survive and accomplish great things in their journey in 
history. National societies in each of the countries participating in the euro, instead of 
accepting this new currency were and are against it, which has caused tremendous inflation, 
inequalities, increase in cost, reduction in foreign investments and exports, and has affected 
negatively social improvements and growth because public policies have been lost. 
[Kallianiotis (2011a)]. Financial systems and economies are negatively affected by the 
growth in incomes of illegal immigrants and the excessive profits of businesses. Lately, a 
large proportion of population entrusted their assets to financial markets (stock exchanges) 
by taking them out from banks (traditional savings) and now, with this global crisis, they 
lost completely their wealth. Also, the occupation structures changed; they destroyed 
farming (that means destructions of villages and small towns) and small businesses 
(destruction of entrepreneurs).  
Lastly, the role of the ignorant, but powerful bureaucrats is tremendous in Europe (Brussels) 
and the structure of powerless governments is not very stable in some countries. The style of 
public policy varied considerably, both overtime and between the countries. In all European 
countries, the exploitation of labor, the financial disaster of 1929-1931 undermined the 
legitimacy of capitalism, leading to a general sidelining of securities markets and a high 
degree of formal regulation. Marxists and socialists favored extensive nationalization and a 
“social market economy”, where government regulators set the legal parameters, within 
which market processes could evolve. After 1960s, with fiscal policies, they stimulated the 
economic growth by issuing extensively government bonds, which promoted the expansion 
of the government bond markets. Then, trade was growing and the operation of 
multinationals developed the financial markets, Euro-currencies markets, and Euro-
banking. The pre-transition phase of Europe was characterized by inflation, high growth 
and full employment, banks were state-owned mostly, very little corporate bankruptcies, 
inadequate control over monetary aggregates and credit, an intellectual battle of ideas 
among economists and within the media, and an increasing vulnerability of the currency (at 
least, countries have as tool the devaluation of their currencies for pursuing trade policies) 
and of the domestic financial system to external sources of disturbance. Then, it came the 
integration in 1990s and the global financial crisis in 2008, which made Europe an 
oppressive and in debt continent, begging IMF for loans, third-world, poor and 
unemployed, unrecognizable mixture of Europeans and non-Europeans, but called them 
“European citizens”. These debt crises are going to deprive EU nations of their public 
wealth with the imposed privatizations by the Troika. This is a true social crisis for Europe 
(social dissolution)! 
4. Concluding remarks 
Assessment of the comparative performance of the different enterprises owned by private 
firms (POEs) or by governments (SOEs) is basically impossible, due to the complexity and 
social effects and due to political pressure and expediency. The Euro-zone had evolved 
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markets, through privatization, in the world; but, what are the social benefits of market 
users and of the nations? By pure economic measures, we might say that there was 
economic welfare, but there was no social one. The savers (investing in the stock market) 
lost their money in the year 2000 and 2008, and many of them had sold their real assets and 
used this liquidity to invest in financial assets promising an outrageous return (without 
mentioning the risk of their investments). Employment has also been negatively affected. 
The Euro-zone might have created some opportunities for the financial markets, but their 
risks have caused the cost to exceed the benefits. Thus, we can assert that with privatization, 
we will benefit from the high liquidity, which is created in the financial markets; but its 
social cost offsets the social benefits. 
Privatizations have been motivated by a range of different subjective goals and suspiciously 
imposed objectives; many have nothing to do with efficiency or social welfare. Some goals 
are fiscal; raising money from the sale of public enterprises in order to reduce deficits and 
pay for the current government expenditures, due to its inefficient management and 
corruption. Also, privatization is reducing the economic and political influence of unions, 
which is against workers’ interest. These new private firms with their shares will stimulate 
and develop the domestic capital markets and provide more investment opportunities 
(share ownership) to wealthy citizens, to pension funds, to institutional investors, and to 
foreigners. Finally, the economic importance of the government will be reduced and the 
private firms (multinationals, Arabs, China) will take over (economic imperialism, 
globalization, etc.) the entire national wealth. 
In assessing the impacts of privatization, there is statistically a problem of selection bias 
because the choice was not random. The privatization is more likely to occur to badly-
performing state-owned enterprises, than to the whole sample of SOEs. Then, the conclusion 
that privatization improves corporate performance based on the post-privatization 
experience of these selected firms, it is true; because they were the worst firms owned by the 
government. Some people say that phone rates have declined substantially, due to 
privatization of telephone companies, but this can be due to deregulation, competition, and 
drastic technological changes (in switches, optic cables, mobile phone technology, 
outsourcing, and numerous other innovations), lately. With the higher prices before, the 
state had high government revenue; now it has to raise taxes from other sources and 
increase borrowing. Then, lower prices cannot be interpreted as welfare-improving; 
especially, for the unemployed citizens. 
Other people are saying that privatization improves profits and share prices of the new 
private firms. Evidence has shown that profitability has been improved, but the rise in share 
prices is due to the politically-motivated under-pricing of the initial share issues. All the 
benefits are going to the financial markets insiders. This is actually a transfer of wealth from 
taxpayers (citizens) to share owners (foreigners) and facilitators (investment bankers). 
Unfortunately, privatization leads to significant labor-shedding and consequently to 
improvements in labor productivity. Then, the labor-shedding is the dominant source of 
post-privatization improvement in profitability. But what about the social welfare with so 
many people unemployed or displaced to low pay (minimum wages) and unsecured or part 
time jobs?  
Furthermore, many economists have proved that privatization has not been an economic 
miracle, but only a part of the wider liberal (“new age”) restructuring and trend in the 
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global economy after 1980s (globalization), involving imposition of higher taxes, public 
spending restrictions, destruction of trade unions, increasing “flexibility” (exploitation) of 
labor, etc.; but, the GDP growth and employment have not increased as a result of 
privatization. Ownership of a large section of the economy (nations’ endowments) has been 
transferred (redistribution of wealth) from public hands (citizens) to private ones 
(foreigners). We have created inefficient and unequal material opportunities republics (but 
not democracies) by introducing different non-traditional valuation techniques. We, with 
our approvals and popular writings, destroyed the nuclear families, the villages, the small 
towns, family businesses, and the sovereign nations, and call our-selves social scientists. 
Politically, because of the trend and pressure, there is a strong, but wrong perception that 
this has been important and successful for them. The question is here, what the future 
politicians are going to sell? There will be no national wealth anymore. Then, the current 
politicians have not only caused serious problems to their citizens, but to their future 
colleagues, too.   
The welfare of public sector workers is affected differently by economic shocks than is the 
well-being of private sector employees and this is an issue of political economy. In many EU 
countries, public sector employees constituted a large force in the electorate. As voters and 
as officials implementing social policies, they have a large influence on the legal rules 
governing the private labor markets. Their interests are not aligned with those of private 
sector employees. Public sector employees do not benefit directly through enhanced market 
power and increased salaries in the private labor market because these actions are 
increasing uncertainty and cost of production. Hence, they should be more inclined to 
abolish private-sector protections that discourage firing, such as severance pay, advance 
notice requirements, and seniority rules, policies that may result in persistent 
unemployment. Public servants enjoy some economic rent, too. This can be called a 
bureaucratic rent or utility premium of government sector workers relative to private sector 
ones and can be caused by high wages, fringe benefits, and job amenities or by the 
possibility of extracting bribes. High economic security enjoyed by public sector employees 
is a valuable fringe benefit of public sector employment that should be taken into account 
when we analyze the social welfare loss, due to privatization. During the current debt crisis, 
the pressure from the lenders for reduction of the public sector has affected negatively the 
social welfare.  
People need “good life self-sufficiency”, which includes sufficient work, sufficient property 
ownership, sufficient wealth, sufficient education, sufficient leisure time, and sufficient 
progress. People need to reach human excellence (perfection) and they need self-sufficiency, 
safety, security, and certainty for developing virtues. Then, people need private property 
ownership and nations need public property ownership. State ownership makes people to 
be co-owners and cultivate civil friendships, love, patriotism, and become involved in the 
life of the state (homeland, nation). The end of an Aristotelian democracy is liberty and 
equality. Of course, five centuries later, we adopted new superior virtues, through 
revelation. We expect people to reach, through work, a certain level of self-sufficiency, but 
privatization eliminates their right to work and confines their national wealth. Thus, we 
have to find the optimal level of privatization that maximizes the social welfare. This is the 
point where the marginal benefits of privatization (revenue to the government, efficiency of 
the private sector, reduction of deficits and debt, increase in liquidity of the financial 
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unemployment, loss of income and public wealth, dependency on foreign capital, private 
monopolists, higher prices, high risk, bail out cost), which can be written as 
( P SEDMB MC ). 
The social welfare systems, today, have failed to sufficiently satisfy even the basic needs of 
mere life for all individuals. The first problem that arises from privatization is the failure of 
the system to create a balance between the rich (who are now the owners of the private 
firms) and the poor (who are now unemployed, due to privatization). The wealthy people 
rule in our societies, both directly and indirectly; with their money they erode the 
government, too. It is impossible for a challenger without a great deal of wealth to win a seat 
in the government. Most people never rule, and many people remain in office for decades. 
Another problem is dependency. Lack of labor that satisfies one’s basic needs foster an 
atrophy of talents and work skills that must be honed in labor. If a family is not self-
sufficient, it is unstable and the same is true for the nation. A system, which is unable to 
create full employment ( u 0 ), price stability ( 0  ), and balanced its trade ( X M ) and 
budget ( T G ) is unnecessary for our societies. 
Technology, with its high cost and its contribution to unemployment, has played a significant 
role in the increasing difficulty of fulfilling basic needs, especially if you are unemployed. 
Additionally, the overall cost of living keeps rising. We become poorer and poorer every day. 
Then, the other problem of our free-market system, except unemployment, is inflation, which 
is mostly a supply-side one, due to our inelastic demands, and the consumers’ loans from 
financial institutions (greediness, profiteering, deception, gluttony, bribery, and corruption). 
Finally, the production of the nation (Q) must be equal to absorption (E); then, exports will be 
equal to imports and the government budget in balance. The lack of a sufficient social welfare 
system, today, puts at risk not only the stability of our democracy, but also the greater good of 
the ability of citizens to flourish within their nation, which is also losing its sovereignty. The 
current situation reminds us the Roman Empire at the time of its fall and destruction. 
Reliable evidence of any positive impact of privatization on broader growth, efficiency, and 
welfare is sparse or inexistent. In a democratic society, the perception of “consumers” (citizens 
and voters) matter more than the politicians’ one. Politicians’ views and prospects, today, are 
far away from the citizens’ ones; and this is the reason that they try to avoid any referendum. 
Democracies and democratic values are disappearing from our societies. The future of the 
citizens and of the new generations will be very difficult. Traditional state ownership, now, 
plays no economic role in Europe and the list of candidates for continuing privatization is very 
short. Of course, the pressure from EU, IMF, World Bank, and other international institutions 
(which are against the indigenous culture, heritage, and freedom of humans) will continue in 
all countries to sell every asset to the private firms and now, it is the “best time”, you can buy 
public enterprises at a very low market price. Why are these agencies against society? What is 
their objective? For whom are they working? Who is controlling them?   
The unfortunate pro-free-market reformers in Europe aim to continue to privatize all state-
owned enterprises and to sell everything that belongs to the tax payers (citizens) to 
multinational firms (foreigners). The citizens are losing the public wealth; they have no 
private wealth because the rich foreigners have acquired every private real and financial 
assets and at the end, they will become homeless in their own country and because of no 
immigration laws, they will become minorities inside their nation; then, the U.S.A. together 
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with the EU will take away their own country and give it to the visitors (illegal immigrants), 
who have a very high birth rate (and they have become the majority inside the host 
country). If this is social justice and the philosophy of international laws and institutions are 
in favor of these crimes against the citizens, against the nations, and against the history, 
humanity is in trouble! The current financial crisis has proved that privatization needs some 
moderation. Only governments can act (gradually and moderately) against the business 
cycle and improve, through public policies and regulation, employment, income, national 
wealth, and the social welfare of the country. The corrupted private (free-market) financial 
institutions depend on governments to bail them out. 
Finally, privatization proposals in key public services sectors, such as water and electricity, 
are in many cases strongly opposed by opposition political parties and civil society groups. 
Usually campaigns involve demonstrations, political means, and strikes by trade unions; 
sometimes they may become violent, but the state has the police and suppresses the 
demonstrators. It is possible that national services may sub-contract or out-source functions 
to private enterprises instead of having a total privatization. Also, a public enterprise may 
be privatized, with a number of shares (51%) in the company being retained by the state. 
While partial privatization could be an alternative, it is more often a stepping stone to full 
privatization, but the government is doing this slowly to avoid its political cost. 
Privatization programs have been undertaken in many countries across the world and in 
every one in the EU. Stanford (2008) says that “the striking point about the range of case 
studies presented in Privatization Experiences in the European Union [Kothenburger and 
Whalley (2006)], however, is that there would seem to be little evidence of any universal 
truths regarding either the inefficiencies of state ownership, or the benefits of privatization”. 
The first privatization program conducted by transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1989 in the process of instituting a market economy, after the fall of 
communism, had some rationale. The worst privatization program is the one carried out in 
developing countries and in high debt EMU member-nations under the pressure by 
international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, and EU). The least harmful 
privatization is the one that is carried out by developed country democratic governments 
without any pressure from international institutions or the EU, but just to maximize the 
social welfare of the nation without transferring any power to foreigners or compromising 
the security and safety of its own citizens.  
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Paradoxes of Welfare:  
Universality, Truth, and Power  
in Modern Welfare Provision 
Kaspar Villadsen 
Copenhagen Business School,  
Denmark 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter explores paradoxes in modern welfare provision. In so doing, it both engages 
with theoretical expositions of the contradictions within modern forms of governing and by 
presenting three specific case studies on paradoxical welfare. The chapter draws in 
particular upon insights from Michel Foucault and governmentality writers, and empirically 
it uses studies from Denmark done by the author and one done by a fellow researcher. First 
the chapter presents the view on governmentality as it was developed by Foucault and 
writers who draw on his framework for understanding modern power. This section 
especially highlights the paradoxes inherent in modern ways of governing, and it discusses 
how these paradoxes re-emerge and give shape to modern welfare provision. Next, the 
chapter explores three cases of concrete welfare provision with a focus on its inherent 
paradoxes. The first case is on the preparatory training of unemployed people, the second 
concerns anti-authoritarian dialogue techniques used in motivational therapy, and the third 
examines health promotion by means of ‘playful’ techniques purporting to influence 
individuals’ identity-work. Finally, a brief discussion is offered on how paradoxes may be 
handled not only analytically but also by practitioners. The point of departure of the chapter 
is that paradoxes constitute a persisting and integral property of modern welfare provision. 
This means that we may hardly hope to suspend or resolve them once and for all, but 
should rather look for ways of rendering them productive.  
2. Governmentality: A prism for observing paradoxes 
In the tradition of critical analyses of power offered by Foucault and his interlocutors, 
particular attention is paid to paradoxes inherent in modern exercises of power. As an 
immediate marker, we may say that the perspective examines the problem of ‘governing 
freedom’. More precisely this problem concerns how in modern societies authorities may 
govern formally free individuals, and at the level of politics, how state authorities may 
regulate when confronted by a civil society characterised by a fundamental capacity of self-
regulation. These broad, diagnostic observations rely upon the approach to liberalism taken 
by Foucault and more recent ‘governmentality studies’ (Barry et al., Rose 1993; Dean 1999). 
Liberal government, on this view, has an internal self-problematizing impetus which makes 
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it sceptical towards (state) planning, in-depth regulation and control of human affairs, while 
it nevertheless intervenes to ensure the play of ‘natural’ regulation within the economy or 
civil society. This double gaze, which observes its objects as at the same time natural and 
cultivated, gives to liberalism (in its different forms) a “prodigiously fertile problematic” 
inciting critique of existing forms of governing and the invention of new ones (Gordon 1991: 
18). On this account, then, the key paradox in liberal welfare states is, in brief, their impetus 
to govern that which is fundamentally, and by its nature, self-governing. 
Another key paradox is the concomitant historical emergence of a double-sided citizen-
figure in modern welfare states. That is, the citizen appears concomitantly as a formal, 
juridical category, whose autonomy should be respected and a as a living being that needs 
discipline, training, care, empowerment and whose health and risks should be looked after. 
An admittedly oversimplified reading of Foucault’s historical work suggests that the 
establishment of modern welfare states based on rights and the delineation of the state’s 
proper scope of intervention was, paradoxically, accompanied by a multiplication of 
institutions and expertise indeed concerned with detailed interventions into the lives of 
citizens. The curious co-existence within modern welfare states of a discourse of formal rights 
and a proliferation of detailed technologies aimed at shaping the subjectivity of citizens is 
noted several places in Foucault’s work (Foucault, 1982; 1994). Thus, in the famous text The 
Subject and Power, Foucault argues—contrary to certain prevalent theories—that the modern 
state is not at all indifferent to the individualities of its population, quite the opposite: 
Most of the time, the state is envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, 
looking only at the interests of the totality or, should I say, a class or a group among the citizens. 
That’s quite true. But I would like to underline the fact that the state’s power (and that is one of 
the reasons for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power. (Foucault, 
1982: 213). 
Foucault explains further that a key reason why the modern state makes use of such an 
individualizing strategy is that it has integrated several components of pastoral power, i.e. 
the rationality and form of governing characteristic for ecclesiastical institutions. One crucial 
characteristic is that this pastoral power is “coexstensive and continuous with life; It is 
linked with a production of truth—the truth of the individual himself’. (Foucault, 1982: 214). 
As a consequence of this integration, the exercise of political sovereignty became infused 
with a pastoral rationality concerned with securing the prosperity and happiness of all and 
each. It is clear that this individualizing power, in terms of its dependence of knowledge of 
individuals’ views, values, and identities, stands in immediate contrast to a formal-legal, 
universalizing conception of the citizen. Foucault offers, then, by drawing this genealogical 
trajectory an alternative understanding of the paradox of universality, still pertinent to so 
many areas of concrete welfare provision. 
A related way of describing the paradoxical character of welfare provision is to emphasize 
the self-contradictory nature of liberalism, understood as a rationality fundamental for 
modern welfare states (irrespectively of specific party political governments). Liberalism is 
self-contradictory since it requires already autonomous individuals while at the same time it 
develops programs to foster and shape independence (Hindess, 1993). This paradox 
becomes more intense and delicate if we consider that liberal thinkers and practitioners for 
the most part already recognise that measures to bind individuals contractually and morally 
to the social order is both a hindrance and precondition of freedom.  
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We must take care, however, not to insert the problem of welfare paradoxes within a 
register of ideology critique. It would be tempting to see the real expansion of disciplinary 
welfare apparatuses as happening under the guise of a background music singing the song 
about a minimal state. Yet, as has already been indicated in the above, Foucault and more 
recent writers on governmentality urge us to see liberalism not as an abstract doctrine which 
is never accomplished or might be severely contradicted by real-life liberal arrangements. 
Liberal forms of governing rather tend towards offering recurrent critique of existing 
governmental arrangements, including those that are established through their own 
procedures and practices. One might say, then, that liberal forms of governing have a certain 
‘preparedness’ for what might happen when governing—how the objects of government 
react when being governed, how populations and economies are effected, and of course, 
which forms of resistance and critique that may be provoked in the governed subjects. And 
so, while liberal governing certainly has certain propensities and predilections, it is a highly 
flexible machine that holds no dream of a total effectuation of a pre-given set of doctrines. It 
is rather propelled by another dream, which is how to model the art of government upon 
the very rationality of the governed themselves: “This, it seems to me, is what characterizes 
liberal rationality: how to model government, the art of government, how to found the 
principle of the rationalization of the art of government on the rational behaviour of those 
who are governed.” (Foucault, 2008: 312). 
Although this key paradox of how to govern freedom has received great attention within 
the governmentality literature (Gordon, 1991; Valverde, 1996; Rose, 1999; Dean, 1999), other 
paradoxes relevant for analysis of welfare provision may be discerned in Foucault’s 
writings. We shall not examine these paradoxes in greater detail here, but may merely 
mention that another key term in Foucault’s work, ‘discipline’, is fundamentally paradoxical 
(Foucault, 1995). Discipline is, for Foucault, one the one hand, a set of practical 
arrangements for normalizing criminals, improving factory discipline, standardizing 
hospitals, and more. On the other hand, discipline also denotes a ‘strategic logic’ or an 
abstract rationale that takes diverse concrete instantiations depending on each particular 
institutional setting (Villadsen, 2008a: 179). The strategic logic of discipline may be termed a 
paradoxical one. First, it echoes the paradox of governing freedom: The exercise of discipline 
in its many variants is at the same time a form of subjugation and precondition for the 
subject’s exercise of power, or ‘agency’, as sociologists would have it. Discipline may thus be 
evaluated as having both empowering and constraining effects on the subject. Second, the 
specific scheme of observation inherent to discipline has a self-propelling, limitless 
mechanism. Such a view could be substantiated be the simple fact that the normal solution 
to disciplinary failures is the exercise of more discipline, and so, disciplinary institutions 
thrive on their failures.  
Discipline has, however, also a more formal quality that drives it toward self-perpetuation: 
Its binary scheme of observation, i.e. normality/deviance, has an unlimited applicability 
and a stable fixation of each side of the binary is fundamentally unachievable. Since the logic 
of discipline is relational, an object which is observed as ‘normal’ in relation to the deviant 
may subsequently be observed as deviant in relation to another standard of normality. Or 
put more simply, the disciplinary gaze may observe a population (prisoners, school 
teachers, job seekers), establish a certain norm of normality and then categorise some 
individuals as deviant. The population of ‘normal’ individuals may, however, be observed 
anew, and some members may again be separated out as deviating sufficiently from the 
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it sceptical towards (state) planning, in-depth regulation and control of human affairs, while 
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A related way of describing the paradoxical character of welfare provision is to emphasize 
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norm to be ‘abnormal’. One paradox inherent to discipline, then, is that an individual may 
be at the same time normal and deviant, depending on the context, the norm, the moment 
and the characteristics of other individuals present. The phrase ‘we live in a normalizing 
society’ indicates this relational mechanism in discipline.  
Writers in the Foucaultian tradition do not normally theorize the concept of paradox (if they 
use it at all), when addressing governmental contradictions. Yet, the above framing of 
governmental ambiguities and contradictions as paradoxes hopefully indicates analytical 
potentials in using the term. Foucault did never himself theorize the term, but he 
occasionally uses paradox to describe contradictions inherent in particular forms of 
government. For instance, he uses the term in his description of the science of police, a 
rationality of government that emerged in Germany during the 17th and 18th century and 
had as its goal to maximize the strength of the state by undertaking in depth regulation of 
social relations. Foucault comments that ‘the central paradox of police’, is that its objective of 
governing is “to develop those elements of individual lives in such a way that their 
development also fosters the strength of the state” (1994: 322). For Foucault, this double 
objective constitutes a key element in modern forms of government. It always observes the 
citizen as both a part of the totality of the population and as an individual whose particular 
welfare must be secured.  
We note that Foucault on this occasion (as well as on others) uses a conventional 
understanding of paradoxes. Here, paradox means a situation which seems to have no 
logically viable solution, since characterised by the presence of two irreconcilable demands. 
In such a commonly accepted understanding “paradox may mean a state in which two 
diametrically opposing ideas/forces are simultaneously present, neither of which can ever 
be resolved or eliminated” (Stacey, 2003: 11). A bit of analytical complexity could be added 
to this understanding by drawing briefly (and loosely) upon some basic ideas concerning 
paradoxes in Niklas Luhmann. This is not the place to debate the compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between Foucault and Luhmann’s systems theory at the level of 
epistemology (see for instance, Borch, 2005), nor to contrast Luhmann’s sympathetic attitude 
to the modern, rational bureaucracy with postmodern values of fluidity, fragmentation and 
respect for unique individuality (Villadsen, 2011a; DuGay, 2000). I merely wish to add to my 
analytical approach a few elementary points from Luhmann which seem immediately 
reconcilable with Foucault’s approach to government and power (Pottage, 1998).  
Contrary to most social science, paradoxes are for Luhmann not to be avoided and 
eliminated. They are rather a basic condition of communication and function as impetus for 
new communication, and here communication should be understood in a very broad sense 
encompassing both the use of language, acts, and symbols. Paradoxes rests on the existence 
of a difference, a distinction with two sides between which there is a certain indeterminacy 
(Kneer & Nassehi, 2000). As soon as an observer indicates one side of the distinction, he will 
be referred to the other side. For instance, to observe what is lawful one immediately needs 
to indicate the unlawful. The paradox is that this observer (of first order) cannot not observe 
the distinction upon which his observations rests, and thus he cannot question if the basic 
distinction of law that distinguishes between right and not-right is in itself rightful. Or, to 
return to the case of discipline, the paradox is here that the positively indicated side in the 
distinction normal/deviant is divided again, when we observe that within the ‘normals’ still 
some individuals deviate from the norm. The example illustrates that there is nothing 
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fundamental about paradoxes; they are rather the property of the communicative operations 
of social systems.  
For systems to reproduce themselves communicatively, they need to put aside the paradox 
by making it immediately invisible through strategies of ‘de-paradoxification’. New 
distinctions, concepts or programs are needed to recodify or reformulate the paradox so that 
it becomes manageable; or, so that the complexity of indeterminacy becomes determinable 
(Luhmann, 1991). The Luhmannian observer (of second order) can observe the 
communicative strategies that are performed by first order observers to negotiate, 
reconfigure and displace paradoxes in order to make them less disruptive. Governmentality 
analysts undertake a similar job, since they also analyze how governmental programs and 
technologies revolve around particular paradoxes, which they are forced to unfold, 
negotiate and reformulate to make them less disruptive. The below case examples will be 
guided by insights from the governmentality literature, supplemented by these basic points 
about paradoxes offered by Luhmann.   
2. Key paradoxes in welfare provision 
Keeping in mind the insights from Foucault, some of his recent interlocutors, and Luhmann, 
I will use the term ‘governmental paradoxes’ to pinpoint challenges and contradictions 
faced by welfare services broadly. In more specific terms, the paradox of welfare provision 
will be examined in three different prototypes, that is, ‘the paradox of universality’, ‘the 
paradox of truth’, and ‘the paradox of power’. First, with respect to universality, welfare 
provision generally observes the citizen as at the same time particular and universal. This 
paradox leads to a series of programs, techniques and institutions that seek to meet the 
citizen in an open, singular, unrestricted fashion, but nevertheless make reference to some 
inherent, generalised qualities allegedly resting within each individual. A study below 
addresses this key problem in social work by exploring a strictly related paradox, that is, the 
concomitant emphasis on respect of the client’s autonomy and a desire to change the 
personality of clients. Most avenues of social policy and social work emphasize that the 
client is autonomous, that choices must originate from the client himself, that ‘over-selling’ 
services is counterproductive, etc. At the same time, however, social work construes a series 
of specific aspects of the client as objective problems that demand treatment, elimination or 
keeping in check (Villadsen, 2004; 2007).  
In a short text on the historical emergence of ‘the form of knowledge of social work’, Mark 
Philp (1979) expounds key paradoxes in this knowledge—although he does not theorize the 
term. Philp argues that the knowledge of modern social work is paradoxical since it 
constructs clients as equipped with a subjectivity which is at the same time universal and 
particular: “The social worker creates a subject who is characterised by a universal 
subjectivity, one which applies to all individuals and yet no one in particular” (Philp, 1979: 
91; Quoted in Villadsen, 2008a). For this construction, social work draws upon disciplines 
within the human sciences such as psychology, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology, but 
Philp argues that social work is irreducible to these disciplines. It has its own regime of truth 
that revolves around the paradox of how to produce objective knowledge of subjectivity. 
The key strategy of ‘deparadoxification’ taken up by modern social workers is, as it is 
implicit in Philp’s analysis, to allude to a not immediately visible subjectivity within the 
client when representing the client to society or institutional figures such as the judge, the 
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fundamental about paradoxes; they are rather the property of the communicative operations 
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communicative strategies that are performed by first order observers to negotiate, 
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will be examined in three different prototypes, that is, ‘the paradox of universality’, ‘the 
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paradox leads to a series of programs, techniques and institutions that seek to meet the 
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concomitant emphasis on respect of the client’s autonomy and a desire to change the 
personality of clients. Most avenues of social policy and social work emphasize that the 
client is autonomous, that choices must originate from the client himself, that ‘over-selling’ 
services is counterproductive, etc. At the same time, however, social work construes a series 
of specific aspects of the client as objective problems that demand treatment, elimination or 
keeping in check (Villadsen, 2004; 2007).  
In a short text on the historical emergence of ‘the form of knowledge of social work’, Mark 
Philp (1979) expounds key paradoxes in this knowledge—although he does not theorize the 
term. Philp argues that the knowledge of modern social work is paradoxical since it 
constructs clients as equipped with a subjectivity which is at the same time universal and 
particular: “The social worker creates a subject who is characterised by a universal 
subjectivity, one which applies to all individuals and yet no one in particular” (Philp, 1979: 
91; Quoted in Villadsen, 2008a). For this construction, social work draws upon disciplines 
within the human sciences such as psychology, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology, but 
Philp argues that social work is irreducible to these disciplines. It has its own regime of truth 
that revolves around the paradox of how to produce objective knowledge of subjectivity. 
The key strategy of ‘deparadoxification’ taken up by modern social workers is, as it is 
implicit in Philp’s analysis, to allude to a not immediately visible subjectivity within the 
client when representing the client to society or institutional figures such as the judge, the 
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doctor, or the parents (Philp, 1979: 99). The image of a miserable and morally decayed 
pauper who nevertheless possesses an inner humanity and socializable potential, which 
may be excavated behind his immediate appearance, was created by the philanthropist and 
passed on to the modern welfare expert (Villadsen, 2011b). This paradox of universality is 
inherent to welfare institutions which encourage their professionals to meet the specific 
citizen/user as a ‘unique person’, and yet need to structure this meeting by standardized 
categories essential to the universal welfare state (Højlund, 2009). At the practical, 
institutional level, then, the paradox becomes one of how management may increase the 
responsiveness toward the particular needs of citizens as users while maintaining the law-
based procedures that safeguard the same citizen’s formal rights. 
The second paradox is the paradox truth. This paradox has recently been reflected in the 
emergence of new demands upon professionals to not act as ’besser wissers’ or as if they 
were in possession of the ultimate truths about needs, welfare, health values etc. This 
paradox of truth has resulted in multifarious technologies that aim a facilitating the 
production of individual opinions on such matters from clients, patients or other services 
users. The paradox in this anti-authoritarian kind of truth production is that the 
professionals may always doubt whether the statements really come from the interior of an 
autonomous subject, or whether this speech is infected by external forces such as subculture, 
‘clientization’, or addiction (Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008). The idea of social clients who are 
divided within themselves between, for instance, authentic willpower and dependency, 
stems from this paradox.  
Foucault suggested an analysis of the historical foundations for the paradox of truth over 
some famous passages towards the end of The Order of Things (1994, 303-343). There, he 
argues that the modern episteme—that is, the overriding and fundamental conditions for 
the production of knowledge in modernity—is marked by an ambiguous figure of Man, 
paradigmatically visible in Kant’s oeuvre. In short, Foucault argues that since the end of the 
18th century modern man’s framework of perception has been governed by an 
‘anthropological double structure’ which conceives of man as an ‘enslaved sovereign’ who is 
at one and the same time free to determine how he lives, works and speaks and determined 
by his biology, labour and language. This double– and indeed a paradoxical—structure 
institutes a relentless ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ which permeates modern Man’s relation to 
his own production of knowledge of the world as well as of himself. Suspicious of his own 
status as both knowing subject and knowable object, he questions whether his knowledge 
succeeds in objectively representing the world, or if it is merely a subjective expression of 
the forces of biology, labour and language which inevitably govern him, as it were, behind 
his back? The case study of dialogue techniques below describes recent attempt to negotiate 
exactly the problem of distinguishing statements originating from the interior will of the 
speakers from those that are produced by structures in the broadest sense of the term.  
The third paradox, the paradox of power, encapsulates the concomitant emphasis on 
deregulation and regulation in modern welfare states. The problem is that the welfare state 
wishes to facilitate the diversity of civil society, yet the state often resorts to planning in 
order to secure this diversity. In many cases, social policies conceive of civil society as an 
unfathomable residual, as well as a concrete collaborator. Paradoxically, for instance, is that 
when governmental authorities seek to support and revitalize agents in civil society, they at 
the same time fear that this very support may infect and undermine the particular rationality 
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of voluntary and grass roots organization (Villadsen, 2008b; Villadsen, 2009). More formally, 
the problem is thus that any premeditated attempt to delimit and strengthen the free, 
autonomous act always runs the risk of undermining this very autonomy. The fundamentally 
asymmetrical relations of power between state authorities and civil society agents are 
therefore sought equilibrated, for instance by means of strategies of ‘partnerships’, ‘project-
organisations’, or quality standards defined by civil society agents themselves (Andersen, 
2008).  
Another version of the paradox of power appears in the relation between centralised state 
authorities and local welfare services when institutions are viewed as at the same time 
autonomous agents and formally regulated service providers. This paradox becomes 
manifest in the concomitant stress on centralized regulation, supervision, and enforcement 
of nationwide standards and calls for increased local autonomy and user-sensitive diversity 
in welfare provision which have been voiced across European welfare states (Clarke & 
Newman, 1997). The paradox of concomitant delegation and centralization is echoed at the 
institutional level where a key problem is how management may favour trust and floor-
level initiatives at the expense of documentation and control, while still checking such 
initiatives by documentation and control? 
At the level of client-professional interactions, the paradox of power appears in yet other 
versions. Generally, client-centred work revolves around concepts of ‘empowerment’, 
‘facilitation of the client’s development’, or ‘supporting client-autonomy’. To justify the need 
for empowerment-work, however, requires that the person to be empowered is first 
categorized as ‘powerless’. Here, the welfare expert takes up the role as ‘good despot’ who 
can both name someone powerless and prescribe the means and telos of the process of 
empowerment (Valverde, 1996; Cruikshank, 1999). The justification for exercising this 
naming and intervening function is makes reference to a defect of the will, lack of self-
esteem, or deprived habits on the part of the disempowered. The idea of an interior will-
power that could be awoken to take control of such unfortunate forces rests, as Valverde 
observes, upon a distinction between passion and reason and techniques for differentiating 
spaces of rule, creating “a spatial division between two psychic spaces” within the governed 
subject (Valverde, 1996: 369). The paradox of empowering social work and therapy is that 
the benefactors need to be observed as disempowered and be placed, as it were, in a 
disempowering position, in order to be empowered. And so, there is a simultaneous 
empowerment and a disempowerment. The general strategy of deparadoxification is here a 
spatial differentiation of the psychic texture of the governed subject (Karlsen & Villadsen, 
2008). An objectification of the subject with reference to the subject’s self-control is hereby 
accomplished.  
3. Activation: Awakening the ‘wage earner’ in each unique person  
Welfare provision is, as mentioned, characterized by its attempts to strike a balance between 
the demand to respect the autonomy of the individual and the ambitions to subject the very 
same individual to a process of transformation. One way of striking this balance is to work 
for a ‘clarification’ of the client’s wishes and needs through different forms of dialogue 
(which we will examine below). Another, related, strategy is to concentrate the 
transformation-work upon specific, isolated aspects in the client, for instance, his view of 
himself or his surroundings, his manner of speaking, or his habits of dressing. Such aspects 
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doctor, or the parents (Philp, 1979: 99). The image of a miserable and morally decayed 
pauper who nevertheless possesses an inner humanity and socializable potential, which 
may be excavated behind his immediate appearance, was created by the philanthropist and 
passed on to the modern welfare expert (Villadsen, 2011b). This paradox of universality is 
inherent to welfare institutions which encourage their professionals to meet the specific 
citizen/user as a ‘unique person’, and yet need to structure this meeting by standardized 
categories essential to the universal welfare state (Højlund, 2009). At the practical, 
institutional level, then, the paradox becomes one of how management may increase the 
responsiveness toward the particular needs of citizens as users while maintaining the law-
based procedures that safeguard the same citizen’s formal rights. 
The second paradox is the paradox truth. This paradox has recently been reflected in the 
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were in possession of the ultimate truths about needs, welfare, health values etc. This 
paradox of truth has resulted in multifarious technologies that aim a facilitating the 
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users. The paradox in this anti-authoritarian kind of truth production is that the 
professionals may always doubt whether the statements really come from the interior of an 
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divided within themselves between, for instance, authentic willpower and dependency, 
stems from this paradox.  
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some famous passages towards the end of The Order of Things (1994, 303-343). There, he 
argues that the modern episteme—that is, the overriding and fundamental conditions for 
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by his biology, labour and language. This double– and indeed a paradoxical—structure 
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speakers from those that are produced by structures in the broadest sense of the term.  
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when governmental authorities seek to support and revitalize agents in civil society, they at 
the same time fear that this very support may infect and undermine the particular rationality 
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of voluntary and grass roots organization (Villadsen, 2008b; Villadsen, 2009). More formally, 
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therefore sought equilibrated, for instance by means of strategies of ‘partnerships’, ‘project-
organisations’, or quality standards defined by civil society agents themselves (Andersen, 
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Another version of the paradox of power appears in the relation between centralised state 
authorities and local welfare services when institutions are viewed as at the same time 
autonomous agents and formally regulated service providers. This paradox becomes 
manifest in the concomitant stress on centralized regulation, supervision, and enforcement 
of nationwide standards and calls for increased local autonomy and user-sensitive diversity 
in welfare provision which have been voiced across European welfare states (Clarke & 
Newman, 1997). The paradox of concomitant delegation and centralization is echoed at the 
institutional level where a key problem is how management may favour trust and floor-
level initiatives at the expense of documentation and control, while still checking such 
initiatives by documentation and control? 
At the level of client-professional interactions, the paradox of power appears in yet other 
versions. Generally, client-centred work revolves around concepts of ‘empowerment’, 
‘facilitation of the client’s development’, or ‘supporting client-autonomy’. To justify the need 
for empowerment-work, however, requires that the person to be empowered is first 
categorized as ‘powerless’. Here, the welfare expert takes up the role as ‘good despot’ who 
can both name someone powerless and prescribe the means and telos of the process of 
empowerment (Valverde, 1996; Cruikshank, 1999). The justification for exercising this 
naming and intervening function is makes reference to a defect of the will, lack of self-
esteem, or deprived habits on the part of the disempowered. The idea of an interior will-
power that could be awoken to take control of such unfortunate forces rests, as Valverde 
observes, upon a distinction between passion and reason and techniques for differentiating 
spaces of rule, creating “a spatial division between two psychic spaces” within the governed 
subject (Valverde, 1996: 369). The paradox of empowering social work and therapy is that 
the benefactors need to be observed as disempowered and be placed, as it were, in a 
disempowering position, in order to be empowered. And so, there is a simultaneous 
empowerment and a disempowerment. The general strategy of deparadoxification is here a 
spatial differentiation of the psychic texture of the governed subject (Karlsen & Villadsen, 
2008). An objectification of the subject with reference to the subject’s self-control is hereby 
accomplished.  
3. Activation: Awakening the ‘wage earner’ in each unique person  
Welfare provision is, as mentioned, characterized by its attempts to strike a balance between 
the demand to respect the autonomy of the individual and the ambitions to subject the very 
same individual to a process of transformation. One way of striking this balance is to work 
for a ‘clarification’ of the client’s wishes and needs through different forms of dialogue 
(which we will examine below). Another, related, strategy is to concentrate the 
transformation-work upon specific, isolated aspects in the client, for instance, his view of 
himself or his surroundings, his manner of speaking, or his habits of dressing. Such aspects 
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may be isolated and presented as objective problems which impede the client from getting a 
job, wean out of substances, or, simply, realizing himself. Delineating the intervention 
around isolated, ‘objective’ problems pertaining to the individual client seems at immediate 
glance to meet the demand to respect him as an autonomous and sovereign person. In this 
way, it can be imagined that a core of individual autonomy is left untouched, which 
reassures us that the client may still make free and independent choices. Across different 
kind of social services, the idea of meeting the particular individual is contradicted by a 
quest for awakening particular general characteristics in the client.  
An illustrative case on this strategy of de-paradoxification comes from training of long term 
unemployed, which was included in an earlier study of the author (Villadsen, 2004). A 
manual for how to do preparatory training and activation endorsed by the Danish Ministry 
of Social Affairs takes as its starting point the paradigmatic liberal position that one must 
never violate client autonomy (Sørensen, 2001). It was not an arbitrary text within Danish 
social policy. The extensive manual was offered for download at the homepage of Ministry 
of Social Affairs, and its principles were thus authorized and promoted for application in 
concrete activation projects. It stresses, on the one hand, that the client should be respected 
as a fully autonomous subject who may only be influenced indirectly by shaping the 
conditions around his choices. On the other hand, the text presents various aspects of the 
client’s personality as objects of manipulation and correction. The manual overcomes the 
paradox of the concomitant emphasis on autonomy and intervention by means of the 
following moves: First it asserts that the client is autonomous and self-responsible, and that 
responsibility should never be taken from him. Instead, the social worker should direct his 
efforts toward ‘the conditions’ for the client’s choice, in order to make some choices more 
attractive than others. The client should always be able to maintain the experience that it is 
himself who has wished a particular service or has made a particular choice (Sørensen, 2011: 
98). As we shall observe, however, the ‘conditions’ for the client’s choices are not all strictly 
external to the client’s subjectivity; quite the contrary. 
The manual gives a lot of specific recommendations as to how preparatory training of 
unemployed people should be carried out. The book is intended as “a tool for anyone who 
works with projects, courses, and other services related to activation or rehabilitation unemployed” 
(Berg Sørensen, 2001: Dust cover). The manual takes as point of departure that social policy 
is in the middle of a transformation which means that it needs to be accommodated to 
citizens who make responsible choices on the basis of their own values and possibilities. 
This situation creates the well-known dilemma which activation projects can not escape 
negotiating: “On the one hand, society should offer conditions and possibilities that enable 
the client to become self-reliant; on the other hand, the client must not be deprived of the 
responsibility for his own life.” (Ibid: 69). In this respect, unemployed constitute a 
particularly great challenge since many of them have been out of work for so many years, 
that they have been ‘clientized’ and thus are inclined to leave the responsibility to the social 
worker. Sørensen cautions that there is a major risk that welfare provision will have 
negative effects by creating even more dependency and helplessness. For this reason, the 
social workers should not to be so eager that they end up ‘over-selling’ the services offered 
to the clients. “The efforts should never look as if we are ‘pulling somebody’s leg’ or using 
pressure, which may leave the clients with the impression that it was the social counsellors 
and not them who thought that they should be prescribed a particular measure.” (Ibid: 98). 
Rather than enforce, agitate or persuade, the social worker should restrict himself to exercise 
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an indirect influence upon the clients’ actions and choices. It is a matter of informing, 
counselling, and, to a certain extent, impelling.  
We influence what one might call ‘the conditions of action’ which frame the clients’ 
responsible choices. The clients are and should always be responsible for themselves and the 
options they take in relation to their situation and their future. The social counsellors can, 
however, influence the frames within which they make choices by making some choices 
more favourable than others. (…) Of course, those choices that one should try and stimulate 
are those that lead the clients to increased self-reliance. (Ibid: 61). 
Activation as it quickly turns out, however, is by no means merely about ‘influencing the 
frames’ around the clients’ choices and leaving the clients themselves untouched. On the 
contrary, the instruction book highlights a number of personal aspects in the client, such as 
the client’s perception of himself and particular elements in his surroundings: the labour 
market, the connection between payment and work, his own resources, what are realistic 
goals for the future, and more. In addition, it focuses on aspects related to behaviour, self-
presentation, and lifestyle: the client’s hygiene, clothing, way of speaking, degree of initiative, 
and overall, immediate appearance.  
A key objective is to ‘re-install a wage earner’s mentality’ in the activated clients. The fact is 
that most clients were originally responsible and characterized by a wage earner’s mentality 
which is regarded as quintessentially human. However, many years as passive recipients of 
benefits have eroded this fundamental attitude. The book asserts that it is a misunderstanding 
that people should only work if they are motivated to do so and feel that it brings them 
personal development. This is certainly not the case for many wage earners, who simply 
work in order to receive a salary. An important component in activation projects is thus to 
instruct the participants about the fundamental connection between performing good work 
and receiving payment. 
Many clients show signs of this original wage earner-mindset, which, however, has been 
damaged by a long period of living as a welfare recipient. This living has annulled the mindset 
which can be very harmful for these clients’ capacity for and motivation to become self-
supporting. For exactly this reason, projects which ‘re-install’ this mindset may be a first step on 
the pathway to self-reliance. (Sørensen, 2001: 84). 
Some clients are even said to hold a ‘negative wage earner’s mentality’, and the goal is to 
substitute it which its direct opposite. This re-instalment work, however, simply constitutes 
the overall horizon in activation projects. A range of additional tasks are necessary to take 
on in order to make clients ready for the labour market. Many of these concern how to work 
on and eliminate a number of inappropriate or ‘incorrect’ conceptions of the world which 
some clients entertain. This goes for, for instance, the view that the labour market is 
stressful, cold, and impersonal. But this problem also concerns some clients’ understanding 
of what it means to be activated. Some clients hold the incorrect view that activation may be 
compared to slave labour. This is because they see a passive life on welfare benefit as a real, 
existing possibility for their survival, and by this token they come to view work in activation 
projects as ‘unpaid slave labour’. According to Sørensen, a major task is to explain the 
clients that passive living on welfare ‘is simply not on offer’, and that activation is to be 
viewed as paid work. “In as far as the clients conceive of themselves as paid workers, their 
self-esteem will increase.” (Sørensen, 2001: 62):  
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may be isolated and presented as objective problems which impede the client from getting a 
job, wean out of substances, or, simply, realizing himself. Delineating the intervention 
around isolated, ‘objective’ problems pertaining to the individual client seems at immediate 
glance to meet the demand to respect him as an autonomous and sovereign person. In this 
way, it can be imagined that a core of individual autonomy is left untouched, which 
reassures us that the client may still make free and independent choices. Across different 
kind of social services, the idea of meeting the particular individual is contradicted by a 
quest for awakening particular general characteristics in the client.  
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conditions around his choices. On the other hand, the text presents various aspects of the 
client’s personality as objects of manipulation and correction. The manual overcomes the 
paradox of the concomitant emphasis on autonomy and intervention by means of the 
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responsibility should never be taken from him. Instead, the social worker should direct his 
efforts toward ‘the conditions’ for the client’s choice, in order to make some choices more 
attractive than others. The client should always be able to maintain the experience that it is 
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98). As we shall observe, however, the ‘conditions’ for the client’s choices are not all strictly 
external to the client’s subjectivity; quite the contrary. 
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is in the middle of a transformation which means that it needs to be accommodated to 
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the client to become self-reliant; on the other hand, the client must not be deprived of the 
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that they have been ‘clientized’ and thus are inclined to leave the responsibility to the social 
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social workers should not to be so eager that they end up ‘over-selling’ the services offered 
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an indirect influence upon the clients’ actions and choices. It is a matter of informing, 
counselling, and, to a certain extent, impelling.  
We influence what one might call ‘the conditions of action’ which frame the clients’ 
responsible choices. The clients are and should always be responsible for themselves and the 
options they take in relation to their situation and their future. The social counsellors can, 
however, influence the frames within which they make choices by making some choices 
more favourable than others. (…) Of course, those choices that one should try and stimulate 
are those that lead the clients to increased self-reliance. (Ibid: 61). 
Activation as it quickly turns out, however, is by no means merely about ‘influencing the 
frames’ around the clients’ choices and leaving the clients themselves untouched. On the 
contrary, the instruction book highlights a number of personal aspects in the client, such as 
the client’s perception of himself and particular elements in his surroundings: the labour 
market, the connection between payment and work, his own resources, what are realistic 
goals for the future, and more. In addition, it focuses on aspects related to behaviour, self-
presentation, and lifestyle: the client’s hygiene, clothing, way of speaking, degree of initiative, 
and overall, immediate appearance.  
A key objective is to ‘re-install a wage earner’s mentality’ in the activated clients. The fact is 
that most clients were originally responsible and characterized by a wage earner’s mentality 
which is regarded as quintessentially human. However, many years as passive recipients of 
benefits have eroded this fundamental attitude. The book asserts that it is a misunderstanding 
that people should only work if they are motivated to do so and feel that it brings them 
personal development. This is certainly not the case for many wage earners, who simply 
work in order to receive a salary. An important component in activation projects is thus to 
instruct the participants about the fundamental connection between performing good work 
and receiving payment. 
Many clients show signs of this original wage earner-mindset, which, however, has been 
damaged by a long period of living as a welfare recipient. This living has annulled the mindset 
which can be very harmful for these clients’ capacity for and motivation to become self-
supporting. For exactly this reason, projects which ‘re-install’ this mindset may be a first step on 
the pathway to self-reliance. (Sørensen, 2001: 84). 
Some clients are even said to hold a ‘negative wage earner’s mentality’, and the goal is to 
substitute it which its direct opposite. This re-instalment work, however, simply constitutes 
the overall horizon in activation projects. A range of additional tasks are necessary to take 
on in order to make clients ready for the labour market. Many of these concern how to work 
on and eliminate a number of inappropriate or ‘incorrect’ conceptions of the world which 
some clients entertain. This goes for, for instance, the view that the labour market is 
stressful, cold, and impersonal. But this problem also concerns some clients’ understanding 
of what it means to be activated. Some clients hold the incorrect view that activation may be 
compared to slave labour. This is because they see a passive life on welfare benefit as a real, 
existing possibility for their survival, and by this token they come to view work in activation 
projects as ‘unpaid slave labour’. According to Sørensen, a major task is to explain the 
clients that passive living on welfare ‘is simply not on offer’, and that activation is to be 
viewed as paid work. “In as far as the clients conceive of themselves as paid workers, their 
self-esteem will increase.” (Sørensen, 2001: 62):  
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The instruction book also takes another route to objectify client-problems in that it draws a 
distinction between what is relevant for the labour market and what is private. First, the 
book represents the private life of the client as irrelevant for the labour market and 
something that one should not intervene upon. Nevertheless, a number of rather intimate 
aspects of the clients’ personality are turned into objects of examination and corrective 
intervention. How is this paradox negotiated? A point repeated in the book is that the social 
worker should abstain from getting involved in problem pertaining to the clients’ private 
life—at least as long as these problems do not clearly hinder the client’s preparatory training 
for the labour market. But this is a difficult demarcation line. Which aspects of the client’s 
personality may be said to influence his possibilities to enter into paid work, and which 
aspects may be excluded as private, irrelevant problems? Sørensen says that for some clients 
it may be ‘behaviour- and lifestyle-related aspects’ that constitute the barrier for entering the 
labour market. The book mentions “insufficient personal hygiene, inappropriate clothing, 
lacking politeness, failure to identify oneself with colleagues’ or other people’s view of the 
situation, behaviour which unintendedly is perceived as aggressive, inappropriately 
submissive conduct” (Ibid: 195). The distinction first introduced in the book between labour 
market relevant aspects and private aspects of the client’s life turn out to be highly fluid and 
hard to uphold and fixate once and for all. Or, more radically, the distinction between the 
public and the private realm conventionally though to be antecedent to government, is 
rather created and reconfigured by the deparadoxifying operations of the program.     
The final aspect which the book objectifies as a problem for activation work is the client’s 
visual appearance. The client’s looks and immediate appearance is clearly emphasized as 
decisive for his possibilities on the labour market, and it is not viewed as undue intervention 
to turn this ‘surface’ into an object of evaluation and correction. Again, the implicit 
assumption seems to that it is possible to carry out intervention and manipulation of 
delineated parts of the client—in this case, his visual appearance—without violating him as 
an autonomous and self-responsible subject. The book gives an example from a project 
which indeed took a decisive approach to the clients’ appearance. There, professional 
stylists were asked to evaluate every aspect of the clients’ looks and bodily comportment, 
and in several cases they accomplished “dramatic changes which required of the clients 
quite a lot of habituation and practice.” (Ibid: 197). It is concluded that the clients underwent 
a radical transformation in which their appearance and self-presentation became much more 
self-assured. Following the headline ‘clients under transformation’ this project is 
commemorated as an exemplary activation project:  
The project was exemplary with respect to clarifying the clients professionally, training and 
making them ready for their entry into the labour market. One of the means was professional 
stylists who helped the clients with all aspects related to their looks and immediate appearance. 
They took a systematic approach which included discussion and suggestions for choice of clothe, 
makeup, perfume, and haircut, and similarly, their way of talking with colleagues and customers 
face-to-face and over the phone was evaluated and discussed. A particular effort was made to 
make the women appear more smiling and kind. (Ibid: 197).  
The view that women should appear smiling and kind certainly contradicts the ideal of 
taking each particular individual as point of departure, since it invokes stereotypical 
assumptions about gender and gendered behaviour. Yet, on the contrary, many of the 
advices given by the stylists to their clients rest on highly generalized views, that is, 
irrespective of gender, concerning looks and behaviour.  
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To sum up, it has been noted that the training project starts from the dictum about 
respecting the autonomy of the client and yet includes a series of governmental objects, 
most of which pertain to the personality of the job-seeker. Problems to be worked upon 
include job-seekers’ choices of dress, hair style and make-up; their personal conduct and 
self-presentation (manner of speaking, gesture, especially the right balance between 
eagerness and unobtrusiveness); their attitude towards work and receiving benefits; and, 
not least, their self-perception and self-esteem (i.e. rather than seeing themselves as 
powerless and option-less, they should see themselves as flexible and resourceful, with 
opportunities for work and in life in general). In this way, the project illustrates a widely 
held conception of the client-subject: that it is possible to manipulate specific client attributes 
without violating the client as an autonomous and self-responsible subject. These 
observations resonate with other studies of job training and other kinds of transformative 
social work which ‘fragmentize’ the universal judicial subject of rights into a series of 
subjective experiences and obligations which professionals may objectify as problems 
needing correction (Mik-Meyer, 2006; Villadsen, 2007). In this way, preparatory job training 
reconfigures the paradox of the co-existence of the universalistic and particularistic client. 
The logical indeterminacy is overcome by the creation of definite objects of analysis and 
intervention. 
4. Dialogues: how to regulate ‘free’ and ‘authentic’ statements 
This section presents a case study of dialogue techniques that illustrates and unfolds the 
paradox of truth in welfare provision. The study was done by the author and a fellow 
researcher (Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008). It takes its lead from the proliferation of dialogues as 
a popular governmental instrument, which has been witnessed across a range of welfare 
services—a development which followed the critique from the 1980s onwards of excessive 
expert guidance and welfare professionals who supposedly ‘steal the problems’ from their 
clients. The study demonstrates that while dialogue techniques demand that welfare 
professionals should speak less and allow clients to speak more, they nevertheless subtly 
regulate organisational domains of speech. Dialogue techniques thus vividly display the 
paradox of producing the truth: they aim to facilitate free, ‘authentic’ statements (which are 
true because they are ‘free’, that is, unaffected by power), but at the same time a number 
regulatory procedures pre-shape conversational space. 
The problematic that incites the quest for dialogue in welfare provision echoes the paradox 
of truth sketched out by Foucault in The Order of Things. From the perspective of dialogue 
technology, the client or patient is at the same time conceived as a centre of meaning, a 
carrier of his own identity, and as fundamentally shaped by ‘structures’ determining his 
behaviour and identity. How can the patient both constitute a carrier of individual truth and 
be deeply embedded in the collectivity of language and culture? Dialogue technology 
promises to resolve the paradox by separating out those statements that can be ascribed to 
the interior will-power of the patient and those that allegedly stem from culture, influences, 
substances, or even the welfare system itself.   
The paradox of truth creates a constant doubt as to whether the discourse produced in 
client-centred work reflects genuine wishes in patients or if they are inflicted by external 
factors. The fact that this doubt is emerging with in health counselling is particularly 
noteworthy, since modern medicine has so far enjoyed a self-assured knowledge privilege: 
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The instruction book also takes another route to objectify client-problems in that it draws a 
distinction between what is relevant for the labour market and what is private. First, the 
book represents the private life of the client as irrelevant for the labour market and 
something that one should not intervene upon. Nevertheless, a number of rather intimate 
aspects of the clients’ personality are turned into objects of examination and corrective 
intervention. How is this paradox negotiated? A point repeated in the book is that the social 
worker should abstain from getting involved in problem pertaining to the clients’ private 
life—at least as long as these problems do not clearly hinder the client’s preparatory training 
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To sum up, it has been noted that the training project starts from the dictum about 
respecting the autonomy of the client and yet includes a series of governmental objects, 
most of which pertain to the personality of the job-seeker. Problems to be worked upon 
include job-seekers’ choices of dress, hair style and make-up; their personal conduct and 
self-presentation (manner of speaking, gesture, especially the right balance between 
eagerness and unobtrusiveness); their attitude towards work and receiving benefits; and, 
not least, their self-perception and self-esteem (i.e. rather than seeing themselves as 
powerless and option-less, they should see themselves as flexible and resourceful, with 
opportunities for work and in life in general). In this way, the project illustrates a widely 
held conception of the client-subject: that it is possible to manipulate specific client attributes 
without violating the client as an autonomous and self-responsible subject. These 
observations resonate with other studies of job training and other kinds of transformative 
social work which ‘fragmentize’ the universal judicial subject of rights into a series of 
subjective experiences and obligations which professionals may objectify as problems 
needing correction (Mik-Meyer, 2006; Villadsen, 2007). In this way, preparatory job training 
reconfigures the paradox of the co-existence of the universalistic and particularistic client. 
The logical indeterminacy is overcome by the creation of definite objects of analysis and 
intervention. 
4. Dialogues: how to regulate ‘free’ and ‘authentic’ statements 
This section presents a case study of dialogue techniques that illustrates and unfolds the 
paradox of truth in welfare provision. The study was done by the author and a fellow 
researcher (Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008). It takes its lead from the proliferation of dialogues as 
a popular governmental instrument, which has been witnessed across a range of welfare 
services—a development which followed the critique from the 1980s onwards of excessive 
expert guidance and welfare professionals who supposedly ‘steal the problems’ from their 
clients. The study demonstrates that while dialogue techniques demand that welfare 
professionals should speak less and allow clients to speak more, they nevertheless subtly 
regulate organisational domains of speech. Dialogue techniques thus vividly display the 
paradox of producing the truth: they aim to facilitate free, ‘authentic’ statements (which are 
true because they are ‘free’, that is, unaffected by power), but at the same time a number 
regulatory procedures pre-shape conversational space. 
The problematic that incites the quest for dialogue in welfare provision echoes the paradox 
of truth sketched out by Foucault in The Order of Things. From the perspective of dialogue 
technology, the client or patient is at the same time conceived as a centre of meaning, a 
carrier of his own identity, and as fundamentally shaped by ‘structures’ determining his 
behaviour and identity. How can the patient both constitute a carrier of individual truth and 
be deeply embedded in the collectivity of language and culture? Dialogue technology 
promises to resolve the paradox by separating out those statements that can be ascribed to 
the interior will-power of the patient and those that allegedly stem from culture, influences, 
substances, or even the welfare system itself.   
The paradox of truth creates a constant doubt as to whether the discourse produced in 
client-centred work reflects genuine wishes in patients or if they are inflicted by external 
factors. The fact that this doubt is emerging with in health counselling is particularly 
noteworthy, since modern medicine has so far enjoyed a self-assured knowledge privilege: 
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truth was guaranteed by the expertise of medicine itself, and openness towards other 
authorities was severely restricted. Recently, however, the health sector has witnessed a 
proliferation of books and instructional texts that promote various schemes for conversation 
as a means to help patients who suffer from ‘lifestyle-related’ illnesses such as drug abuse, 
alcoholism, obesity, smoking, and gambling. The general objective is to mobilize through 
verbalization the patients’ own understanding of their problem (Clausen, 2005; Mundt et al., 
2003; Dalum et al., 2000; Mabeck et al., 1999).The emergence of dialogues ‘at equal terms’ 
within health care challenges the traditional knowledge privilege of medicine and generates 
a greater complexity of alternative knowledge claims. Or, we might say that the paradox of 
truth becomes more intense and urgent.  
After having emphasised the reconfiguration of speaking positions by which the health 
professionals are urged to restrain their own expert-discourse and allow patients to speak, 
Karlsen and Villadsen immediately notes that what the new dialogue technologies call for is 
not an absolute, but rather a strategic silence:  
The one who used to speak must learn to administer speech economically and strategically, in such 
a manner that he or she by means of silence urges the previously silenced to speak, and through this 
taciturn administration ties the speaking to his or her words. (Karlsen and Villadsen, 2008: 347)  
Most textbooks and professional instruction manuals for health counselling emphasize that 
any effective treatment of lifestyle-related illnesses must place the patient’s own perception 
of his situation centre stage by listening to his own words. In the textbook Make your patient 
change lifestyle, it thus says: “Only by listening to the patient is it possible to form an image 
of the patient’s concerns and reflections regarding his or her current behaviour” (Nielsen, 
1998: 739). But a key challenge is how to structure the patients’ statements in a manner that 
direct their speech in certain directions and prevent it from going astray and venture into 
areas that are unrelated to their lifestyle illnesses.  
Karlsen and Villadsen give several examples of specific dialogue techniques applied in 
contemporary health counselling, but here we shall focus on only one of them termed ‘the 
balanced decision scheme’ (Botelho, 2002). This tool is particularly well suited to materialize 
the patient’s own ‘self-motivating’ statements. In practical terms, the balanced decision 
scheme is designed as a box which consists of four empty squares. The process begins when 
the patient fills out these squares, either in the presence of a professional or as a ‘home 
assignment’. The fields are marked with the following headlines: ‘advantages from 
continuing’ (1); ‘disadvantages from continuing’ (2); ‘disadvantages from quitting’ (3) and, 
‘advantages from continuing’ (4).  
The squares 1 and 4 makes it possible to register the patient’s own stated reasons for change, 
and in this way, they constitute a reservoir of ‘self motivating statements’, which the 
professional can mobilize. (Model 1) 
What is figuratively created in this scheme is a divided subject, or better, a subject which is 
divided inside himself. In this regard, this dialogue technology parallels many other 
technologies for client-centred work which similarly operates with a subject harbouring an 
internal division between two psychic spaces, variously termed will-power and 
dependency, reason and passion, autonomy and dependency, and more. Of course, this 
posited internal division makes it possible for the health counsellor to address an imagined 
latent faculty inside patients who fail to comply with treatments.  
 















Source: Mabeck et al., 1999 
Model 1. 
But this construction of a divided subject brought about through the balanced decision 
scheme has an additional, and, as it were, more directly strategic function. The balanced 
decision scheme is a tool that not only makes the professional capable of averting, but even 
of positively utilizing, one of the most fundamental conflicts in traditional health 
counselling. This is the ‘duel’ of arguments and counter-arguments for lifestyle changed 
exchanged between patient and health care professional; a duel that almost always results in 
polarization and a pacification of the client (Nielsen, 1998: 737).  
Within health counselling is has long been acknowledged that the advice of the health 
counsellor, in particular in the shape of prohibitions, runs the risk of being, not just ineffective, 
but downright aggravating for the behaviour it intended to correct. A further problem with 
this unfortunate mechanism is that it undermines not only the credibility of the advice, but 
also the advisor’s authority. Instead of achieving a recognition in the client of the need to 
change his lifestyle, a social conflict is set in motion involving great risks for the health 
counsellor to lose his possibilities for influencing the patient. However, the balanced decision 
scheme offers a solution to this problem by its attempt to internalise the conflict. The 
immediate conflict between the counsellor and his prohibiting advices and the reluctance of 
the patience is turned inwards, and is thereby recoded as a conflict resting in the patient’s self-
relation. The publication Speaking about change by the national Danish committee on smoking-
related illnesses sates this vividly: “It is a crucial point in motivational interviewing that part of 
the art of health counselling is to move the discussion of pros and cons of a given lifestyle 
‘inside’ the person you are counselling” (Dalum et al., 2000: 67).  
By the use of juxtapositions of pros and cons for undertaking lifestyle changes, the balanced 
decision scheme materializes the conflict as internal, as originating from within the patient’s 
self-relation. Any possible conflicts between the counsellor’s advice and his interpretation of 
the patient’s statements, on the one hand, and the patient’s reluctance comply, on the other, 
may be reduced to a mere symptom of the patient’s inner ambivalence (Nielsen, 1998: 737). 
The balanced decision scheme thus displaces the conflict from a social relation to an internal 
relation between one physic domain and another inside the patient.  
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Once a patient begins to recognize this internal conflict, other dialogue techniques may be 
mobilised to bring him to reconsider his ambivalence, and on this basis choose the form of 
lifestyle prescribed by health counselling. In such dialogues, there is a paradoxical double 
sided demand on the patient with respect to his self-relation: It is a matter of confirming the 
patient’s will to acknowledge their own lack of will-power.  
Techniques for health counselling also need, however, to address a problem in the health 
care professional’s typical attitude towards the speaking patient. This problem stems from 
the fact that health professionals have traditionally been rather sceptical with respect to the 
truth claims in patients’ own discourse on diseases. Thus, part of the injunction that health 
counsellors should ‘meet patients on their own terms’ is that they acknowledge (and begin 
to control) their traditional expert-reluctance against patients’ subjective opinions. And so, 
again it becomes clear that to bring out free and authentic statements and to make sure that 
their truth value is acknowledged takes quite a lot of work, and part of that work is to make 
the professional listen with less preordained scepticism regarding the status and utility of 
the layman’s words.  
 The study points at some possible future consequences of the proliferation of dialogue 
technologies. It shows how the transformation in the discursive space of institutionalized 
welfare—most forcefully illustrated in the emphasis on more dialogue—does not mean the 
abolishment of expert guidance, but rather invokes new forms of government and self-
government. The ‘dialogue on equal terms’ does not in itself guarantee statements which 
dislodged from power. Contrasting themselves to Habermas and his followers, the authors 
question the view of dialogue as a universal tool for overcoming social conflicts in modern 
society. Rather, they see it as “a technology of government, which—by employing and 
combining an array of detailed techniques—seeks to structure the inter-relations and the 
self-relations of the participants in accordance with specific logics and objectives”. (Karlsen 
& Villadsen, 2008: 359).  
The authors suggest that the proliferation of dialogue technologies is explainable by the fact 
that it seems capable of solving, or navigating through, a fundamental paradox in modern 
welfare states. I would add that this paradox is the paradox of truth. The problem is, the 
authors say, “how to bring the individual to recognize a particular speech as his or her own? 
How to turn the individual into an author of statements, which are produced, selected and 
arranged through discursive ordering procedures?” (Karlsen & Villadsen, 2008: 360). The 
study demonstrates how much work there is involved in bringing about ‘spontaneous, 
truthful and authentic’ speech. They also demonstrate the paradox that the discourse, which 
demands that patients, clients or employees should be allowed to speak, does not 
necessarily give these individuals a right to speak. It remains in the hands of the 
professionals to determine the procedures and develop the instruments of dialogue. The 
objective is to fill the room with individuals’ authentic statements, but the conversational 
space is already pre-shaped by regulatory procedures.  
By way of conclusion, Karlsen and Villadsen suggest the prediction that as long as welfare 
state provisions are permeated by the paradox of truth, demands for ‘liberating’ dialogue 
technologies are likely to intensify. To bring clients and patients to utter self-responsible, 
self-examining, and self-sanctioning statements, while simultaneously turning them into 
authorities of those statements, will remain a de-paradoxifying strategy across welfare 
services. Future studies must describe how new technologies, new concepts and even new 
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institutions arise from this dialogical instance of the paradox of truth. The contradictions 
and disappointments of dialogue techniques will call for the development of new types of 
professionalism at the expense of existing ones. A significant task for future analysis of 
manifestations of the paradox of truth in welfare services is, Karlsen and Villadsen suggest, 
to help welfare professionals and their managers reflect upon the costs and consequences 
resulting from the reconstruction of professionalism and their space to make dialogue with 
their clients. 
5. Playful state power: Health promotion through identity-games 
The last case demonstrates the paradox of power by analysing recent campaigns for health 
promotion in Denmark. In this national context, during the last twenty years, national health 
plans have displayed a clearly anti-authoritarian and culturally sensitive character. The 
National Health Plan launched in 1999, thus made significant efforts to distinguish itself from 
earlier ‘individualizing’ and ‘excessively authoritarian’ health promotion strategies. Lars 
Thorup Larsen (2003: 9) observes that this health plan rejects the tendency to ‘blame the 
victim’ and adopts a concept of ‘the everyday environment’ as the essential object for 
campaign measures. This form of health campaign tries to avoid targeting the lifestyles of 
citizens in a direct, negative and individualizing fashion. Instead, it emphasizes the 
potential of stimulating the surroundings of the individuals in need of change, to become 
indirect promoters of health. Rather than intervening by means of centralized state 
regulation, the objective is to engage local municipalities and civil society in the struggle for 
‘healthier environments’. This network-type governmental strategy is directed at ‘the 
environment’ in a very broad sense, as it seeks to mobilize public institutions under the 
municipalities, schools, local communities, workplaces, and even group dynamics inside 
companies—hereby transgressing public/private divisions and sector boundaries. In short, 
it is a campaign that aims to make other agents undertake their own ‘micro-campaigns’. The 
range of problems arising from this aspiration to govern entities which are self-governing 
reflects well what I described as the paradox of power. 
In 2007, the Danish health authorities invented a new board game, Health at Play, in 
collaboration with the private parents’ association Schools and Society. Earlier Danish 
public health campaigns were allegedly too individualizing and tutelary, and the game 
presents itself as anti-authoritarian, ‘playful’, sensitive to citizens’ opinions, and 
transgressing traditional sector boundaries (National Board of Health, 2007). Health at Play is 
to be played by parents, both alone or with their children, and it can be played at meetings 
between parents supervised by a school teacher. The instruction manual states that there is 
no ambition to force everyone live in the same way, and that a modern society should 
always leave room for diversity. 
As Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen has argued, however, the aim of Health at Play’ is indeed to 
shape the lives of families so that their activities conform more closely to governmental 
health objectives (Andersen 2008). The core of the game is a set of cards with questions 
about personal attitudes towards health issues that the players can choose to either agree or 
disagree with. One attitude might be “parents are the most important role models for 
children” and the participants must then seek to reach a common agreement on this issue. 
One may certainly question if ‘game’ is an adequate name for this initiative which offers no 
principle of scoring points and has no winners and losers (possible except for ‘our health’). 
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The aim is to settle responsibilities for children’s health between parents, school and pupils. 
But Health at Play uses no sanctions or control measures; it simply seeks to generate debate 
and reflections, and establish commonly shared value—in short, it is directed at individuals’ 
identity-work.  
The game is a tool used by the health authorities to navigate between respecting the autonomy 
of individual families and promoting intensified health aspirations of governmental 
authorities. It does so by oscillating between imagined, ‘playful’ commitments and real, 
binding commitments. The participants can choose to merely entertain various commitments 
to a healthier life style, but they may also decide to make the agreements binding and 
inscribe them into a contract that is supposed to count in real life. By this token, the game 
suddenly turns into the much more serious and far-reaching ‘game’ of changing life style. 
One may thus say that the game represents the playful part of a multi-pronged strategy for 
health promotion which also consists of traditional information campaigns, efforts to make 
healthy food available at the canteens public schools, and more. 
Health at Play makes use of a noticeably cross-sector approach. The health authorities use the 
game to make incursions into the schools and the school-parent relation in their attempt to 
mobilize new agents to promote health objectives. The health authorities thus envision 
power as spanning across sectors and institutions. They recognize the need to take into 
consideration and subscribe to practices and strategies already operating within those 
domains, for instance in the schools. Thus, the health authorities seem to recognize that they 
cannot themselves meet their aims for health promotion. Or, as Andersen observes, the 
health authorities acknowledge that there is no place where power may be possessed (2008: 
159). The health campaign, that is, displays a particular way of overcoming the paradox of 
power (how to govern that which is autonomous and self-governing). Indeed, the authorities 
understand that power cannot be exercised with authority. It cannot be imposed from ‘above’ 
or ‘from outside’ but must be realized indirectly, by the involved agents themselves, engaged 
in ‘playful’ and fluid micro-relations. In this way, the game displays some rather advanced 
reflections on how to exercise power in a modern context. It thus acknowledges that power 
must be inherent to its object, here conceived as a multiplicity of social forces that will shape 
and direct the campaign’s strategic goals in diverse and undeterminable ways 
In thus attempting to channel their efforts through a number of indirect relations, the 
Danish national health authorities display some symptoms of what Foucault called ‘the 
State phobia’ They do not just harbour scepticism towards state power; they engages in a 
series of sceptical reflections about government agencies that might govern ‘too much’ and 
without respect for, or with insufficient knowledge of, the processes and domains of 
government (Rose & Miller, 1992). One may say that the health authorities reflect a 
conception of power that in a sense pursues Foucault’s (methodological) injunction to ‘cut 
off the King’s head’ and clearly emphasizes the decentred micro-physics of power (Foucault, 
1980a: 121). Power is conceived of as an attempt to sway others to act by stimulating their 
identity work, acknowledging that the health authorities do not constitute the source of 
power and its effects. What is at stake, then, are strategies that depend upon others’ 
strategies that need to be taken into account. 
The study observed how Danish national health authorities navigates the paradox of power 
by conceptualizing power as something that must be exercised by modelling and fine tuning 
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itself according to the rationality of individuals and groups. Consequently the normative 
standards to be achieved cannot be imposed authoritatively from ‘above’ but are rather co-
produced by very the domain to be governed itself. The case demonstrates how the problem 
of exercising state power is dealt with by invoking new practices of ‘anti-authoritative’ and 
‘user-sensitive’ health promotion. This observation constitutes an analytical challenge for 
critical research from a Foucaultian or broader post structural perspective. The kind of anti-
authoritarian campaign strategy evident in Health at Play reflects an understanding of 
knowledge, identity and power a kin to key tenets of ‘critical thinking’ such as post 
structural theorizing, critical pedagogy, and even governmentality studies. What hereby 
begins to emerge is a circular logic between power and critique in which critical thinking is 
adopted by authorities that may instrumentalize it for producing new strategies of 
government. By this token, it becomes increasingly difficult to make a clear distinction 
between who are ‘the radical critics’ and who are on the side of ‘bureaucratic power’. In 
other words, a perhaps uncomfortable blurring of the hitherto so self-assuring dichotomy 
between the ‘progressive critics’ and the ‘representatives of bureaucratic state power’ is well 
under way.  
To sum up, in negotiating the paradox of power the recent Danish health campaign takes up 
a rather complex thinking on power and government which evinces parallels to post-
structural concepts of power. Firstly, the campaign articulates a conceptualization of power 
as mobile and reversible series of ‘playful’ micro-relations. Secondly, it views power as non-
subjective, productive and as non-localizable within traditional sector demarcations (to be 
inscribed into various ‘environments’, agents and locales). Thirdly, the campaign 
acknowledges that citizen groups and professionals are guided by their particular views and 
values which will shape the effects of playing about health. Consequently the normative 
standards to be achieved cannot be imposed authoritatively from ‘above’ but are rather co-
produced by very the domain to be governed itself.  
6. The permanence and potentials of governmental paradoxes 
By way of conclusion, I will briefly offer some thoughts on how governmental paradoxes 
may be handled, analytically as well as practically. It should be clear that the analytical 
framework adopted here views paradoxes as a permanent and inevitable feature of 
modern welfare provision, and modern governing more broadly. Instructive is perhaps to 
point out some possible approaches to governmental paradoxes that runs counter to a 
Foucaultian/governmentality, and which we need to take account of in terms of their 
shortcomings as well as their possibilities.  
It is straightforward to explain welfare paradoxes as produced by a mismatch and 
asymmetry between the institution and its object. We may, for instance, imagine cases 
where welfare institutions and their professionals are guided by a particular ‘doxa’, i.e. a set 
of self-evident and partly implicit ideas, which contrasts with how their clients perceive 
themselves and their problems. It has been described how social workers at projects for job 
training and rehabilitation maintain a therapeutic doxa which focuses on personal issues 
and personal development although they are confronted by clients who believe that their 
essential problem is related to professional qualifications and possibilities at the labour 
market (Mik-Meyer, 2006). The approach of the researcher is here one of making explicit to 
the participants that they are caught up within the doxa, and this ‘unveiling’ may ameliorate 
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where welfare institutions and their professionals are guided by a particular ‘doxa’, i.e. a set 
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the state of affairs by illuminating the fundamental contradictions that generate conflicts 
and resistance. The researcher who takes this approach is typically particularly attentive to 
the asymmetries between the professionals in welfare institutions vis-á-vis citizens and 
users with respect to their possibilities for defining welfare values, programs, and methods.  
A prominent solution to the problem of closure and self-referential values in welfare 
services is the practically oriented reform literature termed New Public Management (NPM) 
which has received great attention in the last two decades (Lane, 2003; Ferlie et al., 1996; 
Bozeman, 1993). For this reason we will spent some time discussing NPM in terms of its 
paradoxyfying and deparadoxyfying effects. In NPM, the general approach to public 
management is one of identification of problems and achievement of solutions through the 
choice of adequate managerial tools. There is an assumption that it is possible to clarify the 
explanatory causes for paradoxes, list alternative solutions, make calculations of costs, gains 
and risks, and, on this basis, choose a specific managerial instrument. However, critics have 
claimed that New Public Management has an over-optimistic trust in hard line technology-
based control of welfare services, and this observation has relevance for our discussion of 
the management of paradoxes in welfare provision. It is thus interesting that NPM- 
perspective by and large view technologies as tools to carry out managers’ objectives, solve 
problems and overcoming paradoxes. The possibility that technologies might in themselves 
create new paradoxes or intensify existing ones is rarely considered in this literature. This 
point was made by Andersen and Thygesen who demonstrated how NPM technologies 
entail a diversity of antagonistic images of organisations, while paying particular attention 
to how a technology of goal-steering rendered organisations’ relation to their environment 
highly ambiguous or even ‘polyphonic’ (Thygesen & Andersen, 2007).  
As outlined earlier, the concept of paradoxes allows us to go beyond the immediately 
observable lines of conflict and communicated dilemmas to explore which kind of logical 
paradoxes that are embedded in specific areas of welfare provision. We further recall that 
paradoxes are created from the drawing of distinctions that constitute logically impossible 
dualities which communication is forced to unfold, reformulate and displace. The concept 
thus allows us to explore how services reforms and new managerial strategies for welfare 
management need to unfold and ‘deparadoxify’ the paradoxes of welfare, for instance by 
inventing new concepts that seek to render the paradoxes less urgent and threatening. We 
shall follow this approach in the following discussion of NPM as a regime for reform of 
welfare services. Indeed, NPM may be conceived as a series of concepts and techniques for 
deparadoxification that never accomplish dissolving or an annulment of the paradoxes but 
rather have as their effect a dislocation of them, sometimes resulting in the emergence of 
reshaped and intensified versions of the paradoxes. It is thus telling that NPM often stages 
itself as a tool to overcome and dissolve starkly articulated juxtapositions between 
universality versus particularism, rule-bound versus flexible, neutrality versus parochial 
interests, economic efficiency versus welfare professionalism, managers versus employees, 
compliance versus commitment, and centralised control versus local freedom. The typical 
approach of NPM is that it is possible to override or even dissolve the oppositions.  
NPM has received lots of critique, many of which are based upon the claim that this 
managerial regime implies an import into welfare organisations of economic and 
managerial rationalities that are fundamentally foreign to public welfare provision. In its 
starkest version, the critique has portrayed NPM as a one-dimensional managerialism which 
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is unsuited to capture and contribute to the management of public welfare organisations 
(Osborne, 2006). Proponents of NPM have to some extent themselves provoked this critique, 
since the most radical advocates have questioned the legitimacy of key elements in 
democratic regulation of public welfare services, arguing that it imposes unreasonable 
constraints upon the management of public services (Meier, 1997). Conversely, observers 
who are sceptical against the adoption of NPM-principles have argued that there is a 
fundamental tension between the professional ethics of welfare professionals and MPM 
which is blind to these ethics because of its key tenets, i.e. its emphasis on economic 
efficiency, the maintenance of performance standards, and the promotion of management as 
an independent activity.  
The debates about the benefits and the problems of NPM invoke the paradox of universality, 
but this time predominantly in terms of the more specific problem of how welfare services 
can be at one and same time guided by particular professional values and by universal 
standards. This paradox is further intensified by the emergence of NPM as it attempts to 
give ‘management’ the status of an autonomous professional rationality put one the same 
footing as the other significant professional logics of modern welfare provision: medicine, 
pedagogy, and psychology. One influential tenet of NPM (and managerialism more 
broadly) is the demand that ‘managers must be given the right to manage’, as observed by 
Pollitt (1993: 3). This is the idea that managers cannot perform effective management unless 
they are granted reasonable room for manoeuvre. From this follows the assertion that also 
public sector managers must enjoy the freedom to decide over the use of organisational 
resources in order to maximise desired performances. But this ‘liberated manager’ of 
welfare production constitutes a paradoxical figure: He is envisioned as a ‘neutral’ promoter 
of a particular managerial rationality! The paradox is produced by a peculiar rewinding of 
the classic distinction between management and administration (Clarke & Newman, 1995: 
64). The manager was seen as an active decision maker, whereas the administrator merely 
implemented decisions made elsewhere in an impartial fashion. However, NPM now 
attributes ‘impartial implementation’ to the manager’s side of the distinction turning it 
paradoxical. What emerges is the welfare manager ‘who needs managerial freedom to 
implement others’ decisions’.  
Let us become a bit more specific about this paradoxical welfare manager. One the one 
hand, he represent a particular managerial rationality which revolves around the goal of 
achieving increased productivity. Key measures are the setting of performance targets, the 
instalment of tighter financial control and the creation of more transparency and greater 
comparability with respect to achievements. On the other hand, the manager is envisioned 
as a ‘neutral’ agent who will simply assist welfare organisations in achieving their particular 
goals which are rooted in particular professional values. Here, the image of the welfare 
manager is one of an administrative ‘relay’ or a ‘catalyst’ who use purportedly neutral 
technologies of optimization. By this I mean that the figure of the neutral manager entails a 
view of technologies as tools that may realize or unleash ‘latent resources’ without 
influencing or fundamentally shaping the content of welfare services in the process. The 
paradox of the liberated manager is, in brief, that he figures as at the same time an agent of a 
new, managerial freedom and as a neutral, administrative relay.   
The paradox of the concomitant valuation of the universal and the particular reappears, 
however, in yet another version under NPM. Here, we start by observing that NPM is often 
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promoted as a tool for reforming public services by reference to its capacity to overcome 
lines of conflicts among employees or irreconcilable orientations towards specific 
professional values. The basic assumption is that effective achievement of organisational 
goals depends upon the creation of a ‘strong culture’ or ‘corporate identity’ in welfare 
organisations (Clarke & Newman, 1997: 62-63). Interesting for present purposes is that NPM 
to some extent was promoted as a tool to overcome the tensions between concomitant 
attachments and loyalties of welfare professionals. These competing attachments would 
include attachment to a particular occupational group and its professionalism, attachment to 
the local, employing organisation, and even attachment to unarticulated notions of ‘public 
service’ in general (Clarke & Newman, 62). Strategies to built strong corporate culture and 
commitment to the mission of the organisation would conceive of such extra-organisational 
loyalties as problems that needed to be addressed by management.  
The new managerialism placed great stress on giving up of traditional modes of attachment and 
sought to bridge the motivation gap by combining culture management (the creation of purpose 
and meanings) with performance management (measuring what really matters). It stresses 
reduced supervisory control to achieve enhanced integration, moving from compliance to 
commitment (Clarke & Newman, 62). 
The interpretation offered by Clarke and Newman has two interesting components. First, it 
emphasises that the various extra-organisational attachments uphold by welfare 
professionals should be displaced in a twofold movement: the establishment of 
organisationally shared values, which should then be monitored more rigorously in terms of 
levels of performance—‘measuring what really matters’. One may thus say that the strategy 
of deparadoxification is one of promoting the locally adaptable managerialism as universal. 
Or, putting it slightly different, dissolving those employee-attachments that transcend the 
specific organisational sites of employment (such as occupational values and collegiality), 
the new managerialism is universal in terms of its uniform objective of strengthening the 
local, corporate culture of all welfare organisations.  
Second, Clarke and Newman points to another key deparadoxification strategy of NPM 
which consists in reformulating the division line and hierarchy between managers and 
employees by means of concepts that signals integration and togetherness: shared values, 
organisational culture, mutual interests, mutual commitment, and so on. The traditional 
image of an opposition between managers who instruct, demand, and sanction employees 
‘from above’ is to be replaced by alliances, value consensus, and a shared outlook. To be 
sure, this strategy of downplaying and reconfiguring opposing interest between managers 
and their subordinates has for long been a strategic component in the ‘soft’ HRM and 
culture management which appeared around the late 1970s and onwards. Karen Legge thus 
critically observed that concepts of ‘mutuality’, ‘interdependence’ and moving ‘from 
compliance to commitment’ may serve a strategy of obfuscating fundamentally 
irreconcilable interests and potential conflicts between employer and employees (Legge, 
2005). In the case of reforming welfare provision, NPM there strategy for overriding conflict 
lines between managers and employees has been one of creating a new distinction between 
‘core’ and ‘periphery’. This distinction makes it possible to speak of concentrating on ‘core 
services’ and that which can be contracted out, delegated to partners, or even left for 
revitalised communities and voluntary agencies. The idea of a pluralization of welfare 
provision by establishing a new kind of ‘welfare mix’ (Ascoli & Ranci, 2002) or ‘third sector 
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involvement’ (Anheier & Seibel, 1990) designates strategies for establishing more network-
like forms of services arrangements, in which the special qualities of the different agencies 
involved may ‘blend’, inspire and challenge tired out certainties of conventional welfare 
provision. The problem that these new network arrangements create new tensions and 
challenges in as far as multiple and sometimes incompatible professional logics become 
interlinked in networks comprising different professional and voluntary agencies has only 
begun being studied (Villadsen, 2008b).      
The final paradox which is addressed and reformulated by NMP concerns the status of 
governance relations between central authorities and local welfare institutions. The degree 
of centralised control and monitoring of local services providers has, of course, been a 
longstanding issue in debates on public management. Arguments have revolved around the 
perceived tension between the governmental objective of ensuring equal standards, 
disciplining costs, and guaranteeing the observance of the national social law, on the one 
hand, and the need to grant local institutions room for manoeuvre allowing them to adjust 
services to local needs, invent new practices, and develop particular values. The classic 
paradox was, then, how central authorities could be at one and the same time a ‘top-down’ 
controller and a guarantor of local freedom. NPM offers a kind of a solution to this paradox 
by creating a space for central government as both maintaining responsibility for the local 
welfare provision by detailed supervision and performance audit and downplaying 
responsibility by emphasising that responsibility for concrete services delivery is a local 
matter. In this way, central government can adopt a double role in relation to welfare 
provision (Clarke and Newman, 1995: 81). On the one side, it claims to represent public 
interest by carrying out performance evaluations (or, perhaps rather, asking local services to 
carry them out), by disseminating information on how to manage, and by authorising 
particular quality standards and budgetary restraints. On the other side, central government 
wishes to delegate responsibility, grant organisations ‘freedom to manage’, and it requests 
‘local initiative to accommodate local conditions’.  
The trick of de-paradoxification, it has been argued, is to make local welfare organisations 
accountable to central governments in a more indirect manner (Thygesen & Andersen, 
2004). The apparent withdrawal of centralised control of local services purported by NPM 
seems to be accompanied by a proliferation of new and mundane managerial technologies. 
These technologies render welfare organisations responsible and accountable to central 
authorities by making local organisations audit themselves (an audit which may be offered 
to the local services as a helping tool, the use of which might nevertheless be obligatory). 
More studies could be done to explore how specific managerial technologies are 
promulgated as tools to overcome the alleged division lines and paradoxes in public 
management (some fruitful advancements were made with respect to technologies of 
accountancy by Peter Miller (and his co-authors), although he did not address the 
problematic of governance through the concept of paradox (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2006; 
Miller and Rose, 2009).  
An alternative approach for overcoming problems, contradictions and paradoxes in welfare 
provision which we will mention only briefly is the Governance approach (Rhodes, 1996; 
Kooiman, 2003). Advocates for this approach to reform welfare provision typically oppose 
themselves against the key tenets of NPM. The point of departure of governance theorists is 
a decentring of the state, which in their view is traversed by a plethora of competing 
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promoted as a tool for reforming public services by reference to its capacity to overcome 
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interests, pressure groups and networks of public, private and voluntary organisations. 
They describe (some of them commemoratively) how reforms of welfare states from the 
1980s onwards have effected a shift from government through hierarchic bureaucracy to a 
network-based governance that involves market agents, quase-markets and voluntary 
agencies in the delivery of public services. From this observation, Governance scholars 
posits a greater complexity and fragmentation of state power, where central authorities 
increasingly depend upon other, non-state actors to implement policies and secure the 
delivery of what is still considered public services (Bevir, 2010: 436)  
In terms of welfare provision, a key problem for these scholars is how to establish 
democratic bottom-up processes in which citizens and user groups participate in the 
definition of welfare services, particularly through different types of user boards. That 
paradoxes and contradictions in welfare services may be dissolved if services are turned 
more responsive to citizens’ views is a general assumption for governance scholars. This 
assumption seems to rest on a conception of clients and users as rational agents who are 
self-conscious of their individual interests and preferences. In this way, the governance 
approach typically relocates both causes and solutions to paradoxes of welfare outside the 
institutions or in ‘governance networks’. Establishing user-involvement in welfare services 
demands, however, that the users get a voice; that they views are somehow represented and 
channelled into welfare institutions. In this context, a new paradox emerge in the shape of a 
social services user who are at one and the same time in need of guidance from welfare 
professionals and a self-transparent knower of his own interests and needs. For this reason, 
perhaps, governance scholars pay particular attention to studying and discussing how the 
‘voice’ of the services user can be heard devoid of external powers and other people’s 
influences. Their general approach is that conflicts of interests are to be resolved by local 
and perhaps innovative forms of consensus-making in which solutions to particular 
problems are produced, as far as possible by the effected individuals themselves. In this 
context, I shall merely mention one key shortcoming of this framework for reforming 
welfare services and institutions. Focussing predominantly on user involvement, inter-
organisational networks, and consensus making processes the governance approach leaves 
little room for recognising paradoxes as an inherent property of welfare services.  
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the analytical force of applying a governmentality 
perspective supplemented with Luhmann’s concept of paradox to the understanding of 
modern welfare provision. In particular, the analytical framework is well-suited to explore the 
inherent paradoxes of regulating welfare services, which we designated ‘governmental 
paradoxes’. These paradoxes are to be found both at the level of professionals’ interactions 
with citizens, at the level of management of welfare organisations, and on the level the 
governance relations between central authorities and local services units. In welfare provision, 
the paradoxes of universality, truth, and power were suggested as pervasive and enduring 
challenges to be tackled by professionals and programs for the organisation of services 
arrangements. A greater attention to these paradoxes as conditioning the spaces of action in 
welfare provision would, it is suggested, generate a better sense of what is at stake in current 
controversies and on-going developments.  
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It was further argued that the major reform initiatives for re-invigorating welfare services, 
NPM and governance theory, do not addresses governmental paradoxes in a satisfactory 
manner. Whether the approach to welfare paradoxes is one of more user-involvement in the 
definition of services or one of the employment technical tools for carrying out managerial 
strategies, paradoxes are thought of as something to be done away with. It is thus telling 
that what I have termed governmental paradoxes would normally be described as 
‘dilemmas’, ‘tough choices’, ‘contradictions’, ‘ambiguous normative pressures’ etc. The two 
dominant approaches within public management research do not conceive of paradoxes as a 
fundamental condition of management. Despite the many differences in their views of 
welfare management, they both adhere to a problem-and-solution scheme that understands 
the paradox as a temporary obstacle and something which can be surmounted.  
However, in the approach adopted here borrowing upon the governmentality-framework 
and some basic suggestions for the study of paradoxes in Luhmann, paradoxes are not 
dissolvable. They are logical impossibilities which will continue to exist and manifest 
themselves as long as there is such a thing as modern welfare provision. Further studies are 
needed to understand processes of de-paradoxification which can similarly be expected to 
be a persisting activity that takes many shapes across different avenues of welfare provision. 
I suggest that we be ready to acknowledge that de-paradoxification work may be certainly 
be burdensome in some instances, but that it might produce new possibilities and feed 
positively into welfare services in others. One positive effect of de-paradoxification could for 
instance consist in the reformulation of lines of confrontations between groups or 
contradictions between values which appear as fixed and ‘stifled’. This is what I take to be 
implied in the suggestion to ‘unleash the paradoxes’ in public management (Majgaard, 
2009). This view also has implications for practitioners. It means that we should not aim to 
dissolve the paradoxes or ‘take sides’ with respect to their irreconcilable demands; we 
should rather understand how paradoxes, as well as being problematic, are also always 
productive, in as far as they generate debate, provoke contestations of existing arrangements, 
and call for new solutions.  
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1. Introduction 
Partnership is one of the most repeatedly used terms and concepts in public policy. Yet its 
meanings and interpretations vary, and despite its apparent popularity, some policy-makers 
and agencies are inclined to be fearful of the whole notion of partnership. What began as a 
proposal for a more effective way of supporting subsidiarity in decision-making about three 
decades ago, has now developed into sets of institutional arrangements and frameworks, 
whereby government, the social partners and the community and voluntary sector come 
together to address issues of mutual and common concern. This chapter looks at the 
growing importance of partnership and endogenous approaches to aspects of social welfare. 
It notes how partnerships have piloted new methods of social welfare provision and service 
delivery, based on local flexibilities and tailored responses to client needs and potential. 
Over time, many pilot approaches have become mainstreamed, and lessons from the local 
have come to impact on and influence the national. Other partnership initiatives have 
however faltered and waned, mainly due to the inabilities of agencies to make the transition 
from traditional and hierarchical government to multi-lateral and flexible governance 
processes and arrangements. Across Europe, partnership governance is most imbedded in 
institutions at the regional and sub-regional tiers, and Area-Based Partnership organisations 
tend to provide social welfare services as part of a suite of local development actions that 
include training and up-skilling local populations, supporting new enterprise development 
and animating the community and voluntary sector. Thus, social welfare has become 
integrated into broader territorial development strategies.  
In several European states, a shift towards endogenous approaches to social service and 
welfare provision in tandem with local development interventions has yielded considerable 
successes in promoting social inclusion and reducing levels of dependency. Italy has a long 
tradition in endogenous development, which was brought into sharp focus with the 
economic crisis of the 1970s. A concentration on diversifying local economies based on 
optimising endogenous resources has enabled Emilia-Romagna to become one of the most 
developed regions in Europe with consistently low levels of unemployment (Mazzonis, 
1997; Noya, 2009). Producer co-operatives and social enterprises in Spain provide job 
opportunities for persons unable to access mainstream commercial employment. These 
grassroots activities also provide essential local services and ensure that produced capital is 
retained locally. Furthermore, co-operative banks such as Mondragón have enabled people to 
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invest their savings locally and access credit on favourable terms. Such movements serve to 
alleviate poverty and support community development (Briscoe and Ward, 2005), and their 
successes at local level have had the effect of enticing statutory bodies and the productive 
sector to engage in collaborative structures with civil society. 
Global economic trends associated with the increased mobility of capital, trade liberalisation 
and the growing significance of regional and territorial conditions in determining macro 
and micro-economic performance (Vázquez-Barquero, 1997; Sternberg, 2000; 392 and 
Stimson et al. 2009), accelerated the willingness of businesses to engage in partnership with 
trade unions, statutory and regional agencies, local government and the community and 
voluntary sector. These factors, together with a recognition of the limitations on central 
governments motivated the state to become a gradual, if somewhat reluctant advocate of 
partnership approaches1. In addition, the EU has provided a critical impetus to the 
development of partnership processes specifically through initiatives such as INTERREG, 
which targets cross-border collaboration among cities and regions, and LEADER, which is a 
strongly bottom-up approach to rural development. The EU has also promoted dedicated 
Community Initiatives in the area of social policy such as URBAN (targeted at 
disadvantaged urban communities) NOW (New Opportunities for Women) and EQUAL 
(which sought to promote equality of access to the labour market, with specific targeting of 
marginalised groups). Thus, national (state level) and supranational factors have had a 
significant influence on the evolution of partnerships and the emergence of varied and 
multi-level approaches to social welfare provision. The OECD has noted that “support for 
endogenous development can be highly effective in supporting long-term development 
through measures such as support for entrepreneurship, developing human capital, 
spreading innovation, and building local institutions and firm network” (1999: 32-33).  
The burgeoning of partnership structures and mechanisms has propelled a shift in the 
management and delivery of social welfare, whereby traditional state-led schemes 
(universal and / or means-tested) are either being replaced by or complemented with 
service provision models that are more tailored to addressing individual client needs and 
potential and are more territorially differentiated. Consequently, social welfare is 
increasingly viewed not just as a safety net for those experiencing poverty or disadvantage, 
but as part of a suite of interventions designed to promote social inclusion, empowerment 
and community cohesion and development (NESC, 2005; McEwen, 2011). New and 
emerging approaches to social welfare provision and actors’ perspectives thereof raise a 
number of challenges and questions that this chapter seeks to elucidate. The role of 
beneficiaries in shaping and influencing the delivery of supports and the degree to which 
service users are actually empowered is a key issue. Allied to the change in the perception of 
welfare recipients from clients to customers and their increased participation in making 
decisions about the orientation of social welfare services, is the complex issue of governance. 
Partnership governance implies that agencies share power with other stakeholders, 
including representatives of the beneficiaries (Douglas and O’Keeffe, 2009, Stimson et al, 
2009). New power structures and networked decision-making arrangements (Herrschel and 
                                                                 
1 The European Foundation (2003: 14 and 2005) provides further examples of what it describes as 
“grassroots initiatives” that have stimulated the development of partnerships in Germany, Portugal and 
Austria. Noya (2009) and Noya and Clarence (2007) provide case study analysis of social economy 
contributions to local economic development in Canada and Europe. 
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Tallberg, 2011) mark a reduction in the power held by top-down agencies as partnerships 
allow for inputs from service-users, communities, unions, employers, producers and local 
government. Thus, challenges emerge in respect of the capacity of endogenous efforts to 
generate innovation, the interfaces and dynamics between representative and participative 
democracy, accessing resources for development, determining the appropriate spatial scales 
of intervention and the ability of partnerships to effect long-term change in mainstream 
policies and systems. 
This chapter draws on experiences in social welfare service delivery across four European 
states. It outlines and assesses how Area-Based Partnership organisations in Ireland, 
Finland, Spain and Sweden have approached social welfare provision. The specific case 
studies that are elaborated here demonstrate how partnerships have integrated social 
welfare into local development actions. They have done so to varying degrees and with 
variable levels of success. Their approaches have been shaped not just by national and local 
policies and systems, but by the levels of collaboration or conflict between agencies involved 
in the partnership itself. The selected case studies for this chapter are all located in 
predominantly rural areas. Thus, they provide insights into outreach delivery of welfare 
services, and they reveal how agencies responded to issues such as accessibility, transport 
provision and information dissemination. The case studies also address how rural 
partnerships seek to support progression to employment in the context of a narrow local 
economic base. 
The chapter opens with a review of the emerging and increasing roles that Area-Based / 
territorial Partnerships play in social welfare services generally. It examines the drivers of 
such processes and how these have manifested themselves in different locations and 
contexts. The chapter describes partnerships as development agencies with a social welfare 
brief, and it presents and discusses their composition, structures and operations. 
Subsequently, the chapter considers the outputs and impacts of Area-Based Partnerships’ 
approaches to social welfare, including stakeholder participation and the degrees of 
innovation, the extent to which initiatives have become mainstreamed, and the ways in 
which regional and national policies and practices may have been amended as a result of 
local pilots and lessons. The chapter also assesses the limitations of area-based approaches, 
and it questions the significance of factors such as the lack of long-term funding streams, 
shortcomings in enforcement and limited information dissemination. 
2. Emergence and evolution of area-based partnerships 
Collaborative partnerships have been part of the political landscape for several decades. 
Corporatist or national-level partnerships involving governments and the productive sector 
have ensured social stability in Scandinavia and in the Alpine States since the 1950s. 
Enterprise and issue-based partnerships have proven adept at rehabilitating districts 
affected by economic re-structuring and de-industrialisation notably in cities of the UK, 
France and Belgium. Joint venture companies and strategic partnerships have enabled 
agencies to tap into expertise from industry and the education sector in areas such as 
heritage, landscape management and ecology among others. The most prolific and 
significant model of partnership that has emerged in Europe over recent decades can be 
classified as Local Development or Area-Based Partnerships. These can be defined as 
formally-agreed organisational frameworks that bring together representatives of the 
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statutory, social partner and community sectors, to agree and implement a strategic work 
plan for the development of a particular area, usually at the sub-regional / inter-municipal 
scale. Their remit is multi-sectoral, and there is a high degree of emphasis on citizen 
participation and social inclusion. 
2.1 Features of partnership 
The proliferation of Area-Based Partnerships is associated with the state embracing the 
capacities of the productive sector and civil society to contribute to shaping and delivering 
public policy. As McEwen (2011; 81) contends, collaborative approaches to social welfare 
have the potential to provide “greater opportunities to develop welfare systems suited to 
local preferences and needs, and can create an institutional environment which is conducive 
to social policy innovation.” The effectiveness of partnerships is enhanced by power-
sharing, decentralisation, subsidiarity, a sharing of responsibilities, joint-initiatives between 
the partners, attention to and investment in building the capacity of partners, and 
commitments to delivering agreed work programmes, which are subject to review and 
evaluation. Intra-partner dynamics involve elements of endogenous and exogenous 
approaches to development. They oblige partners to consult with the stakeholders, whom 
they represent. Negotiations, trade-offs and compromises are part and parcel of the 
decision-making process within partnership, which have the advantage of ensuring greater 
acceptance of decisions made, but the disadvantage of being cumbersome and time-
consuming. Partnerships are required to be innovative, and to demonstrate the flexibility to 
respond to local needs and requirements in ways that hierarchical exogenous bodies are not. 
Although partnership approaches have frequently been presented as offering an alternative 
to traditional exogenous development (Hughes et al. 1998), they can also be seen as 
complementing the neo-conservative policies of central governments (Todaro, 1994; 
Geoghegan and Powell, 2009). Through their activities in the provision of services to the 
unemployed, the enhancement of community infrastructure and the promotion of new 
enterprise development among others, partnerships are fulfilling re-distribution functions 
that were previously undertaken through state welfare systems or by statutory bodies 
(O’Keeffe and Douglas, 2009). Yet, as Ray (2006) notes, the re-distribution associated with 
partnership is less direct than that pursued through processes associated with Keynesian 
models. Instead, the potential beneficiaries are charged with a degree of responsibility in the 
re-distribution process, and their ability to organise themselves enables them to take greater 
advantage thereof. Thus, contemporary partnership approaches marry top-down concerns, 
namely a need for effective re-distribution and cost management (e.g. out-sourcing) with 
bottom-up concerns – specifically communities’ needs to access resources and the 
stimulation of local potential. They do so by putting the notion of territory and space at the 
centre of development; hence, the area-based approach underpins partnerships’ strategies 
and activities. Post-Fordist restructuring, the development of ICT (Information and 
Communications Technology) and the emergence of endogenous and multi-level 
governance structures places an onus on regional and local actors to pursue policies of 
territorial resource development, although this pursuit can be assisted by the centre. Thus, 
the role of the territory as the space, within which resources are located, accessed, organised 
and manipulated or conserved, assumes an increased significance (AEIDL, 1999; Douglas, 
1995 and 2005).  
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Among the defining characteristics of Area-Based Partnerships are their endogenous 
structures and processes, their locally-defined and accessible base in terms of remit and 
membership, their multi-sectoral operations, a large degree of financial and decision-making 
autonomy, and above all, a participative structure, decision-making and implementation 
process. As described by the OECD:  
“Partnerships help bring synergies between different actors operating within the local area, and 
a level of co-ordination between agencies and policies that was not achieved with nationally 
designed, segmented and sectoral policies… (they) have the flexibility to adjust to different local 
conditions or to react quickly when local conditions changed” (1999: 36). 
The evidence presented in the literature and the evaluations of partnership (OECD, 2001; Ó 
Broin and Kirby, 2009; Pike et al., 2011), suggests that: 
 Partnership arrangements and structures involving the community, social partner and 
statutory sectors can be varied to respond to local conditions and needs. 
 Partnerships need to be sufficiently flexible and autonomous to respond innovatively to 
emerging challenges and opportunities for development. 
 Partnership structures ought to have mechanisms that ensure participation and shared-
power for the mutual benefit of members and the target population. 
 Partnership is a development process, and it involves on-going animation and capacity-
building of partners, and the development of inter-partner linkages and collaboration. 
 Inter-partner collaboration represents the most desirable level of interaction. 
The following table (adapted from AEIDL, 1999) synthesises, definitions of Area-Based 
Partnership. These converge around a vision of bottom-up oriented and participative 
mechanisms and processes, in which arrangements remain suitably flexible, and the remit is 
sufficiently broad so as to deal with the multiplicity of needs, and respond to the various 
opportunities that arise in dedicated areas. The principles of integration and co-ordination, 
more than the exact models are transferable. As the table shows, partnership approaches to 
development incorporate many of the features of bottom-up development. These include 
the valorisation of local dimensions, citizen participation and empowerment, collective 
community-based action and mobilisation of local resources. However, unlike approaches 
that are exclusively endogenous, most Area-Based Partnerships in practice do not seek to 
exclude the exogenous. Rather they seek to promote linkages, co-operation and 
collaboration between bottom-up and top-down agents of development, giving effect to 
what Ray (2006) describes as neo-endogenous development.  
2.2 Drivers of area-based partnership 
Area-Based Partnerships embody the bottom-up approach to development, which involves 
high levels of citizen participation, so that local actors are implicitly involved in developing 
local resources and stimulating the productive restructuring process, and so improve the 
level of employment and well-being of the population (Vázquez-Barquero, 1997; OECD, 
2001; Márquez-Domínguez, 2009). Advocates of endogenous strategies consider all 
territories as having development potential based on their own resources, and they favour a 
departure from classical and neo-classical economic approaches, which, like traditional 
models of social welfare provision were directed by the centre, and universally applied 
(Malecki, 1997). Endogenous policies have been on the ascendancy since the mid-1980s. 
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statutory, social partner and community sectors, to agree and implement a strategic work 
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 Area-Based Partnerships Traditional Exogenous 
Organisational 
Structure. 
Broadly-Based membership, with an 
emphasis on citizen participation. 
Complex Structures reflect 
participative democracy, and 
opportunities for inputs. 
Specific structures and actions to 
target and animate participation by 
socially excluded groups. 
Inclusive information sharing and 
feedback mechanisms, based on 
horizontal structures. 
Positive Equality Proofing, with 
gender and social class mix. 
Narrow membership, recruited 
from specific experts or political 
appointees. 
Simple structures reflect 
representative democracy, with 
representatives or appointees 
mandated to act on behalf of the 
population/ citizens. 
No targeting of any specific 
sectors. 
Hierarchical reporting procedures 
via vertical mechanisms. 




Processes are inclusive and 
participatory, but may be time-
consuming. 
Local knowledge and conditions, 
and qualitative/ anecdotal evidence 
influences decision-making. 
Quantitative data and projections 
are also taken into account. 
Partnerships enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy. 
Processes are regulated, time-
efficient and may be taken by an 
appointed group, acting on behalf 
of the whole body. 
Statistical data, external reports 
and quantifiable targets play 
significant roles in informing 
decision-making. 
The degree of autonomy may be 
limited by the need to report to a 
local authority, national or 
government bodies, or to a 
minister. 
Spatial Remit. Locally-defined and respected 
boundaries that have economic as 
well as social and cultural relevance 
and application. 
Pre-defined boundaries, based on 
political or administrative units. 
Resource 
Allocation. 
Resources are targeted spatially and 
sectorally, and influenced by social 
inclusion needs. 
Applications for funding are 
animated. 
Resources are allocated on the 
‘value for money’ of the projects 
submitted. 
Applications are processed on 
first come, - first served basis. 
Financing. Arrangements are ad hoc. 
Allocations are made through 
competitive tender, and based on 
area/business plans submitted to 
funding agencies. 
Allocations are relatively small in 
the overall (territorial development) 
context. 
Arrangements are more 
permanent, and linked to the 
fixed-term budgets of government 
departments. 
Allocations are relatively sizeable. 
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Relationship 
with Citizens. 
It is based on participation. There is 
considerable interfacing with the 
citizen at community level and 
through group structures. 




Financial information is published 
and disseminated. 
Citizen participation is viewed as 
unnecessary, as skills can be 
contracted in. Information may be 
circulated to citizens about 
particular projects. 
Accountability is ultimately to 
directly-elected politicians. 
Financial information may be 
available from central sources. 
Resource-base. Local knowledge and experiences 
form the basis for strategic 
decisions. 
Experts in particular fields of 
knowledge are recruited or 
contracted. 
Activities. Multi-Sectoral. 
May also operate as a catalyst to 
influence or seek to affect actions in 
other arenas that impact on its own 
work. 
Uni-sectoral. 




Client and Project through-put. 
Economic Output. 
Innovation. 
Levels of Participation. 




Client and Project through-put 
Economic Output. 
 
Table 1. Features of Area-Based Partnerships, compared with those of Exogenous Agents of 
Development 
They are based on the theories of neo-Schumpeterian innovation, industrial districts and the 
innovative milieu (Vázquez-Barquero, 1997; Sternberg, 2000). They emphasise regional and 
local innovation, and view multi-sectoral, inter-business and inter-agency networking as 
essential in stimulating development potential. The territory or locale emerges as a place of 
co-ordination and learning (Malecki, 1997; Márquez-Domínguez, 2009), while networking 
(Cook, 1996; Phillips, 1998), inter-actor and agency collaboration (Douglas, 2010) enable “a 
shift away from redistribution and subsidies in favour of measures to increase the 
productivity of enterprises and encourage private investment, including an emphasis on 
endogenous assets” (OECD, 2005b; 8). The consequence for social welfare systems is that 
regional and territorial variations emerge in respect of their application within states 
(McEwen, 2011). 
There is a strong body of literature among geographers espousing the merits of territorial 
approaches to development and public service provision that bring stakeholders together in 
collaborative structures to identify and stimulate local potential and promote social 
inclusion. Moseley (2003) notes that partnership arrangements can bring ‘added value’ to 
development initiatives, and enable the realisation of synergies that would not be possible 
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where an agency or organisation acted alone. Similar contentions can be found in economic 
political science literatures. Craig and McKeon (1994) describe how collective effort through 
partnership can attract external resources into an area or a project, either through direct 
programme support or by securing additional resources from other local and non-local 
sources, with public, private and community / voluntary sectors all having the capacity to 
contribute, albeit not necessarily with the same means. Having reviewed Area-Based 
Partnerships in a number of different territorial contexts, Meldon et al. (2002: 9) note, 
“development is a multi-dimensional process incorporating economic, social and 
environmental objectives, which can only be successfully delivered through direct 
participative governance and cross-sectoral partnerships.” 
By creating mechanisms that allow for multiple inputs into decision-making and service 
delivery, partnerships introduce greater complexity relative to traditional top-down 
structures. However, by giving voice to a multiplicity of experiences and perspectives, they 
generate new synergies, and as Douglas (2010; 170) observes, based on extensive case study 
research in Canada, “traditional and top-down and command-and-control mechanisms… 
have had their successes in dealing with problems, they do not have the capacity to deal 
with the complex problems, which require continuous vigilance and changes in the 
behaviour of stakeholders and managers, as well as in the approach to management.” This 
thesis is supported by Turok (2011), who argues the need to move away from welfare-to-
work approaches, and towards inclusive growth strategies that involve inputs from diverse 
interests around a common agenda, thereby generating “more dynamic and effective 
interventions, being rooted in place allow for greater sensitivity to local needs and 
circumstances and a richer understanding of shifting circumstances” (2011; 85).  
2.3 Partnership governance 
The drive towards the establishment of collaborative partnerships, and the accompanying 
renewed focus on the territorial is occurring in multiple political and economic contexts. In 
all cases it has implications for decision-making and for the ways in which public bodies 
operate. The formation and evolution of Area-Based Partnerships represent what several 
commentators (Moseley 2003; Douglas and O’Keeffe, 2009) refer to as a fundamental 
paradigm shift from a system of government where decision-making and political power 
were centralised, to a system of multi-level governance where power is shared, and where 
organisations and institutions that share objectives, must also share resources, responsibility 
and authority in order to achieve their collective goals. Area-Based Partnerships provide a 
vehicle through which the community and voluntary sector interfaces directly with the 
state, and through which agreed cross-sectoral programmes are delivered, in a way that 
responds with flexibility to meeting local needs and fostering opportunities. Some 
commentators refer to multi-level governance as ushering in a hollowing-out of the state 
(Adshead, 2006), while others see it as potentially enabling the state to off-load 
responsibilities to citizens (Ó Broin and Kirby, 2009). In any event, the state plays an 
important role as a power-broker and distributor of resources, and power and resource 
struggles are frequently foremost on the agendas of partnerships (Crouch, 2011). 
One of the more significant challenges for partnership governance structures is the 
promotion of information-sharing and subsequent collaboration between agents, 
particularly those in the public sector who, as a consequence of experiencing the transition 
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from traditional government to multi-level or partnership governance, find themselves 
interfacing horizontally with and referring more to locally-based coalitions rather than 
relating vertically to government bureaucracy. The heightened degree of multi-actor agency 
(in France and elsewhere) has led some observers to claim that governance relations are no 
longer structured through bureaucratic hierarchies but through a series of overlapping 
networks (Nicholls, 2005; 783). As inter-agency interfacing and collaboration with local 
citizens become more prominent among public institutions, their roles in promoting 
community development, citizen-empowerment, collective and inclusive decision-making 
and the development of social capital are increasingly significant (Scott, 2004; Walsh and 
Meldon, 2004; OECD, 2001, 2005; European Foundation, 2005). 
Several commentators (Bennett and Krebs, 1991; Kooiman, 1993; Hughes, 1998; Walsh and 
Meldon, 2004, ESPON, 2006) describe the emerging forms of governance as fluid, somewhat 
chaotic and based on interdependence between organisations, and continuing interactions 
within inter-organisational networks. Partnership governance arrangements and the 
ensuing actions will invariably vary from one location to the next, but are characterised by 
the core principles of:  
 high levels of participation by local citizenry; 
 a degree of flexibility in decision-making and resource allocation processes;  
 the capacity to respond to local needs and opportunities;  
 the embodiment of top-down and bottom-up approaches to development. 
As well as presenting challenges and opportunities for statutory bodies and government 
agencies, the transition from government to governance (Davoudi, 2005; O’Keeffe and 
Douglas, 2009) presents civil society with a platform for continuous participation in local 
decision-making, and brings with it increased responsibilities. Traditional government and 
democracy that is based exclusively on representative processes is characterised by: 
 The dominance of state power; 
 Organisation through formal public sector agencies and bureaucratic procedures; 
 Neat and usually simple dividing lines between formal government relations and 
agents. 
This implies that – through systems of representative democracy - citizens and communities 
are charged with electing political representatives to make decisions on their behalves. 
Partnership or multi-stakeholder governance, operating in the context of representative 
democracy is characterised by: 
 A proliferation of agencies, service deliverers and regulatory systems in decision-
making processes; 
 Horizontal self-organisation among mutually independent actors;  
 Increased emphasis on territorial, rather than sectoral approaches to policy making, 
service delivery and economic competitiveness. 
Through their involvement in partnerships, civil society organisations become absorbed into 
the decision-making apparatus, with the potential to be either subsumed into it, or to give 
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2.4 Social capital and beneficiary participation 
Davoudi (2005) argues that the shift from government to governance has expanded the 
policy-making space, broadened the range of actors involved in decision-making and has 
diffused the locus of power downwards. The responsibilities that come with giving effect to 
participative democracy place considerable onus on partnerships, as they are expected to 
animate and support widespread community involvement and citizen participation, while 
also securing buy-in to citizen engagement on the parts of agencies more accustomed to 
relying exclusively on the channels of representative democracy. Emerging developmental 
approaches to the provision of social welfare and public services increasingly involve “new 
forms of public-voluntary and public-private partnerships … and the possibility for local 
actors of greater autonomy and security in funding” (NESC, 2005: xxi). Such economic and 
institutional evolution requires local development partnerships to fine-tune their ability to 
target services, articulate local needs and incorporate participative approaches into the 
delivery of local services. 
In order to optimise the contributions of all stakeholders involved, partnerships must, as 
recommended by Birch (2008; 66), promote goodwill trust that extends beyond existing 
relationships, so as to promote “empowerment of the local community… [and] sustainable, 
local regeneration.” This confers on partnerships a role in promoting social capital, whereby 
community spirit and volunteerism are engendered and the community and voluntary 
sector enhances its capacity to partake in public policy formulation and implementation. 
The challenge in this respect is to ensure that community organisations are inclusive 
(Humphreys and Dineen, 2006). 
Similarly, Donnelly (2004) and Turok (2011) contend that meaningful partnership and a 
genuine sharing of power are pre-requisites to tackling inequality and social exclusion. Indeed, 
there is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates how endogenous-led initiatives, 
promoted through Area-Based Partnerships have been particularly effective in engaging 
vulnerable and disadvantaged communities such as Roma, the long-term unemployed and 
those with little formal education, although the extent to which they do so is determined by 
governance arrangements and intra-partnership dynamics and the levels of social capital 
generated as much as by external factors (Esparcia et al., 2000; Pobal, 2001 and 2006; Carnegie 
Commission, 2010; Nardone et al., 2010). Some partnerships have been proactive in targeting 
socially excluded and vulnerable members of society and enabling them to participate in local 
decision-making through participative fora, thereby stimulating local social capital (O’Keeffe, 
2009), while others appear to be less effective in reaching out to communities, and can actually 
serve to reinforce local hierarchies (Furmankiewicz et al., 2010). Almost universally, Area-
Based Partnerships that engage local citizens through participative mechanisms and integrate 
service provision into community animation and development strategies are more likely to 
add value to the promotion of social inclusion than are partnerships that are dominated by a 
single agency and that fail to promote outreach actions and community empowerment. 
3. Assessing the contributions of area-based partnerships to social welfare 
services 
The review of partnership features, dynamics and issues presented in this chapter highlights 
key performance areas including the role of local actors in initiating partnership, the extent of 
power-sharing between stakeholders, the mechanisms for beneficiary participation, innovation 
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in service delivery and the impacts of local lessons and experiences on mainstream practices 
and policies. The EQUAL Community Initiative, which was initially rolled out by the EU in 
the 1990s, has provided a funding, support and co-ordinating mechanism to enable Area-
Based Partnerships to deliver innovative approaches in promoting social inclusion and 
encouraging participation in the workforce. Funded by DG Directorate General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion up to 2008, several elements of EQUAL are 
currently supported by national and regional governments. Its stated aim is “to promote new 
means of combating all forms of discrimination and inequalities in connection with the labour 
market” (Commission of the European Communities, 2000; 2). Citing the title in the 
Amsterdam Treaty on employment, the Commission advocates action at “the local and 
regional level, in urban and rural districts – that is to say at the level of territories able to 
generate local co-operation” (op. cit. 2-3), and it went on to state that EQUAL would be 
implemented by Development Partnerships (DPs). By virtue of their roles in stimulating access 
to the labour force, addressing social exclusion and discrimination, piloting innovations, 
disseminating good practices and promoting inter-agency and inter-territorial collaboration, 
EQUAL Development Partnerships provide a useful case study from which to draw lessons 
about the effectiveness or otherwise of partnership approaches to social welfare provision and 
development. 
The specific case studies referred to here relate to experiences in Finland, Ireland, Spain and 
Sweden. Experiences from the Finnish case demonstrate the importance of transport 
services and the outreach delivery of supports in rural communities with low population 
densities. The Irish case study deals with three LEADER Local Action Groups who came 
together to promote progression to employment of beneficiaries from a range of defined 
target groups including refugees, lone-parents, low-income smallholders, older unemployed 
people and people with disabilities. Lessons from this case study point to the importance of 
tailored one-to-one supports to individuals. The case studies from Spain reveal how social 
economy enterprises can play a supportive role in facilitating individuals to make a 
transition from exclusion to mainstream employment. In Sweden, collaboration with local 
employers emerges as a means of providing opportunities for unemployed people to access 
work experience and training. Such holistic methodologies are enabled through endogenous 
approaches, the localised nature of the delivery agencies, and their linkages with civil 
society. The partnership agencies in all cases have established structures to enable client 
group participation in decision-making, as part of the process of tailoring interventions and 
empowering beneficiaries. Thus, they provide some insights into social welfare governance. 
Data were collected in the five case study locations by means of a survey questionnaire among 
all beneficiaries, in-depth face-to-face interviews with a sample of beneficiaries, meetings with 
household members of some beneficiaries to provide a holistic appraisal of social welfare 
interventions, interviews with frontline staff and DP (Development Partnership) members and 
facilitated workshops with all stakeholders. The findings show that partnerships’ approaches 
have enabled innovations in accessing and empowering clients. The flexibility implicit in local 
development approaches transfers well to the provision of social welfare supports, as 
interventions, particularly in respect of personal development and vocational training were 
tailored to suit individuals’ needs and their progression potential. The approach of all DPs 
focused very strongly on the empowerment of individual clients, and several fora were 
convened to enable beneficiaries to input into local decision-making. Statutory or traditional 
mainstream providers proved to be generally open to taking on board ideas, suggestions and 
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2.4 Social capital and beneficiary participation 
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together to promote progression to employment of beneficiaries from a range of defined 
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work experience and training. Such holistic methodologies are enabled through endogenous 
approaches, the localised nature of the delivery agencies, and their linkages with civil 
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good practices that emerged from the bottom-up, but some were less forthcoming in 
committing funding to particular pilot initiatives. The Development Partnerships have 
compiled and articulated specific policy recommendations, but their work in having these 
fully implemented remains on-going. As well as delivering EQUAL in their respective local 
contexts, each of the Development Partnerships participated together in a transnational 
partnership called WORKLINKS, which enabled them to share experiences and seek to 
promote best practice and mainstreaming. 
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2 Each Development Partnership also provided for representation on its board from among the beneficiaries. 
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3.1 Engaging beneficiaries – localisation and endogenous approaches 
Unlike mainstream agencies, which have to deal with all those who present claims for social 
welfare supports, the Development Partnerships in this study have had the facility to focus 
on a limited number of beneficiary types. This has allowed them to pursue a more 
personalised approach to welfare provision than any of the beneficiaries would have 
previously experienced. It has also enabled the Development Partnerships to work with 
individuals to address non-economic obstacles and barriers (such as low literacy levels, 
domestic violence, addictions, mental ill-health) that had inhibited their self-development. 
Having a range of agencies represented on their Boards of Directors, Development 
Partnerships were well-positioned to draw on the knowledge and expertise of personnel 
such as counsellors, medics and educators, and through their linkages with employers, the 
partnerships were able to arrange tailored and taster work-experience programmes for their 
clients. 
Consultations with social welfare recipients who participated in this study revealed that 
there was seldom one factor that prevented them coming off social welfare and making the 
transition to employment. Institutional and structural barriers such as a lack of transport 
services, rural isolation, limited childcare options and unavailability of services, particularly 
health and social services emerged as significant barriers to client empowerment and 
progression. Barriers also exist at local community level and clients in all four countries 
reported that the attitudes of family members, neighbours and peers emerge as significant 
factors. In this context, negative attitudes on the part of other people may reduce the self-
confidence and self-esteem of a client, such that he/ she can face additional difficulties in 
coming forward to access support. By the same token, a supportive family and community 
can play an important role in client empowerment. Drug abusers from the Aproxímate (Esp) 
catchment area recounted how prejudices and fears, either on the part of employers or other 
workers, caused them to be hesitant in coming forward to access supports. Many articulated 
that they were more comfortable approaching a partnership than a government agency, due 
to their past experiences of state systems. 
Research in each of the five case study locations reveals specific barriers faced by women in 
the rural context. In these cases, as well as in many rural areas throughout Europe, most job 
opportunities have traditionally been in the fields of agriculture, quarrying, forestry, fishing 
and construction, all of which have tended to be male dominated. Women tend to be less 
likely to have the skills or the desire to take up employment in these areas, and therefore 
face more acute difficulties in accessing the jobs that may emerge in their municipalities. 
Clients have also reported varying degrees of prejudiced attitudes towards females, where 
women are somehow perceived ‘less able’ to carry-out certain tasks. While the interventions 
made through the Development Partnerships have made considerable progress in enabling 
many females to deal with prejudices on an individual level, there is a need for a more 
extensive approach to challenging all forms of prejudice and potential discrimination. 
Experiences in each of the study locations are definitive on the significance of the bottom-up 
approach; being endogenous organisations with established links to the local communities, 
Development Partnerships have an independence and autonomy that enables clients to 
approach them with greater confidence. Working through local development structures 
(services operate in the offices / bases of community development organisations), means 
that supports are present at a community level that would be impossible if the initiative 
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(services operate in the offices / bases of community development organisations), means 
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were administered through state bureaucracy or large institutions. Some clients have 
reported that approaching a local and bottom-up organisation removes fears they may have 
had about losing welfare benefits. Clients in Sweden were particularly vocal in articulating 
the merits of accessing services locally, as some claimed to have had negative experiences of 
government offices. Consequenlty, those working with the SUCCESS DP (Se) have had to 
build-up rapport and co-operation with those in the statutory sector, as well as with the 
client. 
Each of the partnerships has demonstrated how they have succeeded in disseminating 
information to clients via community and local networks. Aproxímate and Res Laboris (Esp) 
each cover extensive catchment areas over several municipalities. Recognising that outreach 
offices alone have a limited impact in terms of engaging with those most in need of 
assistance, the DPs have developed linkages with several community associations and 
charitable bodies. Each of these bodies is informed of the supports available, and undertakes 
to disseminate information in its own municipality. Indeed, many of the clients assisted by 
Aproxímate were initially referred to it by local charities and associations. 
The case studies reveal how the development partnerships have been proactive in following 
up with clients. This contrasts with clients’ experiences of larger organisations that have 
tended to place the entire onus on the client to chase up opportunities, as was particularly 
the case in Ireland and Spain. The local partnerships contrast further with traditional 
agencies in that they do not seek to categorise or label clients and ‘diagnose’ based on that 
categorisation. Instead, each individual is assessed and supported based on his / her own 
life situation, skills, likes / dislikes, interests and ultimate goals in life. Such an approach is 
time-consuming and requires a large degree of commitment on the part of support staff. 
Indeed, the research findings are clear on the need for frontline Job Coaches and Facilitators 
to have community development skills, so as to maximise the effectiveness of bottom-up 
approaches.  
3.2 Beneficiaries’ experiences of area-based partnerships 
Observations by clients and support staff alike confirm the importance of confidentiality, trust 
and understanding between both parties. Jobs’ Facilitators / Coaches report how they have 
refined their listening and inter-personal skills in enabling clients to deal with life challenges, 
and to set attainable goals for themselves. While the intensive one-to-one approach applied by 
EQUAL DPs incorporates many of the features of traditional job coaching and mediation, it 
extends far beyond either. The case studies underscore the need for the process of client 
support to be based as much on empowerment as on employment progression. 
The experience of those affected by drug dependencies supported by Aproxímate (Esp) 
spells out the need to: 
 Provide the client/ beneficiary with complete information, 
 Detail the benefits to him/ her, 
 Promote the active participation of the client/ beneficiary, 
 Empathise with the beneficiary and create a relationship of mutual trust. 
Reporting on experience of working with clients, one Facilitator has describes how “the 
work done will be collectively agreed upon at all times, although the client is considered the 
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main protagonist who sets the objectives and carries out the tasks.” The Aproxímate 
experience underpins the need for a constant focus on developing the clients’ self-esteem, 
and the need to work on aspects such as “abilities, skills and capacities.” Support structures, 
such as those provided by Ideum (House of Ideas, Se) represent a suitable context in which 
the individual can gain confidence and develop his/her skills. As one participant described 
Ideum: 
“No one knows anything about the other. You choose what you want to tell about yourself. 
Everyone knows that they are respected for who they are … Ideum is a greenhouse where you are 
allowed to grow in your own tempo.” 
The approach taken by SUCCESS (Se) and Rural Options (Irl) proposes that the facilitator/ 
mediator work with the client to formulate a personal plan that is based on the following: 
 What goals and expectations has the participant? 
 What does the participant think about the agencies’ goals and his/her personal goals? 
 The participant’s description of his/ her current situation 
 Mapping of the resources, possibilities and limitations. 
Res Laboris (Esp) applies a similar approach, and has developed an extensive template, 
which the client and facilitator can use to identify skills, abilities, preferences, opportunities, 
gaps, challenges, needs, resources and potential. Moreover, the Res Laboris Centre provides 
a specific programme for those who lack work experience and qualifications. Funded by Res 
Laboris, this programme enables employers to taken on social welfare dependents, and to 
provide them with in-house training and employment for a dedicated period of time. This 
arrangement does not require any financial contribution from the employer, and has no 
impact on the rights of clients to retain their social welfare benefits. 
The Rural Options (Irl) approach is also motivated by removing the barriers to equality, 
that impede the client’s self-development. Therefore, while the facilitator / coach may be 
working face-to-face with a client to improve his/ her abilities, he/ she also works with 
colleagues within the LEADER3 Partnerships to address the broader support issues that 
are essential to client progression. Linkages between EQUAL and various Rural Transport 
Programmes operated by the Partnerships have been essential in enabling clients to access 
training and employment. Community development structures, including lone-parents’ 
groups and networks of people with disabilities have provided clients with a social outlet, 
and have also served as vehicles through which structural inequalities are being 
addressed. 
3.3 Beneficiaries’ perspectives 
When asked to rate the extent to which the intensive one-to-one approach pursued by 
Development Partnerships had lived up to their expectations, the clients replied as follows: 
                                                                 
3 LEADER, which began in 1991, is a European Union Community initiative to promote rural 
development. Current (2007 – 2013) rural development policy in Europe (Regulation 1698/2005) 
requires that strategies and actions are promoted by means of the LEADER method – namely 
encouraging the implementation of integrated, high-quality and original strategies for sustainable 
development with a strong focus on partnership and networks of exchange of experience. 
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3 LEADER, which began in 1991, is a European Union Community initiative to promote rural 
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To a large extent:  71% 
To some extent:  14.5% 
Not Sure / Too Early: 14.5% 
These responses indicate a very high level of satisfaction among clients. Many clients 
commented that they valued having access to a facilitator who was willing to allocate the 
necessary time to addressing their issues. When asked whether or not they had been 
allocated sufficient time, 86% replied that they had. Clients were also asked to identify the 
main benefits that had accrued to them personally as a result of the one-to-one approach. 
The following diagram presents the results. 
 
Fig. 1. Main Personal Benefits as identified by Clients 
The majority of clients identified more than one benefit. The most frequently cited benefits 
were: 
- I have a plan or a sense of what I want to do with my career / life, and 
- I got a place on a training programme. 
While the latter reveals little difference between the outputs of Area-Based Partnerships and 
those of exogenous agencies, the former highlights a substantial difference, and is reflective 
of the holistic approach that is enabled through collaborative partnership and client 
empowerment. 
At the time of the survey, over 70% of clients had completed at least one training 
programme. Half the clients surveyed stated they have gained greater self-confidence as a 
result of their participation in employment and training supports, while 36% claimed that 
they enjoy better relations with their family and friends, relative to before their engagement 
with the DP. When asked to identify the most positive aspects of the DP service, the 
following were the most frequently cited: 
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 The facilitators’ skills and approach,  
 Facilitator’s understanding, 
 Counselling support,  
 Building up a relationship of trust,  
 Opening up doors to other organisations. 
When asked to suggest changes to the type of support provided, clients identified the need for: 
 More training 
 Work Experience 
 Personal Assistant Allowances (especially for people with disabilities) 
 Continuity. 
The high levels of satisfaction with the one-to-one approach are also reflected in the 
following table. The table presents the views expressed by clients regarding the potential to 
expand the approach to other contexts. 
 
 Agree Don’t Know/ No Opinion Disagree 
The one-to-one approach is better than any previous 
experience I had in relation to employment. 91% 9%  
The one-to-one approach focused on my personal 
development and abilities. 100%   
Other agencies need to adopt the one-to-one 
approach 86% 14%  
The one-to-one approach would be too intensive for 
most people.  22% 78% 
Table 3. Clients’ Assessment of the One-to-One Approach 
Each of the five DPs has promoted a high degree of integration and complementarity 
between EQUAL and the other actions promoted by them. Over 78% clients reported having 
had contact with another member of the Partnership staff, with the most frequent interfaces 
being with training officers / co-ordinators. Thus, the multi-stakeholder composition of 
partnerships, and the integration of social welfare with other developmental supports lend 
themselves to the optimisation of progression opportunities for clients. 
3.4 Innovation 
Localisation, bottom-up and partnership have combined to create conditions that are 
favourable to innovative, flexible, integrated and holistic approaches to client progression 
and the realisation of equal opportunities. The development of employment opportunities in 
the social economy or third sector in parallel with job coaching maximises the probability of 
client progression. Linkages with local employers have encouraged innovations in the ways 
in which workplaces respond to the integration of new entrants. Government agencies have 
generally responded positively to the need for vocational training, and have provided DPs 
with the resources to run tailored programmes for clients. Agencies have however been 
more reticent about sharing data with one another, and territorialism on the part of some 
agency personnel remains a barrier to innovation. 
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Social Economy enterprises have provided a very valuable training and employment outlet 
for many clients. The highest rates of uptake of employment in this sector occur in Spain, 
most notably in the Aproxímate catchment area. For many clients, a placement in a social 
economy setting provides the opportunity to (re)gain their self-confidence, get a taste for 
work, and/ or to adjust to the routine and responsibilities that go with having a job. Thus, a 
flexible approach on the part of social economy enterprises provides clients with a 
mechanism for making the transition to mainstream employment. For other clients, the 
social economy has provided the most appropriate form of employment. The lessons from 
the Spanish experience have transferred well to the Irish context, and since 2010, the Irish 
partners have expanded their own social economy enterprises, including a community food 
centre and a furniture restoration business, which predominantly employs people with 
mental ill-health4. Indeed, many members of this client group do not come within the 
statutory agency definition of a ‘person with a disability,’ but at the same time, many are 
incapable of holding down a mainstream job. 
The five partnerships have each demonstrated a positive and pro-active approach to 
meeting the needs of those who live in rural areas and have responded through a variety of 
outreach mechanisms. One Jobs Coach operates from a cattle mart one day each week, so as 
to promote engagement by low-income smallholders and their families, while others operate 
part time from community and youth drop-in centres. Interestingly, the DP members and 
staff did not see their outreach actions are being particularly innovative in themselves, but 
they mark a very clear departure from the approaches pursued by exogenous social welfare 
delivery agencies. 
When asked about innovation specifically, DP members tended to speak extensively about 
their work in changing attitudes among, and arrangements with local employers. They have 
sought to promote flexible approaches to work placements, and members of the SUCCESS 
(Se) and Res Laboris (Esp) DPs have made arrangements with local employers to provide 
beneficiaries with transport and with staggered working times so as to enable them to 
gradually make the transition from welfare dependency to part-time work. In order to 
support employers to ‘take the risk’ involved in employing a client who has been distant 
from the labour force, the Actíva Foundation (Se), in conjunction with the social insurance 
office implements a scheme under which the worker is placed with the employer, but where 
Actíva manages the employment, pays the wages, ensures that the employee completes 
his/her tasks and advances in terms of his/her personal progression. This innovation is also 
being promoted in Finland, and it demonstrates the added value that can be generated from 
inter-agency interfacing through partnership.  
In Arvidsjaur (a municipality in Northern Sweden) a special method called “personal 
coordinator” is being developed that gives the client – due to a joint agreement between the 
different local authorities involved with the client – the opportunity to choose one person, 
from a certain number of civil servants representing the authorities, who will accompany 
the client through the whole rehabilitation process. This means the establishment of a better 
and more reliable relation between the client and the person giving support that will lead to 
a smoother and shorter rehabilitation process with the clear focus on the clients’ real needs; 
the individual approach. 
                                                                 
4 These particular social enterprises are operated by one of the LEADER Local Action Groups in the 
Irish DP – IRD Duhallow. Further details are available on www.irdduhallow.com. 
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It is evident from the DP experiences to date that the more universal national social security 
systems in Finland and Sweden relative to those in Ireland and Spain (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009) allow for greater flexibility and innovation on the parts of partnership. In 
particular, the mechanisms to enable sick-listed persons to resume employment on a 
temporary or phased basis have the potential to operate in other member states. Thus, the 
abilities of partnerships to effect policy change is determined not just by internal dynamics, 
but by the willingness or otherwise of statutory agencies to take risks and embrace 
innovation. However, most public service systems are risk-averse and functionaries are not 
incentivised to innovate. Indeed, within many bureaucracies staff members are, despite the 
demonstrative benefits of partnership, more likely to be rewarded for client throughput 
rather than their achievements through collaborative partnerships.  
3.5 Beneficiary empowerment 
The tripartite structure of Area-Based Partnerships (i.e. involving the statutory, social 
partners and community sectors) seeks to create synergies by capitalising on the expertise, 
experiences and perspectives of multiple stakeholders while simultaneously promoting 
participative democracy and social capital and client inputs into decision-making. The 
following diagram outlines the core partnership structure on which the DPs are based.  
 
Fig. 2. Development Partnership Structure 
In the case of Rural Options (Irl), the local development sector plays a strong role. This has 
ensured a high degree of integration and complementarity between EQUAL and local 
development actions, including LEADER. As a result, clients and beneficiaries have enjoyed 
access not just to employment facilitators / jobs’ coaches, but to a range of supports in the 
areas of education, training, personal development, job-coaching, enterprise supports, 
mentoring and the promotion of the equality agenda at community level.  
Both Spanish DPs have secured strong representation from the local government sector. Res 
Laboris brings together representatives from several municipalities. This ensures that 
EQUAL has a presence throughout an extensive area. It has also facilitated the development 
of outreach services. The DP is closely linked to the Local Action Group (ADI El Záncara) 
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which is responsible for implementing the Spanish national LEADER Programme 
(PRODER5). This ensures complementarity between EQUAL and activities in the areas of 
community and enterprise development. It has also enabled the DP to garnish greater 
support from employers and the social partners. Res Laboris works to ensure high levels of 
employer participation. The DP contracts a development officer (vendedor de empleo), who is 
responsible for liasing with local businesses and noting their human resource requirements. 
This informs both the staff and the clients, and enables clients to direct their efforts towards 
specific and tangible opportunities. 
The DP Aproxímate also demonstrates strong participation by the local authority sector. Ten 
municipalities are represented on the DP. The town of Antequerra in central Andalucía 
provides a clear example of where municipal authorities responded to overtures from the 
DP by setting up a forum of people with disabilities to advise them on streetscape design. 
As a result, clients and the local community have benefited from the town’s enhanced 
physical layout. In addition to municipal representation, the County Council of Málaga and 
the Regional Government (Junta de Andalucía) have one representative each on the DP. 
Participation by the latter has ensured that lessons emerging at a local level are taken on 
board regionally and that the DP has an input into economic and employment strategies 
such as the regional research and industrial plans.  
Each of the partnerships has made efforts to include clients on its Steering Committee / Board 
of Directors, thereby giving effect to the principles of participative democracy referred to 
earlier in this chapter. However, they have had mixed success in this respect. Rural Options 
(Irl) established five client networks to provide mechanisms for client consultation and 
representation drawn from smallholders, people with disabilities, people parenting alone, 
asylum seekers and the long-term unemployed aged over forty. Each network has elected a 
representative to the Rural Options DP, who is charged with representing the network, and 
with providing two-way feedback between the clients and the DP. While the clients contribute 
actively to the DP Board, they are all volunteers and lack the required resources to provide 
comprehensive feedback to the broad category of persons they represent. Thus, they tend to 
rely on newsletters produced by the DP and its constituent partners, and their visibility among 
the public is low. Similar experiences are reported from the other DP locations, although 
agency representatives report that they benefit from being able to float ideas with beneficiaries 
through the mechanism of the DP. The DPs’ shortcomings in this respect are indicative of a 
widespread weakness among partnerships, as articulated by Ó Broin (2009; 124), 
“representatives of marginalised groups lack the power of the employers’, trade unions’ or 
farmers’ groups. They do not have the same ability to hold up the implementation of decisions 
agreed during the social partnership process.” 
3.6 Inter-agency collaboration 
Collaboration with the statutory sector has been a strong feature of all the DPs. At SUCCESS 
(Se), mediators have been pro-active in developing linkages with the social welfare services, 
                                                                 
5 PRODER, established in 1996, is a programme created to support national rural development in Spain. 
The Spanish government and the EU co-financed the initiative. It promotes rural development and is 
delivered locally by Local Action Groups, which are multi-stakeholder partnerships, similar to LEADER 
Groups. 
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and have encouraged a more personalised and tailored approach to enabling EQUAL clients 
to progress towards employment. Similar collaborations have been pursued between DP 
Aproxímate and ‘Andalucía Orienta’ (the Andalucian Employment Services). These have 
delivered job-insertion programmes, specialised counselling, job-monitoring and work-
experience placements. In the case of Rural Options, collaboration with Teagasc (the state 
agricultural advisory service) has provided smallholders with enhanced access to a tailored 
programme designed to promote complementary off-farm employment. 
Collaboration with the social partners, and in particular with employers has seen Rural 
Options implement a total employability programme. This programme was developed 
through collaboration between the DP, the national training and employment agency (FÁS) 
and a large employer in the area. It comprised a specific training programme designed to 
enable EQUAL clients to access jobs that had been ring-fenced for them in a new factory. As 
a result, ten clients have taken-up employment.  
Collaboration with community and voluntary associations, and with the third sector has 
been important in maximising the accessibility of EQUAL in Spain. In Málaga, for example, 
collaboration between Aproxímate and the drug-addition centre; C.E.R.A.L. has been 
essential in enabling clients to overcome their personal fears and to embark on training and 
development programmes. Other community-based associations, such as the Centre for 
Women in Ronda, play a vital role in referring clients to EQUAL, and in providing 
complementary supports. Co-ordination between Aproxímate and the Association for 
People with Disabilities (Fidelis et Fortis) has provided clients with additional opportunities 
to develop their social skills and self-confidence.  
Although there is consensus among the DPs on the value of partnership and collaboration, it 
is recognised that some agencies have been slower than others to buy into collaborative 
processes. In such circumstances, the DPs have responded by pursuing direct approaches to 
key personnel. Mediators working with SUCCESS (Se) report having had to take the lead in 
pursuing contacts with the Labour Office and Social Insurance Office in the interest of 
promoting a collaborative approach to supporting the client. In the case of Rural Options 
(Irl), the project co-ordinator and individual members of the DP Board of Directors have had 
to press upon the offices of local government to encourage some public agencies to engage 
with policy development.  
3.7 Mainstreaming 
Their local focus, endogenous nature, strong links with civil society and third sector 
organisations and innovations in their approaches to service delivery have contributed to 
each of the DPs exceeding their targets in respect of the number of clients supported, trained 
and placed in employment. The partnership approach has also contributed to engendering 
more positive attitudes towards social welfare beneficiaries, and it has fostered a more 
supportive environment in which they have been empowered to promote self-actualisation. 
However, the fluidity of the policy environment in which partnerships operate, and the ad 
hoc nature of some funding streams implies restrictions on the number of clients with which 
DPs can engage. Moreover, the current tightening of financial resources affecting 
government agencies is delimiting the abilities of Partnerships to broker resources and 
commitments from them. Thus, while Area-Based Partnerships emerge as efficient and 
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innovative agents in the delivery social welfare services, they face challenges in realising 
and effecting longer-term institutional change.  
Working with clients to enable them to overcome the structural and institutional barriers to 
progression has heightened the DPs’ awareness of the need for policy changes. Partnerships’ 
internal evaluations have also pointed to the need for what Scott (2004) describes as a 
greater emphasis on mainstreaming, while national Managing Authorities for EQUAL 
convened information-exchanges and encouraged partnerships to “identify best practice 
and lessons learned… with a view to their integration into local, regional, national and 
European employment and human resource policies and practices in the context of 
achieving a labour market open to all (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
2004; iv). Partnerships have responded by expanding statutory sector participation on their 
boards and working groups / sub-committees, convening bilateral meetings with key 
agencies and by disseminating information to agencies and elected political representatives. 
They have also held seminars on policy mainstreaming, and in this respect the transnational 
co-operation strand within EQUAL has proven to be effective in sensitising agencies to 
innovations in labour market supports and interventions. The EU’s stewardship of EQUAL 
up to 2008 was a key enabler of transnational collaboration and the dissemination and 
transfer of good practices. Since then however, the EU has stepped back from funding the 
initiative and transnational contacts have been considerably reduced, and there is less 
discussion of policy development.  
Among the policy innovations arising from the DPs’ experiences are: 
 Providing social welfare clients with access to a trained multi-disciplinary team, so as to 
address the totality of needs in an integrated and holistic manner, 
 Delivering progression supports to social welfare clients as part of the suite of local 
development actions that enable community empowerment and territorial regeneration, 
so as to encourage accessibility and preventive approaches to inter-generational welfare 
dependency, 
 Outreaching the delivery of tailored training programmes to community facilities in 
conjunction with civil society organisations so as to encourage participation and to 
counter stigmas associated with some institutional training facilities and offices, and 
 Providing accessible counselling supports in parallel to the roll-out of interventions to 
enable client progression. 
While elements of these innovations are transferrable to existing exogenous agencies, to do 
so without any accompanying institutional reform would fail to generate the level of 
benefits to social welfare clients that can be realised through collaborative area-based 
partnership structures and methodologies. Delivering services through partnerships in 
which civil society and client groups are key stakeholders and power-brokers allows for 
interventions to be tailored to meeting the long-term needs of those on social welfare. 
Removing the structural barriers associated with cumulative disadvantage in deprived 
neighbourhoods underscores the merits of area-based approaches and the integration of 
social welfare into community development strategies. Thus, while state agencies cannot 
expect to be able to replace or subsume Area-Based Partnerships, they must ensure they do 
not usurp them either. It behoves the state therefore to go beyond resource provision, and to 
work with communities and beneficiaries in a holistic manner, with the goal of 
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empowerment. In this respect, specific recommendations for national and regional 
authorities can be advanced drawing on the experiences of the DPs in this research: 
 Proofing legislation to ensure that it does not discriminate against rural and marginal 
communities and citizens, 
 Enabling agencies to access one another’s data-bases so that information on clients is 
shared in an empowering way that promotes their integration into the labour market or 
social enterprise, 
 Increasing supports for social economy / third sector employment and personal 
development opportunities for those most distant from the commercial labour market. 
The current austerity measures being introduced by governments bring into sharp focus the 
need for innovation in social welfare systems. As agency budgets are reduced and payments 
to clients are curtailed, the onus on policy makers and functionaries to engage in lateral 
thinking and multi-stakeholder collaboration becomes all the greater. In this context, 
partnership processes can no longer be viewed as pilot programmes operating in parallel to 
the mainstream, partnership itself needs to become the mainstream. 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
Evaluations of the five Development Partnerships reveal that they have had considerable 
positive impact in delivering social welfare services and in shaping the local contexts in 
which they operate. They have: 
 developed and promoted accessible support services, 
 exceeded their targets for client placement in training and employment, 
 increased awareness of the issues faced by those excluded from the labour force (among 
social partners and the statutory sector), and enabled innovative responses from the 
productive sector, 
 established representative structures that serve to empower the client groups, and give 
them a voice in local decision-making, 
 involved local, regional and national-level actors in changing attitudes and in 
undertaking initiatives that promote the realisation of equality, 
 identified and broken down barriers that prevent welfare clients from accessing proper 
support that would enable their progression, and 
 articulated policy changes so as to redress discrimination and inequalities, so that all 
persons are empowered to access appropriate services. 
The achievements of the partnerships profiled here bear out the arguments advanced by 
Turok (2011) that locally-oriented strategies with multi-stakeholder inputs contribute to the 
realisation of inclusive growth and more effective and dynamic interventions. Their 
experiences also support the recommendations put forward by Birch (2008) and by Noya 
and Clarence (2007) that the promotion of social enterprises advances the social inclusion 
agenda within communities and improves quality of life. Challenges persist for the 
partnerships in refining their organisational structures so as to enable maximum client 
group participation, and the generation of local social capital. They also need to pay 
attention to ensuring that in the mainstreaming of partnership they avoid what Crouch 
(2011; 301) describes as the “depart from universalism of the historical modern state, 
selecting privileged interlocutors from among the institutions in the territory.” 
 
Social Welfare 110 
innovative agents in the delivery social welfare services, they face challenges in realising 
and effecting longer-term institutional change.  
Working with clients to enable them to overcome the structural and institutional barriers to 
progression has heightened the DPs’ awareness of the need for policy changes. Partnerships’ 
internal evaluations have also pointed to the need for what Scott (2004) describes as a 
greater emphasis on mainstreaming, while national Managing Authorities for EQUAL 
convened information-exchanges and encouraged partnerships to “identify best practice 
and lessons learned… with a view to their integration into local, regional, national and 
European employment and human resource policies and practices in the context of 
achieving a labour market open to all (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
2004; iv). Partnerships have responded by expanding statutory sector participation on their 
boards and working groups / sub-committees, convening bilateral meetings with key 
agencies and by disseminating information to agencies and elected political representatives. 
They have also held seminars on policy mainstreaming, and in this respect the transnational 
co-operation strand within EQUAL has proven to be effective in sensitising agencies to 
innovations in labour market supports and interventions. The EU’s stewardship of EQUAL 
up to 2008 was a key enabler of transnational collaboration and the dissemination and 
transfer of good practices. Since then however, the EU has stepped back from funding the 
initiative and transnational contacts have been considerably reduced, and there is less 
discussion of policy development.  
Among the policy innovations arising from the DPs’ experiences are: 
 Providing social welfare clients with access to a trained multi-disciplinary team, so as to 
address the totality of needs in an integrated and holistic manner, 
 Delivering progression supports to social welfare clients as part of the suite of local 
development actions that enable community empowerment and territorial regeneration, 
so as to encourage accessibility and preventive approaches to inter-generational welfare 
dependency, 
 Outreaching the delivery of tailored training programmes to community facilities in 
conjunction with civil society organisations so as to encourage participation and to 
counter stigmas associated with some institutional training facilities and offices, and 
 Providing accessible counselling supports in parallel to the roll-out of interventions to 
enable client progression. 
While elements of these innovations are transferrable to existing exogenous agencies, to do 
so without any accompanying institutional reform would fail to generate the level of 
benefits to social welfare clients that can be realised through collaborative area-based 
partnership structures and methodologies. Delivering services through partnerships in 
which civil society and client groups are key stakeholders and power-brokers allows for 
interventions to be tailored to meeting the long-term needs of those on social welfare. 
Removing the structural barriers associated with cumulative disadvantage in deprived 
neighbourhoods underscores the merits of area-based approaches and the integration of 
social welfare into community development strategies. Thus, while state agencies cannot 
expect to be able to replace or subsume Area-Based Partnerships, they must ensure they do 
not usurp them either. It behoves the state therefore to go beyond resource provision, and to 
work with communities and beneficiaries in a holistic manner, with the goal of 
 
Area-Based Partnerships and Social Welfare: Innovations and Challenges 111 
empowerment. In this respect, specific recommendations for national and regional 
authorities can be advanced drawing on the experiences of the DPs in this research: 
 Proofing legislation to ensure that it does not discriminate against rural and marginal 
communities and citizens, 
 Enabling agencies to access one another’s data-bases so that information on clients is 
shared in an empowering way that promotes their integration into the labour market or 
social enterprise, 
 Increasing supports for social economy / third sector employment and personal 
development opportunities for those most distant from the commercial labour market. 
The current austerity measures being introduced by governments bring into sharp focus the 
need for innovation in social welfare systems. As agency budgets are reduced and payments 
to clients are curtailed, the onus on policy makers and functionaries to engage in lateral 
thinking and multi-stakeholder collaboration becomes all the greater. In this context, 
partnership processes can no longer be viewed as pilot programmes operating in parallel to 
the mainstream, partnership itself needs to become the mainstream. 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
Evaluations of the five Development Partnerships reveal that they have had considerable 
positive impact in delivering social welfare services and in shaping the local contexts in 
which they operate. They have: 
 developed and promoted accessible support services, 
 exceeded their targets for client placement in training and employment, 
 increased awareness of the issues faced by those excluded from the labour force (among 
social partners and the statutory sector), and enabled innovative responses from the 
productive sector, 
 established representative structures that serve to empower the client groups, and give 
them a voice in local decision-making, 
 involved local, regional and national-level actors in changing attitudes and in 
undertaking initiatives that promote the realisation of equality, 
 identified and broken down barriers that prevent welfare clients from accessing proper 
support that would enable their progression, and 
 articulated policy changes so as to redress discrimination and inequalities, so that all 
persons are empowered to access appropriate services. 
The achievements of the partnerships profiled here bear out the arguments advanced by 
Turok (2011) that locally-oriented strategies with multi-stakeholder inputs contribute to the 
realisation of inclusive growth and more effective and dynamic interventions. Their 
experiences also support the recommendations put forward by Birch (2008) and by Noya 
and Clarence (2007) that the promotion of social enterprises advances the social inclusion 
agenda within communities and improves quality of life. Challenges persist for the 
partnerships in refining their organisational structures so as to enable maximum client 
group participation, and the generation of local social capital. They also need to pay 
attention to ensuring that in the mainstreaming of partnership they avoid what Crouch 
(2011; 301) describes as the “depart from universalism of the historical modern state, 
selecting privileged interlocutors from among the institutions in the territory.” 
 
Social Welfare 112 
The Development Partnerships themselves stress their defining features, and they 
emphasise the merits of what they perceive as their client-centred, holistic and tailored set of 
interventions relative to the constrained approaches that characterise bureaucratic agencies. 
As one of their working documents states: 
“…we have developed another perspective. We promote an individual and holistic approach, 
which takes into account not only the personal problems presented, but also the structural or 
policy-related issues. Intensive one-to-one support has demonstrated that problems or difficulties 
initially considered personal to the participant are often far more complex … In working with 
participants in this fashion, it is crucial to communicate all barriers detected; structural as well 
as cultural, to relevant statutory agencies and organisations, so that they can become aware of 
the problem and take appropriate action in a co-ordinated fashion.”  
The experiences of the DPs have demonstrated the merits of providing social welfare 
supports that are locally based, delivered in collaboration with civil society, integrated into 
community development strategies, and which are characterised by flexibility and openness 
to innovation. Partnership has yielded considerable benefits for individuals in terms of 
improved access to employment, training and enhanced quality of life. It has revealed that 
in several cases, particularly among the long-term unemployed, failure to access 
employment or training had little to do with an individual’s personal ability or disposition, 
and much to do with pre-existing and inflexible structures, procedures, schemes, practices, 
attitudes, prejudices and/ or policies that directly or indirectly prevent a willing individual 
from achieving self-development. The DPs’ experiences demonstrate as McEwen (2011; 80) 
illustrates with respect to regional devolution of social welfare policy and functions, that 
multi-level government increases “the number of access points for pro-welfare advocates, 
not just to defend existing social programmes but to get new policy ideas on the agenda and 
to facilitate social policy innovation.” They underscore the advantages of neo-endogenous 
collaboration over single agency delivery and provide a model for the roll-out and 
advancement of social welfare in increasingly straitened times. 
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5 
Look to Norway 
– A Sobering Challenge to a Success Story 
Dag Leonardsen 
Lillehammer University College, 
Norway 
1. Introduction 
For several years, the United Nations has ranked Norway as having the highest standard of 
living in the world. This position is the result of a complex mix of ‘politics of solidarity’ 
(redistribution of resources), ‘professional administration’ (efficient, loyal and competent 
bureaucracy), and ‘good luck (oil resources since the 1970s). A comparatively large degree of 
economic equality, not least safeguarded through a compulsory and generous insurance 
system (the National Insurance Scheme), has contributed to giving Norway a reputation as 
the prototype of a successful Keynesian welfare state.  
There is hardly any disagreement about the characterisation of all the Scandinavian welfare 
states as success stories, at least if one agrees on the overarching aim of income equality and 
even distribution of wealth (Barth et al., 2003). However, the recipe for success in a period of 
relative scarcity is not necessarily the recipe for success in times of affluence. Or to be more 
specific: The recipe for success when people have a ‘lack of money’ is not necessarily the 
correct recipe if the pressing problem is ‘lack of meaning’. While the first type of problem 
can be attacked by stimulating economic growth, this is at best only partly true for the 
second type of problem. The research topic I want to bring into focus in this article is the 
(general) dilemma related to politicians using yesterday’s problems and especially, 
yesterday’s way of understanding these problems, to attack today’s problems. My frame of 
reference is the Norwegian welfare state. I ask to what extent the traditional welfare 
approach (as seen in all of the Scandinavian countries) is able to grasp the essence of 
modern social problems. Not disregarding the importance of safeguarding people’s 
economic basis, and not disregarding the strong efforts that have been taken to prevent 
social problems to arise, I want to argue that the ‘technocratic’ and ‘administrative-
managerial’ approach to welfare politics need to be supplemented with a more ‘sociological’ 
approach, where the challenge of ‘lack of meaning’ is given closer and more serious 
attention. Even though the awareness of such a perspective has been present – at least at the 
rhetorical level - since the 1970s, the significant operational implications of such recognition 
have been more difficult to identify. By raising the discussion on problem identification 
(‘what is the real problem?’) I do not want to challenge the celebration of the Scandinavian 
welfare state model as a project of success, but I ask what type of challenges we are 
confronted with if ideals about social inclusion, social solidarity, and the quest for living a 
respectful life, are given due attention. In this regard I am not talking about technical 
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respectful life, are given due attention. In this regard I am not talking about technical 
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questions related to indexing of pensions or actuarial accounting of insurances etc. I am 
talking about sociological challenges regarding belonging, respect and recognition in a 
society of atomisation and exclusion. My assertion is that even the celebrated Scandinavian 
welfare state is unable to handle these challenges satisfactorily. It is unable to fulfill its basic 
promise about protecting its weakest citizens, not primarily against material, but against 
existential distress1.         
The general perspective underlying my research question was clearly expressed by 
Galbraith back in 1958 when he made the important observation that ‘we are guided, in 
part, by ideas that are relevant to another world; and as a further result we do many things 
that are unnecessary; some that are unwise, and a few that are insane’2 (Galbraith, 1971: 32). 
He added that the ideas by which politicians have interpreted their existence and challenges 
were not forged in a world of wealth but in a world of poverty. By asking this type of 
question, Galbraith turns our attention to what should really be a focus of science: what 
really is the problem? In societies characterised by The Great Disruption  (Fukuyama, 2000) 
and Liquid Modernity (Bauman 2000), with an increasing number of people Seeking Safety in 
an Insecure World (Bauman, 2001), politicians and ministries are continuously searching for 
‘solutions’ to a broad variety of social problems; problems which actually call for a deeper 
reflection concerning what this problem really is about, and which, in turn, might call for 
qualitative new approaches regarding problem solving.        
Furthermore, having control of the national economy in a period of protectionism is 
something different from having control in a period of global market competition and a 
disempowered national state. If a fair income distribution (‘Robin Hood politics’) was a 
realistic aim in the days of Keynes (until the mid-1970s), the chances of ending up with 
increasing income differences (‘Matthew effect’) and processes of social exclusion are high in 
an era of neo-liberalistic economy. But most of all, there is a good chance that alienation, 
withdrawal and resignation will create a situation of deep mental distress among an 
increasing number of people. 
Inspired by the thoughts of Galbraith, I will first give a brief outline of the main social problems 
in Norway in different periods after WWII. Most attention will be given to the period 1945-
80 when the main standards and principles were set. I will look at how the dominating 
social problems were interpreted at that time (i. e. how did they answer to the ‘what-is-the-
problem’ question), which measures were implemented to combat the problems, and then I 
will ask to what extent these strategies could be described as adequate in preventing social 
problems occurring. In conclusion, my analysis is a story supporting Galbraith, not in the 
assertion that politicians have done ‘insane’ things, but in the observation that politicians 
                                                                 
1 Some have argued that the failure of the welfare state to prevent social problems was a main reason 
for the New Right turn from the early 1980s. As an illustration, Minister of Finance (1990-93) in New 
Zealand, Ruth Richardson (referred in Boston, 1999: 25) formulated this critique of the comprehensive 
welfare state: ‘It set out to reduce poverty and ended up increasing poverty. It set out to reduce income 
inequality and ended up increasing inequality. It set out to allow people to live in dignity, and ended 
up creating ghettos where lawlessness and hopelessness are rife. If that is success, its ways must be 
mysterious indeed’. 
2 Einstein (referred in DeHart Hurd, 1998) has formulated a corresponding insight when saying that, 
‘the significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we 
created them’. 
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have been ‘guided, in part, by ideas that are relevant to another world’. More specifically, I 
find that the strong emphasis on macro and structurally oriented measures after WWII (i.e. 
labour market politics, regional politics, trade and industry politics, in combination with an 
extensive ‘cradle to grave’ welfare policy) were successful regarding income compensation 
for most citizens. However, when it comes to tackling the welfare problems of late 
modernity (i. e. not the lack of money, but the lack of meaning) I find that even the 
successful Norwegian welfare state has been unable to compete. I will argue that there is a 
mismatch between some types of social problems (‘the lack of meaning’ problems) and the 
measures applied to combat them. In short, the way of thinking is characterised by (mainly) 
applying yesterday’s medicine to today’s problems – and these problems are in certain regards 
different from yesterdays’ problems. While safeguarding economic security still represents a 
basic mandate for the welfare state, I maintain that the dominating technocratic, 
professional, scientific, bureaucratic, and pecuniary approach to modern welfare problems 
is insufficient. For many years, Norwegian politicians have announced a strong belief in the 
contribution that social scientists, qua social engineers, in cooperation with an efficient 
administrative system, could deliver to create an inclusive society. Because of this strong 
optimism in scientific solutions to a variety of social problems, the politicians have avoided 
a more fundamental debate on social problems as value dilemmas. And even more: the 
ability to decode and interpret modern social problems in a language of value conflicts and 
value priorities seems to have been weakened as social scientists gradually entered the role as 
‘state consultants in preventive work’. While waiting for scientific solutions to significant 
social challenges, the politicians were ‘protected’ from being exposed to these problems as 
being deeply political.   
The perspective presented here implies a critique of overly optimistic politicians when it 
comes to their strong belief in ‘social engineering’ solutions to some of the main challenges 
in late modernity. For many years governments have been seeking support from the social 
scientests for help in much the same way as they sought support from the economists when 
the markets went into meltdown in the 1930s. At that time, the economic science actually 
succeeded in ‘rescuing’ the crisis ridden economies (with Keynesian medicine). Now it 
seems that politicians expect representatives of the (remaining) social sciences to solve 
today’s social problems by way of some sort of social engineering strategies. No doubt, these 
sciences should do their utmost to help curb emerging social problems. However, today a 
‘dangerous’ mix of interests has occurred between governments in search of legitimation 
and solutions, and a ‘social science industry’ (social researchers accompanied by a swelling 
profession of social workers) which (too) easily promises ‘technocratic’ solutions to what 
essentially is a political problem. In Norway, as in so many other countries, politicians are 
searching for what they call ‘evidence-based’ knowledge that can tell them in a scientific way 
and with scientific certainty, ‘what works’ in our endeavours to prevent crime, mental distress, 
suicide, drug addiction, etc. As problems escalate, so does the rhetoric about ‘prevention 
first’, and so do calls for scientific solutions. I do not want to discredit the social sciences and 
their capacity for supporting governments in their efforts to create social integrative 
societies. However, I do signal a need for critical reflection when it comes to differentiating 
between ‘value conflicts’ and ‘administrative problems’. Herbert Marcuse (1991) has 
formulated the problem very distinctly, when saying that ‘the historical achievement of 
science and technology has rendered possible the translation of values into technical tasks – the 
materialization of values. Consequently, what is at stake is the redefinition of values in 
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technical terms, as elements in technological process’ (Marcuse, 1991: 236, author’s italics). 
From a philosopher’s point of view, von Wright (1994) has made a corresponding remark, 
when warning against the illusion that more scientific techniques can protect us against 
threats in modern society.   
While the Norwegian welfare state probably deserves its good reputation when it comes to 
safeguarding basic economic necessities for its citizens, this should not prevent us from asking 
critical questions like those presented above. In this article I want to address the society of 
social sciences as well as the society of politicians and plea for drawing a clearer line of 
demarcation concerning ‘what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God’; i. e. what is for 
politicians to tackle as questions that belong to the sphere of values, and what is for social 
scientists to handle as a ‘professional’ topic. As an illustration of the implications of my way of 
arguing, I want fewer, not more social workers, psychologists, professional care takers, to 
occupy kindergartens, schools, etc., to ‘help’ our children. I want fewer, not more, advisors, 
counselors, coaches, to guide our coming generation into society. But I want more discussions 
about ethical implications of political priorities that most likely produce The Exclusive Society 
(Young, 1999). Today, I think too many social scientists are offering ‘tools’ that represent the 
‘wrong’ answer to the main challenges of today. Even though he puts the message sharply, 
Ivan Illich (1973) has a point when saying: ‘The pooling of stores of information, the building 
up of a knowledge stock, the attempt to overwhelm present problems by the production of 
more science is the ultimate attempt to solve a crisis by escalation’. Norway is a country that 
can afford to ‘professionalise’ (as Illich describes it) social challenges in late modern society. 
However, I am not sure if this represents a (socially) sustainable road to the future. 
2. The Norwegian welfare state 1945-2010: the success and the limits of state 
intervention 
2.1 1945-60: Work and welfare as synonymous concepts 
At the end of WWII, the answer to the question: ‘what is the problem’ was more or less self- 
evident and could be converted into one word: poverty. For the Labour Government (in 
office for some twenty years after 1945) the overarching challenge was to rebuild the 
country through optimal and responsible investments, and through safeguarding full 
employment. As Hanisch (1977: 58) expressed it, ‘work and welfare became two sides of the 
same political coin, which means that the economic policy was targeted towards preventing 
social problems through stabilising and increasing the level of employment’. With this point 
of departure, the logical implication was that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Labour became the two dominant institutions to ‘remove distress, insecurity and inequality’ 
(Labour Party, Policy Program, 1949: 2). For those citizens who, for different reasons, were 
unable to contribute through regular work (pensioners, disabled or sick people, the 
unemployed) all the political parties in Norway agreed on a plan to (hopefully) render 
superfluous the old ‘Poor Law’ (means tested payments) by incorporating different benefits 
into an integrated National Insurance Scheme (passed in 1966). Once again, the challenge 
confronting the politicians was how to safeguard an economic bottom line for every citizen.  
The important message is that there was absolutely no disagreement about concluding that 
there was a complete overlap of interests between the economic and the socio-cultural 
system: what was beneficial for Norway Inc. was beneficial for its citizens. The main 
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challenge was to speed up economic and human investments and in this way contribute to 
the indisputable aim of rapid economic growth. ‘The Construction State’ became almost 
synonymous to ‘The Welfare State’. Social prevention became synonymous to rebuilding 
and developing the country economically, and the sooner the better. In principle, all the 
main social problems that existed could be converted into a question of money to meet well-
known needs (and not as later on, a question of knowledge and expertise to meet complex 
human needs). 
2.2 1960-70: Integrating welfare into the process of economic growth 
This is a decade of optimism. However, already in this period the first signals of uneasiness 
concerning social development appear on the political agenda. In the long-range program 
1958-61 from the Labour Government one reads that there was a need to re-adjust social 
policy thinking: 
Economic progress and social reforms through many years have brought new types of social 
challenges to the forefront. The significant social problems are to an increasing extent about 
health problems in its broadest meaning (mental depression, lasting disability, chronic illnesses 
and alcohol abuse), about family and crime problems. Exclusively economic support will in these 
cases rarely represent a lasting solution (White Paper, no. 67, 1957: 72, author’s italics). 
 This was the argument behind the conclusion that a re-orientation of social policy strategies 
was desirable. The most important aspect of the proclaimed change could be described as a 
‘scientification’ and ‘professionalisation’ of social policy (‘a significant need for social research 
has appeared’, as expressed by the Ministry of Social Health and Welfare; op. cit.: 72). The 
most important aspect of this emphasis was recurring declarations about the importance of 
social preventive thinking; to which the social sciences most certainly could contribute.  
The feeling of ‘uneasiness’ referred to above was expressed by the Party Leader Trygve Bratteli 
(LP) at the National Congress (NC) in 1965. After a short presentation on the profound 
economic and technical changes that had taken place since 1945, Bratteli continued: 
Modern societies – to an increasing extent characterised by science and technical innovation – 
seem to have entered an essentially new type of development. What is happening is that some 
very profound changes take place at a very high speed. However, these rapid changes that take 
place in the everyday lives of ordinary people will lead to uneasiness and uncertainty, and it will 
lead to significant industrial and social problems’ (NC, 1965: 147).  
The speech ended, however, in an optimistic way: ‘The challenge confronting our Party is to 
take the lead in taking advantage of the enormous possibilities that modern times represent 
and to find a solution to social problems accompanying economic growth and change’ (op. 
cit.: 147).        
In the early 1960s leading politicians recognised that involving Norway in an increasingly 
competitive European free market system3 would speed up geographical, technological and 
                                                                 
3 After a relatively protectionist period, Norway gradually liberalised its trade relations after WWII. In 
1960, the country joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which meant a gradual 
deconstruction of customs and tariff barriers. The immediate result was a speeding up of geographical 
and social changes.  
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economic changes that very likely would generate social problems. While these social 
problems were only vaguely identified by the politicians (e. g. the talk about ‘uneasiness’), 
public documents show that ‘mental problems’ (mental distress, drug and alcohol abuse, 
family problems, crime) rather than ‘pecuniary problems’ (poverty) were coming to the 
forefront of the political agenda. How should these ‘new’ challenges be confronted? 
At the rhetorical level the Labour Party responded by including ‘contentment’ into the 
established general aim about ‘economic growth’, and, in addition, announced as an 
overarching aim that the government wanted to create ‘safety during social change’. 
Furthermore, an appeal to the social sciences entered the political programs. Since the 
economists had been very successful in saving a wrecked economy in the 1930s (Keynes), it 
was now reasonable to ask the social scientists for help with new types of problems 
appearing in the socio-cultural system. Once again, Trygve Bratteli presented the 
authoritative message: 
During a period of huge changes and reform of our society we have to give priority to the science 
about man and his environment, about the body and the health of our soul, about contact and 
living together, about human society and about human history. In every regard we have to invite 
the help that science to an increasing extent can supply us with’ (NC, 1965: 149).   
This declaration was mirrored in the Working Plan for the Labour Party from the same year: 
The expertise among researchers and the impatient struggle among ordinary people for a better 
society represent dynamic forces that can develop our new society in a way that induces safety 
and security in a world of changes’ (op. cit.: 149).   
In other words; science (together with ordinary people’s struggle) was seen as a kind of 
guarantor of the social well-being of its citizens. While the politicians in 1945 appealed to 
what they defined as ‘all constructive forces’ to participate in rebuilding the country, twenty 
years later this appeal explicitly included the social sciences. From the historical documents 
it is evident that the political interpretation of the existing social problems was that well 
informed administrative measures at different levels could curb eventual ‘barbaric’ side 
effects in the wake of a ‘civilising’ economic growth. Social problems could, as in the first 
decade after 1945, be converted into administrative problems of regulation, and 
consequently, they did not directly provoke political questions regarding value priorities 
etc. The confidence in the problem solving capability of the social sciences was not only 
unquestioned, it was taken for granted. In the political debates from this period politicians 
were talking about how the social sciences could help find solutions to the different types of 
social problems, not if they could. 
At the ‘operational’ level (i. e. practical politics) the Labour Government introduced through 
the 50s and 60s a wide variety of regulation instruments. In this way the classical social 
democratic ideology was visualised: instead of taking direct control over the means of 
production, one took a more indirect control via economic, financial, labour market, and 
regional politics. The basic way of thinking was expressed in the Principal Program from 
1967 (when the Labour Party was not in office). After having referred to the massive 
technical and economic changes that had taken place, the program declared that this 
development called for ‘bold efforts’ from the government. Since the country was only at the 
beginning of a process of change, a process that would set thousands of jobs at risk, it was 
steadily underlined that the government had to guarantee that every citizen was taken care 
 
Look to Norway – A Sobering Challenge to a Success Story 123 
of and that any kind of passive resignation to the market forces was out of the question. In a 
political manifesto produced in 1967 this message was emphasized with these words: ‘What 
the country needs is firm control’ (NC, 1967: 227).           
This is not the place to go into details about which policy instruments Norwegian 
governments implemented in this period. What is well documented is that Norway figures 
as one of the most consistent social democratic governments in the world through at least 
three decades after 1945, with a strong focus on protecting every citizen from the negative 
side effects of economic turbulence. While it was explicitly recognised that taking advantage 
of global market involvement would have its price (from protectionism to free market 
competition), it was also declared that these changes would take place within full 
governmental control. Due to a well equipped tool box in the governmental offices, no one 
should fear for their overall living conditions: ‘We must be able to guarantee that the 
extensive structural changes taking place in economic life shall not hit anybody’, Per Kleppe 
(Minister of three different Ministries 1971-81) announced in his speech to the National 
Congress in 1969. 
 Summing up, we have seen that what was described as ‘new social problems’ (i. e. 
problems that could not be converted into problems of poverty) appeared on the agenda in 
the period 1960-70.  In retrospective, the government did not interpret these problems in a 
principally different way from how they interpreted social problems in the earlier period. 
Social uprooting and uneasiness did not really challenge the value priorities the government 
had made in the direction of turning the Norwegian economy into an open market 
economy. The hypothetical problems that were discussed as a (possible) consequence of a 
tougher economic climate were more or less passed over by reassurances saying that the 
omnipotent and interventionist state could act in a proactive and preventive way. What was 
the result? 
Given the strong measures that the government introduces in this period, the following 
quote from the Labour Party’s Principal Program (passed in 1969) appears surprising: 
Even in societies that have reached the highest material and technical level of standard one can 
register discontent, human callousness, conflicts and dissatisfaction. The industrial society has 
not succeeded in developing human ways of being together that satisfies basic social and 
psychological needs. We experience that people are alienated and that the competitive society and 
the one-dimensional cultivation of material goods generate a barren and empty life for many 
people’ (‘Labour Party’, 1969). 
To the extent that this description gives a fair portrait of the situation, the political ambition 
‘Economic growth and contentment’ from the early 1960s seems to have been partly achieved. 
While the political obligation to focus social prevention was formulated as early as in 1953, 
and the long term program from 1957 promised to ‘pay close attention to preventive health 
and social work’ (White Paper, no. 67, 1957: 72), towards the end of this decade different 
sources of information indicated that something had gone wrong. Also, this is the period 
when (in Norway) the relatively newly established science called ‘sociology’ started to 
report on ‘the social state of the country’. Book titles like The Myth of the Welfare State 
(Norway) and The Hollow Welfare State (Sweden), illustrates what should become even more 
apparent in the next decade. The optimism as for what could be obtained by way of an 
interventionist state seemed to have been exaggerated. It was not uncommon in the political 
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debate to hear that a concept like ‘the welfare society’ had to be put in inverted commas 
until the negative trends had been turned. The sudden increase in expenditures to social 
security benefits (the old means-tested ‘poor law’) represented only one worrying signal 
that ‘something was wrong’. Increasing crime figures was another. Even though the Labour 
Party had been out of office in the period 1965-70 it was admitted that the power balance 
between ‘market forces’ and ‘political control’ had developed in disfavor of the latter:  
‘To a large extent we are still hampered by insufficient tools for political control. We have too 
little knowledge about the society we want to change and the world we are a part of. We have to 
obtain more knowledge, more statistics, more research documentation in all fields of importance 
for the change of society’ (Per Kleppe, NC, 1969). 
A recurrent topic in the above presentation was the need for more and stronger measures to 
get political control over societal developments. In accordance with classical social 
democratic ideology, Per Kleppe was true to the voluntaristic perspective on politics, 
namely that, in principle, anything can be attained in terms of political goals as long as one 
occupies political power. Within a social democratic context, ‘governing’ is synonymous to 
‘ruling’. The technocratic elements in this ideology were easily identifiable in these years. 
When negative traits of development occurred it was only a question of time before 
ingenious planning tools could be invented (be it within the economic, the labour or the 
welfare policy). Especially, the belief that science could contribute to solve political 
challenges was strong. Gradually the planning tools were developed more in relation to the 
economic system (industrial, financial, regional, labour) than to the socio-cultural system 
(the National Insurance System was carried through in 1967). 
Let me return to the announcement made by Trygve Bratteli in 1965, when he said that the 
challenge for the next few years was ‘taking advantage of the enormous possibilities that 
modern times represent and to find a solution to social problems accompanying economic 
growth and change’. At the end of the decade it was openly admitted, even among Labour 
Party representatives, that this ‘solution’ was not yet found. As shown in Leonardsen (1993) 
this was not only due to a ‘lag’ in the preventive measures in relation to problem producing 
mechanisms, but also to a gradual policy change over some decades, expressed by 
Halvorsen (1977: 76) in this way: ‘While the safeguarding of full employment in the 1930s 
was considered as a part of the general welfare policy, these two fields were split after the 
War. The National Benefits System and the Social Security System were developed to take 
care of those who could not stick to or take a job’. How did these changes, away from a 
comprehensive perspective on welfare, affect the ambitious aims for welfare policy in the 
next decade? 
2.3 1970-80: ‘A qualitatively better society’? 
While the two preceding decades (in spite of some emanating social problems) had been 
characterised by broad optimism, the situation changed in this period. After almost thirty 
years of steady economic growth the international economy lost drive. Even before the oil 
crisis in 1973, a process of (relative) stagnation had started: a process that announced 
essential political readjustments. Traditional Keynesian demand side economics did not 
work in a globalised market economy and the new political signals were tellingly open: ‘It is 
already evident that, on longer terms, it would not have been possible to increase the 
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activities and the income redistribution to the extent that is included in the present 
arrangements and plans’ (White Paper no. 71, 1972-73, Special Analysis no. 2). These were 
the days, in Norway as well as outside the country, when expansive governmental policies 
were replaced by careful contractions, mirrored in book titles like The Fiscal Crisis of the State 
(1973), Can Government Go Bankrupt (1978), and Legitimation Crisis (Habermas, 1976).  
The dilemma confronting politicians in Norway could be described in this way: on one side, 
social scientists reported that social problems were on an even steeper increase than in the 
preceding decade (at this time, the concept of ‘the client producing system’ was often used 
in reports, Kolberg, 1970: 140 ). One of the more profiled voices among sociological 
researchers made his point clear by saying that; 
until now, the social policy has to a large extent safeguarded the life quality of ordinary people 
and those with disabilities and made them secure and safe if something negative was to happen. 
In this way, social policy is an expression of the power balance in society – the welfare benefits 
are used by the strong ones when they need it. Even if the intention with social policy is to help 
the weakest among us, there is a lot to be improved in the coming years (Løchen, 1970: 208).     
This critical perspective on the situation in the early 1970s was actually echoed by one of the 
dominant voices in the Labour Party itself, Per Kleppe: 
I will go as far as to say that I do not think we are able to carry out our aims as for our welfare 
policy in a society that is so strongly dominated by capitalist influence as Norway is today. The 
implementation of our welfare program takes as a premise quite a radical change of society. We 
are not running for “adaptation policy” (LP’s Conference on welfare politics, 1971: 81-82).   
While sociologists (and politicians themselves) reported negative trends concerning social 
problems and the economists reported that ‘throwing money at social problems’ was a non-
sustainable alternative, the situation became even worse for the politicians, when the 
electorate started reacting against what was labeled ‘kind-ism’ (i. e. too much social support 
paid to all sorts of ‘needy’ people). In 1973, a populist tax-paying-refusers’ party was 
established in Norway (‘The Anders Lange’s Party for a significant reduction of taxes and 
customs’) with some 5% support among the electorate. For the politicians in charge, this 
looked like a ‘catch 22’ situation. Dahl Jacobsen (1971: 39) presented the problem in this 
way:  
A joint problem for all the Scandinavian countries is that the very fundament for the welfare 
policy until today is about disintegrating. The debate on welfare policy has gotten a taint of 
breaking up atmosphere, and it is absolutely not evident in which direction we are to move from 
here.  
Most of the political parties took responsibility for these changed attitudes by inviting a 
broad debate about the future of the welfare state, and in 1971 the Labour Party launched 
their strategy under the headline: ‘A new perspective on the welfare policy’. Minister of 
Social Welfare, Odd Højdahl presented the outline of this strategy by first openly admitting 
that, for the politicians, it had come as a big surprise that social problems escalated at the 
same time as economic affluence and social reforms had been attained. ‘[We] thought that 
the abolishing of mass poverty, improved housing, and better educational and working 
conditions, would make main elements of the welfare policy superfluous. However, it was 
not that simple’. This ‘welfare paradox’ (less poverty, more social problems) was hard to 
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debate to hear that a concept like ‘the welfare society’ had to be put in inverted commas 
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not that simple’. This ‘welfare paradox’ (less poverty, more social problems) was hard to 
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understand for those politicians who had their historical background in the 1930s (crisis 
ridden economy with high unemployment) and the 1940s (war economy).  
However, when it came to the content of the new signals regarding welfare policy, the 
perspective was much the same as in earlier days. While Højdahl admitted that ‘the strong 
demands for efficiency and productivity in different sectors of society make many people 
fall by the wayside’, he concluded his presentation by saying that, ’the only solution is 
further economic growth. I will ask you not to equal economic growth with social problems’ 
(NC, 1971: 254-255). He explicitly announced that what was good for the economy was good 
for people in general. In short, the way of understanding the social problems of the 1970s 
was much the same as it was in 1945: it was through rapid economic growth in combination 
with a broad variety of governmental measures through which the welfare society could be 
sustained. 
For sure, the measures that were introduced to prevent social problems were many and 
strong also in this period. What had been implemented in the 1960s as a vigorous regional 
policy, industrial policy, financial policy, labour policy, and an extensive welfare policy, was 
prolonged in this decade. Especially important was the introduction of the ‘Establishing 
Control Law’, 1977, and the support system for industrial activity called ‘Geographical 
differentiation of the payroll tax’. However, the general economic development in Europe 
and elsewhere led to a change (from around 1977) in the direction of more micro oriented 
and selective measures. Through different sets of ’micro stimulations’ the government 
hoped to avoid an economic setback as could be seen in the rest of Europe. But as the 
economic setback lingered on, the government was ‘forced’ to resign over its attempts to 
cause the intermediary deletion of the market mechanism (direct support to factories etc.). 
Towards the end of the decade the message was a call for giving priority to those businesses 
and factories that had the ability to restructure and modernise. The Robin Hood principle 
had to resign for the Matthew principle. As Østerud (1978: ii) observed, there was a striking 
tendency to ’lower the level of ambitions, and to adapt to the external leads and changes, 
and to regard public plans as a foundation of information in the continuous process of 
decision’ (in bold in the text). This implied, according to Østerud, a completely new role for 
planning and planners. The fact that Norway gradually became more involved in an open, 
competitive European market economy4, and also, that Norway since 1970 became an oil 
nation, clearly amplified this development. A process of abdication from political control of 
the economy became increasingly dominant at a time when the impetus for change 
escalated.  
One should note that in spite of economic conditions that indicated increasing turbulence, 
and in spite of negative reports regarding increasing social problems, the level of political 
ambitions was unchanged. Taking care of ‘soft values’ was as important as before. Within 
the frames of what was called ‘a new welfare policy’ the Labour Party continuously talked 
about ‘giving social values preeminence’ in every regard and it was imperative that ‘social 
policy’ (which in Norway is written in one word, indicating a type of sector politics) from 
                                                                 
4 After having become a member of the EFTA, the government tried to become a member of the EU. 
However, this attempt was turned down twice (1972 and 1994) by the electorate. However, in 1994 
Norway became a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). EEA is based on the same four 
‘freedoms’ as the EU (the free movement of goods, person, services and capital among the EEA member 
countries). 
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now on should be written in two words (indicating that social values should be a premise for 
all types of planning). A stronger focus was directed at developing what was called ‘self-
supporting networks’; not least because one had gradually reached an awareness that ‘the 
state cannot make people happy’5. All these declarations were formulated at the same time 
as the ‘winds of change’ were accelerating. What Vice-President Reiuf Steen at the National 
Congress described in 1973 as the (existing) ‘panting competition society’ (NC, 1973: 62) 
should be transformed in the direction of ‘a real equal society where people had a chance of 
experiencing peace and prospects for developing all their abilities’ (op. cit.: 62). However, 
such an ambitious aim could be attained only if stronger measures were introduced. The 
message from Steen was crisp and clear: 
‘For the Labour Party there should be absolutely no doubt concerning the main perspective: by 
intervening directly into the societal system, by removing the causes of the problems, through 
the regional policy, through measures like rehabilitation allowance and rehabilitation 
employment, we will reach a society with people that function in accordance to their talents 
rather than investing a lot of money to repair damages evolving due to cold and inhuman 
conditions of competition in the labour market and in society in general’ (underlining in text, 
NC, 1973: 66).  
We can conclude that the government continued having high ambitions for building ‘a 
qualitatively better society’. The overarching strategy for the governing Labour Party was 
condensed in the slogan ‘Economic growth and protection’ (i. e. of people and nature). This 
was the declared road to ‘a qualitatively better society’.  In addition, a continuous flow of 
new administrative tools for keeping structural changes under control were implemented in 
the 1970s. But perhaps most importantly, the trust in the social sciences for supporting the 
politicians with the necessary know-how to manoeuver in a complex and mobile society was 
uncontested. Facing the question of how much change society could take, the Minister of 
Education and Research Einar Førde declared in 1980: ‘One of the most important tools for 
political governing that should be implemented is an action program for social research’ 
(Førde, 1980: interview). In other words, the technocratic paradigm taking for granted that 
‘science’ would come up with continuously new approaches that would counteract negative 
side effects of rapid change, was still the dominating way of thinking.  
However, the initiatives in the direction of increasing the politicians control of society, took 
place at the same time as steps were taken to speed up economic changes in society. 
Increased integration in European and global markets alongside a developing oil-based 
economy (i. e. two strong impulses of change) were the backdrop to an expansion of 
governmental steering instruments. To use an illustrative picture, one pushed harder on the 
accelerator but as a compensation one also pushed harder on the brakes. Bratteli gave a 
precise presentation of the situation in 1973 when saying: ‘I think most people think the 
speed of change in society is quite good. What we need now is safety and security during 
the accompanying changes’ (NC, 1973: 29). The question is: would it be the political slogan 
‘safety and security during change’ that would be the most likely outcome in the coming 
years or would it rather be ‘a change of safety and security’ for the citizens?  
                                                                 
5 This perspective was presented by Gro Harlem Brundtland (Minister of the Environment) at the 
National Congress in 1979, when she declared that ‘it is a main challenge to follow a strategy where 
people are empowered to handle their problems themselves’ (NC, 1979: 134). 
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2.4 1980-2010: From Keynes to Adam Smith. Paradise lost?       
In 1983, Kolberg published a book (about Norway) entitled The welfare state – goodbye? Five 
years later, Marklund (Sweden) published Paradise lost? The Nordic welfare states and the 
recession 1975-1985. Both titles indicate the main focus of the welfare state debate, actually all 
through the period 1980-2010. These were the years of a general right wing turn in politics. 
Even though (as we have seen) the economic contraction started in the mid-1970s, in all 
Nordic countries it took until the early 1980s before governments implemented the first 
more systematic restrictions in welfare spending (Marklund, 1988: 30). Norway, in these 
years economically strengthened through its new status as an oil nation, representing no 
exception to this general trend of welfare contraction. An important political change 
characterising this period was that the Labour Party lost some of its hegemonic status. 
During the period 1981-86/1989-90, and 1997-2000/2001-2005 Norway had 
conservative/centre-right governments, to some extent inspired by neo-liberal thinking. 
While the Norwegian Labour Party held a rhetorical distance to this ideology, like its sister 
parties in Europe, the neo-liberal influence was easily identifiable also within the social 
democratic camp. However, in the midst of a new recognition that one had to define limits 
for public expenditures, these problems (as they were experienced by the politicians) did not 
actually seem to decrease6.             
But which type of social problems were registered during the period 1980-2010? To what 
extent did the extensive preventive interventions announced in the preceding periods 
(regional policy, labour market policy, structural policy, and the general extensive welfare 
policy) result in a decrease of social problems? At the entrance of the 1980s the strong efforts 
in preventing social problems seemed to have had a rather disappointing effect: 
The strong economic growth has had its price…. The rapid changes have created uneasiness, 
alienation and insecurity about the future. New human problems have appeared: new illnesses 
and new troubles. Drug abuse increases. … Beneath the surface of wealth we can find huge 
human and social problems that are unsolvable within the present system of dominating 
capitalistic features (Labour Party, 1981). 
The Party Leader, Reiulf Steen, was very explicit when, in 1981, he declared that ‘not at any 
time since WWII has social security been more vulnerable than now’. Vice President Einar 
Førde expressed his worries in 1983 by saying that ’we can fill up a medium big Norwegian 
city with children suffering from what is known as ”serious lack of care”; adding that the 
youngsters optimism for the future had changed in the direction of pessimism and fear. 
According to Førde, the ‘No-Future Generation’ had arrived. In the Labour Party’s program 
1986-89, the challenge was identified in this way: ‘A big and increasing number of children 
and youngsters are being neglected, maltreated, they drop out of school and end up 
drifting’. Also, it was stated that ‘queues for getting financial assistance are increasing’ 
(primarily due to increasing unemployment rates and increasing housing costs) (Election 
Manifesto, 1986-89). In the 1990s, the worrying signals referred to ’too many children getting 
too little care and supervision’, and cases of incest, child maltreatment and children living 
on the street represented illustrations of this (Election Manifesto, 1990-93). In a statement 
                                                                 
6 An overview of references regarding official publications (1980-2010), covering topics on social 
prevention and social welfare, amounts to at least 60 references. Like in the preceding periods, I delimit 
myself to references referring to the Labour Party. 
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passed at the National Congress in 1992, the Labour Party declared that ‘loneliness, fear, 
increase in psychiatric sufferings, increase in suicides, even among children and young 
people, indicate that time and efforts do not suffice for giving the necessary care we should 
offer each other’. An increase in crime (especially serious crimes) was part of the picture. 
Four years later, the ‘Principles and values program’ talked about problems like lack of 
social network in society, little reciprocity and contact among people, increasing crime, drug 
abuse, and mental illness. Suicide was reported to be one of the most frequent reasons for 
death among young people, mirroring increasing loneliness and social isolation among 
people (‘Principels and values’, 1996). At the Labour Party National Congress in 1996 the 
Party Leader Torbjørn Jagland announced that ‘a new under-class’ and ‘new class divisions’ 
were emanating. At the turn of the century, poverty and the abolishment of poverty had 
become an essential problem to combat. At the Congress in 2000, Jagland reported that some 
70,000 children were living below the poverty level (Election Manifesto, 2001-05), ‘many 
children are not in a position to have their dinner every day; they never go for a holiday; they 
cannot participate in school excursions’. Problems regarding eating disturbances also occurred 
at this time. Two years on, Jagland admitted that ‘the stress, the pressure, and the competition 
drive for more and more material goods had made a significant number of groups burned out 
and expelled from the labour market’ (NC, 2002: 18). Finally, at the National Congress in 2005 
and 2007 Prime Minster and Party Leader Jens Stoltenberg had to admit that, in spite of strong 
governmental efforts, social and economic inequalities and injustice had taken a hold in 
Norwegian society7. The increasing amount of immigrants was only one of the reasons that 
one could register an expansion of the ‘new under-class’. While people continuously had 
become materially richer they were not necessarily living a richer life, he stated.  
One should remember that it was a conservative government that was in office during most 
of the 1980s, implementing policies of a more neo-liberal character than the Labour Party 
wanted. Accordingly, Labour Party representatives were strong in their critique of those 
voices preaching a language of free competition and celebration of narrow-minded 
capitalistic efficiency. These groups (i.e. the conservative government) were actually 
presenting ‘an uninhibited appeal to human egoism’ (Gunnar Berge, NC, 1985: 68) while, on 
the other side, the Labour Party would recommend stronger efforts from ‘society’. However, 
when analysing why inequalities and injustice had increased ‘in spite of decades of intense 
endeavors to safeguard that every citizen had equal opportunities’, Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg (Labour Party) admitted that it was not only the centre-right government that 
was to blame. Increasing inequalities were due also to ‘strong forces in the societal 
development that continuously pull in the direction of inequality. Thus, inequality is 
reproduced from generation to generation’ (NC, 2005: 16). Stoltenberg did not at this 
occasion specify what he meant by ‘strong forces’, but if we look at earlier presentations by 
leading Labour Party representatives, one will find this: The Labour Prime Minister Odvar 
Nordli declared in 1979 that they (i. e. the Labour Party) for too long had disregarded that 
the international system needed leadership through a binding international cooperation, 
and that they ‘for too long had failed to take the consequences of the fact that this system 
was without real control by national and international organisations’ (NC, 1979: 62). Even 
                                                                 
7 According to a OECD report from 2008, ‘income inequality increased significantly in the early 2000s in 
Canada, Germany, Norway and the United States’ (OECD, 2008). For further documentation, see Wahl, 
2009. 
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2.4 1980-2010: From Keynes to Adam Smith. Paradise lost?       
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6 An overview of references regarding official publications (1980-2010), covering topics on social 
prevention and social welfare, amounts to at least 60 references. Like in the preceding periods, I delimit 
myself to references referring to the Labour Party. 
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passed at the National Congress in 1992, the Labour Party declared that ‘loneliness, fear, 
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7 According to a OECD report from 2008, ‘income inequality increased significantly in the early 2000s in 
Canada, Germany, Norway and the United States’ (OECD, 2008). For further documentation, see Wahl, 
2009. 
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though this was not equal to saying that the Norwegian economy was ‘drifting weak-willed 
on a rough ocean’ (expression used by Nordli), it meant that some basic prerequisites for the 
national economy were set in this open international system. Reiulf Steen (Party Leader) 
shared this analysis when (two years later) he said that ‘as a political party and as a political 
movement, we have not to a sufficient extent been in control of the new societal conditions 
we ourselves have been the driving forces behind’ (NC, 1981: 85).  
In short; as the Norwegian economy gradually had become more and more deeply involved 
in the European free market system, leading representatives of the Labour Party admitted 
that essential dimensions of the societal development were outside political control. But 
what could be done? No doubt, an essential ideological shift took place within the Labour 
Party during the 1980s; i. e. the period when a conservative government implemented what 
roughly could be defined as a neo-liberal inspired program (privatisation, marketisation, 
‘modernising’ the state administration, etc). The way leading representatives of the Labour 
Party interpreted the electorate in the 1980s, it was evident that the old rhetoric about 
governmental and bureaucratic solutions, heavily dependent on taxing and centralised 
solutions, had come into miscredit. 
The ideological shift that had already started in the 1970s was amplified during this period. 
The Labour Party, originally heavily anchored in a Keynesian tradition with a strong belief 
in the omnipotence of the central state, gradually had to recognise that an increasing 
integration in the European free market economy came at the price of shrinking national 
political control. For the Labour Party, political as well as economic arguments favored 
participation in an open market economy. However, this called for sobriety regarding which 
instruments were available in the political tool box.  
The main arena for declaring this ideological shift was the National Congress in 1987. Two 
speakers, Prime Minister/Party Leader Gro Harlem Brundtland and Vice President Einar 
Førde presented the ‘new’ message. As Norway had become more integrated into the 
European as well as the global economy, one had to acknowledge that ‘the task for political 
organisations should be the setting of political aims and defining the framework. After that, 
it is the leaders’ and their employees’ challenge to reach the given aims. We believe this will 
redeem innovation and engagement’ (Brundtland, NC, 1987: 21). Due to stronger demands 
among the electorate for more individualised and tailor-made services, one had to become 
more sensitive to such demands. The main challenge was to see that the services were 
offered on equal terms. It was argued that monopolies (public or private) more often 
developed in the direction of organisational coagulation than competing institutions. 
Accordingly, it would be a good strategy to bring competition into the public sector. From 
mixed economy to mixed administration – this was the message, and it was underlined that 
the trade-off between public and private sector was not to be defined once and for all.    
The political ambitions were no less than before. Taking care of the weakest in society, a 
universal welfare state, giving priority to the common interest, prevention instead of 
repairing; all the political aims from earlier periods were intact. The Prime Minister 
ascertained that it was people, not money, it was children, not cars, that should be in focus. 
However, new times demanded new strategies. In his introduction to the Labour Party’s 
election manifesto, Førde asked for a willingness to being self-critical about a socialist 
tradition where bureaucratisation and centralising tendencies had been strong. Referring to 
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the new manifest, he stated that the choice between public and private operation had to be 
done according to what was most convenient for reaching the given aim. It was the need of 
the customer that should be the defining standard. And people had to show more 
responsibility themselves. However, one precaution was taken: ’We shall offer no 
compromises when it comes to stating that health, social security and education are so basic 
common needs that we will not allow commersialisation of these services. In this connection 
I will recommend dogmatism’, Førde concluded (NC, 1987: 73). When the political program 
for the decade 2010-2020 (‘Social Democracy 2020: A New Party Program’) was launched, 
the traditional social democratic value foundation was confirmed by Vice President Helga 
Pedersen, who ‘re-named’ the Labour Party to ‘The Social Security Party’. The essence of 
this program, according to Pedersen, was social security for every citizen, for their jobs, 
education, and their welfare. And, like before, a significant strategy for safeguarding these 
aims was ‘a significant strengthening of the preventive efforts’ (NC, 2009: 78).     
Summing up the period 1980-2010; as a result of fundamental political and economic changes, 
the Labour Party ‘modernised’ much of its strategic thinking in this period. While the defense 
of the Scandinavian welfare state stood firm, a ’realistic’ approach to what this meant in an era 
of fierce competition and demands for efficiency was adopted. Like in China, the pragmatic 
approach saying that ‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches 
mice’, became a central mark of recognition for the Labour Party. ‘New politics for new times’; 
this was the recurring slogan, while simultaneously taking care of the old ideals.  
3. Look to Norway? Limits to social engineering policy and limits to social 
science solutions 
I want to use this historical overview, on a principal level, to discuss what kind of lessons can 
be drawn from the paradox that a strong, distributive welfare state (but less so during the last 
decade) in a very rich country like Norway has had to see social problems escalate (according 
to the politicians themselves) as material affluence increases? Why has social exclusion, crime, 
drug addiction, mental distress, and even expenditures on municipal financial assistance, been 
on an upward trend in spite of a strong political will for preventive politics, a broad (but 
decreasing) array of regulating measures, and a solid economy? If any country in the world 
should be able to compete with processes of alienation and anomie in late modernity, it should 
be Norway and the Nordic countries. As we have seen, the politicians themselves as well as 
governmental papers, appear to be quite disillusioned. Why look to Norway? I will trace this 
question in deep respect and recognition of what has been attained by the Nordic welfare 
states8. In a comparative perspective, there is obviously more on the credit than on the debit 
side of the account. However, the pronounced technocratic approach in the confrontation with 
‘modern’ social problems (defined as ‘problems of meaning’) call for critical comments. 
Furthermore, the obvious success story should not prevent us from asking searching questions 
about the role of, and the use of, the social sciences in political-administrative planning9.   
                                                                 
8 In addition to a general high living standard and economic equality, the Nordic countries are 
characterised by high levels of trust (Uslaner, 2007).   
9 My approach in this analysis is in many ways complementary to what Asdal (2011) has done concerning 
environmental policy in Norway. In her detailed analysis, Asdal shows how the rhetoric about nature and 
environmental questions clearly announced that these topics should have pre-eminence. When it came to 
environmental questions, one had to take ‘the asthmatics of nature’ as the staring point.   
 
Social Welfare 130 
though this was not equal to saying that the Norwegian economy was ‘drifting weak-willed 
on a rough ocean’ (expression used by Nordli), it meant that some basic prerequisites for the 
national economy were set in this open international system. Reiulf Steen (Party Leader) 
shared this analysis when (two years later) he said that ‘as a political party and as a political 
movement, we have not to a sufficient extent been in control of the new societal conditions 
we ourselves have been the driving forces behind’ (NC, 1981: 85).  
In short; as the Norwegian economy gradually had become more and more deeply involved 
in the European free market system, leading representatives of the Labour Party admitted 
that essential dimensions of the societal development were outside political control. But 
what could be done? No doubt, an essential ideological shift took place within the Labour 
Party during the 1980s; i. e. the period when a conservative government implemented what 
roughly could be defined as a neo-liberal inspired program (privatisation, marketisation, 
‘modernising’ the state administration, etc). The way leading representatives of the Labour 
Party interpreted the electorate in the 1980s, it was evident that the old rhetoric about 
governmental and bureaucratic solutions, heavily dependent on taxing and centralised 
solutions, had come into miscredit. 
The ideological shift that had already started in the 1970s was amplified during this period. 
The Labour Party, originally heavily anchored in a Keynesian tradition with a strong belief 
in the omnipotence of the central state, gradually had to recognise that an increasing 
integration in the European free market economy came at the price of shrinking national 
political control. For the Labour Party, political as well as economic arguments favored 
participation in an open market economy. However, this called for sobriety regarding which 
instruments were available in the political tool box.  
The main arena for declaring this ideological shift was the National Congress in 1987. Two 
speakers, Prime Minister/Party Leader Gro Harlem Brundtland and Vice President Einar 
Førde presented the ‘new’ message. As Norway had become more integrated into the 
European as well as the global economy, one had to acknowledge that ‘the task for political 
organisations should be the setting of political aims and defining the framework. After that, 
it is the leaders’ and their employees’ challenge to reach the given aims. We believe this will 
redeem innovation and engagement’ (Brundtland, NC, 1987: 21). Due to stronger demands 
among the electorate for more individualised and tailor-made services, one had to become 
more sensitive to such demands. The main challenge was to see that the services were 
offered on equal terms. It was argued that monopolies (public or private) more often 
developed in the direction of organisational coagulation than competing institutions. 
Accordingly, it would be a good strategy to bring competition into the public sector. From 
mixed economy to mixed administration – this was the message, and it was underlined that 
the trade-off between public and private sector was not to be defined once and for all.    
The political ambitions were no less than before. Taking care of the weakest in society, a 
universal welfare state, giving priority to the common interest, prevention instead of 
repairing; all the political aims from earlier periods were intact. The Prime Minister 
ascertained that it was people, not money, it was children, not cars, that should be in focus. 
However, new times demanded new strategies. In his introduction to the Labour Party’s 
election manifesto, Førde asked for a willingness to being self-critical about a socialist 
tradition where bureaucratisation and centralising tendencies had been strong. Referring to 
 
Look to Norway – A Sobering Challenge to a Success Story 131 
the new manifest, he stated that the choice between public and private operation had to be 
done according to what was most convenient for reaching the given aim. It was the need of 
the customer that should be the defining standard. And people had to show more 
responsibility themselves. However, one precaution was taken: ’We shall offer no 
compromises when it comes to stating that health, social security and education are so basic 
common needs that we will not allow commersialisation of these services. In this connection 
I will recommend dogmatism’, Førde concluded (NC, 1987: 73). When the political program 
for the decade 2010-2020 (‘Social Democracy 2020: A New Party Program’) was launched, 
the traditional social democratic value foundation was confirmed by Vice President Helga 
Pedersen, who ‘re-named’ the Labour Party to ‘The Social Security Party’. The essence of 
this program, according to Pedersen, was social security for every citizen, for their jobs, 
education, and their welfare. And, like before, a significant strategy for safeguarding these 
aims was ‘a significant strengthening of the preventive efforts’ (NC, 2009: 78).     
Summing up the period 1980-2010; as a result of fundamental political and economic changes, 
the Labour Party ‘modernised’ much of its strategic thinking in this period. While the defense 
of the Scandinavian welfare state stood firm, a ’realistic’ approach to what this meant in an era 
of fierce competition and demands for efficiency was adopted. Like in China, the pragmatic 
approach saying that ‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches 
mice’, became a central mark of recognition for the Labour Party. ‘New politics for new times’; 
this was the recurring slogan, while simultaneously taking care of the old ideals.  
3. Look to Norway? Limits to social engineering policy and limits to social 
science solutions 
I want to use this historical overview, on a principal level, to discuss what kind of lessons can 
be drawn from the paradox that a strong, distributive welfare state (but less so during the last 
decade) in a very rich country like Norway has had to see social problems escalate (according 
to the politicians themselves) as material affluence increases? Why has social exclusion, crime, 
drug addiction, mental distress, and even expenditures on municipal financial assistance, been 
on an upward trend in spite of a strong political will for preventive politics, a broad (but 
decreasing) array of regulating measures, and a solid economy? If any country in the world 
should be able to compete with processes of alienation and anomie in late modernity, it should 
be Norway and the Nordic countries. As we have seen, the politicians themselves as well as 
governmental papers, appear to be quite disillusioned. Why look to Norway? I will trace this 
question in deep respect and recognition of what has been attained by the Nordic welfare 
states8. In a comparative perspective, there is obviously more on the credit than on the debit 
side of the account. However, the pronounced technocratic approach in the confrontation with 
‘modern’ social problems (defined as ‘problems of meaning’) call for critical comments. 
Furthermore, the obvious success story should not prevent us from asking searching questions 
about the role of, and the use of, the social sciences in political-administrative planning9.   
                                                                 
8 In addition to a general high living standard and economic equality, the Nordic countries are 
characterised by high levels of trust (Uslaner, 2007).   
9 My approach in this analysis is in many ways complementary to what Asdal (2011) has done concerning 
environmental policy in Norway. In her detailed analysis, Asdal shows how the rhetoric about nature and 
environmental questions clearly announced that these topics should have pre-eminence. When it came to 
environmental questions, one had to take ‘the asthmatics of nature’ as the staring point.   
 
Social Welfare 132 
As we have seen, during some 25 years after WWII one could argue that ‘social problems’ 
was another term for ‘poverty’, and, accordingly, these problems could be converted to a 
pecuniary dimension. Preventive politics was synonymous with politics for economic 
growth. The period of welfare optimism; i. e. the period of uncontested belief that political-
administrative instruments would be able to prevent social problems, lasted as long as the 
Keynesian fundament for economic policy held firm. When the international scene changed 
and a neo-liberal ideology took control, this perspective gradually changed. Even though 
the ideology from the ‘old’ welfare state remained intact (taking care of people from cradle 
to grave), ideas about ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘self-supporting networks’ were 
announced. However, while the social problems appearing from the 1970s could be 
described as being of a complex and existential character (‘problems of meaning’), the 
interpretation of how these problems could be tackled or even prevented did not change in 
a way that affected the overarching priorities for general societal development. Generally 
speaking, the situation is not very different today. The confidence that, somewhere out 
there, there has to be some kind of sociological correspondence to Keynes that can be 
implemented seems to stand firm. Is there an alternative perspective? 
George and Wilding (1976) might represent an interesting starting point. When giving a 
kind of ideal type description of the modern economic system, they observe that if this 
system is to flourish, it both requires and generates a particular value system. According to 
these authors, the capitalistic system depends on and fosters an ethic of self-help, freedom, 
individualism, competition and achievement. They confront these values with the values 
needed to underpin a successful public welfare system, and continue: 
If such a system is to flourish, the stress on the virtue of self-help must be replaced by stress on 
the need to help others. Individualism must be replaced by a concern for the community at large; 
competition by co-operation; achievement must be defined in social and communal rather than in 
individual terms – values that are socialist rather than liberal’ (p. 118).  
In concluding, these authors bring to the forefront the deep value conflict that actually exists 
between the economic and the socio-cultural system; a conflict that is essential to 
understand ‘why fundamental aims set out in a period of post-war collectivist euphoria 
have not been achieved’ (p. 118).  
I will argue that a message pointing to a rationality conflict between the economic and the 
socio-cultural system is really what the science of sociology has been pleading for, from 
Durkheim to Bauman, from Polanyi to Sennett. A flourishing economy in a market society 
demands efficiency, competitiveness, flexibility, and an ideology of individualism and 
survival-of-the-fittest thinking. Contrary to this, a flourishing socio-cultural system calls for 
time, cooperation, routines, and an ideology of collectivism and ‘caring-for others’ 
(Leonardsen, 1993, Leonardsen forthcoming). While participation in the economic system 
demands certification (education), participation in the socio-cultural system is open. While 
being independent of others is important in a competing system, being dependent on others is 
what characterises life in the socio-cultural system at different times of the life span 
(children, pensioners, unemployed, handicapped etc.).   
The challenging question is whether this means that we are confronted with an antagonistic 
value conflict (as seems to be the position of George and Wilding) or not. Is the relationship 
between the economic and the socio-cultural system primarily a zero-sum type of 
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relationship (what one gains, the other loses), or is it realistically imaginable that a state of 
entente cordial can be arrived at (i. e. a situation of more even ‘power balance’ between 
conflicting values)? Asked sociologically; what does it take to bring the socio-cultural 
system into a more harmonious relationship with the economy than politicians and social 
scientists seem to think it is today (as shown above)?   
The basic philosophy behind the social democratic project has been the so-called ‘welfare 
principle’ (Tawney, Crosland). According to this principle, all kind of problems can be 
explained away in the sphere of distribution. For governments disposing a sensitive 
stethoscope and a multitude of governing instruments (including an army of knowledgeable 
researchers), there are principally no limits to what can be brought under political control. 
Governing is synonymous to ruling. The question is: Are the variety of modern social 
problems (here defined as ‘lack of meaning’ problems) of such a character that they can be 
converted to the formula of being ‘governable’ problems? Can these problems in a 
satisfactory way be handled in the sphere of distribution? ‘The welfare principle’ takes as a 
given premise that mostly all problems can be converted into this type of problem. My 
critique address two types of challenges in this connection: 
1. Antagonistic value conflicts. I do not want to simplify a very complex field of research by 
arguing that all the modern welfare problems should be regarded as the fruit of a 
merciless capitalistic system. They should not. No doubt, the welfare state has 
contributed to the mutation and modification of many value conflicts in these societies. 
As Esping-Andersen (1990) has pointed out, the welfare state has contributed to a de-
commodification of labour (i.e. public services are rendered as a matter of right, meaning 
that people can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market). Nevertheless, to the 
extent that the quality of a good society is demonstrated by the way it treats its poor and 
depressed, one has to admit that, even within the Nordic welfare state model, the 
inclusive society, where ‘people had a chance of experiencing peace and prospects for 
developing all their abilities’ (Steen 1973: 12) is at a significant distance. What’s more; this 
aim is a moving target which, even according to the politicians, seems to be extremely 
hard to attain. In the renowned book The Strategy of Equality, LeGrande (1982) has a 
chapter titled ‘The Dreamers’. In this chapter he presents the basis of the social democratic 
welfare project and the strategy of equality. The presentation shows the confidence these 
people had in a belief that public expenditures on the social services could promote social 
equality. Unfortunately, the conclusion to the chapter is rather depressing since, according 
to LeGrande, one can as much identify a ‘Matthew effect’ as a ‘Robin Hood effect’ in the 
wake of decades of social democratic redistributional politics. My focus has not been on 
economic and social equality in itself but rather on the operationalised consequences of 
such inequalities (i. e. what in this chapter is called ‘modern social problems’). My own 
conclusion is no less optimistic than LeGrande’s. 
For those who would argue that these are ex post conclusions I would remind them that the 
historical presentation given above shows that the politicians in charge at a relatively early 
point of time warned about this development, as did the researchers (Leonardsen, 1993, 
Hovedkomiteen, 1976). However, instead of entering an analysis about market forces 
released contra the omnipotence of the welfare state, one took the last premise for granted. 
From my argument above, I think it is fair to conclude that responsible politicians today 
should invite a debate where value conflicts in late modern capitalist societies are given full 
attention. An open discussion on topics like injustices and lack of respect and recognition 
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relationship (what one gains, the other loses), or is it realistically imaginable that a state of 
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(Honneth, 1995, Sennett, 2003) for people struggling with being fully competitive in a risk 
society should be an important ingredient in such a discussion.      
2. The structure of problems and their solving strategies. As mentioned above, a prerequisite 
for the welfare principle was that the state had full control over those values and 
interests that were to be safeguarded. However, values like ‘meaning of life’, 
‘happiness’, and ‘social inclusion’ are difficult to implant by way of administrative 
instructions. As Habermas (1976: 71) points out, ‘the structural dissimilarity between 
areas of administrative action and areas of cultural tradition constitutes, then, a 
systematic limit to attempts to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious 
manipulation’. This is due to the fact that cultural traditions have their own, vulnerable 
conditions of reproduction that are shaped with what Habermas calls ‘hermeneutic 
consciousness’; in other words that ‘there is no administrative production of meaning’ 
(op. cit. 70). What Habermas does here is to draw a principally important distinction 
between two types of rationalities, one referring to the ‘system world’ and one referring 
to ‘the life world’; each having their own idiosyncratic ways of reproduction. In 
practical life, of course, these principles do not (and cannot) operate in separate spheres. 
However, there is a strong case for arguing not only that in late modern society the 
value system of the economic system has invaded the socio-cultural system, but that 
political parties have had too high expectations about manipulating social problems 
away through ingenious interventions. Once the spirit is released from the bottle (once 
the global market forces are set free) it is hard to get it back again (to get political and 
social control of it). Actually, some influential fractions of the Labour Party argued for a 
long time in a way which reflected on these perspectives. An economist like Per Kleppe 
(who also was a Minister in Labour governments all through the 1970s) was (as we have 
seen) aware of the huge challenges Norwegian participation in an open global economy 
would mean for this country. As we have seen, Reiulf Steen was another spokesman for 
such perspectives. However, it was the pragmatic ’right wing’ part of the Labour Party 
that came to dominate and define the political direction to be followed from the mid-
1980s. In spite of endeavours to revitalise local communities and promotion of concepts 
like self-supporting networks, it was the ‘traditionalists’ (i.e. those arguing that rapid 
economic growth was the road to a qualitatively better society) that had the upper hand. 
4. Conclusion 
How should the above arguments be interpreted? Are the everyday endeavors for a better 
society useless unless we start working with the ‘root causes’ of social problems? Of course 
not. What I am saying is that political promises about social prevention and social inclusion 
should be confronted with an analysis of power relations in modern market societies. If 
agreed upon aims are not attained, in spite of financial muscle and a broad basis of scientific 
know-how then there has to be some strong interests, some powerful centres that have 
become too influential. If political rhetoric about ‘soft values’ are to be taken seriously, it 
seems that one has to change some of the political priorities in advance. From a sociological 
point of view, speeding up the pace of change in a world of speedy changes is hardly 
compatible with safeguarding values like social inclusion and participation for everybody. 
The sociology I know about and the sociology I appreciate gives strong support for such a 
conclusion.  
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Furthermore, one should not discount that the social sciences, given these premises, can 
support the political-administrative system with tools that will create balance were imbalance 
already exists. In the above presentation we have seen that, at an early stage, Norwegian 
politicians appealed to the social sciences for being ‘practically useful’ for decision makers at 
all levels of society. To a large extent one could say that the social sciences were turned into a 
troop of ‘rescuing angels’ for the political-administrative system. It would be an exaggeration 
to argue that these sciences have been able to ‘deliver’. Two conclusions could be drawn from 
this observation: one is that the social sciences are still ‘young of age’, but in due time they will 
certainly develop know-how and practical instruments that will help bringing the socio-
cultural system back into balance. Alternatively, the problem is not one of scientific 
immaturity among sociologists, criminologists, psychologists etc. Rather, the problem is that 
these sciences are embarking on types of problems that they have few chances of solving. I 
think the short historical overview of the Norwegian welfare state above gives credence to 
such a conclusion and supports an argument in favour of taking Galbraith, Illich, vonWright 
and Marcuse (see introduction) much more seriously10.         
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this phenomenologically and hermeneutically oriented interview study is to 
explore the subjectivity and life-worlds of the poor. It focuses on experiences of inhibition or 
loss of autonomy among people living in relative poverty in an affluent welfare state1. 
Different psychological perspectives and theories, especially those related to social 
psychology, needs and emotions, aid the interpretation of the findings, which are discussed 
in relation to contextual factors and methodological issues.  
Conventional poverty studies have tended to be dominated by economists, sociologists and 
other social scientists who have sought in the main to define, operationalize and measure 
poverty and conduct comparative macro-level studies (Øyen, Miller & Samad, 1996). 
Themes related to psychology are barely raised in this research tradition, and in 
psychological research poverty is conspicuous by its absence (Lewis, Webley & Furnham, 
1995). This is surprising given that poverty is the world’s most endemic and oldest social 
problem. Psychologists should have much to contribute to poverty studies.  
In this article I attempt to bring poverty as a social problem into the realm of psychology as 
a science. Poverty is understood and investigated with the aid of psychological perspectives 
as a human problem. The goal is to help found a new research area, the psychology of poverty. 
It is a bold ambition, especially for a chapter in a book. We need therefore to narrow the 
field with regard to type of poverty, psychological issues and theoretical perspectives we are 
going to be dealing with.  
The type of poverty we investigate here is the variant that occurs in contemporary Norway 
(and Scandinavia). Norway is one of the world’s richest countries and boasts a relatively 
well-developed welfare system. It has during many years been singled out across a range of 
social welfare indicators as the best place in the world to live in (UN, 2010). Norwegian 
poverty differs from absolute and total poverty which was common throughout history and 
                                                 
1 This is a part-study; social devaluation, insecurity and self-image and self-esteem are described under 
the same umbrella, ”psychology of poverty”, in separate articles (Underlid, 2004; 2005; 2007). Therefore, 
some of the text which focus on general aspects, e.g. method, may have similarities with these previous 
publications. However, this is an original contribution about poverty and autonomy.  
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in developing countries today (UN, 1995), and also from the destitution we find in ghetto-
like districts in affluent developed countries like the US.  
It is this form of poverty, as it is experienced day by day by the poor, that is the intentional 
object of the respondents of this study – the object of their experience – and the object of this 
study. I bracket, however, the objective factors to concentrate instead on the experiences of 
poverty of the respondents. I want to discover the subjective meaning of relative poverty of 
affluent welfare states as experienced by the poor themselves. The general properties of this 
type of poverty have been identified as relative deprivation, social exclusion and the 
‘tyranny of scarcity’ (Stjernø, 1985; Townsend, 1979).  
The second point concerns the psychological issue. As mentioned above, I restrict the 
‘psychology of poverty’ to the experience of poverty, with a more specific focus here on 
experiences of inhibition or loss of autonomy.  
The third point relates to theoretical perspectives. Although psychology is a young science, 
it has a wide range of sub-disciplines and theoretical approaches. The ‘psychology of 
poverty’, as defined here, takes social psychology and perspectives on needs and emotions 
as its starting point. Social psychology is that area of psychology that attempts to 
understand and study individuals in its interpersonal, social, societal and cultural contexts.  
From the point of view of the individual, poverty is also about needs, generally unsatisfied 
needs. But not so much biological needs. The relative poverty of affluent welfare states 
causes psychological and social distress (which is materially conditioned and constituted). It 
is therefore pertinent to focus on psychological needs in the study of the consequences of this 
type of poverty. Psychological needs are loosely and tentatively conceived as categories of 
deep-seated, general, continuous and widespread urges, desires or wants that may be more 
or less conscious/ unconscious. If they are not satisfied, psychological, social or somatic 
harm may result, in the short and/or longer term. Satisfying psychological needs will 
therefore also be in the interests (‘objective needs’) of the subject. Psychological needs of this 
nature differ from likes, preferences and (short lived/superficial) wants in the sense in 
which these terms are generally used and understood. All needs contain a cultural, 
situational and personal element, which dispose towards certain types of behaviour.  
Numerous theories of needs have been developed over the years covering varying numbers of 
basic (generally understood as universal) psychological needs (Franken, 1994). In a 
psychological study of ‘modern poverty’ a natural question would be to ask about the needs 
most involved. There are several candidates. During the interview sessions with the long-term 
recipients of social assistance, some important details came to light. Many of the respondents 
reported feeling ‘locked in’, ‘paralysed’, ‘constrained’, ‘incapacitated’, ‘powerless’, ‘at the 
mercy of’ an impersonal and intractable bureaucracy, etc. These findings instigated a search 
for relevant need-related categories and terms to serve as allies in the attempt to achieve 
theoretical grasp of the situation. They were not found in Maslow’s (1970/1954) famous theory 
of human needs. One of the 27 psychological needs Murray (1938) enumerates in his classic 
work on motivation theory corresponds in part to the findings: autonomy, and particularly 
interpersonal autonomy factors associated with power, influence, dominance, independence 
and self-determination. Murray defines autonomy as follows: ‘To resist influence or coercion. 
To defy an authority or seek freedom in a new place. To strive for independence’ (p. 82). Deci 
(1980) and Deci and Ryan’s (1991) theory of self-determination captures other germane aspects 
of self-expression and self-development more generally. Self-determination is defined as 
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follows: ‘Behaviors that either are intrinsically motivated or stem from well-integrated 
personal values and regulatory processes…’ (Deci & Ryan, 1991, p. 238).  
Although notions of autonomy and self-determination are not particularly visible in the 
literature, it is possible nonetheless to trace Murray and Deci’s ideas in a number of 
psychological theories that utilise related concepts. Haworth (1986) listed more than a dozen 
such theories. The concept of autonomy has additionally been applied in political 
philosophy (Raz, 1986), the philosophy of law and moral philosophy (Dworkin, 1988; 
Haworth, 1986) and the social sciences (Doyal & Gough, 1991).  
Doyal and Gough maintain that the overriding universal objective, from a socio-political 
need and welfare standpoint, would have to be the avoidance of severe harm in the form of 
disabled social participation. They refer in this connection to Townsend’s (1979) definition of 
poverty as relative and objective deprivation.  
According to Doyal and Gough, two basic conditions must be met for a person to participate 
in social settings. The one is survival and a modicum of physical health. The second is that 
the person must not be impeded by other causes, i.e., internal or external barriers 
(autonomy). Doyal and Gough believe, therefore, that survival/physical health and 
autonomy constitute the only basic (universal) human needs. Doyal and Gough define 
autonomy as the ability to make informed choices about prospective actions and how to 
execute them. This presupposes an ability to set goals and devise strategies to achieve them, 
and to evaluate the realism of both in the light of the evidence. 
Although Doyal & Gough’s theoretical frame of reference and research goals do not 
necessarily align with those employed in this study, their points of view are worth 
mentioning - without going into the details in their rather comprehensive theory of human 
needs. Their concept of objective needs could prove important and fruitful in many research 
contexts, not least in poverty studies. That said, the research area ‘psychology of poverty’ 
aims at gaining access to the subjectivity and life-world of the poor, and for that purpose it 
is more relevant to focus on experiential autonomy/inhibition or lack of autonomy. It is 
important to emphasise that the experiences in question are of an objective reality, 
independent of the mindset of the observer, because poverty is basically a material 
phenomenon. It is relevant therefore to focus on the interplay between subjective and 
objective factors.  
In line with the above discussion and my own conception of the term, for the purpose of this 
study personal autonomy is defined loosely and tentatively as self-determination, co-authorship 
of one’s life in the short and long term, and the ability to pursue one’s desires within reasonably wide 
and flexible limits of a biological and social/societal nature without being at the mercy of inner or 
external constraints. In particular, autonomy is conceptualised and viewed in connection with 
activity in the social arena and with significant role responsibilities and actions within 
relevant role domains. Autonomy is further conceptualised as a continuum, not a dichotomy. 
As a value and ideal, autonomy gains significance in relation to values of a more collective 
nature.  
This is a ‘mild’ version of need: autonomy is not necessarily considered to be a 
biological/innate drive like the need for food. It is partly cultural, an ‘acquired taste’ shared 
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From a psychological point of view, poverty is also about feelings. Needs and feelings are 
closely connected, of course. For the sake of simplicity, I use ‘feelings’ to denote emotions 
(short-lived affective reaction to perception of a significant change in own circumstances), 
sentiments (permanently focused affective state) and moods (permanently non-focused 
affective state) (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). I want here to address feelings related to inhibition or loss 
of autonomy in situations of poverty.  
The question in this study is how inhibition or loss of autonomy is experienced by the poor. 
What does it mean to them subjectively, and how should the meanings they ascribe to it be 
interpreted?  
2. Method 
2.1 Research design 
Several contingent factors affected the choice of research strategy: current state of 
knowledge (i.e., lack of research); topic under investigation (poverty and inhibition or loss 
of autonomy); and theoretical perspectives (social psychology, need and emotion 
perspectives). It is an interview study with an exploratory objective. It is phenomenological 
insofar as I provide descriptions of the lived experiences of the poor (Giorgi, 1985). It is also 
hermeneutical insofar as I attempt to interpret and understand these descriptions of lived 
experiences (Ricoeur, 1998). The study is therefore phenomenological and hermeneutical 
(Van Manen, 1992). Unfortunately there is no single, widely recognised phenomenological 
hermeneutical method. The method should not be taken as a closed and static system either, 
without the leeway for imaginative innovation and ideas from other theoretical and 
methodological traditions. The method also needs to reflect the object of study. This is why 
this study is a phenomenologically and hermeneutically oriented study.  
The status and function of the theoretical perspectives in this study must be understood on 
the basis of the phenomenological and hermeneutical grounding. I have attempted to retain 
an open mind in dealing with the phenomena in question, i.e., experiences of inhibition or 
loss of autonomy. That is, I have made an effort to bracket my pre-understandings 
(including theoretical perspectives) as far as possible. The theoretical perspectives consist 
largely of sensitising concepts (Blumer, 1969). They are not defined in any complete sense of 
the word, and their purpose is basically heuristic, to aid interpretation. By translating the 
verbal responses of the poor into psychological terms, we can proceed to reflect over and 
interpret them according to hermeneutical principles.  
2.2 Participants, data collection and analysis 
The selection criteria were as follows: a) registered as a long-term recipient of social security 
payments at a social security office in Bergen, Norway; b) equal numbers of females and 
males; c) within the age-range 18–67; d) of Norwegian nationality; e) and the presence of an 
ability (competence, especially cognitive) and will (motivation) to take part in long 
interviews of a relatively personal nature on psycho-social concerns.  
A preliminary assessment of potential subjects based on my verbal and written instructions 
was undertaken by social security office’s assistant chief officer in collaboration with case 
officers. A letter signed by the chief officer was sent to these individuals informing them of 
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the study and inviting them to take part. The letter offered a number of incentives, among 
them, a promise of one thousand kroner in compensation for taking part. Forty-four 
individuals were invited to take part in the study. Twenty-six accepted, 2 declined and 16 
did not reply. I called each of the 26 (mainly by telephone), to arrange a meeting. One 
decided to pull out after initial contact, but none left during or after the interviews.  
The total number of participants was 25; ages ranged between 20 and 66 years (mean age = 
41, SD = 11,71). Thirteen were female, 12 male. Ten lived alone; 6 in a two-person 
household; 8 in a three-person household; and 1 in a household of four. Eleven had children 
living at home. Two lived with their mother. Seven had a partner; none were married. Two 
had (low level) university/college training; the educational achievements of the rest were 
low: 11 had only completed compulsory schooling. Two had part-time jobs and a further 
two were on sick leave absence from a part-time job. The rest (21) had no connection with 
the labour market. One was on a disablement pension and one was in training. They were 
all, to a greater or lesser degree, affected by poverty. They all fulfilled from three to seven of 
the following poverty criteria: client status; income poverty; wealth poverty; debt poverty; 
general deprivation poverty; housing deprivation poverty and subjective poverty (an 
average of 5.4 criteria). For a more detailed discussion of the concept of poverty in 
psychological studies and the operationalization of poverty, see Underlid (2001, 2003).  
The interviews followed an interview guide organised around ten themes: why the 
respondent is in economic difficulties and requires help from the state (‘ways in – individual 
level’); views of causes of poverty (‘ways in – macro level’); income status; expenses status; 
wealth status; debt status; material properties; the most salient problem; future prospects as 
poor/social security recipient (‘ways out – individual level’); views of solutions/of 
alleviating the situation in general (‘ways out – macro level’). 
The interviews were recorded on a tape recorder. About a third of the interviews took place 
at the author’s office, the rest at the homes of the participants. The conversations lasted two 
to four days. All interviews were conducted by the author. The interview technique I 
applied followed the basic tenets of qualitative interviewing (Kvale, 1996).  
Coding was based on a review of the transcribed qualitative interviews. The 
transcriptions ran to 1808 pages in all (29–130 pages per interview). This corresponds to 
the first step in Giorgi’s (1985) phenomenological method, Sense of the Whole. During this 
stage four main psychological themes emerged: insecurity, inhibition or loss of autonomy, 
social devaluation and a threatened self-image/self-esteem. In a discrete analysis, I 
separated out units of meaning based on psychological perspectives with a focus on the 
phenomenon under investigation, i.e. inhibition or loss of autonomy. This analysis 
addresses only those parts of the text that deal with inhibited or lost autonomy, and 
corresponds to step two of Giorgi’s phenomenological method. The inclusion/exclusion 
criteria applied to textual excerpts are relevance, quality (i.e. clarity) and success in 
depicting the breadth of the respondents’ experiences. The purpose was to generate a text 
that was oriented, strong, rich and deep (Van Manen, 1992). At a later stage of the 
research process the two remaining steps of Giorgi’s method were undertaken: 1) the 
transformation of the subject’s everyday expressions into psychological language with an 
emphasis on the phenomenon under investigation and 2) the synthesis of transformed 
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2.3 Interview environment and ethical reflection 
Efforts were made to establish and maintain a frank, respectful, personal, trustful and 
confidential interview environment. It was deemed necessary to establish a relationship that 
would facilitate dialogue, communication and respondent validation, i.e. communicative 
validity (Kvale, 1989), to encourage the presentation of sensitive personal information from a 
socially vulnerable group.  
A comfortable interview climate was also necessary from the ethical point of view. Certain 
ethical research standards had to be maintained, and the respondents should under no 
circumstances feel their dignity was being undermined or that they were being exploited. 
The interviews needed also to be a positive experience. There was an ethical side to the offer 
of financial compensation as well: as a token of my respect and reciprocation. The 
respondents spoke of sensitive issues over quite a lengthy period of time, they were in a 
difficult situation and belonged to a vulnerable social group. After the completion of the 
interviews, the respondents were given practical information on possible routes with regard 
to assistance. I gave them my business card if they needed to get in touch, for instance to 
obtain copies of reports issuing from the study. All of the respondents were assured that 
confidentiality would be maintained, and they all gave their informed consent. Possible 
ramifications of the study for the respondents, pertinent institutions and social policy 
remained an integral concern throughout the process.  
3. Findings  
Excerpts taken from the qualitative interviews are used to illustrate the experiences of 
inhibition or loss of autonomy. The choice of topics is not random: it is a product of an 
interplay between the analysis of the data and the theoretical or conceptual frame of 
reference.  
3.1 Reduced scope of opportunity and subjective experiences 
The focus in this subsection is on subjective experiences of objective poverty and material 
factors associated with poverty that work to diminish life opportunities. For example, debt 
may be experienced as a burden by the poor. As one of our interviewees said: ‘Yea, it’s 
like a claw… a fist inside you like an insurmountable problem’ [Inger (38), Kjell Underlid, 
24 February, 2000]. Several respondents talked about the meaning of money in relation to 
autonomy: ‘If you haven’t any money, you won’t get anywhere’ [Marit (46), Kjell 
Underlid, 10 January, 2000]; ‘You do have a bit of freedom if you’ve got money… The 
choices are greater, you know, generally speaking’ [Agnete (52), Kjell Underlid, 9 
February, 2000]. 
Another woman maintained that it is difficult to see any opportunities because a) tunnel 
vision, ‘You’re blinkered… I mean you can’t see. There are masses of other things you can’t 
see, because you’re completely cornered’, b) lack of strength to think about it, ‘There are so 
many things, really, you just can’t think about all this, you see, so you push it all away… just 
to keep going’, c) vicious circles, ‘You get into a spiral, a circle… and it’s then you just forget 
to see…’, d) no way out, ‘Forget to feel that you could try and get out of all this, because in 
many areas you may have to… Like, you see what’s stopping you, you don’t see your 
chances’, e) overcome by misery, ‘Cause in a way you sink more and more into the misery of 
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it all…’, f) hopelessness, ‘… and you really can’t see any hope. That’s when the sense of 
hopelessness comes over you…’, g) loose ends, ‘It’s, er, because there are so many things 
you ought to be trying to get hold of… Like gathering a loose end, finding a way out of…’, 
h) consequences, ‘And the one thing often leads to the next… there are those kinds of effects, 
yes’, i) losing one’s balance, ‘It’s just like you… lose your balance at the same time a bit… 
your grounding’, j) preoccupied with keeping one’s head above water, ‘Like you’re 
spending so much time and energy just… um, just keeping your head above water… you 
forget to look towards the horizon…’, k) entangled in a web, ‘It’s just that sense of… 
quicksand?… And then you get caught in a sort of web… and you’re entangled in a … 
whatever you do, like, ‘cause you’re trying many…’. [Trine (38), Kjell Underlid, 7 April, 
2000]. 
There may be dreams and a little hope, but it is not easy to plan: ‘Because that feeling of 
hope – you see there’s so much hope in my life that’s been… and plans in my life that have 
been crushed… The dreams are there! But no plans… and little hope’ [Inger (38), Kjell 
Underlid, 24 February, 2000]. A man said that because he had no savings and was not able 
to save, it was difficult to make plans: ‘Not being able to plan for the future.… It’s hard to 
find the woman of your dreams… a flat of your own…’ [Steinar (30), Kjell Underlid, 24 
November, 1999]. The poor preserve, however, their wishes: ‘Just being able to… shop once 
in a while without having to count the pennies… to be able to take a trip abroad with these 
boys and see…’ [Kari (50), Kjell Underlid, 1 November, 1999]. 
The poor lack a role which for most people in their age groups is regarded as central, 
namely the work role. This role has several important functions (Jahoda, 1982), and is 
generally deemed to be very attractive: ‘I’d do anything to go to work, just given a chance to 
work, ’cause it’s driving me mad sitting at home…’ [Inge (28), Kjell Underlid, 29 March, 
2000]. The lack of work role may impact on non-job-related roles and social participation: 
‘Having something meaningful to do in my spare time would make up for the situation I’m 
in. But you can’t because of the lack of money and, you know, social reasons – that others 
will probably look down at you’ [Steinar (30), Kjell Underlid, 24 November, 1999]; “And 
then you’re pushed to the side lines. And there you stay. It’s awful. It’s nearly like looking at 
life from the outside’ [Trine (38), Kjell Underlid, 7 April, 2000).  
Poverty may also affect parental role, ‘…you feel like you´re not a proper mother because you 
can’t give them the support’ [Laura (44), Kjell Underlid, 11 February, 2000], role as child 
,‘You know, she (mother) says I shouldn’t feel embarrassed at all. And “that’s what I’m here 
for, isn’t it? You’re my only child and bla, bla, bla.” But I’m grown up now, and you grow 
with age – thoughts and everything. And I feel it’s pretty embarrassing’ [Charlotte (33), Kjell 
Underlid, 15 November, 1999], and partner (the woman has to ask for money from her 
partner), ‘I can’t make my own choices about big economic things…’ [Lise (33), Kjell 
Underlid, 14 December, 1999].  
The role as social welfare client was not experienced as an attractive role, ‘You feel you’re 
banging your head against a wall, against a massive system, against red tape and stiff 
regulations’ [Steinar (30), Kjell Underlid, 24 November, 1999], and may influence other roles 
as well, i.e. the role as member of the public, “What can I do?… A social welfare client… Who’s 
going to be bothered to listen to what I’ve got to say?’ [Inger (38), Kjell Underlid, 24 
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for a long time and if you own a house, they’ll ask you to sell it’ [Steinar (30), Kjell Underlid, 
24 November, 1999]; ‘Because we’re only tenants here. There are many things I can’t do or 
decide about’ [Nina (24), Kjell Underlid, 1 March, 2000].  
The role of consumer is clearly important in societies like Norway (Bauman, 1998; Edwards, 
2000), and lack of money can be felt as a tyranny of scarcity, ‘You know, it’s a colossal crisis 
if your shoes are worn out’[Martin (32), Kjell Underlid, 30 November]; ‘Tied hands and 
feet… the money situation means you have very little leeway… means that you can’t do 
anything… And, like, you go round feeling you’re banging your head against a wall… 
you’re condemned to go round and find something else – like, you can’t do anything…’ [Ole 
(54), Kjell Underlid, 4 January, 2000]; ‘So if I’ve got a list of priorities, a wish list, I’ll have to 
rub about everything out’ [Steinar (30), 30 November, 1999]. 
3.2 Further explication/interpretative reflection 
The respondents in this study live under conditions of relative deprivation, that is, their 
financial resources are so meagre that they are excluded from particular ways of life, 
customs and activities otherwise considered normal and desirable in the Norwegian society. 
The inhibition or loss of autonomy must therefore be understood objectively and against the 
background of the immediate social context. This context is not supportive of autonomy to 
any extent.  
Inhibition or loss of autonomy penetrate into many different areas of life and role domains 
(Braybrooke, 1987). The actual objective range of opportunities is reduced. There is little to 
support autonomy in the immediate context of the poor and it is partly overstructured (for 
instance in encounters with the social welfare office) and partly understructured (due to 
joblessness; Jahoda, 1982). But the range of opportunities can be felt and dealt with 
subjectively in a variety of ways which can be more or less functional or dysfunctional in 
relation to practical problem-solving strategies and affective experience.  
Generally, the findings highlight the lack of control felt by the poor over their lives, along 
with an inability to feel any sense of co-authorship of their lives. At the level of everyday 
life, they feel their decisions or choices are restricted to trivial things, like choosing between 
going to a cinema or buying food for the next day. Many feel they have hardly anything to 
chose between at all. They feel tied and often have to forsake things they like and do things 
they dislike (such as shopping with coupons or going to the social welfare office). Many 
refer to a sense of paralysis. They live under the tyranny of scarcity (Stjernø, 1985), despite the 
existence of small, restricted domains of autonomy (Nozick, 1981). Experiences like these, 
which are often accompanied by a sense of vulnerability and loss, but also anger, occur daily 
and are often triggered in autonomy-threatening situations (Argyle, Furnham & Graham, 
1981) such as shopping or visiting the social welfare office. Freedom to act and make choices 
is felt to be severely curtailed over the long term. The poor may dream of a better life, but 
planning one and realising life projects in line with their interests and values are mostly 
considered to be unrealistic. Their economic situation hinders them from achieving key 
goals in life and living up to important values and ideals. The recurring themes are lack of 
autonomy, a sense of oppression, of being tied, bound, controlled, of dependence and 
subservience. There is little room in their lives for agency and intrinsic motivation.  
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3.3 Coping and resources 
One coping strategy was not to think about poverty and related problems ,‘I don’t want to 
think about it… I suppose I take every new day as it comes’ [Siren (36), Kjell Underlid, 20 
December, 1999]; another to approach problems one at a time, ‘Yea, I work on problems one 
by one… I mean, I finish one thing before starting on the next. I get a problem out of the 
way before I start on the next one’ [Knut (20), Kjell Underlid, 22 March, 2000]; a third to 
reduce the time frame, ‘And if I get through that day, and I’m happy when I go to bed in the 
evening when I’ve managed to cope that day… And done something constructive that day, 
then I’m happy about it, and I can start with a fresh outlook the next morning’ [Inger (38), 
Kjell Underlid, 24 February, 2000].  
A young man told that he relied on his psycho-social competence with regard to a) ability to 
reflect critically, ‘I do have an ability to think critically about things, and it’s been stimulated 
and developed in the environment I belong to now’ and b) coping ability, ‘…I know I’ll be 
able to manage… even if I hadn’t got a penny’s worth of help from the social welfare people, 
I’d get by anyway’ [Kim (34), Kjell Underlid, 17 February, 2000]. Another man, however, 
thought that such resources might be inadequate to make his own future, ‘They say you can 
succeed if you want to, on your own, don’t they?… So if what you need is some metal, and 
it’s there, you can make a horse shoe. But if it’s not, like, then you’ve got problems’ [Terje 
(48), Kjell Underlid, 28. March, 2000]. 
Informal social safety nets can play a significant role: ‘But I’ve got a couple of friends who 
I’ve known since I was … that big… You know, and in a way it’s a safety net’ [Agnete, (52), 
Kjell Underlid, 9 February, 2000]. 
3.4 Further explication/interpretative reflection 
These experiences show that the poor, far from being passive victims of their financial 
situation, are active agents doing their utmost to find a balance in their lives. They mobilize 
all available resources. The respondents make use in particular of emotion-focused coping 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), such as different cognitive techniques to prevent or mitigate 
negative effects. Many also looked for comfort in and used different psychological and 
social resources available to them. Informal social networks can act as a vital buffer against 
poverty. Psycho-social resources can help to allay the subjective distress, but are often 
inadequate in the face of practical and financial problems.  
3.5 Metaphors 
In describing her experience of being poor, one woman used a prison metaphor: ‘It’s like 
living in a prison in a way…’. Her main points were as follows. a) Prisoners have a better 
life: ‘…people in prison, it’s better for them than for us, they’re given things without 
having to pay for them: they can watch films, go and play at things, get on a training 
course…’. b) Prisoners tend to give up: ‘It’s like being a prisoner, because you have to give 
up practically everything, like…’. c) They suffer from a lack of freedom, from 
obstructions: ‘You can feel it, because you can’t go out and do anything you want 
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always something that stops you when you go out… Because when you can’t do 
anything, you have no freedom…’. d) They are monitored by prison warders: ‘Prison 
warder, that’s me that is’. e) Prison life is passive: ‘So it turns out that you don’t do much 
on the inside either, because you’re not motivated and… and don’t like doing much 
anyway’. f) But there’s prison leave: ‘True, I’m off on leave from time to time, but as a rule 
I suffer for it afterwards’. g) Plans for making an escape: ‘No, that’s why I think it’s unfair 
and really… because if I’d been a man then: Right I’m off, then, bugger everything, I can’t 
put up with this any more’]. h) Will to live: ‘You really lose the will to… live’. i) Lengthy 
sentence: ‘It’s like I’ve been here for ever…’. j) Apprehensive about the future in prison: 
‘But I get dreadfully anxious about the future, because I know that living like this for just 
a few more years… I start doubting myself, how strong I’ve actually been, that it’s not 
enough, because there’s too much trouble’. k) Fearful of release: ‘If you’re up for release… 
there’s often so much trouble, you have to make calls, ask others, to get it over with… and 
degrading yourself and spilling the beans, sorry I was born, that’s how I feel it… It really 
kills any pleasure you’re feeling when you leave here, like’. 1) Fair sentence? ‘No, it 
wasn’t fair… those things have left their mark in a way… Just starting to brood over 
things: why this and why that? I never deserved it, and… I’ve got myself to blame partly 
because I never got an education… married young’ [Laura (44), Kjell Underlid, 11 
February, 2000].  
A man used a mountaineering metaphor to describe his feelings of loss of control over his life: 
‘You start off on a plotted route. A route that’s your life. But then you find out that for you 
there’s not enough to hold onto on the mountain side to get further. It’s so hard that route. 
You fight and fight, but you don’t get anywhere. You’re stuck half way up that wall… Some 
(grips) are fragile, and some are missing, and… And they’re terrible’ [Steinar (30), Kjell 
Underlid, 11 February, 2000]. 
3.6 Further explication/interpretative reflection 
Metaphor means that a literal meaning is given a non-literal meaning. Although metaphors 
can oversimplify, mask, deceive and lead astray, they can often serve as a springboard for 
the creation of meaning and communication of understanding. They can structure 
experiences and understanding, act as reference points around which to organise data and 
build bridges between things we comprehend and things we are trying to comprehend (Ely, 
Vinz, Downing & Anzul, 2001).  
Although poor people as individuals share characteristics with the rest of humanity and 
other disadvantaged groups, as individuals they are nonetheless unique, and their 
subjectivity belongs to them as unique individuals. Their metaphors and expressions may 
create empathy with and insight into their life-worlds, because they are based on 
particularistic and ideosyncratic experiences.  
The prison metaphor highlights the almost claustrophobic sense of oppression, of being tied 
hand and foot, accommodating to the greyness of everyday poverty, resigned hopelessness 
in relation to the future, and self-reproach. The mountaineering metaphor illustrates the sense 
of powerlessness, of a sense of the ground giving way, accompanied by a fear of losing one’s 
footing and falling.  
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4. General discussion 
I shall now discuss the findings in light of a) theories of needs and emotions, b) contextual 
factors, and c) methodology. 
The inhibition or loss of autonomy experienced by the respondents in the sample can be 
understood on the basis of a concept of subjective needs. They have a subjective need for 
autonomy but experience that it is either blocked or frustrated by poverty. The typical 
affective reaction to this blocking or frustration is usually expressed in anger- or sadness-
related states, although many also react with other feelings, e.g., fear and anxiety.  
Affective reactions associated with inhibition or loss of autonomy varied in intensity from 
moderate unease to very strong feelings. There were instances of short-lived emotions 
linked to actual events, focused and permanent sentiments and diffuse, negative moods 
linked to existential questions of a poverty-related nature. Feelings associated with inhibited 
or lost autonomy in situations of poverty affected all respondents in the sample, penetrated 
different life domains and role arenas, and had shaped the lives of several of the 
respondents over a period of years and even decades. There was nonetheless wide variation 
in the sample with respect to type and intensity of feelings.  
These variations in the experience of inhibition or loss of autonomy may have something to 
do with differences in the objective poverty situation. Poverty can be deep and wide, deep 
and narrow, shallow and wide, shallow and narrow and permanent/chronic or short-
lived/acute. On the other hand there is no strict correlation between objective inhibition or 
loss of autonomy and subjective feelings. Poor people’s objective situation will manifest 
itself in their horizon – as the concept is employed in phenomenology and hermeneutics – to 
different degrees and in different ways (Husserl, 1970; Gadamer, 1989). The poor do not 
necessarily reflect over the likely consequences of inhibition or loss of autonomy. It is not 
certain that the entire range of such inhibition or loss of autonomy is intentional (in the 
philosophical sense, i.e., consciousness as directed at something) and aspects of inhibited or 
lost autonomy are not necessarily objectivised (made into an object of consciousness). In 
general, experienced inhibition or loss of autonomy is multifaceted, multidetermined and 
expressive of an interplay between subjective and objective factors.  
From an emotion theory perspective (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000), the negative feelings associated with 
inhibited or lost autonomy felt by the respondents originate in a negative evaluation of the 
desirability of their perceived situation, or of the situation of people close to them (especially 
their children). In other words, there exists a threat to key values and aspirations. The 
intensity of the feelings is determined by the level of desirability and importance of these 
aspirations as perceived by each individual and how potent, real and relevant they perceive 
the threats to be. Other factors of significance in this connection are what/who is held to be 
responsible for the threats, how controllable/uncontrollable they are felt to be, whether the 
respondent is prepared or unprepared to meet the threat, and how certain/uncertain it is 
that it will actually materialise, and when and how. The extent to which the situation is 
considered deserved or undeserved will also have an impact as will the person’s general 
circumstances, formal and informal safety networks, personality factors, use of defence 
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4. General discussion 
I shall now discuss the findings in light of a) theories of needs and emotions, b) contextual 
factors, and c) methodology. 
The inhibition or loss of autonomy experienced by the respondents in the sample can be 
understood on the basis of a concept of subjective needs. They have a subjective need for 
autonomy but experience that it is either blocked or frustrated by poverty. The typical 
affective reaction to this blocking or frustration is usually expressed in anger- or sadness-
related states, although many also react with other feelings, e.g., fear and anxiety.  
Affective reactions associated with inhibition or loss of autonomy varied in intensity from 
moderate unease to very strong feelings. There were instances of short-lived emotions 
linked to actual events, focused and permanent sentiments and diffuse, negative moods 
linked to existential questions of a poverty-related nature. Feelings associated with inhibited 
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philosophical sense, i.e., consciousness as directed at something) and aspects of inhibited or 
lost autonomy are not necessarily objectivised (made into an object of consciousness). In 
general, experienced inhibition or loss of autonomy is multifaceted, multidetermined and 
expressive of an interplay between subjective and objective factors.  
From an emotion theory perspective (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000), the negative feelings associated with 
inhibited or lost autonomy felt by the respondents originate in a negative evaluation of the 
desirability of their perceived situation, or of the situation of people close to them (especially 
their children). In other words, there exists a threat to key values and aspirations. The 
intensity of the feelings is determined by the level of desirability and importance of these 
aspirations as perceived by each individual and how potent, real and relevant they perceive 
the threats to be. Other factors of significance in this connection are what/who is held to be 
responsible for the threats, how controllable/uncontrollable they are felt to be, whether the 
respondent is prepared or unprepared to meet the threat, and how certain/uncertain it is 
that it will actually materialise, and when and how. The extent to which the situation is 
considered deserved or undeserved will also have an impact as will the person’s general 
circumstances, formal and informal safety networks, personality factors, use of defence 





(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Other relevant factors are salience (stimulus properties in a 
particular context), perception (which is selective), social comparison along different 
dimensions, interpretation of the situation (attribution), needs (general autonomy 
orientation) and general attitude to life (ideology). Negative feelings associated with 
inhibition or loss of autonomy can also be interpreted as the activation of deeper and more 
generalised anxiety related to personality and background, current circumstances (for 
instance too little/too much external structure), belonging, social exclusion, identity and 
fundamental existential issues. Such experiences can therefore also be elucidated from the 
perspective of anxiety theories (Roth, Noyes & Burrows, 1988–1992). Need and emotion 
theories are, however, as an interpretative basis, far too narrow.  
The experiences of the respondents may be understood more broadly in relation to the 
structure and culture of the society in which they live, i.e. contextually. It is a society for 
which commercialism (a system dominated by economic interests), materialism (Fournier & 
Richins, 1991) and consumerism (Bauman, 1998) are key characteristics (Hellevik, 1996). 
Money in this type of society exerts a wide-ranging and decisive influence on feelings of 
autonomy, and lack of money is in many ways an autonomy killer. This is the context in 
which relative poverty in affluent welfare states should be understood in relation to 
experienced autonomy.  
Other groups may also experience inhibition or loss of autonomy due to such contextual 
factors, but the type of inhibited or lost autonomy reported by the respondents in this study is 
poverty-related, and in this sense their experiences are relatively exclusive. Since the questions 
put to them in the interviews concerned their experiences of their poverty-related situation, a 
control group of non-poor would have been irrelevant and meaningless. However, many of 
the same attributes exist among other socio-economically deprived groups.  
The findings also need to be seen in connection with the study’s methodological approach. In 
the interviews information was generated by both parties in conversation or dialogue. Now, 
there is good reason to ask if my own understanding and values, i.e. preconceptions, may 
have influenced the information that was created. I tried to act as an interested, concerned 
and empathic researcher, but also emphasised a professional and neutral approach and the 
use of open, non-leading questions. Whatever may have been non-verbally communicated is 
not easy to say.  
It is also difficult to estimate the impact of the 1000 kroner promised for taking the trouble to 
take part. It may well be that it was perceived by respondents as such a large amount that 
they felt compelled to take part in the study. The rate of participation in this study was 
higher than usual in poverty research, despite this study’s increased number of questions 
and time to complete it. The themes for inquiry were also both more personal and more 
intimate. The fact that none of the participants pulled out, and that after the interviews 
many said unprompted they were pleased with their own participation, may be taken to 
indicate that factors other than money contributed to them remaining in the study or even to 
them becoming respondents in the first place 
The study’s external validity is low, and findings should not be generalised without great 
care to other people suffering from poverty either within the same socio-cultural bracket or 
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beyond. It is a small, biased and judicious sample of long-standing recipients of social 
security in a city in one of the wealthiest countries in the world on the cusp of a new 
millennium. On the other hand, the study may also have touched on experiences of poverty 
that are almost universal and invariant. That said, conventional criteria relating to 
representativeness are not equally relevant in qualitative research where one is more 
interested in the uniqueness of different experiences and in contextual, interactional and 
interpretative concerns (Van Manen, 1992). 
5. Synthesis and concluding remarks 
The purpose of this summary is to conclude the study as a whole, to see it, as it were, from a 
bird’s eye view. It offers in addition a synthesis of transformed meaning units into a 
consistent statement (Giorgi, 1985). 
The ‘psychology of poverty’ has preoccupied me for a considerable time. I have studied 
experiences of inhibited or lost autonomy among the poor and attempted to understand 
what it means. During this process I have sometimes been physically distant from the 
phenomena under investigation (while reviewing the literature and analysing the data for 
example) and sometimes closer (I spent more than six months with the respondents, 
generally in their own homes). I was granted access to the subjectivity and life-worlds of 
the poor in the shape of lived everyday experiences (the ‘taste and smell’ of poverty), 
verbalised and reflected upon within a framework of a trustful dialogue. These 
experiences were fixed in the form of a transcribed text, selected excerpts from which I 
have attempted to explicate and interpret. The interviews were encounters between 
people whose lives, circumstances and horizons differed – between poor and non-poor, 
between the horizon of the lay person and that of the professional psychologist and 
researcher. Both of us existed, however, in the same society and historical period. The 
findings and interpretations are the product of the fusion of horizons made possible by 
these encounters.  
Inhibition or loss of autonomy is a key meaning of relative poverty in affluent welfare states, 
generally accompanied by a sense of anger or sadness. This is a subjective reality for the 
poor. The sense of inhibited or lost autonomy is an existential verity for the poor in affluent 
welfare states. It is a psychological essence of this type of poverty. This does not mean that 
experienced inhibition or loss of autonomy is the only or most significant nucleus of the 
‘psychology of poverty’. Experiences of insecurity (Underlid, 2007), social devaluation 
(Underlid, 2005) and a besieged self-image or sense of worth (Underlid, 2004) are examples 
of other potential essences.  
Whether the data from this in-depth study of a small number of respondents corroborate the 
claim that experienced inhibition or loss of autonomy is a psychological essence of relative 
poverty in affluent welfare states may of course be questioned. Nevertheless the study 
provides a platform on which to base further studies in the ‘psychology of poverty’ – either 
with the same methodology and theoretical perspectives or others. It is my hope that these 
tentative steps into largely virgin territory – for recent contributions, see for example 
Mullainathan´s (2011) excellent article - will inspire others to embark on similar research 





(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Other relevant factors are salience (stimulus properties in a 
particular context), perception (which is selective), social comparison along different 
dimensions, interpretation of the situation (attribution), needs (general autonomy 
orientation) and general attitude to life (ideology). Negative feelings associated with 
inhibition or loss of autonomy can also be interpreted as the activation of deeper and more 
generalised anxiety related to personality and background, current circumstances (for 
instance too little/too much external structure), belonging, social exclusion, identity and 
fundamental existential issues. Such experiences can therefore also be elucidated from the 
perspective of anxiety theories (Roth, Noyes & Burrows, 1988–1992). Need and emotion 
theories are, however, as an interpretative basis, far too narrow.  
The experiences of the respondents may be understood more broadly in relation to the 
structure and culture of the society in which they live, i.e. contextually. It is a society for 
which commercialism (a system dominated by economic interests), materialism (Fournier & 
Richins, 1991) and consumerism (Bauman, 1998) are key characteristics (Hellevik, 1996). 
Money in this type of society exerts a wide-ranging and decisive influence on feelings of 
autonomy, and lack of money is in many ways an autonomy killer. This is the context in 
which relative poverty in affluent welfare states should be understood in relation to 
experienced autonomy.  
Other groups may also experience inhibition or loss of autonomy due to such contextual 
factors, but the type of inhibited or lost autonomy reported by the respondents in this study is 
poverty-related, and in this sense their experiences are relatively exclusive. Since the questions 
put to them in the interviews concerned their experiences of their poverty-related situation, a 
control group of non-poor would have been irrelevant and meaningless. However, many of 
the same attributes exist among other socio-economically deprived groups.  
The findings also need to be seen in connection with the study’s methodological approach. In 
the interviews information was generated by both parties in conversation or dialogue. Now, 
there is good reason to ask if my own understanding and values, i.e. preconceptions, may 
have influenced the information that was created. I tried to act as an interested, concerned 
and empathic researcher, but also emphasised a professional and neutral approach and the 
use of open, non-leading questions. Whatever may have been non-verbally communicated is 
not easy to say.  
It is also difficult to estimate the impact of the 1000 kroner promised for taking the trouble to 
take part. It may well be that it was perceived by respondents as such a large amount that 
they felt compelled to take part in the study. The rate of participation in this study was 
higher than usual in poverty research, despite this study’s increased number of questions 
and time to complete it. The themes for inquiry were also both more personal and more 
intimate. The fact that none of the participants pulled out, and that after the interviews 
many said unprompted they were pleased with their own participation, may be taken to 
indicate that factors other than money contributed to them remaining in the study or even to 
them becoming respondents in the first place 
The study’s external validity is low, and findings should not be generalised without great 
care to other people suffering from poverty either within the same socio-cultural bracket or 
 
Autonomy and Poverty – An Empirical Study of Long-Term Recipients of Social Assistance 
 
149 
beyond. It is a small, biased and judicious sample of long-standing recipients of social 
security in a city in one of the wealthiest countries in the world on the cusp of a new 
millennium. On the other hand, the study may also have touched on experiences of poverty 
that are almost universal and invariant. That said, conventional criteria relating to 
representativeness are not equally relevant in qualitative research where one is more 
interested in the uniqueness of different experiences and in contextual, interactional and 
interpretative concerns (Van Manen, 1992). 
5. Synthesis and concluding remarks 
The purpose of this summary is to conclude the study as a whole, to see it, as it were, from a 
bird’s eye view. It offers in addition a synthesis of transformed meaning units into a 
consistent statement (Giorgi, 1985). 
The ‘psychology of poverty’ has preoccupied me for a considerable time. I have studied 
experiences of inhibited or lost autonomy among the poor and attempted to understand 
what it means. During this process I have sometimes been physically distant from the 
phenomena under investigation (while reviewing the literature and analysing the data for 
example) and sometimes closer (I spent more than six months with the respondents, 
generally in their own homes). I was granted access to the subjectivity and life-worlds of 
the poor in the shape of lived everyday experiences (the ‘taste and smell’ of poverty), 
verbalised and reflected upon within a framework of a trustful dialogue. These 
experiences were fixed in the form of a transcribed text, selected excerpts from which I 
have attempted to explicate and interpret. The interviews were encounters between 
people whose lives, circumstances and horizons differed – between poor and non-poor, 
between the horizon of the lay person and that of the professional psychologist and 
researcher. Both of us existed, however, in the same society and historical period. The 
findings and interpretations are the product of the fusion of horizons made possible by 
these encounters.  
Inhibition or loss of autonomy is a key meaning of relative poverty in affluent welfare states, 
generally accompanied by a sense of anger or sadness. This is a subjective reality for the 
poor. The sense of inhibited or lost autonomy is an existential verity for the poor in affluent 
welfare states. It is a psychological essence of this type of poverty. This does not mean that 
experienced inhibition or loss of autonomy is the only or most significant nucleus of the 
‘psychology of poverty’. Experiences of insecurity (Underlid, 2007), social devaluation 
(Underlid, 2005) and a besieged self-image or sense of worth (Underlid, 2004) are examples 
of other potential essences.  
Whether the data from this in-depth study of a small number of respondents corroborate the 
claim that experienced inhibition or loss of autonomy is a psychological essence of relative 
poverty in affluent welfare states may of course be questioned. Nevertheless the study 
provides a platform on which to base further studies in the ‘psychology of poverty’ – either 
with the same methodology and theoretical perspectives or others. It is my hope that these 
tentative steps into largely virgin territory – for recent contributions, see for example 
Mullainathan´s (2011) excellent article - will inspire others to embark on similar research 





poverty’ puzzle together. The subject is challenging from a theoretical and methodological 
point of view and is important both socially and politically. Poverty is the oldest social 
problem in the world and is describes as the ’scar on humanity´s face’ (Øyen, Miler & 
Samad, 1996). It concerns not only distribution of money and material assets, but also 
distribution of immaterial benefits like autonomy (freedom), which is one of the most hailed 
values and ideals in the world today. From a normative or ethical point of view, poverty is 
about human suffering and social justice (Underlid, 2009), and it demands effective political 
responses.  
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1. Introduction 
During the past decade the hospital industry introduced profound organizational changes, 
including the extensive consolidation of hospitals through the mergers and formation of 
hospital systems. In addition, faced with falling profit margins, hospital industry saw an 
unprecedented wave of hospital closures and loss in operative capacity (Hsia et al. 2011). 
Both trends tend to decrease the existing competitive pressures for hospitals in the market.  
This Chapter will investigate whether changes in competition in hospital markets tangibly 
affect health outcomes as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates after coronary artery 
bypass grafting (CABG) surgery. In this kind of surgery, a vein or artery from another part 
of the body is used to create a new path for blood to flow to the heart, bypassing the blocked 
artery. Since CABG is typically not an emergency but a scheduled procedure, hospital 
competition (based on health outcomes) is more likely to affect mortality rates and other 
measures of quality than in emergency cases where both the patients and treating 
physicians have limited hospital choices.  
Economic theory predicts that concentration of market power leads to higher prices. This may 
or may not hold true in the healthcare industry due to the prevalence of public insurance, 
managed care pressures, as well as the prevalence of nonprofit hospitals. Moreover, higher 
hospital prices may signal higher quality. Thus, policy makers’ attempts to make health care 
markets more competitive and to depress reimbursements may not necessarily lead to welfare 
improvements. The study results in this Chapter will contribute to the existing literature by 
shedding more light on the relationship between hospital competition and health outcomes as 
measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. If hospitals located in less competitive markets 
exhibit inferior health outcomes, then the case for promoting competition through antitrust 
enforcement and support of failing hospitals is strengthened. 
2. Background 
2.1 Existing literature 
Previous literature does not provide a clear guidance as to the effects of hospital competition 
on health outcomes. For example, Propper et al. (2004) examined the relationship between 
hospital competition and mortality rates after emergency acute myocardial infraction (AMI). 
They find that higher competitive pressures in Britain’s National Health Service actually 
increased mortality rates for AMI after controlling for patient mix and other observed 
characteristics of the hospital and its market area. Similarly, using a longer panel of 
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hospitals Propper et al. (2008) find a negative relationship between hospital competition and 
AMI mortality but they find that competition does decrease waiting times. The study 
concludes that hospitals in UK decreased unobservable dimensions of quality (such as 
patient outcomes) but improved observed waiting times. On the other hand, Shortell and 
Hughes (1988), Ho and Hamilton (2000) find no significant relationship between hospital 
competition and hospital quality. For example, Ho and Hamilton (2000) found that mergers 
increased 90-day readmission rates and early discharges for newborns for Mei-Cal patients 
but did not affect inpatient mortality rates.  
In contrast to above mentioned findings, Sari (2002) and Kessler and McClellan (2000) show 
that hospital competition improves health outcomes along several important quality 
dimensions. Unlike UK studies above, Kessler and McClellan (2000) examined the effect of 
competition on AMI outcomes for Medicare patients and found higher AMI mortality rates 
when competition for Medicare patients decreased. Most recently, Gaynor and colleagues 
(2011) estimated the effect of moving from a market with 2.5 hospitals to one with 5 hospitals 
and find that such improvement in competition would result in about 55,000 more life years.  
It is important to note that different patients may be affected differently by competition. 
Kessler and Geppert (2005) examined the effect of hospital competition on more and less 
severely ill patients. They show that higher competitive pressures improve health outcomes 
(and lead to higher costs of treatment) for severely ill patients but do not affect less severely 
ill patients. Finally, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) and Schneider (2008) have found that 
hospital competition improves quality but these quality improvements are not always 
realized depending on Medicare penetration and hospital ownership status.  
2.2 Importance of the study 
CABG surgery is the most common surgical procedure for treating cardiovascular disease. 
Coronary artery disease is the leading cause of all adult non-maternal admissions to 
California hospitals, representing nearly 9% of all admissions (OSHPD). This study 
contributes to the existing research along several dimensions. First, we focus on 30 day 
mortality rates and risk adjusted mortality rates following CABG surgery, while the 
previous literature for this surgery only examined in-hospital mortality rates (Schneider 
2008). Second, we use the hospital quality data from the time period when such reporting 
became mandatory rather than voluntary. Thus, relative to previous literature based on 
OSHPD data, there is less scope for hospital self-selection since all high and low quality 
hospitals have to report their mortality statistics to OSHPD. Lastly, the study attempts to 
examine the relationship between hospital-specific changes in CABG mortality rates and 
changes in market competition. We hope to gage whether changes in competitive pressures 
are responsible for changes in mortality statistics across hospitals.  
3. Methods 
Empirical model and data sources are presented below. 
3.1 Empirical model 
The following model is used in this study: 
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where ∆EM represents changes in excess mortality between 2007 and 2003 for hospital i. 
Excess mortality is defined as the ratio between the observed mortality rate and the 
predicted rate. We estimate (1) using generalized linear model (GLM) separately for excess 
mortality and risk adjusted mortality rate relative to the state average.  
Coefficient of interest is 1  where HHI represents Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) that 
measures hospital competition; the index is constructed based on available bed shares and 
CABG volume, to test whether our results are sensitive to the product definition. HHI is 
inversely related to competition and therefore we expect lower HHI to decrease excess 
mortality if competition indeed saves lives. We use hospital service area (HSA) as the relevant 
hospital market. Unlike market definitions based on geo-political borders (e.g., county), the 
HSA relies on patient flows.  
It is important to note that HHI can be calculated based on patient flows as well as political 
boundaries (such as county or MSA). However, a recent study by Wong et al. (2005) 
calculated hospital competition index using county, MSA, health service area (as done in 
this study), fixed radius and variable radius measures. They found that the method of 
constructing HHI did not affect their estimates of the effect of competition on hospital costs. 
We believe that our two alternative measures of HHI will capture the effect of competition 
on patient outcomes although the magnitude of the effect may be different, as was found by 
Wong et al. (2005).  
We also control for hospital characteristics and other market characteristics, as follows: the 
hospital characteristics include ownership, church affiliation, teaching status, hospital size, 
ER, trauma unit and disproportionate share hospital status. Hospital size is measured as the 
number of staffed beds. Teaching status is defined as hospitals with some residents. We do 
control for the disproportionate share hospital status since hospitals with such designation 
serve a disproportionately high number of medically indigent patients. Hospital market 
characteristics reflect competitive pressures (HHI), area characteristics (percent uninsured 
and per capital income) and demand for community benefits (percent MediCal enrollment).  
3.2 Data 
This study uses hospital data from the Hospital Annual Financial Disclosure Reports filed 
annually by all California hospitals with the Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD). Hospital data will be merged with risk adjusted mortality rates that 
are based on the California Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) Mortality Reporting 
Program (CCMRP). Mortality rates are adjusted for patient characteristics: age, gender, body 
mass index, acuity (elective, urgent, emergent or salvage) as well as for the secondary 
conditions (such as hypertension, diabetes, etc.). Two mortality rates have been calculated. 
Observed mortality rate is the ratio of the number of deaths and the CABG cases multiplied 
by 100. Expected mortality rate is the ratio of the number of expected deaths to CABG cases 
multiplied by 100; expected mortality rate is risk adjusted. In this study we calculate excess 
mortality as the ratio of observed to expected mortality rate. When excess mortality ratio is 
greater than 1.0, that indicates that there were more deaths at the hospital than would have 
been expected. A ratio less than 1.0 indicates that there were fewer deaths at a hospital than 
expected, given the case mix of patients treated at a hospital (CCMRP). Finally, we use risk 
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adjusted mortality rate which is obtained by multiplying the observed annual California 
state average mortality rate by a hospital’s excess mortality ratio for that year.  
In this study we used 479 California general acute care hospitals in 2003 and 456 hospitals in 
2007 to compute HHI based on available beds. Then we reduced our sample to CABG 
performing hospitals to calculate HHI based on CABG surgeries. This definition of hospital 
competition uses a more narrow market definition since hospitals are assumed to compete 
only with other CABG performing hospitals. For our regression analysis, our sample was 
reduced to 109 hospitals that were performing CABG in both 2003 and 2007.  
 
Variable Mean (St. deviation) Minimum Maximum 
Excess mortality in 2003 1.0869 (0.687) 0 3.0372 
Excess mortality in 2007 1.0570 (0.955) 0 7.457 
Differences in excess mortality (2003-2007) 0.00936 (1.062) -4.419 2.154 
Risk adjusted mortality rate, 2003 3.156 (1.995) 0 8.81 
Risk adjusted mortality rate, 2007 2.463 (2.246) 0 17.52 
Differences in risk adjusted mortality rates 
(2003-2007) 
0.621 
(2.685) -8.71 6.26 
HHI, based on available beds, 2003 790.939 (621.272) 177.818 2545.682 
HHI, based on available beds, 2007 603.411 (355.959) 181.108 1235.981 
HHI differences, HHI based on available beds 
(2003-2007) 
185.611 
(344.853) -111.175 1352.938 
HHI, based on CABG volume, 2003 2297.811 (2058.170) 633.475 7847.276 
HHI, based on CABG volume, 2007 1783.738 (1204.323) 613.0733 5235.165 
HHI differences, HHI based on CABG volume 
(2003-2007) 
512.0731 
(1393.311) -331.8247 5252.218 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables  
Table 1 shows that on average the hospitals in California experienced a decrease in both 
excess mortality and risk adjusted mortality rates between 2003 and 2007. Since our 
dependent variable measures the differences in excess mortality between 2003 and 2007, the 
higher the difference the greater the fall in excess mortality and risk adjusted mortality rates. 
Thus, our dependent variables measure improvements in health outcomes.  
Between 2003 and 2007 the number of hospitals in California decreased by 4.8%. Although 
some hospitals saw an increase in competition and some hospitals saw a decrease in 
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competition, on average the hospital competition index actually decreased between 2003 and 
2007. This decrease indicates that hospital markets became more competitive despite the 
decrease in the number of hospitals that operate in California and this holds true for both 
measures of hospital competition. Since HHI does not simply measure the number of hospitals 
but rather hospital market shares, this means that with fewer hospitals in the market hospital 
shares became more equal. In this study we look at differences between 2003 and 2007; the 
higher the difference, the higher the increase in competition for the hospital market.  
If competitive pressures indeed improve health outcomes, we expected changes in HHI to 
have a positive effect on changes in health outcomes.  
4. Empirical results 
Our regression results are presented in Table 2 below.  
Empirical results indicate that higher competitive pressures translate into better health 
outcomes as measured by decreases in excess mortality as well as decreases in risk adjusted 
mortality rates relative to the state average. Results are statistically significant at the 10% 
level for most specifications of the model. Although hospitals in the United States may not 
compete based on price due to high prevalence of public insurance and high prevalence of 
nonprofit hospitals in the industry, competition based on quality may be relatively more 
important, especially as public insurance coverage is being expanded after the passage of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.  
Other important variables include hospital ownership status. Although there is no 
statistically significant relationship between mortality rates in for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals, the nonprofit hospitals saw the same or smaller improvements in mortality than 
for-profits between 2003 and 2007. Municipal hospitals (city and county hospitals) show 
higher risk adjusted mortality rates and Table 2 shows that they saw smaller improvements 
in mortality rates even after we controlled for CABG volume and area characteristics.  
Although we do not see a statistically significant relationship between CABG volume and 
health outcomes, alternative specifications of the volume variable yield a better fit. For 
example, square root of volume has a statistically positive effect on mortality improvements 
(result not shown). This indicates that initial increases in CABG volume improve outcomes 
but this improvement, interestingly, increases at a decreasing rate. We also did not find a 
significant relationship between increases in the number of CABG surgeries performed and 
mortality statistics. This result is consistent with the previous research that shows that over 
time, the disparity in outcomes between low- and high-volume hospitals has narrowed as 
outcomes have improved significantly for all hospitals (Ho, 2000).  
Finally, the effect of hospital competition on health outcomes can be ambiguous since higher 
competitive pressures may potentially decrease the volume of surgeries that each hospital 
performs. If higher-volume hospitals, in fact, deliver better quality of care, competition may 
be undesirable. In our model we measure the effect of hospital competition holding CABG 
volume constant. Thus, we re-estimate our model without the effect of CABG volume. We 
find that even in this specification of the model the relationship between the hospital 
competition (as measured by HHI) holds.  
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Notes: * indicates significance at p<0.1 level, ** indicates significance at p< 0.05 level. All continuous 
variables are in the log form.  
Table 2. Determinants of excess mortality differences (standard errors are in parentheses) 
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5. Limitations of the study 
In this study we concentrate only on clinical outcomes as measured by risk adjusted 
mortality rates. Previous research by Gaynor and Vogt (2000) point out that patient and 
physician preferences may be the driving force in hospital competition. In response to 
patient preferences, some hospitals may compete along both clinical and nonclinical 
dimensions. Some hospitals may respond to competitive pressures by offering private 
rooms with televisions and private phones, hotel-like lobbies and waiting rooms (Lindrooth 
2008). Improvements in such amenities may be important to patients but they are not 
addressed in this study.  
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study estimates the effect of changes in hospital competition on risk adjusted measures 
of hospital outcomes as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. Using the data from the 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development of the State of California for the 
period 2003-2007 we find that hospitals that saw higher competitive pressures also 
experienced greater improvements in health outcomes as measured by mortality statistics 
following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgery. Although higher competition in 
hospital markets may not affect health care prices due to the presence of the third-party 
payers, it does translate into quality competition and better health outcomes. 
A review of health care consolidation trends by Goldberg (1999) indicates that consolidation 
is likely to continue at a rapid pace. Such consolidation can have a negative effect on health 
outcomes if it leads to increases in market power. Results of this study show that a decrease 
in the number of hospitals may not necessarily decrease hospital competition index as 
measured by HHI. Increases in HHI (i.e. decreases in hospital competition) significantly 
decrease quality of care as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. In addition, Dranove 
and White (1994) estimated a trend beginning in the mid-1980s in which higher hospital 
competition lowered prices and cost of care. Similar results were found by Gaynor and 
Haas-Wilson (1999) and Keeler et al. (1999). Mounting empirical evidence leads us to 
conclude that hospital competition improves quality of care and lowers cost of care and 
prices, thus improving patient welfare.  
Our results imply that overtime both technological improvements and antitrust policies will 
play a role in determining improvements in hospital quality. Antitrust analysis of the 
hospital industry should incorporate the potential effects of pro-competitive policies on 
health outcomes since such policies may in fact save lives.  
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variables are in the log form.  
Table 2. Determinants of excess mortality differences (standard errors are in parentheses) 
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5. Limitations of the study 
In this study we concentrate only on clinical outcomes as measured by risk adjusted 
mortality rates. Previous research by Gaynor and Vogt (2000) point out that patient and 
physician preferences may be the driving force in hospital competition. In response to 
patient preferences, some hospitals may compete along both clinical and nonclinical 
dimensions. Some hospitals may respond to competitive pressures by offering private 
rooms with televisions and private phones, hotel-like lobbies and waiting rooms (Lindrooth 
2008). Improvements in such amenities may be important to patients but they are not 
addressed in this study.  
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study estimates the effect of changes in hospital competition on risk adjusted measures 
of hospital outcomes as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. Using the data from the 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development of the State of California for the 
period 2003-2007 we find that hospitals that saw higher competitive pressures also 
experienced greater improvements in health outcomes as measured by mortality statistics 
following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgery. Although higher competition in 
hospital markets may not affect health care prices due to the presence of the third-party 
payers, it does translate into quality competition and better health outcomes. 
A review of health care consolidation trends by Goldberg (1999) indicates that consolidation 
is likely to continue at a rapid pace. Such consolidation can have a negative effect on health 
outcomes if it leads to increases in market power. Results of this study show that a decrease 
in the number of hospitals may not necessarily decrease hospital competition index as 
measured by HHI. Increases in HHI (i.e. decreases in hospital competition) significantly 
decrease quality of care as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. In addition, Dranove 
and White (1994) estimated a trend beginning in the mid-1980s in which higher hospital 
competition lowered prices and cost of care. Similar results were found by Gaynor and 
Haas-Wilson (1999) and Keeler et al. (1999). Mounting empirical evidence leads us to 
conclude that hospital competition improves quality of care and lowers cost of care and 
prices, thus improving patient welfare.  
Our results imply that overtime both technological improvements and antitrust policies will 
play a role in determining improvements in hospital quality. Antitrust analysis of the 
hospital industry should incorporate the potential effects of pro-competitive policies on 
health outcomes since such policies may in fact save lives.  
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1. Introduction 
Price discrimination under imperfect competition is an important area of economic 
research,1 and third-degree price discrimination, the most prevalent form of price 
discrimination, is a major item in any standard treatment of monopoly theory covered in 
intermediate and advanced microeconomics courses (see, for instance, Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2008, or Varian, 1992, 2006). Under third-degree price discrimination the seller 
can charge different prices to consumers belonging to different groups or submarkets. For 
example, the seller may charge different prices to customers who are separated 
geographically (the home and the export markets) or that are differentiated by age (senior 
citizen's discounts), occupation (student discounts), time of purchases (initial equipment 
and replacement purchases), or by end use (milk for liquid consumption or for further 
processing). Moving from non-discrimination to discrimination raises the firm's profits, 
harms consumers in markets where the prices increase and benefits the consumers who face 
lower prices. Consequently, the overall effect on welfare is undetermined. 
Understanding the conditions under which the change in social welfare can be signed has 
concerned economists at least from the earlier work by Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933). A 
move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination generates, as will be shown 
below, two effects:2 firstly, price discrimination causes a misallocation of goods from high to 
low value users (that is, output is not efficiently distributed to the highest-value end); 
secondly, price discrimination affects total output. Therefore, since price discrimination is 
viewed as an inefficient way of distributing a given quantity of output between different 
consumers or submarkets, a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase social 
welfare is that it should increase total output.3 In consequence, in order for price 
                                                 
1 See Stole (2007), Armstrong (2008) and Liu and Serfes (2010) for excellent theoretical surveys. See also 
McAfee (2008) for a modern view of price discrimination and for antitrust implications. 
2 McAfee (2008) provides a nice explanation of these effects. 
3 See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Schwartz (1990) and more 
recently Bertoletti (2004). However, when marginal cost varies across markets that result does not 
maintain (see, Bertoletti, 2009). 
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discrimination to increase welfare a positive output effect must offset the negative effect of 
distributional inefficiency. 
Schmalensee (1981)'s direct approach to the welfare effect and Varian's celebrated bounds 
on social welfare (1985, 1989,1992) have dominated both the research and the teaching of the 
welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination for the last twenty-five years. Our 
analysis, inspired by the pioneering work by Ippolito (1980) and its generalization to n 
markets by Aguirre (2008), offers some advantages over Schmalensee's and Varian's. Firstly, 
it focuses directly on the change in welfare (instead of on indirect Lagrangian techniques or 
on exogenous bounds) and allows the output effect (that is, the social valuation of the 
change in total output) to be distinguished neatly from the misallocation effect. In addition 
we show how it is possible to prove the theorem that "a necessary condition for third-degree 
price discrimination to increase social welfare is that total output increases" by using this 
decomposition. Our approach to the welfare effects of discrimination is also more intuitive 
and can be illustrated graphically. 
2. Analysis 
Consider a monopolist selling a good in two perfectly separated markets. The demand 
function in market i (i=1,2) is given by ( )i iD p , where ip  is the price charged in that market 
and the inverse demand function is ( )i ip q , where iq  is the quantity sold. Unit cost, c, is 
assumed to be constant. The price elasticity in market i is given by '( ) ( ) / ( )i i i i i i ip D p p D p   . 
The profit function in market i, ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i ip p c D p   , is assumed to be strictly concave, 
'' 0i  . 
2.1 Profit maximization 
Under simple monopoly pricing, profits are maximized by charging all consumers a 
common price 0p  such that: 
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Therefore, under uniform pricing, the optimal policy is given by 0 0 0( ) / 1 / ( )p c p p   , 
where 0p  denotes the uniform price and 0( )p  is the elasticity of the aggregate demand at 
0p . If we let 2 1( ) ( )iiD p D p   denote the aggregate demand, then this elasticity is simply 
the weighted average elasticity: 20 0 01( ) ( ) ( )i iip p p    , where the elasticity of market i is 
weighted by the "share" of that market at the optimal uniform price, 
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1( ) ( ) / ( )i i iip D p D p   . Let 0iq  denote the quantity sold in market i,  0 0( )i iq D p  
( 1,2i  ), and 0q  denote the total output, 20 1 ( )iiq D p  , under uniform pricing which can 
be expressed as follows: 
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Therefore, the marginal profit becomes: 
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The monopolist is willing to increase (decrease) the price in market i if the elasticity in that 
market, 0( )i p , is lower (higher) than the elasticity of the aggregate demand, 
0( )p . 
Condition (4) can be written, equivalently, as 
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where , 1,2,i j j i  . Note that ' 0( ) 0i p   iff 
0 0( ) ( ),j ip p    , 1,2, .i j j i   Therefore, if 
possible the monopolist would want to increase the price in the market with lower elasticity 
of demand and to reduce the price in the market with higher elasticity of demand. 
Under price discrimination, the optimal policy for the monopolist is given by: 
 '( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 1,2.d d di i i i iD p p c D p i     (6) 
where dip  denotes the optimal price in market i (and profit functions are assumed to be 
strictly concave in the relevant range). Under price discrimination, the optimal policy for the 
monopolist can be expressed as ( ) / 1 / ( ), 1,2,d d di i i ip c p p i     where 
'( ) ( ) / ( )d d d di i i i i i ip D p p D p    is the price-elasticity in market i. That is, the Lerner index in 
each market is inversely proportional to its elasticity of demand and the monopolist 
therefore sets a higher price in the market with the lower elasticity of demand. The quantity 
sold in market i is ( ), 1,2.d di i iq D p i   Total output under price discrimination is 
2 2
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The change in the quantity sold in market i is given by 0 , 1,2.di i iq q q i     We assume with 
no loss of generality that market 1 is the market with the lower elasticity of demand (the 
strong market) and market 2 the market with the higher elasticity (the weak market). We 
have implicitly assumed that both markets are served under both price regimes so, given the 
strict concavity of the profit functions, then 01 2 .
d dp p p  4 
Therefore, price discrimination decreases the output in market 1 and increases output in 
market 2: 1 0q   and 2 0q  . The effect of third-degree price discrimination on social 
welfare depends crucially on the change in the total output given by 0 1 2
dq q q q q       . 
We next show that the demand curvature plays a relevant role in determining the effect on 
total output. 
2.2 The change in total output and demand curvature 
Given conditions (2) and (7), the change in total output, 0dq q q   , is given by: 
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From (10) we obtain that the effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output 
depends on the demand curvature in each market.5 If the demand in the lower elasticity 
                                                 
4 See in Nahata et al. (1990) the analysis when profit functions are not strictly concave. 
5 See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988), Cheung and Wang 
(1994), Cowan (2007) and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010). 
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market is strictly concave (strictly convex) and the demand in the higher elasticity market is 
strictly convex (strictly concave) then total output increases (decreases) with price 
discrimination. When all demands are linear output remains unchanged. 
2.3 Welfare effects 
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that is, the change in welfare is the sum across markets of the cumulative difference between 
price and marginal cost for each market between the output under single pricing and the 
output under price discrimination.6 As output decreases in the market with lower elasticity 
 
 
Fig. 1. Welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination. 
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From (10) we obtain that the effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output 
depends on the demand curvature in each market.5 If the demand in the lower elasticity 
                                                 
4 See in Nahata et al. (1990) the analysis when profit functions are not strictly concave. 
5 See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988), Cheung and Wang 
(1994), Cowan (2007) and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010). 
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market is strictly concave (strictly convex) and the demand in the higher elasticity market is 
strictly convex (strictly concave) then total output increases (decreases) with price 
discrimination. When all demands are linear output remains unchanged. 
2.3 Welfare effects 





1 1 1 2 2 2[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] ,
d dq q
q q
W p q c dq p q c dq        (11) 
that is, the change in welfare is the sum across markets of the cumulative difference between 
price and marginal cost for each market between the output under single pricing and the 
output under price discrimination.6 As output decreases in the market with lower elasticity 
 
 
Fig. 1. Welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination. 
                                                 
6 We consider the case of quasilinear-utility function with an aggregate utility function of the form 
 2 1 ( )i i ii u q y  , where iq  is consumption in submarket i and iy  is the amount to be spent on other 
consumption goods, 1, 2i  . It is assumed that ' 0iu   and 























of demand and increases in the market with higher elasticity of demand, the first term in 
(11) is the welfare loss in market 1, whereas the second term is the welfare gain in market 2.7 
Figure 1 illustrates how the welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination is measured 
as the addition of the (negative) change in total surplus in market 1 and the (positive) 
change in total surplus in market 2.8 
We want to break down the effect on social welfare into two effects: a misallocation effect, 
which can be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of q units of production from 
market 1 (the market with lower elasticity) to the market 2 (the market with higher 
elasticity), and an output effect, which can be interpreted as the effect of the change in total 
output on social welfare. Obviously, the effect of total output on social welfare crucially 
depends on whether third-degree price discrimination increases total output or not. Then 
we decompose the change in welfare into the two effects for the case where price 
discrimination increases total output.9 
We assume that 0q   and since the change in total output is given by 1 2q q q     , the 
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Taking into account that the optimal uniform price satisfies 0 ' 0 ' 01 1 2 2( ) ( )p u q u q   and by 
adding and subtracting 0 1( )p c q  , see Figure 2, we can express the change in welfare as: 
 W ME OE     (15) 
                                                 
7 The overall effect on welfare may be positive or negative. See Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) for 
sufficient conditions based on the shape of the demand and inverse demand functions to determine the 
sign of the welfare effect. 
8 Ippolito (1980) and more recently Cowan (2011) analyze the effect of third-degree price discrimination 
on consumer surplus and find reasonable settings where the effect is positive. In a related paper Leeson 
and Sobel (2008) consider costly price discrimination. Note that if consumer surplus increases then 
social welfare would increase even though price discrimination costs offset the private incentive to price 
discriminate. 
9 The Appendix considers the case where price discrimination reduces total output. 
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and may therefore be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of 1q  units of 
production from market 1 to market 2. The output effect (17), OE, can be interpreted as the 
effect of additional output on social welfare. It is positive because the social valuation of the 
increase in output exceeds the marginal social cost. Figure 3 illustrates the output effect (the 
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Fig. 3. Output and Misallocation Effects. 
3. Some lessons on the welfare effects of price discrimination 
Some important lessons can be drawn from the above analysis: 
i. An increase in total output is a necessary (but of course not sufficient) condition for third-
degree price discrimination to increase social welfare. This conclusion is not based on 
exogenous bounds. Since the misallocation effect, (16), is always non-positive then a 
positive output effect (based on an increase in output) is needed to increase social 
welfare. In fact, that argument represents an earlier, easier and more intuitive 
demonstration of the theorem that an increase in output is a necessary condition for 
discrimination raises social welfare. Under linear demand, given that total output 
remains constant, social welfare is reduced by price discrimination. 
ii. Market Opening. In the above analysis we assume that both markets are served under 
both price regimes. We now analyze the case in which third-degree price discrimination 
serves to open markets; that is, we assume that market 2 is only served under third-
degree price discrimination. Note that in this case 01 2
d dp p p   and therefore 1 0q   
and 2 2 0
dq q   . Therefore, in this case price discrimination not only increases social 
welfare but also implies a Pareto improvement. Notice that the misallocation effect 
would be zero and the output effect would obviously be positive given that total output 
increases. 
iii. The use of linear demands is not appropriate for illustrating the welfare effects of third-
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the only way for third-degree price discrimination to increase welfare is by opening 
markets. However, the change in welfare depends on two effects: a misallocation effect 
and an output effect. It is easy to construct examples where price discrimination 
increases social welfare but both markets are served. 
Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) find sufficient conditions, based on the curvatures of 
direct and inverse demand functions for third-degree price discrimination to increase (or 
decrease) social welfare. Their main results are that the output effect is stronger than the 
misallocation effect (that is price discrimination increases social welfare) when inverse 
demand in the weak market is more convex than that in the strong market and the price 
difference with discrimination is small, and discrimination reduces welfare when the direct 
demand function is more convex in the high-price market. 
Cowan (2011) shows that aggregate consumer surplus is higher with discrimination if the 
ratio of pass-through to the price elasticity (at the uniform price) is the same or larger in the 
weak market.10 As an application he shows that discrimination always increases surplus for 
logit demand functions whose pass-through rates exceed 0.5 (so demand is convex). Note 
that an increase in the consumer surplus ensures an increase in social welfare given that 
price discrimination increases profits (at least for a monopolist). Therefore, with this 
demand family results are just contrary to those under linear demand: the output effect 
always dominates the misallocation effect for logit demand functions (with pass-through 
rates exceeding 0.5). 
The constant elasticity demand family is very appropriate for illustrating the tradeoff 
between the two effects given that as total output increases with discrimination (see, 
Ippolito, 1980, Aguirre, 2006, and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers, 2010) output effect is 
positive. If both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity 
difference between markets are big enough then the output effect dominates to the 
misallocation effect (see, Aguirre, 2011). 
iv. Third-degree price discrimination is a topic covered by any microeconomics text book. 
However, there is a gap in the literature with respect to an appropriate graphical 
analysis of the effects on social welfare.11 The above analysis fills this gap and provides 
a graphic treatment that is accessible for most readers and highlights the welfare effects 
of third-degree price discrimination. 
4. Advantages over the Schmalensee’s and Varian’s analyses     
We next compare our analysis with Schmalensee's and Varian's. 
Schmalensee (1981) in his graphical analysis decomposed social welfare into two effects:12 
                                                 
10 Pass-through is extensively analyzed by Weyl and Fabinger (2011) and shown to be a unifying 
concept which generalizes and simplifies the analysis of many industrial organization models. 
11 Graphical presentations of third-degree price discrimination typically focus on the comparison of the 
corresponding profit maximization problems. See for example Round and McIver (2006) and Weber and 
Pasche (2008) for recent analysis. 






Fig. 3. Output and Misallocation Effects. 
3. Some lessons on the welfare effects of price discrimination 
Some important lessons can be drawn from the above analysis: 
i. An increase in total output is a necessary (but of course not sufficient) condition for third-
degree price discrimination to increase social welfare. This conclusion is not based on 
exogenous bounds. Since the misallocation effect, (16), is always non-positive then a 
positive output effect (based on an increase in output) is needed to increase social 
welfare. In fact, that argument represents an earlier, easier and more intuitive 
demonstration of the theorem that an increase in output is a necessary condition for 
discrimination raises social welfare. Under linear demand, given that total output 
remains constant, social welfare is reduced by price discrimination. 
ii. Market Opening. In the above analysis we assume that both markets are served under 
both price regimes. We now analyze the case in which third-degree price discrimination 
serves to open markets; that is, we assume that market 2 is only served under third-
degree price discrimination. Note that in this case 01 2
d dp p p   and therefore 1 0q   
and 2 2 0
dq q   . Therefore, in this case price discrimination not only increases social 
welfare but also implies a Pareto improvement. Notice that the misallocation effect 
would be zero and the output effect would obviously be positive given that total output 
increases. 
iii. The use of linear demands is not appropriate for illustrating the welfare effects of third-






















Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Ippolito Meets Schmalensee and Varian 
 
171 
the only way for third-degree price discrimination to increase welfare is by opening 
markets. However, the change in welfare depends on two effects: a misallocation effect 
and an output effect. It is easy to construct examples where price discrimination 
increases social welfare but both markets are served. 
Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) find sufficient conditions, based on the curvatures of 
direct and inverse demand functions for third-degree price discrimination to increase (or 
decrease) social welfare. Their main results are that the output effect is stronger than the 
misallocation effect (that is price discrimination increases social welfare) when inverse 
demand in the weak market is more convex than that in the strong market and the price 
difference with discrimination is small, and discrimination reduces welfare when the direct 
demand function is more convex in the high-price market. 
Cowan (2011) shows that aggregate consumer surplus is higher with discrimination if the 
ratio of pass-through to the price elasticity (at the uniform price) is the same or larger in the 
weak market.10 As an application he shows that discrimination always increases surplus for 
logit demand functions whose pass-through rates exceed 0.5 (so demand is convex). Note 
that an increase in the consumer surplus ensures an increase in social welfare given that 
price discrimination increases profits (at least for a monopolist). Therefore, with this 
demand family results are just contrary to those under linear demand: the output effect 
always dominates the misallocation effect for logit demand functions (with pass-through 
rates exceeding 0.5). 
The constant elasticity demand family is very appropriate for illustrating the tradeoff 
between the two effects given that as total output increases with discrimination (see, 
Ippolito, 1980, Aguirre, 2006, and Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers, 2010) output effect is 
positive. If both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity 
difference between markets are big enough then the output effect dominates to the 
misallocation effect (see, Aguirre, 2011). 
iv. Third-degree price discrimination is a topic covered by any microeconomics text book. 
However, there is a gap in the literature with respect to an appropriate graphical 
analysis of the effects on social welfare.11 The above analysis fills this gap and provides 
a graphic treatment that is accessible for most readers and highlights the welfare effects 
of third-degree price discrimination. 
4. Advantages over the Schmalensee’s and Varian’s analyses     
We next compare our analysis with Schmalensee's and Varian's. 
Schmalensee (1981) in his graphical analysis decomposed social welfare into two effects:12 
                                                 
10 Pass-through is extensively analyzed by Weyl and Fabinger (2011) and shown to be a unifying 
concept which generalizes and simplifies the analysis of many industrial organization models. 
11 Graphical presentations of third-degree price discrimination typically focus on the comparison of the 
corresponding profit maximization problems. See for example Round and McIver (2006) and Weber and 
Pasche (2008) for recent analysis. 






Fig. 4. Schmalensee (1981)’s Output and Misallocation Effects. 
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where the third term on the right hand in (19) may be equivalently written as 0( )p c q  . 
Schmalensee (1981) named the first two terms the (negative) distribution effect and the last 
term the output effect. In contrast, in our paper the output effect is the social valuation of an 
increase in output (that is the valuation of the consumers in the most elastic market). Figure 
4 shows how in the Schmalensee's approach the distribution effect and the output effect are 
overstated and overlapped. His output effect (the green area plus the blue area), 0( )p c q  , 
exaggerates the social valuation of the increase in total output. It is more reasonable to 
define the output effect as the valuation of the additional output by the elastic market 
consumers (that is, those consumers enjoying the increase in output); i.e. the green area. On 
the other hand, the Schmalensee's distribution effect overestimates the negative effect of 
distributional inefficiency: the red areas plus the (negative) blue area. Our approach 
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loss due to the transfer of 1q  units of production from consumers in market 1 to 
consumers in market 2 and, secondly, it identifies the output effect by stating the social 
valuation of an increase in output as the increase in total surplus of consumer in market 2, 
the most elastic demand market.  
Varian (1985) obtained upper and lower bounds on the change in welfare when moving 
from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination. By using the property of 
concavity of the utility function the bounds on welfare change are: 
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or in terms of marginal willingness to pay: 
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The upper bound provides a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase social 
welfare (that is, an increase in output) and the lower bound a sufficient condition. Our 
approach presents some advantages over Varian's. One crucial advantage relates to the 
graphical analysis: his graphic treatment goes not very further from the one market case as it 
appears in Varian (1992)'s text book. On the other hand, the bounds are not very 
informative. Consider for example the two cases used by Varian (1992) to illustrate the 
bounds: (i) linear demands and (ii) market opening. In both cases, our approach allows to 
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and however our analysis states, from (15), (16) and (17), that: 
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On the other hand, when uniform pricing serves to open markets ( 01 2
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loss due to the transfer of 1q  units of production from consumers in market 1 to 
consumers in market 2 and, secondly, it identifies the output effect by stating the social 
valuation of an increase in output as the increase in total surplus of consumer in market 2, 
the most elastic demand market.  
Varian (1985) obtained upper and lower bounds on the change in welfare when moving 
from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination. By using the property of 
concavity of the utility function the bounds on welfare change are: 
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The upper bound provides a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase social 
welfare (that is, an increase in output) and the lower bound a sufficient condition. Our 
approach presents some advantages over Varian's. One crucial advantage relates to the 
graphical analysis: his graphic treatment goes not very further from the one market case as it 
appears in Varian (1992)'s text book. On the other hand, the bounds are not very 
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On the other hand, when uniform pricing serves to open markets ( 01 2
d dp p p   and 
therefore 1 0q   and 2 2 0
dq q   ) the bounds on social welfare are: 
 
0 0




2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] ,
q q q q q q
d
q q q
u q c dq W u q c dq
   

        (24) 







2 2 2[ ( ) ] .
q q q
q q
W OE u q c dq
 






5. Concluding remarks 
Based on a pioneering paper by Ippolito (1980) we construct a simple model which allows 
the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination to be well understood and explained. 
The decomposition of the change in welfare into a misallocation effect and an output effect 
has advantages over the well-established analyses by Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985). 
In particular, our approach provides an earlier and easier proof of the theorem that an 
increase in output is a necessary condition for welfare to improve and a graphic analysis 
which clarifies the welfare analysis of third-degree price discrimination. 
6. Appendix 
Here we decompose the change in welfare into two effects for cases where third-degree 
price discrimination does not increase total output. When total output does not increase 
0q   it is more illustrative to express the change in welfare as: 
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which under quasilinear utility '( ) ( ), 1,2,i i i ip q u q i   becomes: 
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By adding and subtracting 0 2( )p c q  , the misallocation effect and the output effect can be 
expressed as follows: 
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The misallocation effect can be written as: 
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and may therefore be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of 2q  units of 
production from market 1 to market 2. The output effect, OE, can be interpreted as the effect 
of the reduction in output on social welfare. It is negative because the social valuation of the 
increase in output exceeds the marginal social cost. 
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1. Introduction
Automated negotiation provides an important mechanism to reach agreements
among distributed decision makers (Beer et al., 1999; Kraus et al., 1998; Lai et al., 2004;
Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994). It has been extensively studied from the perspective of
e-commerce (Guttman et al., 1998; He et al., 2003; Lopez-Carmona et al., 2006; Sierra, 2004),
though it can be seen from a more general perspective as a paradigm to solve coordination
and cooperation problems in complex systems (Jennings, 2001; Klein et al., 2002), providing
a mechanism for autonomous agents to reach agreements on, e.g., task allocation, resource
sharing, or surplus division (Fatima et al., 2004; Kersten & Noronha, 1998; Zhang et al., 2005).
Most research in multiparty automated negotiation has been focused on building efficient
mechanisms and protocols to reach agreements among multiple participants, being an
objective to optimize some type of social welfare measurement (Hindriks et al., 2009).
Examples of such measurements would be the sum or product of utilities, the min utility, etc...
However, social welfare has not been usually placed itself as an integral part of the negotiation
process.
There are remarkable works which incorporate a social welfare criterion within the search
process (Ehtamo et al., 1999; Heiskanen et al., 2001; Li et al., 2009a). In these works, the
authors build mechanisms to obtain fair agreements by using fair direction improvements
in the joint exploration of the negotiation space. These proposals present however several
limitations. Firstly, they work only when utility functions are derivable and quasi-concave.
Secondly, the protocols are usually prone to untruthful revelation to bias the direction
generated by the mediator. Finally, we argue that, in some scenarios, the classic notions of
social welfare do not adequately represent the social goal of the negotiation, and that the
type of consensus by which an agreement meets in some specific manner the concerns of all
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the negotiators should be considered as an integral part within the multiparty negotiation
protocols.
In addition, in the last years there has been an increasing interest in complex negotiations
(Klein et al., 2003; Lopez-Carmona et al., 2011). Complexity of a negotiation scenario may
depend on several factors, like the cardinality of the solution space, the number of negotiating
agents, the number of issues under negotiation, the degree of interdependency between
the issues, and structural properties of the different agent preference landscapes, like
ruggedness, modality or correlation length (Vassilev et al., 2003). Specially challenging
are those scenarios involving highly rugged or highly auto-uncorrelated utility spaces,
since traditional negotiation approaches (mostly intended for linear or quasi-concave utility
functions) cannot be applied effectively to these scenarios.
We can find some successful research works in the literature addressing negotiation in
complex utility spaces (Fatima et al., 2009; Hindriks et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2003). However,
most of these approaches rely on monotonic utility spaces, binary valued issues, low-order
dependencies, a fixed set of defined a priori solutions or simplification of the negotiation space,
and there are very few works addressing auto-uncorrelated utility spaces with high-order
issue interdependencies. One of the most relevant approaches in this field is (Ito et al., 2007).
They propose a bidding mechanism, which is based on taking random samples of the contract
space and applying simulated annealing to these samples to identify high utility regions for
each agent, sending these regions as bids to a mediator, and then performing a search in
the mediator to find overlaps between the bids of the different agents. Experiments show
that this approach achieves high effectiveness (measured as high optimality rates and low
failure rates for the negotiations) in the evaluation scenario they describe. However, this
approach performs worse as the circumstances of the scenario turn harder (that is, when the
utility functions present low autocorrelation). Furthermore, the bidding-based negotiation
protocol presents some scalability concerns when the number of agents increases. Under
these circumstances, the failure rate increases drastically, raising the need for an alternative
approach.
Therefore, new approaches are needed if automated negotiation is to be applied to settings
involving highly uncorrelated preference spaces. Here the use of heuristic optimization
techniques to assist negotiation processes has been revealed as a promising approach. In
fact, negotiation scenarios and optimization problems are often closely related, since there
are many similarities in the ways both problem families are defined and addressed. For
example, negotiating agents are usually utility optimizers, and negotiation mechanisms are
often evaluated in terms of their ability to reach Pareto-optimal solutions. Multi-objective
optimization has been widely used for negotiation support (Wierzbicki et al., 1993), and
negotiation mechanisms have also been used to solve multiobjective optimization problems,
usually by distributing the different objectives among negotiating agents (Shi et al., 2006).
Therefore, some of the techniques studied in multiobjective optimization may be used in
negotiation, and vice versa.
Apart from using optimization techniques, there is a trend in automated complex negotiation
to use mediated protocols. The existence of a mediator in the negotiation allows agents
to provide more information to facilitate a successful outcome for the negotiation without
revealing too much information to their counterparts. Furthermore, mediated protocols allow
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to decouple agents’ individual objectives (normally, to maximize their profit) from the social
objective of maximizing social welfare.
In this chapter, we will discuss the application of nonlinear optimization techniques to
mediated negotiations involving highly uncorrelated utility spaces, and the effect of the
different notions of social welfare in this kind of negotiations.
1.1 Multi-attribute negotiation in complex utility spaces
Multi-attribute negotiation may be seen as an interaction between two or more agents with the
goal of reaching an agreement about a range of issues which usually involves solving a conflict
of interests between the agents. This kind of interaction has been widely studied in different
research areas, such as game theory (Nash, 1950; Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994), distributed
artificial intelligence (Ehtamo et al., 1999; Faratin et al., 1998; 2002; Gatti & Amigoni, 2005;
Ito et al., 2008; Klein et al., 2003; Lai et al., 2006) and economics (Raiffa, 1982).
Though there has been an increasing interest in complex negotiations in the last years,
little efforts have been made to study complexity itself within negotiation (apart from
computational complexity, which has been thoroughly studied in many scenarios). Therefore,
if we want to be able to assess complexity in negotiations, we need to resort to other
knowledge areas. An area where many authors have dealt with complexity characterization
and measurement is optimization. In fact, negotiation scenarios and optimization problems
are often closely related, since there are many similarities in the ways both problem families
are defined and addressed (Sawaragi et al., 1985; Shi et al., 2006; Wierzbicki et al., 1993).
Therefore, some of the concepts studied in multiobjective optimization may be used in
negotiation.
In the context of a multi-attribute negotiation, complexity may depend at least on the number
of issues, the level of interdependency between the preferences on the issues, the size of the
issue domain, and the possibility of change over time of the negotiation context. The method
to describe preferences and the structural properties of the agents’ utility spaces also play a
fundamental role in the complexity of the negotiation scenario. This is specially true when
optimization techniques are used to find high utility regions within an agent’s utility space,
or to find deals among different agents. A constraint-based preference space, for instance,
may present discontinuities which make gradient based optimizers not applicable, while
differentiable utility functions contribute to a faster local optimization.
Therefore, to study complexity in negotiation scenarios, we may find useful to characterize
structural complexity of the agents’ utility spaces, and to this end we may benefit from existing
research on function characterization for optimization. In particular, some of the results
in the analysis of fitness landscapes in evolutionary computation are specially useful, since
they identify a set of landscape structural properties, such as modality (Horn & Goldberg,
1994), ruggedness, smoothness and neutrality (Vassilev et al., 2003), which are also interesting
regarding search complexity within the solution space in a negotiation scenario. Furthermore,
there are some techniques which allow to measure the complexity of a given space. Most
of the approaches we can find in the literature are based on the correlation between different
samples of the fitness function, like fitness distance correlation metrics (Tomassini et al., 2005), or
stochastic models representing the correlation structure of the space (Hordijk, 1995). A metric
which is easy to compute in most scenarios and allows to make quantitative evaluations
about the complexity of a fitness or utility landscape is correlation length or correlation distance.
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the negotiators should be considered as an integral part within the multiparty negotiation
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depend on several factors, like the cardinality of the solution space, the number of negotiating
agents, the number of issues under negotiation, the degree of interdependency between
the issues, and structural properties of the different agent preference landscapes, like
ruggedness, modality or correlation length (Vassilev et al., 2003). Specially challenging
are those scenarios involving highly rugged or highly auto-uncorrelated utility spaces,
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revealing too much information to their counterparts. Furthermore, mediated protocols allow
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to decouple agents’ individual objectives (normally, to maximize their profit) from the social
objective of maximizing social welfare.
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or to find deals among different agents. A constraint-based preference space, for instance,
may present discontinuities which make gradient based optimizers not applicable, while
differentiable utility functions contribute to a faster local optimization.
Therefore, to study complexity in negotiation scenarios, we may find useful to characterize
structural complexity of the agents’ utility spaces, and to this end we may benefit from existing
research on function characterization for optimization. In particular, some of the results
in the analysis of fitness landscapes in evolutionary computation are specially useful, since
they identify a set of landscape structural properties, such as modality (Horn & Goldberg,
1994), ruggedness, smoothness and neutrality (Vassilev et al., 2003), which are also interesting
regarding search complexity within the solution space in a negotiation scenario. Furthermore,
there are some techniques which allow to measure the complexity of a given space. Most
of the approaches we can find in the literature are based on the correlation between different
samples of the fitness function, like fitness distance correlation metrics (Tomassini et al., 2005), or
stochastic models representing the correlation structure of the space (Hordijk, 1995). A metric
which is easy to compute in most scenarios and allows to make quantitative evaluations
about the complexity of a fitness or utility landscape is correlation length or correlation distance.
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Correlation distance is defined as the minimum distance ψ which makes correlation fall
below a given threshold (usually 0.5). This measure gives an idea of the distance we can
move throughout the solution space while keeping a certain correlation between samples
(Manderick et al., 1991). Throughout this work, we will use the terms “correlated” or
“uncorrelated” to refer to utility spaces in terms of their correlation lengths.
(Klein et al., 2003) present the first negotiation protocols specific for complex preference
spaces. They propose a simulated annealing-based approach, a refined version based on
a parity-maintaining annealing mediator, and an unmediated version of the negotiation
protocol. Of great interest in this work are the positive results about the use of simulated
annealing as a way to regulate agent decision making, along with the use of an expressive
bid language to allow the mediator to improve its proposals. However, this expressiveness
is somewhat limited, with only four possible valuations which allow the mediator to decide
which contract to use as a parent for mutation, but not in which direction to mutate it. On
the other hand, the performed experiments only consider the bilateral negotiation scenario,
though authors claim that the multiparty generalization is simple. Finally, the family of
negotiation protocols they propose are specific for binary issues and binary dependencies.
Higher-order dependencies and continuous-valued issues, common in many real-world
contexts, are known to generate more challenging utility landscapes which are not considered
in their work.
(Luo et al., 2003) propose a fuzzy constraint based framework for multi-attribute negotiations.
In this framework a buyer agent defines a set of fuzzy constraints to describe its preferences.
The proposals of the buyer agent are a set of hard constraints which are extracted from the
set of fuzzy constraints. The seller agent responds with an offer or with a relaxation request.
The buyer then decides whether to accept or reject an offer, or to relax some constraints by
priority from the lowest to highest. In (Lopez-Carmona et al., 2006; 2007) an improvement to
Luo’s model is presented. They devise an expressive negotiation protocol where proposals
include a valuation of the different constraints, and seller’s responses may contain explicit
relaxation requests. It means that a seller agent may suggest the specific relaxation of one or
more constraints. The relaxation suggested by a seller agent is based on utility and viability
criteria, which improves the negotiation process. Though these constraint-based works model
discontinuous preference spaces, the operators used to compute utility and the utility spaces
defined yield monotonic preference spaces, which are far from the complex preference spaces
covered in our work.
Another interesting approach to solve the computational cost and complexity of negotiating
interdependent issues is to simplify the negotiation space. (Hindriks et al., 2006) propose a
weighted approximation technique to simplify the utility space. They show that for smooth
utility functions the application of this technique results in an outcome that closely matches
the outcome based on the original interdependent utility structure. The method is evaluated
for a number of randomly generated utility spaces with interdependent issues. Experiments
show that this approach can achieve reasonably good outcomes for utility spaces with
simple dependencies. However, an approximation error that deviates negotiation outcomes
from the optimal solutions cannot be avoided, and this error may become larger when the
approximated utility functions become more complex. Authors acknowledge as a necessary
future work to study which kind of functions can be approximated accurately enough using
this mechanism. Another limitation of this approach is that it is necessary to estimate a region
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of the utility space where the actual outcome is expected to be (i.e. it is assumed that the
region is known a priori by the agents).
In (Robu et al., 2005) utility graphs are used to model issue interdependencies for
binary-valued issues. Utility graphs are inspired by graph theory and probabilistic influence
networks to derive efficient heuristics for non-mediated bilateral negotiations about multiple
issues. The idea is to decompose highly non-linear utility functions in sub-utilities of clusters
of inter-related items. They show how utility graphs can be used to model an opponent’s
preferences. In this approach agents need prior information about the maximal structure of
the utility space to be explored. Authors argue that this prior information could be obtained
through a history of past negotiations or the input of domain experts. However, our approach
has the advantage that outcomes can be reached without any prior information and that it is
not restricted to binary-valued issues.
There are several proposals which employ genetic algorithms to learn opponent’s preferences
according to the history of the counter-offers based upon stochastic approximation. In
(Choi et al., 2001) a system based on genetic-algorithms for electronic business is proposed.
In this work the utility functions are restricted to take a product combination form (i.e. utility
of an outcome is the product of the utility values of the different issues). The objective function
used is based on the comparison of the changes of consecutive offers. Small changes of
an issue suggest that this issue is more important. For each new population, the protocol
enforces that the generated candidates cannot be better than the previous offer. Unlike other
negotiation models based on genetic algorithms, this proposal adapts to the environment by
dynamically modifying its mutation rate. (Lau et al., 2004) have also reported a negotiation
mechanism for non-mediated automated negotiations based on genetic algorithms. The
fitness function relies on three aspects: an agent’s own preference, the distance of a candidate
offer from the previous opponent’s offer, and time pressure. In this work agents’ preferences
are quantified by a linear aggregation of the issue valuations. However, rugged and
discontinuous preference spaces are not explored. In (Chou et al., 2007) a genetic algorithm is
proposed which is based on a joint elitism operation and a joint fitness operation. In the joint
elitism operation an agent stores the latest offers received from the opponent. The joint fitness
operation combines agent’s own utility function and euclidean distance to the opponent’s
offer. In this work two different negotiation scenarios are considered. In the first one utility
is defined as the weighted sum of the different issue values (i.e. issues are independent). The
second scenario defines a utility function where there is a master issue and a set of slave issues.
Utility is calculated as the weighted sum of the different issue values, but the weights of the
slave and master issues change according to the value of the master issue.
In (Yager, 2007) a mediated negotiation framework for multi-agent negotiation is presented.
This framework involves a mediation step in which the individual preference functions
are aggregated to obtain a group preference function. The main interest is focused on the
implementation of the mediation rule where they allow a linguistic description using fuzzy
logic. A notable feature of their approach is the inclusion of a mechanism rewarding the agents
for being open to alternatives other than simply their most preferred. The negotiation space
and utility values are assumed to be arbitrary (i.e. preferences can be uncorrelated). However,
the set of possible solutions is defined a priori and is fixed. Moreover, the preference function
needs to be provided to the mediation step in the negotiation process, and pareto-optimality
is not considered. Instead, a stopping rule is considered, which determines when the rounds
of mediation stop.
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according to the history of the counter-offers based upon stochastic approximation. In
(Choi et al., 2001) a system based on genetic-algorithms for electronic business is proposed.
In this work the utility functions are restricted to take a product combination form (i.e. utility
of an outcome is the product of the utility values of the different issues). The objective function
used is based on the comparison of the changes of consecutive offers. Small changes of
an issue suggest that this issue is more important. For each new population, the protocol
enforces that the generated candidates cannot be better than the previous offer. Unlike other
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second scenario defines a utility function where there is a master issue and a set of slave issues.
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This framework involves a mediation step in which the individual preference functions
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implementation of the mediation rule where they allow a linguistic description using fuzzy
logic. A notable feature of their approach is the inclusion of a mechanism rewarding the agents
for being open to alternatives other than simply their most preferred. The negotiation space
and utility values are assumed to be arbitrary (i.e. preferences can be uncorrelated). However,
the set of possible solutions is defined a priori and is fixed. Moreover, the preference function
needs to be provided to the mediation step in the negotiation process, and pareto-optimality
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(Fatima et al., 2009) analyze bilateral multi-issue negotiation involving nonlinear utility
functions. They consider the case where issues are divisible and there are time constraints in
the form of deadlines and discounts. They show that it is possible to reach Pareto-optimal
agreements by negotiating all the issues together, and that finding an equilibrium is not
computationally easy if the agents’ utility functions are nonlinear. In order to overcome
this complexity they investigate two solutions: approximating nonlinear utilities with
linear ones; and using a simultaneous procedure where the issues are discussed in
parallel but independently of each other. This study shows that the equilibrium can be
computed in polynomial time. An important part of this work is the complexity analysis
and estimated approximation error analysis performed over the proposed approximated
equilibrium strategies. Heuristic approaches have generally the drawback of the lack of
a solid mathematical structure which guarantees their viability, which raises the need of
an exhaustive experimental evaluation. An adequate complexity analysis and establishing
a bound over the approximation error contribute to give heuristic approaches part of the
technical soundness they usually lack. Among the limitations of the proposal, we can point
out that this work is focused on symmetric agents where the preferences are distributed
identically, and the utility functions are separable in nonlinear polynomials of a single
variable. This somewhat limits the complexity of the preference space.
Finally, combinatorial auctions (Giovannucci et al., 2010; Hunsberger & Grosz, 2000;
Sakurai et al., 2000; Sandholm, 2002; Volgenant, 2002; Xia et al., 2005) can enable large-scale
collective decision making in nonlinear domains, but only of a very limited type (i.e.
negotiations consisting solely of resource allocation decisions). Multi-attribute auctions,
wherein buyers advertise their utility functions, and sellers compete to offer the highest-utility
bid (Bichler et al., 1999; Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005; Teich et al., 2006) are also aimed at a
fundamentally limited problem (a purchase negotiation with a single buyer) and require full
revelation of preference information.
In summary, in the existing research nearly all the models which assume issue
interdependency rely on monotonic utility spaces, binary valued issues, low-order
dependencies, or a fixed set of defined a priori solutions. Simplification of the negotiation
space has also been reported as a valid approach for simple utility functions, but it cannot
be used with higher-order issue dependencies which make utility spaces very uncorrelated.
Therefore, new approaches are needed if automated negotiation is to be applied to settings
involving highly uncorrelated preference spaces. One of the most promising avenues for
research in this area is the use of mediated protocols, and the use of heuristics based on
optimization mechanisms to make these protocols converge to a suitable agreement. We will
see in the following some of these approaches, with special emphasis in the way they use
alternative social welfare notions to impact the final outcome of the negotiations.
2. An auction-based approach for negotiations in complex, constraint-based
utility spaces
In this section we describe a negotiation model specifically designed for complex utility
spaces, which was first described in (Marsa-Maestre et al., 2009). The model relies on the
use of a constraint-based agent preference structure, a mediated, auction-based interaction
protocol capable to support multiple iterations and expressive feedback at each iteration, and
a set of heuristic mechanisms for the negotiating agents and the mediator. For the purpose of
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Fig. 1. Example of a utility space with two issues and three constraints.
this chapter, we will focus on the iterative negotiation protocol and the mechanisms used for
deal identification at the mediator.
2.1 Constraint-based nonlinear utility spaces
Nonlinear agent preferences can be described by using different categories of functions, like
K-additive utility functions (Chevaleyre et al., 2004), bidding languages (Nisan, 2006), or
weighted constraints (Ito et al., 2008). In this section we focus on nonlinear utility spaces
generated by means of weighted constraints. In these cases, agents’ utility functions are
described by defining a set of constraints. Each constraint represents a region with one or
more dimensions, and has an associated utility value. The number of dimensions of the space
is given by the number of issues n under negotiation, and the number of dimensions of each
constraint must be lesser or equal than n. The utility yielded by a given potential solution
(contract) in the utility space for an agent is the sum of the utility values of all the constraints
that are satisfied by that contract. Figure 1 shows a very simple example of an agent’s utility
space for two issues and three constraints: a unary constraint C1 and two binary constraints
C2 and C3. The utility values associated to the constraints are also shown in the figure. In this
example, contract x would yield a utility value for the agent u(x) = 15, since it satisfies both
C1 and C2, while contract y would yield a utility value u(y) = 5, because it only satisfies C1.
More formally, we can define the issues under negotiation as a finite set of variables x =
{xi|i = 1, ..., n}, and a contract (or a possible solution to the negotiation problem) as a vector
s = {xsi |i = 1, ..., n} defined by the issues’ values. Issues take values from the domain of
integers [0, X].
Agent utility space is defined as a set of constraints C = {ck|k = 1, ..., l}. Each constraint
is given by a set of intervals which define the region where a contract must be contained to





i ] defines the minimum and maximum values for each issue to satisfy the
constraint. Each constraint ck has an associated utility value u(ck).
A contract s satisfies a constraint c if and only if xsi ∈ Ici ∀i. For notation simplicity, we denote
this as s ∈ x(ck), meaning that s is in the set of contracts that satisfy ck. An agent’s utility
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for a contract s is defined as u(s) = ∑ck∈C|s∈x(ck) u(ck), that is, the sum of the utility values of
all constraints satisfied by s. This kind of utility functions produces nonlinear utility spaces,
with high points where many constraints are satisfied, and lower regions where few or no
constraints are satisfied (Ito et al., 2008). For the purpose of this work, we make the following
additional assumptions, relaxing some of the common limitations of previous approaches,
which allows us to tackle more realistic scenarios:
• We assume that the number of issues and the domains of the issues are such that they make
exhaustive search within the utility space of the agents intractable.
• We assume that the utility spaces of an agent is highly uncorrelated, and so no a priori
assumptions may be made about where high utility contracts may be located. Therefore,
agents may need to resort to local nonlinear optimization techniques to identify such
high-utility contracts.
• We assume knowledge about other agent’s preferences not to be common (i.e. agents
do not know their opponent preference structures, neither they can compute opponent’s
utility for a given contract).
• We assume that the negotiation setting is competitive, and that agents may be unwilling to
reveal too much information about their preferences to the other negotiating agents.
The proposed negotiation protocol and decision mechanisms, which are described in the next
sections, are specifically designed to address this negotiation setting.
2.2 Expressive, iterative interaction protocol
In highly uncorrelated utility spaces, one of the main problems of basic auction-based
negotiation is that it usually relies on a one-shot protocol: agents send their bids to the
mediator, the mediator searches for solutions and the negotiation ends. If a solution has
been found, the negotiation is successful. Otherwise, the only possibility is to repeat the
process until it is successful. In scenarios where high-utility regions are “wide” this is hardly a
problem, since agent bids usually cover a wide range of the solution space, and the probability
for the mediator to find a successful deal is high. In highly uncorrelated utility spaces,
however, high utility regions agents send as bids tend to be narrower, and thus it is very likely
that a single iteration of the protocol achieves no solution. In these cases, it would be desirable
that agents had a way to “learn” from previous interactions to issue bids which are more likely
to result in a deal. For this to be possible, two mechanisms are needed: a mechanism for the
mediator to provide feedback to the agents, and a mechanism which allows the agents to use
this feedback in the generation of new bids.
Our proposal for an iterative, expressive protocol may be briefly described as consisting of the
following steps:
1. Bidding: Each agent Aj generates a set Bj with n
j
b bids. Each bid represents a region in
the solution space which, in general, contains only contracts the agent would accept as
solutions to the negotiation problem.
2. Deal Identification: The mediator employs a search method to find overlaps between agents’
bids. If a solution is found, the protocol ends.
3. Feedback: If no satisfying solution is found, the mediator creates feedback statements ρj for
each agent and distribute them.
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Fig. 2. State diagram of the protocol.
4. Adaptive Bidding: Each agent creates a new set of bids Bj′ taking into account the received
feedback. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated until a solution is found or a given limit is reached (be
it an amount of time or a number of iterations).
For the formal description of the interaction protocol, we have employed an specification
framework based on formal dialogue games (Amgoud et al., 2000; Hitchcock et al., 2001;
Lopez-Carmona, 2006; McBurney & Parsons, 2002), where the interaction protocol is modeled
by defining three key elements. A set of locutions establishes which communications are
permitted between the agents. A set of decision mechanisms allows agents to advance
through the different stages of the protocol and to invoke the different locutions as needed.
Finally, operational semantics indicates how the dialogue game evolves depending on the
outputs of the different mechanisms and the locutions exchanged by the agents. The detailed
specification of the protocol is beyond the scope of this discussion, and can be found in
(Marsa-Maestre, 2009).
For the purpose of this chapter, to have a clear understanding of the role of the different
elements within the protocol and the relationships between them will suffice. The dialogue
may be seen as a set of states, where these states are defined by the different mechanisms,
and where transition rules govern the transitions within the states when a certain locution
is passed between agents or a certain output is passed between different mechanisms of the
same agent. Figure 2 shows a state diagram which represents the link between transition
rules, decision mechanisms, and locutions. The states represent the decision mechanisms,
and the transitions are specified by the outputs of the mechanisms firing them and, in case of
transitions involving different agents, by the exchanged locutions.
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The protocol considers the existence of nine decision mechanisms: four for the negotiating
agents (labeled Ax in the diagram) and five for the mediator (labeled Mx). Mechanisms M1,
A1, M2, and M5 focus on the opening and closing of the negotiation dialogues, and are not
of much interest for this specific work. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we will assume
simple implementations for these mechanisms. On the other hand, mechanisms A2, A3, M3,
and M4 play key roles in the negotiation stage of the protocol, and will be further discussed
in the following section. Before addressing in detail the mechanisms directly related to the
negotiation stage, we will briefly review the different mechanisms considered by the protocol:
M1: Start Negotiation. Determines the initial feasibility of the negotiation. In the following,
we will assume that all negotiations proposed by the mediator are feasible, and thus this
mechanism will always yield as output feasible_negotiation.
A1: Assess Negotiation. Decides whether the negotiating agent participates or not in the
proposed negotiation. We will assume that not participating in the negotiation has zero
utility for the agent, and so it will always participate. Thus, the output of this mechanism
will always be enter_dialogue.
M2: Confirm Dialogue. Confirms the feasibility of the negotiation once the responses from all
agents have been received. Since the negotiation is defined as feasible in the output of the
mechanism M1: Start Negotiation and all agents are willing to participate in the dialog, the
output of this message will always be feasible_negotiation.
A2: Generate Bids. Generates a set of bids to send to the mediator. This mechanism, along
with mechanism A3: Assess Feedback, constitutes the core of the agent negotiation strategy.
Therefore, in the following sections we will address different strategies for bid generation.
M3: Identify Deals. Searches for solutions to the negotiation problem once the bids from the
different agents have been received. The deal identification strategy at the mediator greatly
influences important properties of the model such as social welfare maximization, deal
probability and performance.
M4: Generate feedback. Builds feedback statements sent to the negotiating agents to try to
influence the generation of new bids at each protocol iteration. This mechanisms influences
the ability of the model to refine the search for solutions in successive iterations.
A3: Assess Feedback. This mechanism complements the previous one in the task to provide
the model with the possibility for iterative improvement. It is used by negotiating agents
to generate a new set of bids at each protocol iteration, taking into account the feedback
received from the mediator.
A4: Assess Solution. Decides whether the negotiating agent accept or rejects a solution found
by the mediator. We will assume that negotiating agents have a reservation value which
remains unchanged during the negotiation. A negotiating agent will accept any solution
proposed by the mediator which is above its reservation value.
M5: Confirm Solution. Confirms the success or failure of a negotiation once the responses
from the agents have been received. We will assume that a negotiation is successful if all
negotiating agents accept the solution proposed by the mediator.
For the negotiation model to be complete, it is necessary to define the negotiation mechanisms
which will implement the agent strategies. Since this chapter is concerned mainly with
mediated approaches and their use of heuristic methods and alternative social welfare
notions, in the rest of this section we will focus in the mechanisms used to identify deals within
the mediator (M3). Mechanisms used for bidding can be found in (Lopez-Carmona et al.,
2010).
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2.3 A probabilistic deal identification mechanism
Scalability is identified as one of the main drawbacks in a bidding based negotiation protocol
(Ito et al., 2007). Once agents have placed their bids, the mediator performs an exhaustive
search for overlaps between the bids using a breadth-first algorithm with branch cutting. In a
worst case scenario, this means searching through a total of nnab bid combinations, where nb is
the number of bids per agent, and na is the number of negotiating agents. In the experiments,
the authors limit the number of combinations to 6, 400, 000. This means that, for 4 negotiating
agents, the maximum number of bids per agent is na
√
6400000 = 50. This limit becomes harder
as the number of agents increases. For example, for 10 agents, the limit is 4 bids per agent,
which drastically reduces the probability of reaching a deal. This is specially true for highly
uncorrelated utility spaces, where bids are narrower.
To address this scalability limitation, we propose to perform a probabilistic search in the
mediator instead of an exhaustive search. This means that the mediator will try a certain
number nbc of randomly chosen bid combinations, where nbc < n
na
b . In this way, nbc acts
as a performance parameter in the mediator, which limits the computational cost of the deal
identification phase. Of course, restricting the search for solutions to a limited number of
combinations may cause the mediator to miss good deals. Taking this into account, the
random selection of combinations should be biased to maximize the probability of finding
a good deal. Intuitively, in such complex scenarios, a mediator with no knowledge of the
agents’ preferences could try to achieve that by balancing the utility of the agents’ bids (to
maximize agent’s social welfare) and the volume of those bids (to maximize the probability of
a successful negotiation).
More formally, we may find mathematic expressions for the deal probability and the expected
utility in a negotiation using the auction-based protocol. The deduction of these expressions
can be found in (Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010). For the purpose of this section, the final
expressions will suffice. In particular, deal probability for a single run of the auction-based
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where ukl is the utility for the l-th bid of agent k. According to this expression, to maximize
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way bid utility and bid volume.
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We formally represent this through the following definitions:
Definition 1. Volume of a bid. The volume of a given region b within the solution space D is defined
as the cardinality of the set of contracts contained within the region defined by the bid.
v(b) = |r| , with b ⊂ D
Definition 2. Quality factor. The quality factor of a given region b within the solution space D (be
it a constraint or a bid) is defined as
Q0(b) = u(b) · v(b),
where u(b) and v(b) are, respectively, the utility and volume of the bid b.
Intuitively, it can be seen that the quality factor defined above allows an agent to balance bid
utility (to maximize its own benefit) and bid volume (to maximize deal probability). Taking
this into account, the parameter used to bias the random selection in the mechanism is Q0,
so that higher-Q0 bids have more probability of being selected for bid combinations at the
mediator.
The mechanism is formally shown in Algorithm 1. We can see that the number of analyzed
bid combinations is limited to nbc (1), and that the function combine_bids (...) selects the bid
combinations to analyze (2). Limiting bid combinations at the mediator allows us to remove
the limit on the bids issued by the agents, which increases the probability of finding good
potential deals. However, it may be convenient to keep a less strict limit in the number of bids
sent to the mediator, in order to keep communication load of the negotiation process within
reasonable bounds.
Algorithm 1: Probabilistic deal identification
Input:
A: set of negotiating agents;
na = |A|: number of negotiating agents
B: set of bids issued by every agent;
U: declared utilities for every agent’s bids
Q0: declared quality factors for every agent’s bids;
sw: social welfare function
nbc: maximum number of bid combinations at the mediator
Output:
s f : final potential deal
n = 0;
S = ∅;
1 while n < nbc do
2 s = combine_bids (A, na, B, U, Q0) ;
if s �= ∅ then
S = S ∪ s;
n = n + 1;
end
s f = arg {maxs∈S sw (s, U)};
The core of this mechanism from an strategic point of view is the probabilistic selection
function combine_bids (A, naB, U, Q0), which generates a bid combination selecting a bid from
each agent. This function is the one which ultimately determines which bid combinations are
tested at the mediator. Different algorithms may be used to generate these combinations.
Among the multiple possibilities, we have considered the following ones:
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• Uniform combination selection: The simplest approach is to make a totally random selection
of bids for each combination. Intuitively, the main drawback of this approach is that, as
discussed above, reducing the search space arbitrarily may lead us to discard high social
welfare solutions.
• Tournament selection of bid combinations: It seems reasonable to bias combination selection
by means of the quality factor Q, that is, making the selection favor bids with high quality
factor. A fairly straightforward way to do this is by means of tournament selection. For
each bid combination, a subset of nt bids is randomly drawn from each agent, and the bid
maximizing quality factor is selected from each subset to form the combination.
• Roulette selection of bid combinations: In this case, to select a bid for an agent j, a set of labels
Lj is created, where each label l ji corresponding to bid b
j
i is repeated a number of times









is generated for each agent j, and the bid corresponding
to label kj-th in set Lj is selected. In this way, the probability for each bid to be selected is
proportional to its quality factor Q0.
• Ordinal probabilistic selection: For each agent j, the bid set Bj is sorted in quality factor




is drawn from a probability distribution favoring lower numbers, and the kj-th bid is
selected. Some probability distribution functions which may be used are the negative
binomial distribution, the geometric distribution (a particular case of the previous one),
or the positive normal distribution.
As we can easily see, by using this strategy for deal identification, the mediator is favoring
those bids combinations which maximize the sum of quality factors, rather than maximizing
the sum of utilities. In this sense, the mediator is using an alternative form of social
welfare, which not only cares about individual agent utility, but also about deal probability.
Experiments performed in (Marsa-Maestre et al., 2009) show that using this Q-based social
welfare notion allows for better performance and scalability in complex utility spaces.
However, the protocol and deal identification mechanism are prone to some strategic stability
problems, which may make individually rational agents agents to try to bid narrow, high
utility bids to maximize their expected utility in case of agreement, but severely impacting
deal probability. These stability issues can also be lowered by means of alternative social
welfare, as we will see in the following section.
2.4 Addressing stability issues through the use of alternative social welfare notions
In (Marsa-Maestre et al., 2009), once a set of viable solutions has been found, the mediator
chooses as the solution the one which maximizes social welfare. However, as discussed in
(Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010), when the mediator uses the classic social welfare option an
agent’s attitude greatly influences the final utility value for this agent if an agreement is
reached. Once all valid intersections have been found, the final outcome is selected using
a function which depends on the utility values the outcome gives to the agents. Selfish,
risk-willing or highly competitive agents, which give more importance to utility against
volume in the bid generation process, will have, on average, higher utility bids, and thus
their expected utility conditioned to the existence of a deal will be higher. Taking this into
account, the preferred strategy of an agent may be to take a selfish attitude, as we inferred
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deal probability. These stability issues can also be lowered by means of alternative social
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in the previous section. The problem is that, in complex utility spaces, having all agents
taking such attitudes could lead to very narrow offers at the mediator, which would make
deal probability (given by Equation 1) decrease drastically. This may lead the protocol to
negotiation failures, with zero social welfare, thus resulting in situations of infinite Expected
Price of Anarchy (Papadimitriou, 2001) , turning the negotiation model unstable.
To improve the strategic stability of the negotiation, the mechanisms should be modified to
incentivize the adoption of socially optimal strategies. A feasible way to do that is to modify
the social welfare notion at the mediator to reward in the selection of the final solution to those
agents which have made wider bids. This can be done by using a generalized or asymmetrical
version of the Nash product, similar to the ones used in (Kalai, 1977) to model agents’ power
of commitment. In particular, we propose a modification of the Nash product which we have
called weighted product by average volume:
Definition 3. Weighted product by average volume The weighted product by average
volume of a solution to a negotiation problem among na agents is the product of the utilities the
solution gives to every agent i, weighting each utility ui (s) by an adjustment factor equal to the ratio
between the average volume of the bids issued by the agent v̄i and the maximum average volume of the








max1≤j≤na v̄j , (3)
where ui (s) is the utility of the solution s for agent i, and v̄i is the average volume of the bids issued by
agent i.
In this way, the utility for those agents who have issued widest bids (which, on average, will
be the ones using more socially oriented strategies) will be given more weight in the selection
of the final solution than those of the more selfish agents. An interesting effect of this metric is
that a rational agent could issue some high volume, low utility bids to try to compensate for
its high-utility, low volume bids. To counter this effect, we propose to consider bid utility and
bid volume jointly, using a product weighted by average quality factor:
Definition 4. Weighted product by average quality factor The weighted product by average
quality factor of a solution to a negotiation problem among na agents is the product of the utilities that
solution gives to every agent i, weighting each utility ui (s) by an adjustment factor equal to the ratio
between the average quality factor of the bids issued by the agent Q̄i0 and the maximum average quality












i is the average quality factor of the bids issued by agent i.
In (Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010), experiments were conducted for the different social welfare
notions, comparing the utility obtained by a selfish agent, using its individually optimal
strategy, against the utility obtained by the agent when using the corresponding socially
optimal strategy, assuming the rest of the agents are also using that socially optimal strategy.
Experiments were made for utility spaces with different correlation lengths. Furthermore,
since the model is designed for multi agent negotiations, experiments were performed
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for different number of selfish agents, thus studying the effect of possible coalitions or
coincidences. Results showed that the mechanism based on average volume provided not
enough improvement in stability. For all cases median utility results were higher for selfish
agents, thus maintaining the incentive for agents to deviate from the socially optimal strategy.
The mechanism based on average quality factor, however, significantly mitigated the gain for
selfish agents, removing the incentive to choose the previously individually optimal strategy.
Another threat to mechanism stability is strategic revelation of information. In incomplete
information scenarios (Jonker et al., 2007), since the agents’ beliefs about the preferences of a
given agent may influence the decision mechanisms they use, an agent may use as a strategy
to lie about its own preferences in order to manipulate the decision mechanisms of the rest
of the agents to its own benefit. This raises an additional concern to mechanism design
(Weiss, 1999). It would be desirable to design protocols which are not prone to be manipulated
through insincere revelation of information. Incentive-compatibility is defined as the property
of a negotiation mechanism which makes telling the truth the best strategy for any agent,
assuming the rest of the agents also tell the truth.
In the negotiation model we are dealing with, information revealed to the mediator is the set
of agents’ bids. These bids represent regions within the solution space. Each offer has an
associated utility value, a volume, and an associated quality factor value. Since bid volume is
directly related to the region represented by the bid, it does not seem feasible to fake it, since
it can be easily checked by the mediator. Quality factor may be faked, but since the mediator
is very likely to recompute it, this strategy is also harmless. Finally, agents may fake bid
utility. Insincere information revelation about bid utility may generally occur in two ways:
exaggerating upward or downward the utility values of all bids, or exaggerating the utility
values of some bids with respect to the others. Exaggerating all bids is not profitable with
the proposed deal identification mechanisms, since bid selection at the mediator is performed
independently for each agent. This means that the bids from different agents do not compete
among each other to be selected as part of a solution. In contrast, the different bids of a single
agent compete among themselves. Taking this into account, an agent could try to exaggerate
the utility value of its preferred bids, thus trying to increase the probability of the mediator
choosing those preferred bids to form deals. As far as social welfare is concerned, this is a
problem if the set of exaggerated bids is small with respect to the total set of bids, since that
would reduce the number of effective bids considered by the mediator, thus reducing deal
probability.
Therefore, we seek for mechanisms which counter this effect, incentivizing sincere revelation
of information. A possibility to achieve this is to normalize the utility values assigned by
the agents to their bids, thus lowering the absolute differences in utility. We propose three
different possibilities regarding utility normalization:
• Normalization to maximum utility : obtained by dividing each agent’s bid utility by the







Using this normalization mechanism we can avoid the manipulation of the final deal
by exaggerating upwards the utility values of the preferred offers. It does not prevent,
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however, downward exaggerations, that is, to assign an extremely low value to the bids
which are less profitable for the agent.
• Bounded maximum-minimum normalization: Attempts to prevent the manipulation of the
negotiation model through upwards or backwards exaggerations. It is given by the
expression

















and u�min and u
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max are parameters












between the utilities of an agent’s bids.
• Ordinal normalization: obtained by ordering the different bids of an agent according to their
utility or quality factor, and mapping this order to a monotonically increasing succession
of utility values, regardless of the original utility values. For instance, if B is the set of
bids for an agent, in ascendent order of utility, and taking the arithmetic succession s =
{1, 2, . . . , nB} as the mapping function, the normalized bid utility values would be of the
form
un (bi) = si = i.
To evaluate the effect of the described mechanisms over the incentive-compatibility of the
model, in (Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010) we also conducted experiments comparing the utility
obtained by an insincere agent with the utility obtained being sincere, assuming the rest of
the agents are sincere. The behavior of the insincere agent was modeled by exaggerating
the utility of a portion of the agent’s highest utility bids. We considered different degrees of
exaggeration for the insincere agent: the insincere agent exaggerated 75%, 50%, 25% and 12.5%
of its bids. Results showed that all proposed normalization techniques reduced the incentive
for the insincere agent to exaggerate, but only bounded maximum-minimum normalization
made the expected gain for the insincere agent negligible, thus effectively removing the
incentive to exaggerate, improving incentive-compatibility of the model.
3. Using social welfare to incentivize different consensus policies
So far we have seen how social welfare notions may be used to incentivize different kind
of behaviors from the negotiating agents. However, social welfare notions can also be used
to directly influence the negotiation outcome, looking for specific kinds of agreements. In
(Hoz et al., 2011), a consensus policy mediated framework (CPMF) is defined for negotiations
with complex utility spaces. The negotiation framework is based on the use of a mediator,
which iterates through a series of contracts trying to optimize social welfare throughout
the use of Mesh-adaptive Generalized Pattern Search (Lewis et al., 2000) and an iterative,
expressive protocol which gathers the different negotiating agents valuations for the contracts
in the mesh. This framework is specially interesting for the scope of this chapter, because
the framework explicitly allows the mediator to pursue optimization objectives different than
classic social welfare, thus allowing for the enforcement of different consensus policies.
The most widespread consensus policy found in the automated negotiation literature is
social welfare maximization, which suggests desire to satisfy all the agents. However,
the requirement to satisfy all the agents may not be suitable for multi-agent preference
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aggregation, or simply the system may need to implement more sophisticated forms of
aggregation.
We propose to use other mediation rules to improve the negotiation processes where either a
quorum is not necessary or simply such quorum is not possible. For example, a solution may
be acceptable if most of the agents support it. To incorporate these notions into our negotiation
framework we will use a more general class of aggregation rules. The idea is to use a quantifier
guided aggregation, which allows a natural language expression of the quantity of agents that
need to agree on an acceptable solution. As we shall see the Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA)
operator (Yager, 1996) will provide a tool to model this kind of softer mediation rule.
3.1 OWA operators
An aggregation operator M : Sn → G, (S, G ∈ [0, 1]) is called an OWA operator of dimension n
if it has an associated weighting vector W = [w1w2 . . . wn] such that wt ∈ [0, 1] and ∑nt=1 wt =
1 and where M(S1, . . . , Sn) = ∑nt=1 wtbt where bt is the tth largest element of the aggregates
{S1, . . . , Sn}.
Note that in the definition of OWA we have used the notation M to identify the aggregation
operator with the mediation rule, Sn to make reference to the preferences of the agents, and G
to define the group preference. In the OWA aggregation the weights are not directly associated
with a particular argument but with the ordered position of the arguments. If ind is an
index function such that ind(t) is the index of the tth largest argument, then we can express
M(S1, . . . , Sn) = ∑nt=1 wtSind(t). It can be shown that OWA aggregation has the following
properties:
1. Commutativity: The indexing of the arguments is irrelevant
2. Monotonicity: If Si ≥ Ŝi for all i then M(Si, . . . , Sn) ≥ M(Ŝi, . . . , Ŝn)
3. Idempotency: M(S, . . . , S) = S
4. Boundedness: Maxi [Si] ≥ M(Si, . . . , Sn) ≥ Mini[Si]
Under these conditions the OWA operator is a mean operator. The form of the aggregation
is dependent upon the associated weighting vector. We have a number of special cases of
weighting vector are worth noting. The vector W∗ defined such that w1 = 1 and wt = 0 for
all t �= 1 gives us the aggregation Maxi[Si]. Thus, it provides the largest possible aggregation.
The vector W∗ defined such that wn = 1 and wt = 0 for all t �= 1 gives the aggregation




i=1 Si. Finally, an interesting family of OWA operators are the E-Z OWA operators. There
are two families. In the first family we have wt = 1/q for t = 1 to q, and wt = 0 for t = q + 1 to
n. Here we are taking the average of the q largest arguments. The other family defines wt = 0
for t = 1 to q, and wt = 1n−q for t = q + 1 to n. We can see that this operator can provide a
softening of the original min and max mediation rules by modifying q.
3.2 Quantifier guided aggregation
In the preceding, we have seen how the OWA operators can be used to compute the group
preference for different alternatives. However, our aim is to define consesus policies in
the form of a linguistic agenda for our mediation mechanisms. For example, the mediator
should make decisions regarding the exploration of the negotiation space, i.e. expansion and
contraction of the mesh, following mediation rules like
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however, downward exaggerations, that is, to assign an extremely low value to the bids
which are less profitable for the agent.
• Bounded maximum-minimum normalization: Attempts to prevent the manipulation of the
negotiation model through upwards or backwards exaggerations. It is given by the
expression
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Most agents must be satisfied by the contract, at least α agents must be satisfied by the contract,
many agents must be satisfied, . . .
The above statements are examples of quantifier guided aggregations. (Zadeh, 1983) suggested
a formal representation of these linguistic quantifiers using fuzzy sets. He suggested that
any relative linguistic quantifier can be expressed as a fuzzy subset Q of the unit interval
I = [0, 1]. In this representation for any proportion y ∈ I, Q(y) indicates the degree to
which y satisfies the concept expressed by the term Q. In most applications of the quantifier
guided aggregation we use a special case class of these liguistic quantifiers, called Regular
Increasing Monotone (RIM) quantifiers. These types of quantifiers have the property that as
more agents are satisfied our overall satisfaction can’t decrease. Formally, these quantifiers
are characterized in the following way: 1) Q(0) = 0, 2) Q(1) = 1 and 3) Q(x) ≥ Q(y) if
x > y. Examples of this kind of quantifier are all, most, many, at least α. Two examples of RIM
quantifiers are all which is represented by Q∗ where Q∗(1) = 1 and Q∗(x) = 0 for all x �= 1,
and any which is defined as Q∗(0) = 0 and Q∗(x) = 1 for all x �= 0.
The question now is how to obtain the OWA operator to satisfy a quantifier guided
aggregation. Again assume we have a collection of n agents. These agents have
their preferences represented as fuzzy subsets over the set of alternatives in the mesh
{S1(x+o(k)), . . . , Sn(x+o(k))}. Under the quantifier guided mediation approach a group
mediation protocol is expressed in terms of a linguistic quantifier Q indicating the proportion
of agents whose agreement if necessary for a solution to be acceptable. The basic form of the
mediation rule in this approach is that Q agents must be satisfied by the contract, where Q is
a quantifier.
The formal procedure used to implement this mediation rule is described in the following. The
quantifier Q is used to generate an OWA weighting vector W of dimension n. This weighting
vector is then used in an OWA aggregation to determine the group support for the contract.
For each contract in the mesh the argument of this OWA aggregation is the degree of support
for that contract by each of the agents, Si(xej (k)), i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, the process used in the
quantifier guided aggregation is as follows:
1. Use Q to generate a set of OWA weights, w1, . . . , wn.
2. For each contract xej(k) in x+o(k) calculate the overall group support G(xej(k)) =
M(S1(xej (k)), . . . , Sn(xej (k))).
The procedure used for generating the weights from the quantifier is to divide the unit interval





)− Q( t − 1
n
) for t = 1, . . . , n .
Because of the nondecreasing nature of Q it follows that wt ≥ 0. Furthermore from the
regularity of Q, Q(1) = 1 and Q(0) = 0, it follows that ∑t wt = 1. Thus we can see that
the weights generated are an acceptable class of OWA weights.
In Figure 3 we show an example of a RIM linguistic quantifier and illustrate the process of
determining the weights from the quantifier. We see that the weights depend on the number
of agents as well as the form of Q. In Figure 4 we show the functional form for the quantifiers
all, any, Q∗, Q∗, at least α percent, linear quantifier, piecewise QZβ and piecewise QZα .
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Fig. 4. Functional form of typical quantifiers: all, any, at least, linear, piecewise linear QZβ
and piecewise linear QZα .
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For each contract in the mesh the argument of this OWA aggregation is the degree of support
for that contract by each of the agents, Si(xej (k)), i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, the process used in the
quantifier guided aggregation is as follows:
1. Use Q to generate a set of OWA weights, w1, . . . , wn.
2. For each contract xej(k) in x+o(k) calculate the overall group support G(xej(k)) =
M(S1(xej (k)), . . . , Sn(xej (k))).
The procedure used for generating the weights from the quantifier is to divide the unit interval
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n
) for t = 1, . . . , n .
Because of the nondecreasing nature of Q it follows that wt ≥ 0. Furthermore from the
regularity of Q, Q(1) = 1 and Q(0) = 0, it follows that ∑t wt = 1. Thus we can see that
the weights generated are an acceptable class of OWA weights.
In Figure 3 we show an example of a RIM linguistic quantifier and illustrate the process of
determining the weights from the quantifier. We see that the weights depend on the number
of agents as well as the form of Q. In Figure 4 we show the functional form for the quantifiers
all, any, Q∗, Q∗, at least α percent, linear quantifier, piecewise QZβ and piecewise QZα .
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Fig. 4. Functional form of typical quantifiers: all, any, at least, linear, piecewise linear QZβ
and piecewise linear QZα .
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The quantifiers all, any and at least α describe the consensus policy using a natural language
verbal description. However, more generally any function Q : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that Q(x) ≥
Q(y) for x ≥ y, Q(1) = 1 and Q(0) = 0 can be seen to be an appropriate form for generating
mediation rules or consensus policies. Thus there are two techniques to generating these
quantifier based mediation rules. One possibility is to start with a linguistic expression and
then obtain Q. The second approach is to allow the mediation rule to be directly expressed
in terms of a function Q. One important characteristic of this second method is that we can
easily introduce into our mediation a number of formal properties that are not very easily
expressed using a verbal description of the quantifier. The linear quantifier Q(y) = y for
instance generates wt = 1/n, and thus, all the agents get the same weight. The QZβ quantifier
it is required that at least β agents are satisfied to initiate a Q linear improvement. QZα initiates
the Q linear improvement with the first satisfied agent, and once there are α agents satisfied
there is no improvement in Q if more agents are satisfied.
One feature which distinguishes the different types of mediation rules is the power of an
individual agent to eliminate an alternative. For example, in the case of all this power is
complete. In order to capture this idea the Value Of Individual Disapproval (VOID)




measures this power. For the all, any, at least α and linear quantifiers the VOID measures




2 ) and therefore
VOID(QZβ) ∈ [0.5, 1]. The QZα quantifier gets VOID(QZα) = α2 and VOID(QZα) ∈ [0, 0.5].
Another family of quantifiers are those defined by Qp(y) = yp for p > 0. In this case
VOID(Qp) = 1 −
∫ 1
0 r













For Qp we see that as p increases we get closer to the min and that as p gets closer to zero we
get the max.
3.3 Impact of consensus policies on automated negotiations
In (Hoz et al., 2011), we performed experiments to test the performance of the protocol under
a proof of concept scenario and a complex negotiation scenario for 5 different consensus
policies defined by the corresponding VOID degrees: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.95, using the
quantifier Qp(y) = yp. We also defined a contrast experiment where the consensus policy
based mediation process is deactivated, such that the group preference evaluation is limited
to compute the sum of agents’ valuations for a given contract (i.e. the winner contract is that
with the highest sum of valuations), which corresponds to classic social welfare. Experiments
showed that social welfare maximization tends to achieve poorer agreements in complex
utility spaces, while consensus policies which try to satisfy only a subset of the agents achieve
higher satisfaction degrees for the agents. Using different consensus policies may allow,
for instance, to perform simultaneous partial agreements among subsets of the negotiating
agents, which may be of key importance in some scenarios, like group formation negotiations.
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4. Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have studied how different notions of social welfare may be used to
influence the outcome of mediated negotiations. First, we have presented a model for
automated negotiation with complex, constraint based utility spaces, where using social
welfare notions which take into account both bid utility and deal probability provide an
improvement of the performance and scalability of the negotiation protocol as the complexity
of the utility space increases. Results show that there is a significant advantage in using the
quality factor Q0 and the proposed mechanisms in highly uncorrelated utility spaces, both in
terms of optimality and failure rate. We have also seen how social welfare notions can address
strategic issues within our model, allowing to address important problems such as stability
and incentive compatibility.
The model definition has been divided into three parts: the agent preference model, the
interaction protocol and the decision mechanisms. To describe the agent preference model
we have chosen a representation based on weighted constraints, since this allows to easily
generate utility spaces of adjustable complexity, which is an advantage for the evaluation of
the proposed mechanisms. Regarding the interaction protocol, an auction-based, expressive,
iterative approach has been chosen. The use of the mediator allows to reduce information
revelation between negotiating agents, and also facilitates to separate the individual agent
strategies (which for rational agents tend to be maximize their own profit) from the social
strategies. The interaction protocol is closely related to the one-shot, auction-based protocol
described in (Ito et al., 2007), with the difference that our model considers the possibility
to perform multiple iterations and provides the mediator with expressive capabilities to
send feedback to the agents at each iteration, in order to refine their bids. There are other
works in the literature suggesting the use of expressive negotiation protocols in multi-agent
negotiations. (Li et al., 2009b; Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010; Marsa-Maestre et al., 2008) use
gradient information to bias the search for solutions in linear unmediated negotiation, and
(Lopez-Carmona et al., 2007) uses relax requirements in bilateral buyer-seller negotiations.
Finally, we have explored the hypothesis that the consensus type by which an agreement
meets in some specific manner the concerns of all the negotiators should be considered in the
construction of multiparty negotiation protocols. We argue that there exist situations where
an unanimous agreement is not possible or simply the rules imposed by the system may not
seek such unanimous agreement. Thus, we have used a particular aggregation of the agent
preferences by the mediator, which allows to define different social welfare notions (which we
call consensus policies) based on OWA and quantifier guided aggregation. Results show that
CPMF efficiently manages negotiations following predefined consensus policies and solves
situations where unanimous agreements are not viable.
Though the conducted experiments have yielded satisfactory results, there is still plenty of
research to be done in this area. We believe that the results presented opens the door to a new
set of negotiation policies where social welfare notions, be it as behavior adherence metrics
or as consensus policies, will play an important role. We are also interested in dynamic
adjustments for the social welfare notions, so that at different steps in the negotiation the
consensus policies may be adapted to the specific negotiation dynamics. Finally, the challenge
of enforcing alternative social welfare notions without the aid of a mediator still remains open.
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The presence of long-lasting conflicts in situations where reaching an agreement would benefit
all parties is a pervasive phenomenon. This paradoxical fact, pointed out by Hicks (1932) in
the context of strikes, has especially serious consequences when nations are engaged in war.
One of the most common sources of conflict is bargaining over a territory, present in both
secessionist movements as in international disputes1. This chapter aims to provide a rationale
to the "Hicks paradox" in a context where two countries are engaged in open conflict for a
territory. Although termination of the conflict (i.e. reaching a negotiated outcome) improves
the welfare of both parties, it is shown that when bargainers act rationally, the probability that
the conflict persists over time is positive.
There are two main ways in which the inefficiencies associated to delay in bargaining
are explained from a rational choice perspective: asymmetric information and dynamic
commitment problems2. The former invokes the existence of some sort of incomplete
information in the bargaining environment. For instance, states might prefer fighting instead
of achieving a peaceful settlement when there is uncertainty about the other’s cost of fighting.
The latter resorts to dynamic commitment problems whereby the players may face incentives
to renege on agreements. Our contribution belongs to the first category.
We propose a game-theoretic approach to understand the relationship between conflict, social
welfare and the likelihood that a negotiation process emerges. Although the problem we
tackle here is applicable to several bargaining contexts, for expositional purposes we conduct
our analysis through the example of an international dispute over territory3. In contrast
with the standard view of conflict as a bargaining tool (where the threat of war enhances
the bargaining power of the parties), we consider conflict as the status quo, and then focus
on the strategic elements that influence conflict termination. Our contribution is then very
related to the work of Wittman (1979), who envisions the end of war as a rational process.
The key element in our approach is that an inefficient outcome may arise as a consequence
of the parties’ ability to make public statements. When engaged in conflict, strong public
pronouncements against the other’s territorial claims undermine the possibilities of reaching
a mutually beneficial agreement. Why would then the parties make such statements? Our
1 For a survey of the theoretical work on bargaining and war, see Powell (2002).
2 See Fearon (1995).
3 Other contexts where our analysis would apply are: bargaining between a buyer and a seller, firm-union
negotiations, settlements out of court in legal disputes, etc.
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our analysis through the example of an international dispute over territory3. In contrast
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view is that countries use public claims as a rational strategy to better their position in a future
negotiation process.
The declaration of a position as an irreversible commitment4 is used as a tactical approach to
create a more advantageous bargaining environment. The politician who makes the claim
is implicitly committed with the public to fulfill the terms of the pronouncement. Such
statements are effective as they have the power to bind oneself. As Schelling (1956) argued:
When national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of
potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they seem often to create a
bargaining position by public statements, statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permit
no concessions to be made. If a binding public opinion can be cultivated, and made evident to the other
side, the initial position can thereby be made visibly "final." p. 287.
We construct a formal model in which two agents bargain about how to divide the [0, 1]
interval (territory). There are two possibilities: either a negotiation process emerges and the
interval is divided according to a certain division rule, or the negotiation process does not take
place, and the countries must face conflict one more period. In the former case, the territory
is divided according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. If pre-bargaining public
statements are “too far” from each other, negotiations don’t start. Statements are represented
by numbers belonging to [0, 1]. We define a threshold T, whose value is uncertain to the
parties, to account for the distance about claims. If such a distance is above T, then neither
party is willing to negotiate. Uncertainty about T reflects the parties’ lack of information
about each other’s willingness to make concessions.
Countries are engaged in a game in which extreme claims lower the probability of a negotiated
outcome, but they also better their bargaining position in case a pacific settlement is to
be reached. The players must then calculate rationally their strategies in the absence of
information about the realization of the threshold T. We are posing a situation in which there
is a risk-return trade off between aggressive claims and diplomatic efforts (concessions) that
increase the likelihood of a negotiated outcome. Faced with this trade-off, the players’ optimal
strategy includes making statements that involve in some cases persistence of the conflict.
In order to achieve this result, we first characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibrium vector
of public statements. We find that there exists a set of parameters under which the conflict
continues with positive probability at equilibrium. Remarkably, this probability turns out
to be a non monotone function of the conflict costs. For low enough costs, the probability
of conflict is decreasing, then it reaches a minimum at a certain point and when costs go
beyond that point, it increases and converges asymptotically to a constant value. From this
pattern we can extract some conclusions. First, lowering the conflict costs may increase the
probability of conflict if such costs are low enough. Second, when conflict costs are sufficiently
high, variations on them have a negligible effect on the likelihood that a negotiation process
emerges.
The view of conflict termination presented here complements the usual approach to
bargaining and wars, whereby investing resources in military weapons is used as a credible
signal by countries wishing to convey certain private information to their opponents5. In our
4 Muthoo (1996) shows how commitments which can be reversed at a cost affect the players’ "share of
the cake" at equilibrium.
5 As in Kennan and Wilson (1993), delay can also be considered as a signal to convey private information
credibly.
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model, statements are costless6, but they entail consequences that affect the players’ welfare.
The players do not send revealing signals, although the strategic process that precedes
negotiation is characterized by imperfect information. A threshold whose value is uncertain
is introduced to account for all pieces of information that condition the likelihood of a pacific
settlement and are not perfectly known to both parties. In this informational environment, we
are able to characterize a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic model that incorporates
the main elements of our analysis. Section 3 characterizes the generalized Nash bargaining
solution assumed to prevail if negotiations are held. Section 4 is devoted to compute the
statements made by both countries in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 5
investigates the welfare consequences of the equilibrium play of the countries, paying special
attention to the relationship between the conflict costs and the likelihood of a negotiation
process to emerge. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
We consider a dynamic infinite horizon model in which two countries7, L and R, are in conflict
over a piece of land of size 1. At any given period, the conflict can be resolved through
negotiation, or it can persist at least one more period. Formally, the players face a problem
consisting on how to reach an agreement about a division of the interval [0, 1]. This situation
is repeated every period until an agreement is reached.
At the beginning of each period, countries have the ability to make public statements about
their respective territory claims. After the statements are made, two possibilities emerge:
Either a negotiation process takes place, or the conflict continues. If the positions publicly
announced are "too far" from each other, then no negotiation process starts, and each party
i = L, H faces conflict costs Hi. This situation might occur, for instance, if pre bargaining
statements made by country L are regarded as unacceptable by country R.
The conflict cost is a parameter that influences the countries’ welfare and hence affects
their behavior. It reflects the resources lost in the conflict (guns, lives, etc.), or it can even
be interpreted as the cost of a delay in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Unlike
Sanchez-Pagés (2009) and Cramton and Tracy (1992), we consider that countries cannot choose
the intensity of the dispute (and hence, cannot affect the conflict costs).
The countries’ utilities after an agreement is reached are linear and given by uL(y) = θLy
and uR(y) = θR (1 − y), where y ∈ [0, 1] denotes the piece of land that goes to country L if
the territorial status quo is modified through negotiation, and θi denotes country’s i = L, R
valuation of the territory gained. It is implicitly assumed that there is no initial owner of the
land. Therefore, the status quo refers to a situation in which the share of territory possessed
by each country is zero.
We analyze the strategic incentives faced by the conflicting parties before the possibility of
negotiations arises. In particular, we consider that countries use the tactical approach of
making public statements on y with the aim of creating a bargaining position. Let xi ∈ [0, 1]
be the public statement made by country i = L, R, where xL is the territory claim made by L
and 1 − xR represents the territory claim of country R.
6 Croson et. al (2003) show through experiments that cheap talk in bargaining games have real effects,
both in the short and in the long run.
7 We use the terms "countries", "players" or "parties" indistinticly throughout the chapter.
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view is that countries use public claims as a rational strategy to better their position in a future
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4 Muthoo (1996) shows how commitments which can be reversed at a cost affect the players’ "share of
the cake" at equilibrium.
5 As in Kennan and Wilson (1993), delay can also be considered as a signal to convey private information
credibly.
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land. Therefore, the status quo refers to a situation in which the share of territory possessed
by each country is zero.
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We define a threshold T, such that if xL − xR > T, negotiations don’t take place and conflict
continues. If xL − xR ≤ T, a bargaining process takes place whose final outcome is assumed
to be given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. In case negotiations don’t start,
the conflict is ongoing and each country i faces a cost Hi during the present period. At the
beginning of the next period, countries can make again public statements thus opening the
possibility of a negotiation in that period. The discount factor between periods is δ < 1.
We denote by Wi the expected utility of country i = L, R at the beginning of period t, and
usually refer to it as the social welfare. As long as all periods are identical, and we consider
an infinite time horizon, the game that starts in period t is identical to the game that starts in
period t + 1. This allows us to truncate the infinite horizon game and restrict our analysis to
the equilibrium strategies of any given period (say t). The equilibrium payoff of country i will
also be Wi at the beginning of period t + 1. Hence, using the discount factor between periods
we are able to derive endogenously the stationary equilibrium value of Wi. For notational
simplicity and wherever there is no risk of confusion, we omit time subscripts throughout the
chapter.
It is useful to define the utility achieved by country i = L, R, in case the conflict is prolonged
for n periods. This utility is given by:





Hi + δnWi. (1)
The utility din represents the discounted conflict costs during n periods plus the discounted
expected utility at the beginning of period t + n + 1. Observe that din is strictly decreasing in





1 − δ Hi + δ
n ln δWi < 0, (2)
since δ < 1 and ln δ < 0. A quick inspection to Eq. (1) reveals that din(Hi, Wi) depends
negatively on Hi and positively on Wi.
A summary of the situation analyzed can be stated as follows: if at the beginning of period
t a negotiation process starts, the parties have the possibility of reaching an agreement on
the division of land. In the event that negotiations do not start (probably because the public
statements are too demanding), the conflict continues one more period and the payoff faced
by each country is di1(Hi, Wi) = −Hi + δWi, where δWi is the discounted value of the
expected utility at the beginning of period t + 1. In case negotiations take place, the final
outcome obtained corresponds to the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution8. This is a
classical axiomatic solution to bargaining problems, which we refer specifically to our context
in the next section.
3. Generalized Nash bargaining solution
We denote as αL and αR the bargaining power of countries L and R, with αL + αR = 1.
If a negotiation process takes place, either an agreement is reached, or negotiations end up
with a disagreement that involves returning to conflict again. A bargaining breakdown once
the parties have engaged in negotiations is a serious negative outcome. We assume that the
8 See Binmore (1987), Muthoo (1999) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a detailed discussion of the
Nash bargaining solution.
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consequence of such a breakdown is to suffer conflict along n more periods, until the parties
in conflict are again ready for dialogue. The number of periods of conflict, n, represents a
measure of the disagreement costs once the negotiations are underway.
The pair (dLn(HL, WL), dRn(HR, WR)) is the disagreement or threat point9 in this bargaining
problem. The generalized Nash bargaining solution is then given by:
ỹ(αL, αR) = arg max{y}
[y − dLn]αL [(1 − y)− dRn]αR .
Solving the maximization problem stated above yields the following outcome:
ỹ(αL, αR) = αL − αLdRn + αRdLn. (3)
The share of territory that goes to country L, ỹ(αL, αR), depends negatively on country L�s
conflict costs (HL) but positively on country R�s conflict costs (HR) . The magnitude of
such effects increases as the discount factor δ approaches one. The reason is that what the




Hi can be seen as implicit gains (costs avoided) from reaching an agreement. The
higher are the costs avoided (i.e., the higher is Hi) the lower share of land is obtained in
the agreement. This effect is reversed when we consider the conflict costs of the opponent
country. Moreover, ỹ also depends positively on country L�s bargaining power (αL). A
similar interpretation can be given to the share of the interval [0, 1] that goes to country R,
1 − ỹ(αL, αR).
We consider that the bargaining power of country i = L, R, αi, is given by the relative weight
of country i�s public statement with respect to the sum of both countries’ statements. This
assumption highlights the importance of pre-bargaining claims in further negotiation and is
central to our analysis. Specifically, we assume that: αL =
xL
xL+1−xR , and αR =
1−xR
xL+1−xR .




xL + 1 − xR (1 − dRn) +
1 − xR
xL + 1 − xR dLn. (4)
A quick inspection to Eq.(4) reveals that, for any given xR, HR, HL and δ, function y is
increasing and concave in xL. By symmetry, the same occurs to 1 − y with respect to 1 − xR.
4. Bayesian Nash equilibrium statements
This section is devoted to analyze the equilibrium values for the pre-bargaining claims made
by the countries in conflict. These equilibrium values depend on parameters such as the
conflict costs (Hi), the duration of the conflict if no agreement is reached after negotiation (n)
and the discount factor (δ), and they also depend on the stationary value for the social welfare
(Wi). In order to obtain closed solutions and simplify calculus, we compute the equilibrium
outcome under the assumption that the players are symmetric.
9 Observe that the threat point varies as a function of parameters δ, H and n. We are only concerned on
the effects of such changes on the Nash bargaining solution. To see how the influence of the threat point
on the bargaining outcome varies across different type of solutions, see Anbarci et. al (2002).
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We assume that threshold T is uncertain. This assumption reflects the parties’ lack of
knowledge of each other’s response to any given territory claim. The threshold is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, 1], and this distribution is common knowledge. Any given
realization of T represents a measure of the ex-ante probability of negotiation abortion. For
instance, if T is close to zero, the probability that negotiations don’t take place in this period
is close to one. However, the realization of T is not known to the parties before they announce
their positions.
The setting described above can be analyzed as a Bayesian game, in which the players’
strategies are the public statements and the payoff of player i = L, R, at the beginning of
period t is given by Ui(xL, xR) = vui [y(xL, xR)] + (1 − v)di1, where v = 1 represents a
bargaining process leading to outcome y(xL, xR), and v = 0 means that the conflict persists (at
least) during period t. Provided that T ∼ U [0, 1], the probability of conflict in period t, after
the public statements (xL, xR) are made, can be expressed as:
p (xL, xR) = Pr(v = 0 | xL, xR) = xL − xR. (5)
The probability that negotiations are held in period t is then given by 1 − p (xL, xR) .
Uncertainty about the exact value of the threshold induces the following strategic situation:
more extreme positions tend to favour a better outcome in a negotiation process, but as
the players move towards the extremes the probability of aborting the negotiation process
increases. Each player faces a trade off similar to the one faced by the bidders in a first price
auction: A lower price is better if one gets the good, but lowering the price also lowers the
probability of obtaining the good. Therefore, if a player makes a very tough public statement
(to create a stronger bargaining position), negotiations hardly take place. We seek to analyze
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium statements that emerge in this context.
The timing of this game is as follows: (i) players simultaneously announce bargaining
positions xL and xR; (ii) the threshold is realized; (iii) each player receives his payoff. We
look for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game, defined as a pair of statements (x̂L, x̂R)
such that x̂L = arg max{xL} E [UL(xL, x̂R)] and x̂R = arg max{xR} E [UR(x̂L, xR)] , where
E [UL(xL, x̂R)] = p (xL, x̂R) dL1 + θL [1 − p (xL, x̂R)] y(xL, x̂R), (6)
and
E [UR(x̂L, xR)] = p (x̂L, xR) dR1 + θR [1 − p (x̂L, xR)] [1 − y(x̂L, xR)] . (7)
The first order condition obtained from maximizing E [UL(xL, x̂R)] with respect to xL implies
the following equation:




If country L reports a higher xL, the probability that negotiations are held decrease, but the
piece of territory obtained in case negotiations take place is higher. Therefore, Eq. (8) above
represents the equality between the marginal costs of increasing xL (right hand term) and the
marginal benefits of doing so (left hand term). The first order condition ∂E[UR(x̂L ,xR)]∂xR = 0
admits the same interpretation.
From Eq. (8) it is implicit that Wi is treated as an exogenous parameter. The reason is that
Wi represents the welfare at the beginning of the present period (t) and it also represents the
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welfare at the beginning of the next period (t + 1) . If changing the statements xL and xR could
change the equilibrium value of Wi, say to W �i �= Wi, then the stationary value of the social
welfare would be W �i throughout all periods. The players, who are aware of the dynamics of
the game, take the value of Wi as given.
Solving Eq. (8) for xL we obtain xL(x̂R), the reaction function of country L to every possible
given statement x̂R. A similar routine leads us to xR(x̂L), the reaction function of country R
to any given x̂L. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the pair of statements (x̂L, x̂R) is such that
x̂L = xL(x̂R) and x̂R = xR(x̂L).
In order to provide an explicit expression for the pair (x̂L, x̂R) we now make some symmetry
assumptions. In particular, we assume that both countries are identical in their valuations of
territory and in the conflict costs. Namely, θL = θR = θ and HL = HR = H. In this scenario,
we have x̂L = 1 − x̂R. Then, it follows that WL = WR = W and hence dLn = dRn = dn. In a
symmetric equilibrium we have x̂L = x∗(n, H, W) and x̂R = 1 − x∗(n, H, W). We use Eq. (8)
above to compute
x∗(n, H, W) = θ [1 − 2dn(H, W)]
2 [θ(1 − dn(H, W))− d1(H, W)] . (9)
Next we analyze the dependence of x∗(.) on parameters H and n. We simplify notation by
writing x∗ instead of x∗(n, H, W) and dn instead of dn(H, W). Using the expression for x∗ in





























The indirect effect reflects the equilibrium reaction of the pre-bargaining claim to an increase
in conflict costs through the influence that such costs have on the disagreement point. Under
the mild assumption that θ + 2H > 2δW (i.e. if conflict costs are high enough, and/or the
valuation of land is high enough, and/or the discount factor is low enough), the derivative
∂x∗
∂dn
is negative. Therefore, the indirect effect is positive provided that ∂dn∂H < 0.
The direct effect operates in the opposite direction. If the conflict costs increase, and the
disagreement point dn is low enough10, then the threat of a conflict dissuades from making
aggressive statements (e.g. to claim the entire territory). In general, it cannot be established
whether the direct effect predominates or not over the indirect effect. We show later, in a
more restricted context, that the response of the equilibrium claims to a change in H is non
monotone. Specifically, x∗ is decreasing if H is low enough and increasing if H is high enough.
If the parties disagree in negotiations, the conflict lasts for n periods. Next we analyze the
influence of parameter n in the behavior of the parties before negotiations. In particular, we











10 It is required that dn < 12 . Observe that for this inequality to hold it is sufficient that 1 + 2H > 2δW,
provided that dn < −H + δW for n ≥ 2.
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valuation of land is high enough, and/or the discount factor is low enough), the derivative
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monotone. Specifically, x∗ is decreasing if H is low enough and increasing if H is high enough.
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10 It is required that dn < 12 . Observe that for this inequality to hold it is sufficient that 1 + 2H > 2δW,
provided that dn < −H + δW for n ≥ 2.
209ocial Welfare and the Emergence of Negotiations
8 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
From Eq. (2) we know that ∂dn∂n < 0. We also know that
∂x∗
∂dn
< 0 whenever θ + 2H > 2δW.
Hence, we can establish that dx
∗
dn > 0, i.e., the share of territory initially claimed is larger if n
increases (and so do the costs from disagreement).
The likelihood of being in conflict during period t is also affected by changes in H and n.








dn > 0. If the utility obtained in case of disagreement lowers (higher
n), the probability of conflict increases. This effect becomes apparent in the next section, in
which we investigate the relationship between p∗ and H under different values of n.
Let us now focus our attention on the equilibrium value for the generalized Nash bargaining
outcome. First, observe that in our symmetric framework it holds that x̂L = 1 − x̂R = x∗.













2 . Plugging these values into Eq. (4) we obtain y(x̂L, x̂R) =
1
2 (1 −
dn) + 12 dn =
1
2 . Not surprisingly, the Nash bargaining solution evaluated at the equilibrium
statements involves that the territory is equally shared between both countries.
It is worth mentioning that the equilibrium statements computed above eventually depend
on the equilibrium value for W. We derive endogenously the stationary value of W in the next
section.
5. Social welfare, conflict, and the emergence of negotiations
The purpose of this section is twofold: First, it is devoted to compute the welfare expected
from the equilibrium play of the game at the beginning of each period. Secondly, it includes
estimations on the way how x∗ and p∗ respond to H under different scenarios (n = 1, n = 2
and n → ∞).
The value for W is implicitly defined in the following expression:
W = E {UL [x∗(n, H, W), 1 − x∗(n, H, W)]} . (10)
In order to solve Eq. (10) above for W, we use the probability of conflict at equilibrium, given
by:
p∗ = d1 − θdn
θ(1 − dn)− d1 . (11)
Taking into account that y(x∗, 1 − x∗) = 12 , we rewrite Eq. (10) as:
W = p∗d1 + (1 − p∗)12 . (12)
Plugging the expression for p∗ in Eq. (11) into Eq. (12) we obtain:
W =
(d1 − 1 − θdn) d1 + θ2
θ(1 − dn)− d1 . (13)





H + δnW in Eq. (13) and solve
it for W. In order to provide a tractable expression for the social welfare, we assume specific
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values for parameters θ and δ. Namely, θ = 1 and δ = 0.5. Then, we write:
W =
(d1 − dn − 1) d1 + 12
1 − dn − d1 . (14)
Next we discuss how the social welfare varies when n changes. In particular we study the
cases where n = 1 (case 1), n = 2 (case 2), and n → ∞ (case 3). Case 1 corresponds to a
situation in which the players receive the payoffs associated with the status quo when they
fail to reach an agreement. Cases 2 and 3 should be interpreted as if players had an outside
option whose effects imply facing n additional periods of conflict. For each case, we compute
both the equilibrium statement x∗ and the probability of conflict p∗ as a function of the conflict
costs H.
We obtain that in case 1 the social welfare is constant, but in cases 2 and 3, it is strictly
decreasing in H. The effect of H on x∗ and p∗ is non monotonic in cases 2 and 3. For low
values of H, the statement x∗ is decreasing in H. It reaches a minimum, and then increases in
H and converges asymptotically to a constant value. As long as p∗ = 2x∗ − 1, the response of
p∗ to changes in H follows a similar pattern.
We can also calculate how long will the conflict last, for different values of H. Notice
that, if p∗ is the probability of conflict in period t, the number of periods of conflict
(until a negotiation process is undertaken) is a random variable Y that follows a geometric
distribution. Specifically, the probability that there are k periods of conflict is given by
Pr(Y = k) = (p∗)k (1 − p∗), and the expected value of Y is E(Y) = p∗1−p∗ . Below we compute
p∗ as a function of H for the cases n = 1, n = 2 and n → ∞, with θ = 1 and δ = 0.5. Then,
we estimate the number of periods the conflict is expected to last as a function of H for each
given value of n. Moreover, the expected cost of a conflict can also be computed as E(Y)H.
5.1 Case 1 (n = 1)
In this case, dn = d1 = −H + δW. This means that the utility achieved if negotiations break
down is equal to the utility achieved in the case that negotiations do not take place and
the conflict situation persists along period t. The probability of conflict (Eq. (11)) is zero11
provided that the equilibrium statements are equal to 12 (the reader can check it in Eq. (9)).
Then, by Eq. (14) we obtain W = 12 .
It is worth to mention that neither the pre-bargaining claims nor the social welfare are affected
by the conflict costs H. This is due to the fact that such costs exert exactly the same influence
on the two possible outcomes (conflict or negotiation) that may arise after xL and xR are
announced and the threshold T is realized. In the first case (conflict), the payoff for each
country is −H + δW. The Nash bargaining outcome is y = 12 , and in case of disagreement the
parties would obtain d1 = −H + δW. This means that, if the parties broke down negotiations,
the disagreement payoffs would equal the cost of suffering conflict during one more period.
In equilibrium, both parties claim one half of the territory, a negotiation process emerges with
probability one, and each country enjoys a social welfare equal to 12 . The territory is equally
shared and there is no conflict. The expected number of periods the conflict will last is zero,
and the expected cost of the conflict is also zero. As we show below, both the likelihood of a
11 Observe this probability could be greater than zero if we considered θ > d11−d1 .
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negotiation process to emerge and the social welfare are dependent on the conflict costs when
n ≥ 2.
5.2 Case 2 (n = 2)
In this scenario, we have dn = d2 = −(1 + δ)H + δ2W. A conflict in period t involves costs H,
but the emergence of a negotiation process opens the possibility of ending up with an outcome
which is even worse. This outcome occurs if the parties fail to reach an agreement. Then, the
payoff to each country is d2 < d1. Comparing it with the former case, we should expect that
now each country claims for more than one half of the territory. Therefore, the probability of
conflict must be positive.
From Eq. (14) we write the following expression for the social welfare:
W =
(d1 − d2 − 1) d1 + 12
1 − d2 − d1 . (15)
If we substitute d1 = −H + δW and d2 = −(1 + δ)H + δ2W and δ = 0.5 into Eq. (15) above,
we obtain:
W =
(0.25W + 0.5H) (−H + 0.5W) + 12
1 + 2.5H − 0.75W (16)
There are two values of W that satisfy Eq. (16), but only one of them satisfies our assumption
that θ + 2H > 2δW. This value is:
W = 1. 428 6H − 0.571 43
[(









< 0 for all H ≥ 18 .
The stationary value for the social welfare decreases in response to an increase in the conflict
costs. The rationale behind this effect is as follows: If H increases, the disagreement utility
becomes lower. This makes a negotiation process be less attractive for the countries, as long
as the "bad outcome" of conflict today is not so bad compared to the disagreement outcome
(two periods of conflict). As a consequence, the countries are willing to make more aggressive
statements. This behavior decreases the probability of negotiations to emerge. Therefore, the
social welfare falls to a lower level.
Next we check that the equilibrium statements are higher than 12 . For this purpose, we
substitute the value for the social welfare in Eq. (16) into Eq. (9) to obtain:
x∗ = 1
2
1 + 3H − 0.5W
1 + 2.5H − 0.75W . (18)





provided that H > 0, W > 0 and
1 + 2H > W for all H ≥ 18 . The fact that x∗ > 12 implies p∗ = 2x∗ − 1 > 0. An important
conclusion is that if n = 2, and H ≥ 18 the probability that countries continue with the
conflict instead of initiating a negotiation process is positive. This result is in accordance with
12 A solution for W exists whenever H /∈
(
− 34 , 18
)
.
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the observed evidence that even if there is room for a mutually advantageous negotiation,
equilibrium statements may abort the emergence of the process.
Now we compute the equilibrium value of x∗ as a function of the conflict costs. By substituting
W in Eq. (17) into Eq. (18) we obtain:
x∗ = 1
2
1 + 2. 285 7H + 0.285 72
((




1 + 1. 428 5H + 0.428 57
((




It is easy to check that x∗ is strictly decreasing in H across the range (0.125, 0.569 5) . The
minimum value of x∗ is 0.569 5, taken at H = 0.572 87. In this case, p∗ = 0.139, and the
conflict is expected to last 0.161 44 periods. The expected cost of the conflict is 0.09 248 4. The
maximum statement is made when H = 0.125. This statement is equal to 0.666 67, associated
with a probability of conflict of 0.333 34. In this case, the expected number of periods of conflict
is 0.5, and the expected cost of the conflict is 0.062 5. When H → ∞, we have x∗ → 0.585 79.
The probability of conflict is 0.171 58 and the expected duration of the conflict is 0.207 12.
5.3 Case 3 (n → ∞)






H + δnW = − 11−δ H. We are dealing with the
somehow extreme situation in which breaking down negotiations involves that conflict will
last forever. We substitute dn = − 11−δ H into Eq. (14) to obtain:
W =
0.25W2 − H2 + 12
1 + 3H − 0.5W . (20)
Solving Eq. (20) for W yields:













It is easy to see that dWdH
∣∣∣












< 0. This suggests that the magnitude of the social welfare losses
provoked by an increase in the conflict costs becomes higher as n grows large. Compared
to the two former cases, notice that now the disagreement point does not depend on W.
Therefore, the effect of an increase in the conflict costs can be easily computed as a variation
of magnitude − 11−δ in the disagreement utility.




1 + 3H − 0.5W . (22)





whenever H > −0.5W. By substituting W (Eq. (21)) in the latter
inequality we find that it holds for values of H such that 6H > 2
(
3
2 H + 3H
2 − 18
) 1
2 − 1. This
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inequality is satisfied by all H ≥ 112
√
15 − 14 = 0.07 274 9. Hence, for conflict costs above this
value, the probability of conflict is positive, i.e., p∗ > 0. Now we compute the equilibrium














The equilibrium statement x∗ is above 0.75 for low values of H, is decreasing in H across
the range (0.07 274 9, 0.540 57), and reaches a minimum value of 0.612 57 at H = 0.540 57.
For H > 0.540 57, x∗ is strictly increasing and converges asymptotically to 0.633 97. The
probability of conflict now varies between 0.587 44 (when H = 0.07275 and x∗ = 0.793 72)
and 0.225 14 (when H = 0.540 57 and x∗ = 0.612 57). For H large enough, the probability of
conflict is constant and equal to 0.267 94. The expected duration of the conflict ranges from 1.
423 9 periods (for H = 0.07275) to 0.290 56 periods (for H = 0.540 57). The expected conflict
cost is then 0.103 59 if H = 0.07275, and 0.157 07 if H = 0.540 57.
In general, when analyzing the effects of variations in H on the probability of conflict, we are
able to conclude that, in cases where n > 1: (i) p∗ achieves a maximum when the conflict
costs are minimum13; (ii) p∗ achieves a minimum for a certain value of H; (iii) p∗ converges
to a constant value as H → ∞. The pattern of variation of p∗ is driven by the way how the
equilibrium statement x∗ changes in response to H.
Therefore, tough public pronouncements are expected to be made when the conflict costs are
minimum. From that point on, the claims moderate as H grows large. There is a certain value
of H that yields the lowest equilibrium claim (i.e., the highest probability that negotiations
emerge). When H is large enough, the claims tend to a constant value.
As the above analysis reveals, favoring the own position with aggressive claims can either be
the product of extremely low or extremely high conflict costs. In the first case, the countries
find it profitable to take the risk of aborting a negotiation process, as long as the benefits of
a higher bargaining power in future negotiations outweigh the costs of facing conflict today.
For the second case, it must be considered that failure to reach an agreement in negotiations
involves a certain persistence of the conflict (during n ≥ 1 periods) and then high values of
H lower considerably the disagreement utilities. Clearly, the worse outcome is represented
by the disagreement point, the less attractive is a negotiation process. Then, strong public
pronouncements that lower the probability of negotiations should not come as a surprise.
6. Conclusions
This chapter studies the relationship between social welfare, the cost of conflict and the
emergence of a negotiation process. For this purpose, we develop a model in which two
countries are bargaining over a fixed size territory. While no agreement is reached, the parties
keep engaged in a conflict that entails costs in each period. The countries have the ability
to make public statements representing claims over the territory. If the claims are not "too
extreme", a negotiation process emerges that yields as an outcome the generalized Nash
bargaining solution, where the bargaining power of each country is conditioned upon the
previous claims. The disagreement point of this negotiation process is to face conflict during
13 These results are in line with that of Wittman (1979), who finds that a reduction of hostilities may reduce
the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war
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an indeterminate number of periods (ranging from 1 to infinite). On the other hand, if the
public statements are far enough from each other, then no negotiation process emerges and
the conflict continues for at least one more period. As a difference with previous work, conflict
is not considered as a bargaining instrument. Instead, conflict is the prevailing state, which can
only be changed if the parties make diplomatic efforts (concessions, in the form of reasonable
claims) to resolve the dispute through a pacific settlement.
In this setting we conclude that, in general, the probability of conflict in period t is a non
monotonic function of the conflict costs. For low costs it is decreasing, and it increases when
costs are above a certain value. At this particular value, the probability of conflict reaches a
minimum. A similar pattern is obtained with respect to the pre-bargaining equilibrium claims.
The effect of conflict costs on the social welfare is more clear: it decreases monotonically as
the conflict costs increase.
These results suggest that the goals of maximizing the social welfare and minimizing the
probability of conflict are not equivalent, since both are achieved at different levels of conflict
costs. While the welfare is maximum when conflict is costless, the likelihood of a negotiation
process to emerge achieves a maximum for positive conflict costs. Moreover, if such costs are
very high, the probability of conflict achieves a constant value. This explains why in some
instances a negotiation process does not emerge, even if it would be in the interest of the
conflicting parties to initiate it. Although countries must bear certain costs every period the
conflict lasts, they face even higher costs if negotiations emerge but no agreement is reached.
The countries trade-off the conflict costs (today) against the expected outcome of negotiations,
and therefore they make public statements that may involve the persistence of the conflict.
The utility reached at the disagreement point when negotiations break down is a crucial
element to determine the probability of such negotiations to emerge. In our model, the threat
point is parameterized by "n", the number of periods the conflict will last if no agreement is
reached. The analysis made in Section 5 reveals that the social welfare depends negatively
on "n" for any given conflict cost. It is then desirable that the threat point of a negotiation
process is not too harmful for the parties in conflict. This implies that an important issue in the
design of the rules of a negotiation process should be to prevent and limit the consequences of
breaking negotiations. Specifically, before the bargaining over territory takes place, it would
be welfare enhancing that the parties could commit to restart negotiations at an early date in
case no agreement were reached. In general, any measure conducive to mitigate the negative
outcome represented by the threat point would improve the likelihood of achieving a pacific
settlement through negotiation.
If the countries could choose the intensity of the dispute, our model suggests that a moderate
investment in resources devoted to the conflict proves optimal for a negotiation process to
emerge. This conclusion is compatible with the approach that envisions conflict as part of a
bargaining strategy, as in Sanchez-Pagés (2009). According to this view, the nations engaged
in territorial disputes use limited confrontation as a way to convey information about their
relative strength. The information revealed facilitates the emergence of a peaceful outcome.
In our model, though, the line of explanation is a bit different. When conflict costs are positive,
but not too high, the parties might find it beneficial to negotiate as long as the threat point in
case of disagreement does not entail huge utility losses. However, if conflict costs become
higher (for instance, if the countries engage in a nuclear arms race), then the threat point
involves a final confrontation aimed to the absolute destruction of the enemy. We have shown
that the territorial claims in this case tend to be more aggressive, thus lowering the probability
of reaching a negotiated outcome.
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to a constant value as H → ∞. The pattern of variation of p∗ is driven by the way how the
equilibrium statement x∗ changes in response to H.
Therefore, tough public pronouncements are expected to be made when the conflict costs are
minimum. From that point on, the claims moderate as H grows large. There is a certain value
of H that yields the lowest equilibrium claim (i.e., the highest probability that negotiations
emerge). When H is large enough, the claims tend to a constant value.
As the above analysis reveals, favoring the own position with aggressive claims can either be
the product of extremely low or extremely high conflict costs. In the first case, the countries
find it profitable to take the risk of aborting a negotiation process, as long as the benefits of
a higher bargaining power in future negotiations outweigh the costs of facing conflict today.
For the second case, it must be considered that failure to reach an agreement in negotiations
involves a certain persistence of the conflict (during n ≥ 1 periods) and then high values of
H lower considerably the disagreement utilities. Clearly, the worse outcome is represented
by the disagreement point, the less attractive is a negotiation process. Then, strong public
pronouncements that lower the probability of negotiations should not come as a surprise.
6. Conclusions
This chapter studies the relationship between social welfare, the cost of conflict and the
emergence of a negotiation process. For this purpose, we develop a model in which two
countries are bargaining over a fixed size territory. While no agreement is reached, the parties
keep engaged in a conflict that entails costs in each period. The countries have the ability
to make public statements representing claims over the territory. If the claims are not "too
extreme", a negotiation process emerges that yields as an outcome the generalized Nash
bargaining solution, where the bargaining power of each country is conditioned upon the
previous claims. The disagreement point of this negotiation process is to face conflict during
13 These results are in line with that of Wittman (1979), who finds that a reduction of hostilities may reduce
the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war
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an indeterminate number of periods (ranging from 1 to infinite). On the other hand, if the
public statements are far enough from each other, then no negotiation process emerges and
the conflict continues for at least one more period. As a difference with previous work, conflict
is not considered as a bargaining instrument. Instead, conflict is the prevailing state, which can
only be changed if the parties make diplomatic efforts (concessions, in the form of reasonable
claims) to resolve the dispute through a pacific settlement.
In this setting we conclude that, in general, the probability of conflict in period t is a non
monotonic function of the conflict costs. For low costs it is decreasing, and it increases when
costs are above a certain value. At this particular value, the probability of conflict reaches a
minimum. A similar pattern is obtained with respect to the pre-bargaining equilibrium claims.
The effect of conflict costs on the social welfare is more clear: it decreases monotonically as
the conflict costs increase.
These results suggest that the goals of maximizing the social welfare and minimizing the
probability of conflict are not equivalent, since both are achieved at different levels of conflict
costs. While the welfare is maximum when conflict is costless, the likelihood of a negotiation
process to emerge achieves a maximum for positive conflict costs. Moreover, if such costs are
very high, the probability of conflict achieves a constant value. This explains why in some
instances a negotiation process does not emerge, even if it would be in the interest of the
conflicting parties to initiate it. Although countries must bear certain costs every period the
conflict lasts, they face even higher costs if negotiations emerge but no agreement is reached.
The countries trade-off the conflict costs (today) against the expected outcome of negotiations,
and therefore they make public statements that may involve the persistence of the conflict.
The utility reached at the disagreement point when negotiations break down is a crucial
element to determine the probability of such negotiations to emerge. In our model, the threat
point is parameterized by "n", the number of periods the conflict will last if no agreement is
reached. The analysis made in Section 5 reveals that the social welfare depends negatively
on "n" for any given conflict cost. It is then desirable that the threat point of a negotiation
process is not too harmful for the parties in conflict. This implies that an important issue in the
design of the rules of a negotiation process should be to prevent and limit the consequences of
breaking negotiations. Specifically, before the bargaining over territory takes place, it would
be welfare enhancing that the parties could commit to restart negotiations at an early date in
case no agreement were reached. In general, any measure conducive to mitigate the negative
outcome represented by the threat point would improve the likelihood of achieving a pacific
settlement through negotiation.
If the countries could choose the intensity of the dispute, our model suggests that a moderate
investment in resources devoted to the conflict proves optimal for a negotiation process to
emerge. This conclusion is compatible with the approach that envisions conflict as part of a
bargaining strategy, as in Sanchez-Pagés (2009). According to this view, the nations engaged
in territorial disputes use limited confrontation as a way to convey information about their
relative strength. The information revealed facilitates the emergence of a peaceful outcome.
In our model, though, the line of explanation is a bit different. When conflict costs are positive,
but not too high, the parties might find it beneficial to negotiate as long as the threat point in
case of disagreement does not entail huge utility losses. However, if conflict costs become
higher (for instance, if the countries engage in a nuclear arms race), then the threat point
involves a final confrontation aimed to the absolute destruction of the enemy. We have shown
that the territorial claims in this case tend to be more aggressive, thus lowering the probability
of reaching a negotiated outcome.
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Further research should focus on the public good nature of negotiation processes. Once the
process is underway, no agent can be excluded from its benefits. Moreover, taking part in
negotiations does not exclude other agents of being engaged in the process. Provision of
the public good “negotiation” is clearly efficient, as long as the conflicting parties obtain a
mutual benefit. However, contributing to this public good (i.e. making diplomatic efforts
in the form of less demanding pre-bargaining claims) is a strategic decision plagued by
the free rider problem. Interpreting the emergence of negotiations as a game of voluntary
contributions, allow us to conclude that, in general, negotiations are under-provided. This
view of the problem allows for a mechanism design solution to resolve international disputes
over territory.
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